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Abstract
The Florida parishes of Louisiana experienced a peculiar 
pattern of development. Following successive periods of 
English and Spanish domination and an armed insurrection 
resulting in the shortlived Republic of West Florida, the 
region stabilized under the control of delta parish planters.
A fierce tradition of Jeffersonian republican values 
encouraged the plain folk to assert themselves politically 
during the 1830's and 1840's. Yet by employing a series of 
enemies common to southern whites, and by expanding their 
control over the means of access to market, the planters 
stifled the aspirations of the plain folk insuring white 
unity on the eve of secession.
Throughout Reconstruction the planters continued to 
employ common enemies to maintain their dominance. Yet with 
the close of Reconstruction the plain folk rejected the 
authority of the planters. The construction of a railroad 
through the piney woods at the close of the antebellum 
period, and the concomitant social and economic 
transformation of the region, dramatically disrupted 
traditional patterns of stability. Moreover, the 
residents, imbued with a Jeffersonian tradition corrupted by 
the extremely brutal war and Reconstruction periods, rejected
iii
governance and resorted to violence as the primary solution 
to conflict.
With no single faction strong enough to effectively 
govern the territory, and juries unwilling to convict accused 
criminals, the region degenerated into chaos. Multiple 
family feuds provided the only means of societal regulation. 
The failure of state and local government to control the 
violence, and the residents peculiar tolerance of homocide, 
produced some of the highest rural murder rates in the nation 
for the remainder of the nineteenth century.
Chapter I 
To Live As Well As We Do
Thomas Green Davidson was surprised when he heard of the 
brutal murder in neighboring East Feliciana parish. Homicide 
was not unknown in the area, but a killing of this nature was 
certainly unusual. The reports told of a farmer shot in the 
back by an apparent lone gunman from ambush - a 
"bushwhacking." Though a peculiar occurrence in 1854, 
Davidson would live to see a day when such acts of violence 
would not only be common in this region, but would be a 
widely accepted means for settling differences.
Davidson served as representative from Livingston parish 
in the Louisiana legislature. Livingston comprised the lower 
central region of the area known as the Florida parishes, 
those parishes lying within the "boot" of Louisiana between 
the Pearl and Mississippi rivers. This territory acquired 
the name West Florida in 1800 when Spain retained it as part 
of Florida while retroceding Louisiana to France. Following 
a period of territorial ambiguity and an insurrection which 
resulted in the short lived Republic of West Florida, these 
parishes were incorporated into the territory of Louisiana in 
1810.
1
2Traditionally the Florida parishes have been regarded as 
a poor region of the state.1 This assumption rested primarily 
on the relatively inferior quality of the soil in the eastern 
parishes, which resulted in low yields of staple crops, the 
sparse pattern of settlement, and a seeming absence of 
manufacturing capital. Morecver, the immense wealth of 
Louisiana's delta and sugar parishes, among the wealthiest 
regions in the nation in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, has made the Florida parishes appear impoverished by 
comparison. Yet recently compiled evidence suggests that the 
perception of even the eastern Florida parishes as poor 
should be qualified. Excepting cases of unmitigated poverty, 
definitions of wealth can be subject to social and 
geographical conditions. By utilizing a wider range of 
variables the value of resources in a given area can be more 
accurately determined. Numerous studies demonstrate that 
efforts to identify the true wealth of the South must 
incorporate an examination of livestock holdings.2 Also,
though a comparatively minor indication of overall wealth,
;
1 William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest; 
Louisiana Politics 1877-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1969); Roger W. Shugg, Origins of the Class 
Struggle in Louisiana: A Social History of White Farmers and 
Laborers During Slavery and After. 1840-1875 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1939).
2 Frank L. Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South- (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949) herein after 
refered to as Owsley, Plain Folk; Forrest McDonald and Grady 
McWhiney, "The Antebellum Southern Herdsman: A 
Reinterpretation," Journal of Southern History. XLI (May, 
1975).
home manufactures should be included in any examination of 
resources. The value of home manufactures provides an 
indication of the local populations industriousness and their 
level of incorporation into the market economy.
Tables number one and two display the mean and per 
capita wealth of all Louisiana parishes in 1850. Excepting 
the large slaveholding parishes of East and West Feliciana, 
and the relatively urbanized East Baton Rouge, the mean 
wealth of the Florida parishes placed them among the poorest 
one third in the state. Per capita wealth statistics did not 
significantly raise their standing. Comparing parish tax 
assessment roles provides additional evidence for the 
relative poverty of the region. And yet, a comparison of 
resources invested in livestock would place the so called 
poorer regions of the Florida parishes near the middle of the 
state-wide scale in terms of assets allotted to animal 
holdings. Statistics on these parishes demonstrate
significant capital invested in livestock, which indicates 
that the farmers in the area compensated for lower crop 
yields by investing in animals. Thus though less wealthy in 
terms of aggregate wealth, the Florida parishes should not be 
regarded as impoverished.
The delineation of regions within nineteenth-century 
Louisiana also obscures fundamental attributes of "West 
Florida." Typically, Louisiana has been divided into three 
general areas. The first, New Orleans and its urban
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5Table 2
PARISH MEAN WEALTH NO. FAMILIES PER CAPITA PER CAPITA
ASCENSION 14,622,336 755 19,367 8
ASSUMPTION 11,620,468 926 12,549 18
AVOYELLES 6,978,016 792 8,810 23
BATON ROUGE,E. 9,210,083 1044 8,821 22
BATON ROUGE,W. 6,822,800 438 15,577 13
BIENVILLE 2,365,869 571 4,143 38
BOSSIER 5,544,926 478 11,600 20
CADDO 6,506,534 747 8,710 24
CALCASIEU 2,415,692 626 3,858 42
CALDWELL 1,622,173 300 5,407 34
CARROLL 9,780,645 582 16,805 11
CATAHOULA 4,752,136 679 6,998 31
CLAIBORNE 3,302,454 842 3,922 41
CONCORDIA 9,990,639 221 45,206 2
DE SOTO 5,530,479 692 7,992 26
FELICIANA,E. 11,742,054 712 16,491 12
FELICIANA.W. 14,943,983 617 24,220 4
FRANKLIN 2,168,938 346 6,268 33
IBERVILLE 13,991,845 640 21,862 6
JACKSON 2,687,137 632 4,251 37
JEFFERSON 9,013,906 3961 2,275 46
LAFAYETTE 4,593,464 630 7,291 28
LAFOURCHE 7,020,248 938 7,484 27
LIVINGSTON 1,395,274 480 2,906 44
MADISON 10,713,944 448 23,915 5
MOREHOUSE 2,569,310 393 6,537 32
NATCHITOCHES 10,172,858 1432 7,103 29
ORLEANS 21,837,447 19765 1,104 47
OUACHITA 3,611,899 449 8,044 25
PLAQUEMINES 10,670,660 ' 615 17,350 10
POINTE COUPEE 10,622,835 760 13,977 15
RAPIDES 15,071,958 1032 14,604 14
SABINE 1,730,518 636 2,720 45
ST.BERNARD 3,598,053 . 283 12,713 17
ST.CHARLES 6,654,093 191 34,838 3
ST.HELENA 2,751,575 390 7,055 30
ST.JAMES 11,147,157 591 18,861 9
ST.JOHN BAPTIST 7,099,476 530 13,395 16
ST.LANDRY 14,927,621 2910 5,129 35
ST.MARTIN 8,659,860 952 9,096 21
ST.MARY 15,032,119 752 19,989 7
ST.TAMMANY 3,111,260 786 3,958 40
TENSAS 11,183,122 244 45,832 1
TERREBONNE 6,683,425 550 12,515 19
UNION 4,295,739 942 4,560 36
VERMILLION 1,674,348 406 4,124 39
WASHINGTON 1,360,725 406 3,351 43
6TABLE 3
PARISH TAX ASSESSMENTS 1852
TOTAL AMOUNT TOTAL AMOUNT PAID BALANCE OF TAXES
OF TAXES TO 31 st DECEMBER, DUE ON 3 1 st DECEMBER,
PARISHES_______________________________ASSESSED_______________ 1853___________________  1853______
ASCENSION $13,936.00 $13,936.00 $--------------
ASSUMPTION $15,258.43 $15,258.43 $--------------
AVOYELLES $ 8 ,064 .69 $ 8 ,064 .69 $--------------
BIENVILLE $ 4 ,764 .36 $ 4 ,764 .36 $--------------
BOSSIEUR $ 7 ,542 .07 $-------------- $ 7 ,542 .07
CADDO $10,125.98 $10,125.98 $--------------
CALCASIEU $ 2 ,165 .77 $ 2 ,165 .77 $--------------
CALDWELL $ 2 ,323 .19 $ 500.00 $ 1 ,823.19
CARROLL $12,644.15 $12,644.15 $--------------
CATAHOULA $ 6 ,244 .78 $ 2,602.11 $ 3 ,642 .67
CLAIBORNE $ 5 ,482 .47 $ 5,482.47 $--------------
CONCORDIA $16,831.57 $16,831.57 $--------------
DeSOTO $ 7 ,568 .20 $ 7 ,568 .20 $ --------------
EAST BATON ROUGE $14,326.92 $14,326.92 $--------------
EAST FELICIANA $14,508.91 $14,508.91 $--------------
FRANKLIN $ 3 ,056 .78 $-------------- $ 3 ,056 .78
IBERVILLE $19,004.43 $19,004.43 $--------------
JACKSON $ 4,841.05 $ 4,841.05 $--------------
JEFFERSON $31,828.97 $31,828.97 $--------------
LAFAYETTE $ 5,088.03 $ 5,088.03 $--------------
LAFOURCHE $13,087.10 $13,087.10 $--------------
LIVINGSTON $ 2,263.41 $ 2,263.41 $--------------
MADISON $12,442.36 $12,442.36 $--------------
MOREHOUSE $ 3 ,623 .97 $ 3 ,623 .97 $--------------
NATCHITOCHES $10,354.46 $10,354.46 $--------------
ORLEANS, RIGHT BANK $ 4 ,059 .32 $ 4,059.32 $--------------
ORLEANS, 1st DISTRICT $87,645.32 $87,645.32 $--------------
ORLEANS, 2nd DISTRICT $52,172.09 $52,172.09 $--------------
ORLEANS, 3rd DISTRICT $15,367.30 $15,367.30 $--------------
PLAQUEMINES $10,438.61 $10,438.61 $--------------
POINT COUPEE $13,849.28 $ 5,074.02 $ 8 ,075 .26
RAPIDES $22,452.42 $10,370.44 $12,081.98
SABINE $ 2,437.45 $ 2,437.45 $--------------
ST. BERNARD $ 4 ,672 .06 $ 4 ,672 .06 $--------------
ST. CHARLES $ 7 ,612 .29 $ 7 ,612 .29 $--------------
ST. HELENA $ 3 ,609 .50 $ 3 ,609 .50 $--------------
ST. JAMES $15,068.10 $15,068.10 $--------------
ST. JOHN BAPTIST $ 9 ,015 .02 $ 9,015.02
ST. LANDRY $16,652.68 $------ $16,652.68
ST. MARTIN $10,838.56 $10,838.56 $------
ST. MARY $21,772.35 $21,772.35 $--------------
ST. TAMMANY $ 3 ,940 .56 $ 3 ,940 .56 $--------------
TENSAS $15,014.84 $15,014.84 $------
TERRABONNE $12,260.53 $12,260.53 $--------------
UNION $ 4 ,292.82 $ 4 ,292 .82 $--- ---
VERMILLION $------ $------ $------
WASHINGTON $ 2 ,109 .93 $ 2,109.93 $------
WASHITA $ 5,547.11 $ 5,547.11
WEST BATON ROUGE $10,217.29 $10,217.29 $------
WEST FELICIANA $15,729.01 $15,729.01 $------
WINN $ 1 ,284 .09 $ 1,284.09 $------
environs, traditionally considered unique not only to 
Louisiana but to the nineteenth- century South in general. 
Second, Acadiana or the bayou country also emerged as a 
peculiar region to both the state and the South. Settled 
primarily by French Catholics, Acadiana has been regarded as 
unique both for its population and topography. The third 
region may best be called upstate Louisiana. This area 
typically encompasses all the remaining portion of the state 
north of the town of Alexandria, as well as the region along 
the Sabine River and the Florida parishes. More typical of 
the South as a whole, this region contained considerable 
numbers of Protestant yeoman farmers. By 1850 the white 
population of upstate Louisiana consisted largely of 
immigrants of Scotch-Irish ancestry from Georgia and the 
Carolinas. Though upstate farmers also maintained
significant herds of livestock, particularly in the north 
central region, cotton farming dominated.3
The Florida parishes do share many of the 
characteristics of upstate Louisiana, but they also differ in 
some fundamental areas. First, though home to large numbers 
of Scotch-Irish settlers, immigrants of English descent 
predominated among the Anglo-Celtic group. Following the 
American Revolution significant numbers from the Tidewater 
region of Virginia and the Carolinas, many of them Tories
3 Milton B. Newton, Atlas of Louisiana: A Guide For 
Students (Louisiana State University, School of Geoscience 
Misc. Publication 72-1, 1972).
8fleeing persecution, migrated to the Florida parishes.4 The 
attraction inspiring the major migrations in the first decade 
of the nineteenth century centered on the relative isolation 
and abundance of cheap available land. Also, many Tories 
seem to have considered this territory a refuge from 
lingering persecution present in many American controlled 
areas.
Cultural distinctions separated the Florida parishes 
from upstate in other ways. Unlike upstate, the southeastern 
parishes attracted considerable numbers of a variety of 
ethnic groups. Spanish efforts in the late eighteenth 
century to build a barrier against the encroaching Americans 
led to a scattering of small yet significant settlements in 
lower Livingston and St.Tammany parishes. Under the 
direction of Governor Bernardo de Galvez, immigrants from the 
Canary Islands, known as Islenos, located along the Amite 
River and its environs with their primary settlement 
appropriately named Galvez-Town. In their effort to increase
Amite City News Digest. March 13, April 17, and May
1, 1959; Stanley C. Arthur The Story of the West Florida
Rebellion (St. Francisville: St. Francisville Democrat
Printing, 1935) pp. 14-15); Alvin Bertrand Many Louisiana's: 
A Study of Rural Social Areas and Cultural Islands
(Department of Rural Sociology, Louisiana Agricultural 
Experiment Station, Bulletin No. 496, 1955) p.19; John H.
Napier III Lower Pearl River1s Pinev Woods. Its Land and 
People (Oxford: University of Mississippi Center for the
Study of Southern Culture, 1985) p.28; Folklife in the
Florida Parishes. Louisiana Folklife Program Division of the 
Arts, Office of Cultural Development and Center for Regional 
Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University, 1989 (herein 
after refered to as Folk life in the Florida Parishes) p.15.
9the Catholic population in the region, Spanish authorities at 
New Orleans also directed German Catholic immigrants and 
recently displaced Acadians to the Florida parishes. In 1785 
over 200 Acadians settled at Manchac on the south pass which 
connects lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain. In the same year 
another group of Acadians located at Thompson Creek in the 
Feliciana district above Baton Rouge.5
French immigrants continued to trickle into the Florida 
parishes in the first decades of the nineteenth century. By 
1810 French speaking communities flourished at Port Vincent 
and French Settlement in Livingston parish. Other French 
speaking peoples settled along the lakeshore in St. Tammany 
Parish where they participated in the shipping of goods to 
and from the markets of New Orleans. These French, German, 
and Isleno settlers not only separated the Florida parishes 
from the more homogeneous pattern of settlement occurring in 
upstate Louisiana, but they also provided the region with a 
strong Catholic minority.6
5 New Orleans Daily Picayune. February, 21, 1892, pi; 
Gilbert Din, "Early Spanish Colonization Efforts in 
Louisiana," Louisiana Studies. XI, No.l (Spring, 1972); 
Folklife in the Florida Parishes, p.39.
6 H.M. Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana; Together
With a Journal of a Voyage Up the Missouri River in 1811 
(Pittsburgh: Cramer, Spear and Eichbaum, 1814) p. 281
(hereinafter refered to as Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana); 
Timothy Flint, Recollections of the Last Ten Years in the 
Valley of the Mississippi (Reprint, Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1968) pp. 216-217; After seeing 
the large number of Catholic churches in the western Florida 
parishes Flint asserted that the relative absence of 
Protestant churches produced, "a painful sensation in the
In the late nineteenth century other immigrant groups 
came to southeast Louisiana. Like their predecessors, the 
new settlers would have a significant social and political 
impact on the region. Principal among these were the 
Sicilians, who by the late 1880's had established numerous 
truck farms along the Illinois Central Railroad. By 192 0, 
Independence, in present day Tangipahoa parish, emerged as 
the largest rural Italian community in the United States. 
Likewise Hungarian immigrants, though far fewer than the 
Sicilians, migrated to Livingston parish in such numbers in 
the early 1890's that they established one of the largest 
rural Hungarian settlements in the United States. Originally 
named Arpadhon for the Hungarian hero who united the Magyars 
in 800 A.D., this community is presently known as Albany.7
Despite these differences the Florida parishes and 
upstate shared many similarities, particularly in terms of 
topography and relative wealth. Both contained wealthy delta 
parishes bordered by less affluent piney-woods parishes. 
Farming patterns were similar. Each area invested heavily in 
cotton and livestock, though farmers in the Florida parishes 
devoted far more resources to the cultivation of rice. Five
mind of a serious Protestant."
7 John V. Baiamonte, Immigrants in Rural America; A 
Study of the Italians of Tangipahoa Parish. Louisiana (New 
York: Garland, 1980); Alvin Bertrand, Many Louisiana1s . pp. 
23-25; Ginger Romero, "Hungarian Folklife: The Sweet Taste of 
Yesterday" Florida Parishes of Southeast Louisiana Series 
(Hammond: Center for Regional Studies Southeastern Louisiana 
University, 1987).
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of the seven Florida parishes appear among the fifteen top 
rice producing parishes in the state, with Washington, 
St.Tammany, and Livingston producing about 100,000 pounds 
each annually.
Yet the Florida parishes did have greater ethnic 
diversity as well as a larger Catholic minority than 
upstate.8 Moreover, as late as the middle of the 183 0's the 
Florida parishes remained a distinctive region in the eyes of 
the state legislature. The constitution adopted in 1812 did 
not include the Florida parishes as a part of Louisiana. 
Therefore over twenty years later in apportioning 
representation and other issues West Florida continued to be 
treated as a separate seemingly ambiguous portion of the 
state.9 Identifying the differences between these two 
regions could be interpreted as an effort to declare the 
southeastern parishes as more aligned to Acadiana. This 
assumption is certainly not the case as the minority features 
of the Florida parishes are the majority features of
Seventh Census of the United States. 1850
(Washington: Robert Armstrong, 1853) Population and
Compendium; upstate Louisiana did contain some ethnic 
diversity, but the degree of influence the Catholic minority 
exerted in the social and political development of the 
Florida parishes remained far greater than upstate, as is 
substantiated by events in the 1860's and 1870's.
9 For a good example of the legislature's treatment 
of the Florida parishes as a distinctive region of the state, 
see Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of 
Louisiana. Eleventh Legislature, Second Session, "Report of 
the Select Committee Making An Apportionment of 
Representation in the House of Representatives," December 20, 
1833, pp. 15-19.
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Acadiana. Yet as previously shown, the evidence suggests 
that the southeastern parishes exhibited characteristics 
similar to both upstate Louisiana and Acadiana, as well as 
some of the ethnic blend of New Orleans. The Florida 
parishes might best be regarded as a blending of the diverse 
regions of Louisiana, sharing similarities and differences 
with each. By delineating this area as a separate or fourth 
region of the state, its specifics of development can be more 
easily identified.
Like upstate Louisiana, the southeastern parishes 
contained both plantation and piney-woods regions. Though a 
few plantations operated in the piney woods, family farming 
dominated. Yet in the Florida parishes, the social and 
political interaction between the planters and the piney- 
woods dwellers played a central role in the region's peculiar 
pattern of development. The primary difference between the 
people in the plantation and piney-woods sections centered on 
economic wealth and political philosophy. These same 
characteristics were initially influenced by geography. As 
in many other regions, land served as the originating source 
of wealth and power.
The Florida parishes contain three distinct 
topographical areas: pine hills, bluffs, and pine flats.
Pine hills cover the northern portion from central West 
Feliciana to the Pearl River. Excepting small bands of 
Mississippi and Amite River alluvium, the bluff lands cover
13
that portion of the Felicianas and East Baton Rouge south of 
the pine hills and Livingston parish eastward to the Tickfaw 
River. The pine flats comprise the region south of the pine 
hills between the Tickfaw and Pearl rivers. Of the three, 
bluff lands are the most fertile. The pine hills also 
provide choice farm land while the pine flats contain land of 
lower quality.10
The fertile bluffs along the Mississippi attracted the 
initial settlers. Boasting some of the best farm land in the 
Gulf South and a ready access to market, West Feliciana and 
East Baton Rouge parishes, like their neighbors across the 
river, soon supported huge plantations. Several villages 
arose along the Mississippi. Baton Rouge, with a population 
of 3905 in 1850, emerged as the largest town.11 As cotton 
prices soared in the 1830's, the plantation culture expanded 
outward into the pine hills. The completion of a railroad in 
1840 from Port Hudson on the Mississippi above Baton Rouge, 
to Clinton in East Feliciana parish, provided that territory 
with the direct link to the Mississippi it needed to prosper. 
East Feliciana emerged as an extension of the delta
10 Daniel Dennett, Louisiana As It Is (New Orleans:
Eureka Press, 1876) herein after refered to as Dennett, 
Louisiana As It Is: W.W. Clendenin, "A Preliminary Report 
Upon the Florida Parishes of East Louisiana and the Bluff, 
Prarie, and Hill Lands of Southwestern Louisiana" (Geological 
Survey of Louisiana, Bureau of Agriculture Report, 1896); 
United States Department of Agriculture, Report of the Chief 
of the Bureau of Soils for 1905 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1905) p. 252.
11 Seventh Census of the United States. 1850.
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plantation culture and trading center for the piney-woods 
regions to the north and east. Small-scale industries, such 
as engine repair shops, emerged in conjunction with railroad 
and shipping interests at Baton Rouge and Clinton as well as 
at Bayou Sara and St.Francisville in West Feliciana parish. 
A few brick yards and saw mills arose to facilitate 
construction of the emerging villages and farms.12
The plantation culture of the Felicianas and rural East 
Baton Rouge differed significantly from the eastern Florida 
parishes. The Felicianas in particular ranked among the 
wealthiest and most powerful parishes in the state both 
economically and politically. This region clearly reflected 
the dominance of Anglo-Saxon culture and architecture. 
Clinton and the nearby village of Jackson boasted well 
established banking and commercial centers. Sophisticated 
theatrical productions were commonplace, as were society 
balls and gatherings. Clinton alone supported two theatrical 
corps, a Shakespearean Society, several poetry reading
Journal of the House of Representatives of the 
State of Louisiana. Eleventh Legislature, Second Session, 
December 24, 1833, "Report of the Civil Engineer of the
State," pp. 24-25 and "Report of the Board of Public Works," 
p. 32; Diary of Eli J. Capell, November 21-24 and December 
24, 1842, in Eli J. Capell Papers, Louisiana and Lower
Mississippi Valley Collection, Department of Archives 
Louisiana State University (herein after referred to as 
LLMVC); Diary of William Y. Dixon, August 14, 1860, in
William Y. Dixon papers, ibid; Duncan W. Taylor to Eugene 
Hunter September 13, 1856, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers, 
ibid; DeBow's Review. XI, p. 265; Folklife in the Florida 
Parishes, p.46.
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circles, and a Thespian Orchestra.13 Noted American and 
European actors and musicians frequently performed. 
Religious tolerance, which typically existed between 
Catholics and Protestants through most of the Florida 
parishes, in this area also included Jews. Small but 
influential Jewish communities developed at St. Francisville 
and Clinton. A comparatively generous system of poor relief, 
by Louisiana standards, extended to both destitute whites and 
free blacks.14
Perhaps most importantly, by 1850 East Feliciana 
supported educational institutions unsurpassed by those in 
any other parish in the state. These included Centenary 
College at Jackson and the Silliman Female Institute at 
Clinton. In short, a genteel attitude permeated a 
progressive society supported by a prosperous cotton 
economy.15 Writing in the Fall of 1855, Mary E. Taylor, the 
wife of a prominent Clinton minister and planter, summarized
13 Clinton American Patriot. November 3, December 15 
and 29, 1855; Clinton Feliciana Democrat. April 14 and 21,
1855, June 2, 9, and 30, 1855, October 20, 1855.
14 Clinton Feliciana Democrat. May 28 and November 24, 
1855; Clinton American Patriot. January 10, 1855, March 14 
and 21, 1855; F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluctant Rebel: The
Secret Diary of Robert Patrick 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University, 1959) p.10 (Herein after refered 
to as Taylor (ed.) Reluctant Rebel); East Feliciana Parish 
Police Jury Minutes. Vol.8 Folder Group 1853-1859, January 
1,1855 p.134 (LLMVC).
15 F. Jay Taylor (ed.), Reluctant Rebel. p.10; Seventh 
Census, 1850; James William Mobley, "The Academy Movement in 
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXX (July,1947) 
p.821.
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the comfortable existence of the planter class in the western 
Florida parishes by declining to attend a bountiful dinner in 
the country, "there was no inducement at all [to go] ; for 
when people live as well as we do at home they never care 
about going elsewhere.1,16
Despite the grandeur of the western "aristocratic" 
parishes, the core of the Florida parishes centered on the 
eastern piney-woods area. Far less affluent in goods and 
resources, this region stood in sharp contrast to the 
plantation culture of the western parishes. As a result, a 
different set of incentives and convictions shaped the 
lifestyle, labor, and outlook on life of the people in the 
region. As late as 1852 this area remained virtually 
isolated from the outside world. Most of the few reliable 
roads crossing these parishes had served previously as 
military highways, many constructed by Andrew Jackson's 
troops and laborers nearly forty years earlier.17 Extremely 
shallow or otherwise unnavigable streams characterized this 
territory, making access to market difficult.18 Yet the 
majority of the piney-woods dwellers in this area did produce
Mary E. Taylor to B. Hunter, October 19, 1855, in 
Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC).
17 Powell Casey, "Military Roads in the Florida
Parishes of Louisiana," Louisiana History, XV No.3 (Summer, 
1974), (herein after refered to as Casey, "Military Roads").
18 House Journal. Eleventh Legislature, Second
Session, "Report of the Civil Engineer of the State," 
December 24, 1833, pp. 21-28.
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marketable products. Whether they raised beef cattle, 
produced milk, harvested timber, or more likely grew cotton 
or rice, most of the plain folk required a ready access to 
market. Census statistics demonstrate that farmers in the 
region produced far more goods than would be necessary for 
home use.19 Yet the limited number of towns and trading 
centers inhibited local commercial development. The scarcity 
of retail stores made for primitive commercial conditions in 
the eastern Florida parishes. Drummers, travelling salesmen 
who carried essential products such as coffee, pots, pans, 
and sugar through rural areas, frequently visited the piney 
woods. Yet drummers and other travelling merchants seldom 
purchased the goods produced in rural areas.20
19 Compilations in the 1850 and 1860 Agriculture
Census demonstrate that the majority of farmers in the piney- 
woods parishes produced considerably more than necessary for 
home use. Moreover, piney-woods representatives to the state 
legislature typically focused considerable effort on securing 
funding for roads, bridges, and clearing obstructions from 
waterways in their districts. Journal of the Senate of the 
State of Louisiana (New Orleans: Emile LaSere, 1853) herein 
after refered to as Senate Journal. First Session, First 
Legislature of 1853, April 22, 1853; Journal of the House of 
Representatives of the State of Louisiana (New Orleans: Emile 
LaSere, 1852) herein after refered to as House Journal. First 
Session, Fourth Legislature of 1852, March 12, 1852; House 
Journal. First Session 1854, March 10 and 11, 1854; House
Journal. First Session 1856, March 1, 1856; House Journal.
First Session 1857, March 14, 1857; Seventh Census. 1850
Agricultural Statistics; Eighth Census. 1860 Agricultural 
Statistics.
20 Louisiana Legislative Documents, First Session,
Fifth Legislature, Address of Governor Robert C. Wickliffe, 
January 1860; Journal of the Senate of the State of 
Louisiana. Seventh Legislature, First Session, November 24, 
1824 (refers to a bill respecting peddlars and hawkers) ; John 
Inscoe, Mountain Masters. Slavery, and the Sectional Crisis
The South's one great metropolis New Orleans, less than 
fifty miles away across Lake Pontchartrain, fundamentally 
shaped the trade and transportation of the Florida parishes. 
Despite the isolation, economic development in the Florida 
parishes depended directly on the great Mississippi River 
port. Farmers in the central parishes of Livingston and 
St.Helena found access to the New Orleans markets through the 
small river port at Springfield on the Tickfaw River. 
Steamers crossing lakes Pontchartrain and Maurepas deposited 
and collected goods at Springfield. Oxen-pulled wagons 
provided the connection to the interior. The only other 
viable route, to Port Hudson on the Mississippi via Clinton, 
consumed both more time and resources. Both routes were 
tedious, demanding, and hazardous.21
in Western North Carolina (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press,1989) p.40; Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern 
Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the
Georgia Upcountrv 1850-189 0 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983); Lacy Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism: The 
South Carolina Upcountrv. 18 00-1860 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988) p. 81; New Orleans Daily Picayune. 
November 9, 1897; Raleigh Suarez, "Bargains, Bills, and
Bankruptcies: Business Activity in Rural Antebellum
Louisiana" Louisiana History VII, No.3, Summer 1966, pp.191- 
192.
21 House Journal. Eleventh Legislature, Second
Session, "Report of the Civil Engineer of the State," 
December 24, 1833, pp. 21-22; Clinton-Port Hudson Railroad
Flier 1850, in Henry Marston Papers (LLMVC); Diary of Eli J. 
Capell, November 21 and 24, 1842, Capell Papers, ibid.; Amite 
Navigation Company Document, group of farmers who banded 
together to promote the clearing of the Amite River to 
improve trade access to New Orleans, 1818, ibid.; Amite City 
News Digest. October 2, 1959; William Darby, Geographical
Description of the State of Louisiana (Philadelphia: John 
Melish, 1816) pp. 174-175 (hereinafter refered to as Darby,
19
Though less developed than the central region, the 
eastern parishes of Washington and St.Tammany fared a little 
better in terms of access to the markets of New Orleans. 
Some commercial traffic took place on the Pearl River, but 
the primary route lay over the Jackson Military Road, which 
traversed the region from the Mississippi border to 
Madisonville on Lake Pontchartrain. Steamers then completed 
the connection with New Orleans. Yet this route also 
constituted a slow and tedious journey; oxen teams often took 
as long as six days to travel from Madisonville to the 
St.Tammany parish seat at Covington.22
Recognizing the relative isolation of this territory is 
central to understanding the outlook on life of the people 
who lived there. As late as 1852 the Florida parishes 
remained surrounded on the north and east by vast expanses of 
sparsely populated pine forests and on the south by virtually 
impenetrable swamps. Geographical isolation directly 
affected social as well as economic development. Like the
Geographical Description of the State of Louisiana)Taylor 
(ed.), Reluctant Rebel. p.9.
22 St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. June 16, 1825; 
P.L. Bonny Letter, May 5, 1864, Bonny to Cousins, Jones, and 
J.A. Leblanc, April 23, 1864, in P.L. Bonny Papers (LLMVC); 
Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana, p. 285; Darby, Geographical 
Description of the State of Louisiana, p. 175; Amite City 
News Digest. October 2, 1959; Casey, "Military Roads" p.234; 
Amy Quick, "The History of Bogalusa, The Magic City of 
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXIX No.l 
(January, 1946); Robert J. Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early 
Mississippi" Mississippi Folklore Register. X, No.l, Spring 
1976 (Hattiesburg: Mississippi Folklore Society of the
University of Mississippi, 1976) p.15.
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lifestyles of the residents of the pine flats of Mississippi, 
hill country Alabama, Georgia, and Kentucky, and even the 
mountain regions of Tennessee and North Carolina, the 
lifestyle of the people in the eastern Florida parishes 
appeared peculiar to their more cosmopolitan neighbors. 
Typically many planters and urbanites refered to these
regions as "backwoods," a term they employed as a synonym for 
"backwards." Many outsiders generally regarded these 
isolated rural dwellers as poor, neglectful, non- 
materialistic, and lazy.23 This description doubtless 
applied to many piney-woods folk. Yet this perception of the 
isolated rural dwellers seems as negative as the term
"backwoods" seems derogatory. It originated in the outlook 
of the planter class, who having reached the top, either 
ridiculed or failed to understand those who did not 
appreciate their values or aspire to be like them.
This lack of understanding often bordered on contempt. 
Writing his sister in July of 1856 concerning a political 
barbecue in the piney woods, Augustus Carpenter, a wealthy 
planter from Clinton, complained that he did not enjoy 
himself because he was "amongst the piney woods folks." 
Robert Patrick spent much of his youth in St.Helena parish 
but aspired to join the planter elite. After his father
23 Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey in the Back
Country (New York: Mason Brothers, 1863) p. 237 and 297;
Frank Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1949) pp. 1-3; Taylor (ed.) 
Reluctant Rebel. p.9.
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moved the family to neighboring East Feliciana in 1842, 
Patrick described the piney-woods people as virtually without 
culture, claiming that his family had "blessed little to do 
with them."24 A more balanced observation of these rural 
dwellers would combine the perspective of the elite with an 
understanding of how these people viewed themselves.
Historians of the piney woods typically assign a variety 
of other characteristics to the piney-woods regions and
residents. They include: relatively low agricultural
production with an emphasis on sweet potatoes, endemic
drinking and gambling, hospitality, ranging livestock, and 
violence.25 Others, though viewing the piney-woods
inhabitants as proverbially poor, note more positive 
qualities, such as honesty, high moral standards, and a
virtuous lifestyle. The editor of the Amite City Democrat, 
a rural newspaper, described the typical piney-woods home:
the piney woods home is often a log hut plastered 
with mud or boards enclosed by a rail fence, a general 
air of thriftless, careless management around the place,
24 Augustus Carpenter to Sister, July 9, 1856, in
George H. Carpenter Family Papers (LLMVC); Taylor, (ed.) 
Reluctant Rebel. p.9.
25 J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave 
Society: White Liberty and Black Slavery in Augusta's
Hinterlands (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985); 
Grady McWhiney, "Antebellum Piney Woods Culture: Continuity 
Over Time and Place," in Noel Polk (ed.) Mississippi1s Piney 
Woods: A Human Perspective (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 1986); Owsley, Plain Folk.
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an ox wagon in front outside an insecure looking gate, 
three or four hungry looking dogs which bark and whelp 
at your entrance, a lean, woe begone looking horse 
grazing in the yard; a few flowers which tell of a 
womans presence, as the pipes and tobacco which lie upon 
the portice surely betoken the masculine element.26
The article continued with a dreamy blissful sounding 
description of the piney-woods existence, as if the author 
wished to say it was the closest thing to utopia.
Other contemporary observers noted that the piney woods 
consisted of many little communities bound together by 
kinship or long friendship. F.M. Kent, an antebellum 
immigrant from New England, marveled at how friendly the 
people seemed, noting that "as guests you are expected to 
make yourself at home and no one accepts payment even from 
strangers." He added that "hospitality is looked upon as a 
virtue and it generally extends to friend and stranger." 
Kent continued that though the people appeared less educated 
than in New England, they possessed considerable "general 
information" and a keen interest in politics.27
In making perceptive observations of the region as a 
whole, Kent provided a basis for understanding many of the
26 Amite Citv Democrat. October 2, 1875.
27 Dennett, Louisiana As It Is p . 31; F.M. Kent to
"Uncle Moody," February 19 and June 2, 1857, in Amos Kent
Papers (LLMVC).
traits which characterized southerners in general. He noted 
that the law commanded less respect than in New England and 
that a "service of honor" proved as binding as a written 
obligation. Religion, though significant Kent surmised, 
played less of a role in the daily lives of the residents 
than in the older states of the northeast. Ministers 
exercised influence only if the people agreed with the 
clergyman's position. Also, he observed that the people 
seemed more independent in thought and action and he 
speculated that a want of energy on their part resulted from 
the presence of slavery.28
A significant body of evidence suggests that many among 
the piney-woods folk of the Florida parishes aspired to 
improve their own personal financial situation as well as the 
economy of their region. Numerous well attended barbecues, 
the principal mechanism for social and political gatherings, 
took place in the piney woods to encourage the construction 
of railroads and plank roads. On an excursion through the 
piney woods in the summer of 1854 a reporter for the Baton 
Rouge Daily Advocate expressed shock at the number of people 
willing to sell land to the railroad and opportunistic 
businessmen surveying possibilities along the proposed road. 
A farmer in Montpelier, a village in the heart of St.Helena's 
pine forest, argued that the trees themselves were the
F.M. Kent to "Uncle Moody," February 19 and June
2, 1857, in Amos Kent Papers (LLMVC).
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region's greatest asset. Promoting the establishment of a 
turpentine industry in St.Helena, he predicted, "this will 
yield in a few years a larger profit to the owners than do 
the well cultivated cotton lands of Mississippi."29
Despite the willingness of some to improve the 
transportation network as well as economic conditions, many 
more appeared ambivalent about change, and others, as 
railroad promoters would soon learn, would violently resist 
it. Efforts to assign specific traits to these people prove 
misleading. The piney-woods dwellers should not be regarded 
as monolithic in thought and action; some were opportunistic, 
some lackadaisical; some were outspoken, others more 
reticent. Yet a unique piney-woods culture did exist. The 
piney-woods dwellers shared certain general qualities, the 
sum of which embodied their culture. Contrary to the 
superficial stereotypical generalizations assigned to them by 
outsiders, the presence of these qualities prompted the 
emergence of a distinctive way of life. Words such as
29 Amite City Times. July 27, 1867; Clinton Feliciana 
Democrat. May 5, July 28, and August 18, 1855; William Pike 
to Henry Marston, September 10, 1852, in Henry Marston Papers 
(LLMVC); New Orleans Daily Delta. December 14, 1854; Official 
Journal of the House of Repressntatives of the State of 
Louisiana, First Session, Fourth Legislature, March 12, 1852, 
First Session, 1854 Legislature, March 10 and 11, 1854, First 
Session, 1856 Legislature, March 1, 1856, First Session, 1857 
Legislature, March 14, 1857; St. Tammany Parish Police Jury 
Minutes, Second Session 1851, December 1851, First Session 
1852, January 1852;Harry H. Evans, "James Robb, Banker and 
Pioneer Railroad Builder," Louisiana Historical Quarterly 
XXIII No.l (January, 1940; p.199; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. 
August 22, 1854; Greensburq Imperial. April 25, 1857.
laziness, hospitality, and violence describe the symptoms of 
behavior, not the cause. An examination of the results of 
behavior should incorporate an understanding of the sources 
of that behavior to explain it successfully. What separates 
the seemingly derogatory descriptive term "backwoods," from 
the potentially positive term "piney woods," is an 
understanding of the motivating forces which made these rural 
dwellers who they were. These inspirational qualities or 
forces gave shape to their conception of the order of 
society, their perceptions of the outside world, and their 
understanding of the sources of wealth, happiness, and 
security.
Independence, self-sufficiency, and honor, served as the 
principal qualities motivating the piney-woods dwellers or 
plain folk. Though independence and self-sufficiency appear, 
and certainly are related, the two terms focus on distinctive 
matters. Self-sufficiency connotes an economic condition 
while independence more often involves political status. 
Both concepts, which typically complement one another, 
remained fundamental to the piney-woods existence.
Primarily yeoman farmers, the plain folk valued 
independence in a way that is difficult for us in our 
automated, regulated society to comprehend. In his 
introductory remarks preceding the Seventh United States 
Census in 1850, prominent New Orleans editor and promoter 
J.D.B. DeBow lamented, that in 184 0, in many regions of the
26
South objections loomed so strong to the searching nature of 
the questions that several counties and parishes refused 
peremptorily to answer them. DeBow continued that though 
fewer such problems occurred in 1850, in several cases, "it 
was necessary to call in the services of the district 
attorney to enforce the requisitions of the law.30" 
Mistrust of a meddling or energetic government remained 
central to the piney-woods existence. The Livingston Parish 
police jury solved the perennial problem of forcing rural 
farmers to honor their obligations to maintain public roads 
by appointing them overseers with independent control over 
designated sections of the roads. Each specific section of 
the road would theoretically belong to the farmer and 
typically would be named for him. This system relied on peer 
pressure rather than legal coercion to ensure road 
maintenance.31
The importance of personal independence involved not 
simply freedom from government interference, but included the 
ownership of productive resources and a lack of subservience 
to outsiders or outside forces. F.M. Kent noted "the people 
here are more independent in thought and action than in New 
England, none of the isms can find a foothold here." The 
piney-woods folk readily resorted to violence if deemed
30 Introductory Remarks, Seventh Census 1850,
Compendium p. 12.
31 Livingston Parish Police Jury Minutes, June term 
1875, pp.10-13 (LLMVM).
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necessary to maintain their independence, even from their 
neighbors.32 Yet traditionally, in the Florida parishes as 
in many other regions of the South, the piney-woods dwellers 
appeared to see no inconsistency in their surrender of 
political control to the planters.33
Self-sufficiency proved central to this perception of 
independence. Inadequate primary evidence exists to indicate 
whether self-sufficiency, in most cases, resulted from need 
or choice. Yet the propensity of the piney-woods dwellers to 
locate in regions which would obviously require a degree of 
self-sufficiency lends credence to the assumption that they 
opted for an economically autonomous lifestyle. Whether 
self-sufficiency resulted simply from an absence of available 
trading centers, or from a political or philosophical 
conviction, it remained a fundamental aspect of the piney- 
woods existence.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the relative 
nearness of New Orleans eroded the likelihood of a truly 
hermetic existence in the Florida parishes. Most piney-woods
32 Amite City Florida Parishes. September 16, 1891; 
Clinton American Patriot. December 15, 1855; Edward Stewart 
to John Gurley, April 22, 1859, in John W. Gurley Papers
(LLMVC); F.M. Kent to Uncle Moody, February 19, 1857, in Amos 
Kent Papers ibid; Steven Hahn, "The Yeomanry of the Non- 
Plantation South: Upper Piedmont Georgia 1850-1860," in
Orville Burton and Robert McMath (ed.), Class. Conflict, and 
Consensus: Antebellum Southern Community Studies (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1982).
33 For a detailed discussion of the political 
interaction between the planters and plain folk see chapter 
three.
farmers participated in or contributed to an annual market 
excursion to Madisonville, Springfield, or accompanied their 
crops or livestock to New Orleans. This allowed the plain 
folk to secure goods such as salt and gunpowder which often 
proved difficult to obtain in the piney woods. Though this 
attachment to the New Orleans market seems to contradict the 
traditional interpretation of self-sufficiency, by the mid­
nineteenth century this denoted the manner of self- 
sufficiency existing in the Florida parishes, much as it 
exemplified the manner evident in many other areas of the 
rural South. The piney-woods dwellers continued to produce 
virtually all their own food, manufactured their own homespun 
clothing, and fashioned many farm implements. Staple crops 
remained secondary to food production throughout the 
antebellum period.34 Under these circumstances, and in the 
absence of local retail establishments, maintaining that the 
limited procurement of necessities proved tantamount to 
negating a condition of self-sufficiency would obscure a 
fundamental aspect of life in the eastern Florida parishes. 
Understanding the importance of self-sufficiency, although by 
traditional definitions an abbreviated version, is essential 
to explaining the course of events in the late nineteenth 
century. Thus, though seriously truncated by the 1850's,
For a detailed discussion of the emphasis on 
foodstuffs and staple crop production see chapter two.
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self-sufficiency remained an integral component of the piney- 
woods existence.
The plain folk felt pride in their ability to 
"manufacture all that they wear and produce all they 
consume."35 Typically they had plenty to eat, albeit a 
monotonous fare consisting mostly of corn, pork, beans, and 
sweet potatoes supplemented by wild game. Moreover, by 
raising a few bales of cotton, some extra rice or cattle for 
market, the piney-woods folk often enjoyed luxury items such 
as coffee. In the absence of state assistance, the plain 
folk frequently took the initiative to build a levee to 
preserve their homestead or a crude road to provide easier 
access to friends and family.36 Self-sufficiency afforded 
them a level of control over their own lives that poorer 
urban dwellers would never experience and heightened their 
sense of honor.
Like the planters, the plain folk adhered to a rigid 
code of honor, albeit one peculiar to their circumstances. 
Yet unlike the planters, who often resolved affairs of honor 
in prearranged duels, the piney-woods dwellers usually 
settled affronts to honor spontaneously. Every man knew that
Comment of historian J.F.H. Claiborne, 1862, quoted 
in Polk (ed.) Mississippi's Pinev Woods p.ix.
36 Senate Journal. First Session, First Legislature 
1853, March 9, 1853; House Journal. First Session, Fourth
Legislature 1852, February 21, 1852; House Journal. First
Session 1854, March 7, 1854; Kentwood Commercial. July 25 and 
August 8, 1896.
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he risked his life by insulting another. Upon learning in 
April 1876 that Francis Bardwell issued statements the 
previous evening which could be interpreted as insulting to 
his neighbor Fayette Wells's wife, Wells promptly tracked him 
down and emptied his pistol into the unarmed and unsuspecting 
Bardwell. To have done any less would have invited shame and 
ridicule upon the Wells family. As with the elite, the 
consequences of such actions remained secondary to the fear 
of public and private humiliation.37
The end result of the motivating qualities of 
independence, self-sufficiency, and honor, often appeared to 
outside observers as simple laziness, pointless violence, or 
some other misunderstood behavior. Without a proper 
understanding of the social mores of the plain folk, Wells' 
killing of Bardwell appears to be only a heinous cold-blooded 
murder. That it certainly was, but it was also a culturally 
conditioned response condoned by the local populace. 
Appreciating that murder, under certain circumstances, served
37 Amite City Democrat. April 22, 1876; F.M. Kent to 
Uncle Moody, February 19 and June 2, 1857, in Amos Kent
Papers (LLMVC); Clinton Feliciana Whig. December 15, 1842;
Serrano Taylor to Adeline, November 27, 1857, in Hunter-
Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC); Robert Barrow Letter, January 
15, 1858 ibid; Edwin A Davis (ed.), Plantation Life in the 
Florida Parishes of Louisiana 1836-1846. As Reflected in the 
Diary of Bennett H. Barrow (New York; Columbia University 
Press, 1943) March 1, 1842, herein after refered to as Davis 
(ed.) Diary of Bennett Barrow; Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Honor and 
Violence in the Old South (New York: Oxford University Press, 
198 6). Grady McWhiney, Cracker Culture; Celtic Wavs in the 
Old South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988) p. 
160.
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as not merely an accepted but an expected response, remains 
central to understanding the course of events in the late 
nineteenth-century Florida parishes.
Like the planters, most other contemporary observers 
made little effort to understand the motives behind the 
behavior of the plain folk. Visitors to the piney woods 
often arrived with pre-established notions about the rural 
South. Northern and European travellers frequently compared 
the piney woods to their own societies, rather than making 
unbiased observations. As many piney-woods farmers allowed 
their livestock to graze unattended in the open pine forests, 
many outside observers miscalculated and incorrectly reported 
the aggregate wealth of rural regions.38 Many visitors 
arrived with pre-arranged agendas, rather than attempting to 
seek out and understand events peculiar to the rural South. 
Frederick Law Olmsted carefully scrutinized the living 
conditions of the plain folk while focusing his questions 
primarily on their attitudes toward slavery. The Englishman 
William Howard Russell saw little in the culture of the 
piney-woods dwellers, except perhaps crudeness.39 Such
38 Where to Locate New Factories in the States of
Kentucky. Tennessee. Mississippi, and Louisiana on the Line 
of the Southern Division of the Illinois Central Railroad. 
ICRR pamphlet (Cedar Rapids: Republican Printing Co., 1892) 
pp. 122-124; John H. Napier III "Piney Woods Past: A Pastoral 
Elegy," in Polk (ed.) Mississippi's Pinev Woods, p.17.
39 Frederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom: A
Traveller's Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the 
American States (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953); William
Howard Russell, Mv Diary North and South (New York: Harper
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observations enhance our awareness of the appearance of the 
piney woods, but contribute little to our understanding of 
why events developed as they did. Recently the work of 
historians like J. Mills Thornton and James Oakes, have 
demonstrated the importance of understanding the forces which 
determined behavior in the plain folk.40
First and foremost, the motivating force behind these 
qualities, which played so central a role in the piney-woods 
culture, can be traced to a tradition of Jeffersonian 
republicanism. The ideal which envisioned the self-reliant 
yeoman farmer as the very foundation of American liberty. To 
a far greater degree than the planters, who so often boasted 
of their adherence to republican principles, the piney-woods 
folk embodied the spirit of the Jeffersonian ideal.41 They 
lived their lives as proud, independent, and self-sufficient 
farmers shunning an urban, industrial lifestyle and the 
complexities that often accompanied it. Rarely attempting to 
justify their lifestyle, the piney-woods dwellers constituted 
the offspring of Jefferson's philosophy, simply living the 
life he outlined with or without an awareness of his 
teachings. As with the Jacksonians who modified republican
and Row, 1954).
40 J. Mills Thornton, Politics and Power in a Slave 
Society: Alabama 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1978); James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A
History of American Slaveholders (New York: Knopf, 1982).
41 For a detailed explanation of the application of 
republican ideals see chapter 2.
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principles to fit their needs, here was an adaptation 
appropriate to the needs of the piney woods in the backyard 
of the South's largest market. It adhered to that peculiar 
blend of southern republicanism which incorporated white 
independence with an acceptance of black slavery. Yet it was 
a perversion of the Jeffersonian ideal.
Jefferson viewed independence and self-sufficiency as an 
integral component in the making of good citizens. The good 
citizen would take advantage of this independence to become 
educated and thus capable of voting in a rational manner 
which served his own interests best. Moreover, independence 
would allow the farmer to sell and purchase goods from 
whomever he chose, free from the restraints imposed by an 
employer or landlord. Jefferson viewed independence as 
merely a step in the process of creating good citizens. Yet, 
among the piney-woods dwellers of the Florida parishes, 
independence became an end unto itself, not a part of a 
process towards good citizenship. This interruption of the 
process circumvented the end product envisioned by Jefferson. 
As a result, it would eventually emerge as a corrupting 
influence, promoting, in the aftermath of war and defeat, a 
contempt for authority and traditional mechanisms of 
restraint. This half-way embrace of the republican ideal 
would contribute directly to the chaotic conditions of the 
late nineteenth century.
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The presence of slavery in the antebellum South 
reinforced an acute awareness that independence demanded 
constant vigilance.42 The shifting political patterns in 
mid-nineteenth century Louisiana served to augment the 
necessity of vigilance and suspicion of government. The 
famous statement attributed to Jefferson, "I am not a friend 
to an energetic government, it is always oppressive," 
appeared to warn of political tendencies in late antebellum 
Louisiana. As commercial and political interests in New 
Orleans cooperated with delta planters to control state 
government, the political position of the plain folk seemed 
in doubt. Replacing the state constitution of 1845, which 
allowed for an expanded franchise, with the more restrictive 
one of 1852 appeared to threaten the role of the plain folk 
in state politics. The new constitution nullified the 
provision present in the Constitution of 1845 which 
prohibited the counting of slaves in apportioning seats for 
the House of Representatives. This dramatically diluted the 
voting strength of the piney-woods parishes while doubling 
the representation of the plantation parishes. Democratic 
Governor Robert Walker, who aggressively opposed the new 
constitution, warned that "the hardy yeoman, the iron 
framework of a democratic republic" must safeguard their 
liberty from the designs of the millionaire. Walker and
William J. Cooper Liberty and Slavery: Southern 
Politics To 1860 (New York: Knopf, 1983).
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other Democratic leaders warned of the anti-republican 
elements of the new constitution.43 The rancor created by 
the perception of constitutional maneuvering to serve narrow 
interests contributed to the emergence of a deep mistrust of 
politics and government.44 This mistrust in turn affected 
social and political relations between the planters and the 
piney-woods folk, many of whom began to question the 
planters' desire to safeguard their interests. Suspicion of 
the motives of the planters and their urban allies would lead 
many piney-woods voters to seek alternative political 
leaders. As a result, the early 1850's witnessed the first 
cracks in the traditional social order of the Florida 
parishes. These changing circumstances accompanied by war 
and defeat, climaxed by the late nineteenth century in a 
chaotic situation of perverted Jeffersonianism run riot.
An awareness of the values which motivated the lifestyle 
and development of the piney-woods dwellers is central to an 
understanding of social and political development in the
Message of Governor Robert Walker, Senate Journal. 
First Session First Legislature, January 17, 1853, p. 3;
Clinton American Patriot February 7, 1855.
44 The Louisiana Constitution of 1852 did make a few 
democratic reforms, such as making most state offices 
elective. Yet the direct assault on the political power of 
the piney-woods parishes coupled with the "sellout" election 
of 1855, in which Democratic leaders in New Orleans and the 
delta parishes reneged on a deal to support piney-woods 
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor, created deep 
mistrust in the piney-woods parishes. Report of the 
Committee on Amendments to the Constitution of 1852, 
Louisiana Legislative Documents. 1852 (LLMVC).
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Florida parishes. Though an independent lifestyle
necessitated vigilance, the vast majority of the plain folk 
appeared content with their lives. Like the planters, some 
piney-woods folk possessed considerable resources while 
others had little. Each group contained varying degrees of 
wealth and power within itself. Yet in general the piney- 
woods dwellers lived free of the expenses and complexities 
inherent in the lifestyle of many planters.45
The plantation and piney-woods regions of the Florida 
parishes shared many of the characteristics and peculiarities 
of life in the South. Slaves made up twenty five to fifty 
percent of the population in all of the piney-woods 
parishes.46 Likewise each of the plantation parishes 
contained significant numbers of plain folk who shared the 
lifestyle and the values of the piney-woods dwellers. Like 
the shared characteristics, a degree of shared values 
necessarily followed. In the postwar period however, the 
differences would overwhelm the similarities. The dominant 
element in one section embodied a perverted form of the 
republican ideal, while in the other, republican principles 
often seemed significant only as long as they appeared to be
Davis (ed.) Diary of Bennett Barrow; provides a 
good example of the constant state of debt endured by many 
planters in order to maintain their lifestyle, see pp. 20-22.
46 Seventh Census. Population Statistics. 1850; The
number of slaves in the population of the piney woods 
parishes ranged from a high of almost fifty percent in 
St.Helena to a low of twenty five percent in Livingston.
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the means to an end.47 As one region stabilized, the other 
degenerated into chaos - the social and political values of 
the residents in each being fundamental to the outcome.
The qualities independence, self-sufficiency, and honor, 
embodied the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian spirit. Yet these same 
qualities would also prove to be central to the region's 
undoing. Unrestrained, the manifestation of these values 
proved as destructive as they were virtuous. The
introduction of outside forces and events beyond the control 
of the local residents transformed the region. The same 
values which once were an integral component of stability and 
tranquility became essential elements of the nightmare. As 
the nation grappled with the political crisis of the 1850's, 
the Florida parishes experienced the first tremors of the 
storm to come.
Planters appeared to rely heavily on republican 
appeals at election time and during the prelude to secession. 
Republican rhetoric directed to the plain folk in the 
antebellum period, would contribute to a state of affairs the 
planters would find themselves unable to control in the 
postwar period.
Chapter Two 
A Brief Moment of Security
In his travels through the backcountry South in the 
early 1840's, the Mississippi historian and editor J.F.H. 
Claiborne described some of the subtle differences between 
the plantation and piney-woods regions of southeastern 
Mississippi. Finding it unnecessary to provide details on 
the apparent contrasts of life in each section, Claiborne 
instead focused on less obvious yet significant differences, 
such as foods consumed and leisure time activities. In one 
instance he contrasted the "glorious supper" of oysters, 
chicken salad, turkeys, terrapin, and champagne he received 
in Wilkinson County, in the lower Mississippi delta, with a 
meal he received in the piney woods. The piney-woods repast, 
though abundant according to Claiborne, contained numerous 
dishes all composed of potatoes prepared in a variety of 
ways. He and his companion feasted upon baked potatoes, 
fried potatoes, bacon and potatoes boiled together, a hash of 
wild turkey garnished with potatoes, potato biscuit, coffee, 
"strong and well flavored," made of potatoes, and finally, 
potato pie and a tumbler of potato beer.48 Claiborne
48 J.F.H. Claiborne, "A Trip Through the Piney Woods" 
in Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society 
(Oxford: Printed for the Society, 1906) IX, 1906, pp.491 and
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appeared to prefer the finer dining found in Wilkinson 
County. As with many travellers in the rural South, the 
relative splendor of the plantation setting and the 
delicacies provided overshadowed the comfortable but 
seemingly bland existence of the plain folk. Yet his 
observations provide important evidence concerning conditions 
in the antebellum rural South. The amount and quality of 
foods consumed indicates that in the late antebellum period 
prosperous times prevailed in both the plantation and piney- 
woods regions. Though the nature of foods in each area
differed, sustenance was abundant and in keeping with local 
crops and conditions.
The term prosperity often appears in conjunction with
stability when discussing conditions in the antebellum South.
In 1852, the Florida parishes and environs constituted a
highly stable region. This pattern of stability resulted
from economic prosperity and the compatible condition of
mutual dependence existing between the planters and plain
folk. Shared interests based on similar agricultural
pursuits and political fears allowed for the. temporary
availing conditions in the Florida parishes. This beneficial
state of affairs is of particular significance, not only
because it contributed directly to the secession appeal, but
also because stability had proven antithetical to the history
or the Florida parisnes.
533-534.
40
The initial French efforts to colonize West Florida 
ended abruptly in 1763 with their defeat at the hands of the 
British in the French and Indian War. In 1764 British troops 
occupied the fort at Baton Rouge and established additional 
fortifications on Thompson's Creek, in the Feliciana 
district, and at Fort Bute near Manchac on the north shore of 
Lake Maurepas. In an effort to solidify their control of the 
territory, the British offered very liberal land grants to 
retired soldiers. Officers received from three to five 
thousand acres, while privates could claim up to three 
hundred acres. The beneficiaries of this land policy, 
supplemented by British Loyalists who migrated from the 
Atlantic seaboard to the Florida parishes during the American 
Revolution, placed a strong pro-British element among the few 
scattered French settlers remaining in the area.49
Despite the intensive colonization efforts, British 
control constituted only a brief interlude. In 1779 Spain, 
under the direction of the Governor of the Orleans Territory 
Bernardo de Galvez, seized West Florida from the British in 
a military expedition designed to support the American 
Revolutionists. The new Spanish overlords graciously allowed
49 Amite City News Digest. August 7, 1975; Stanley C. 
Arthur The Story of the West Florida Rebellion (St. 
Francisville: St. Francisville Democrat Printing, 1935)
pp.14-15, hereinafter refered to as Arthur The Story of the 
West Florida Rebellion; John Hebron Moore The Emergence of 
the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988) p. 2, hereinafter 
refered to as Moore The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in 
the Old Southwest.
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the British to remain with their land claims intact, provided 
they swore loyalty to the Spanish Crown and embraced 
Catholicism. These conditions, for some, proved a bitter 
pill to swallow. Yet the prospect of losing one's homestead 
and being uprooted induced many to stay.50
Like their British predecessors, the Spanish also 
offered large tracts of land to those who would settle in 
West Florida. Yet in many cases, the Spanish grants 
conflicted with, or overlapped, the earlier British grants 
which Spain had promised to honor. Further complicating the 
situation, both the British and Spanish grants were almost 
always vague and confusing. The lack of precision inherent 
in the British titles is exemplified by a 1776 grant on the 
Amite River which read that "Elihu Bay recieves all that 
tract of land situated on the east side of the River Amit 
about four miles back from said river upon a creek called the 
Three Creeks butting and bounding southwesterly unto land 
surveyed out to Joseph Blackwell and on all other sides by 
vacant land." Similarly, an 1804 Spanish grant read that 
"Luke Collins claims four hundred superficial arpents nine 
leagues up the east bank of the Tickfaw River, bounded on one 
side by William George and by public land on the other two."
50 The stipulation requiring residents to convert to 
Catholicism appears to have been a token gesture rather than
a realistic matter of policy. Little evidence exists to
indicate that the Spanish made more than token efforts to
enforce the decree. Moreover, as will be demonstrated in
chapter 3, religion played an insignificant role in the lives 
of most residents.
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Disputed land claims created tension between pro-British and 
pro-Spanish factions in West Florida.51
From the outset the Spanish government appeared weak and 
corrupt to the inhabitants of West Florida. Not only did the 
Spanish make little if any effort to resolve the conflicting 
land claims, but they also failed to appoint district courts 
to deal with growing criminal activity in the territory. In 
the first decade of the nineteenth century the scattering of 
French and Isleno settlers migrating to West Florida was 
abruptly augmented by large numbers of Americans encouraged 
by the United States1 claim to the region presumed in the 
Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Many army deserters and criminal 
elements counted among these Americans seeking a safe haven 
in West Florida. The territory quickly became infested with 
undesirables who disrupted settlement patterns and waylaid 
wagons and travellers on the trails and highways. In 
addition, considerable numbers of American Filibusters, 
adventurers inciting revolution in Spanish held areas, also 
counted among these migrants. Spanish inability to control 
marauding, resolve internal disputes, and control seditious 
elements, created a volatile mix in West Florida. Official
John H. Napier III, Lower Pearl River1s Pinev Woods 
It1 s Land and People (Oxford: University of Mississippi
Center for the Study of Southern Culture, 1985) hereinafter 
referred to as Napier, Lower Pearl River1s Pinev Woods p. 31; 
"Documents Covering a Royal Land Grant on the Mississippi and 
Amite Rivers," reprinted in Louisiana Historical Quarterly. 
XII, No. I, p. 638; Amite City News Digest. August 7, 1975; 
Arthur The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, p.16.
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communications and settler petitions demonstrate that a 
perception of neglect and vulnerability promoted a general 
feeling of discontent among the population.52 Napolean 
Bonaparte's manipulation of the Spanish Crown further 
exemplified Spains weakness and heightened the belief among 
some elements, that Spain could never adequately police and 
promote the territory.
An abortive 1804 attempt to overthrow Spanish control 
and bring stability to West Florida originated with Reuben 
Kemper of Pinckneyville, Mississippi and his brothers. The 
Kempers, like many of their neighbors just across the border 
in the Mississippi Territory, acted to secure their property 
rights in West Florida as well as out of the belief that 
increasing instability in West Florida could eventually 
destabilize their own region. The brief Kemper Rebellion 
failed because its leaders miscalculated the strength of pro- 
French, British, and Spanish elements, all of whom felt 
threatened by the pro-American faction the Kempers 
represented.53
52 DeBow1s Review. XI, p. 256; Thomas D. Clark "The 
Piney Woods and the Cutting Edge of the Lingering Southern 
Frontier" in Noel Polk (ed.) Mississippi's Pinev Woods: A 
Human Perspective (Jackson; University Press of Mississippi, 
1986) p.64; Amite City News Digest. August 7 and 14, 1975; 
James A. Padgett (ed.) "The Constitution of the West Florida 
Republic" Louisiana Historical Quarterly XX, No.4, October 
1937.
53 DeBow1s Review. XI, p. 264; Arthur, The Story of 
the West Florida Rebellion p.29; Amite City Progress. July 
12, 1945; Amite City News Digest. August 7,1975; St. 
Francisville The Louisianian. November 6, 1819, demonstrates
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By 1810 virtual chaos prevailed in West Florida. 
Spanish authority rarely extended beyond the fort at Baton 
Rouge and the nearby river towns of Bayou Sara and St. 
Francisville. Rising criminal activity in the absence of 
district courts and increasing turmoil resulting from 
disputed land claims propelled the territory to the brink of 
anarchy. The chaotic conditions intensified as increasing 
numbers of army deserters and other fugitives exploited West 
Florida's weakness, settled in the eastern parishes, and 
added to the factional tension. William C.C. Claiborne, who 
would later become the first American governor of Louisiana, 
observed that many desirables were coming to the territory 
but added that, "among them are many adventurers of desperate 
fortunes and characters."54 By the Fall cf 1810, contempt 
for the ineffectiveness of the "pukes," a derogatory name 
applied to the Spanish officials, exploded into the West 
Florida Rebellion.55
that Kemper had good reason to fear for the security of his 
property holdings in West Florida. Included in this edition 
is a description of property in the Feliciana district 
recently lost by Kemper.
54 Dunbar Rowland (ed.) Official Letter Books of
William C.C. Claiborne (Madison: Democrat Printing Co. , 1917) 
V, pp. 56-57 (hereinafter refered to as Rowland (ed.) 
Official Letter Books of W.C.C. Claiborne).
55 Documents of the Unite States House of
Representatives. Twenty-Fifth Congress, Second Session, 
Document No. 463 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832)
hereinafter refered to as U.S. House Documents; Amite City 
Progress, July 12, 1945; Amite City News Digest. April 10, 
1959, August 14 and 21, 1975; Arthur The Story of the West 
Florida Rebellion, p.29.
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Large numbers of American settlers, concentrated 
primarily in the Feliciana District, and others contemptuous 
of Spanish authority called for armed rebellion. Following 
a surprise raid which led to the capture of the fort at Baton 
Rouge, the rebels moved rapidly to consolidate their control 
of West Florida. Two groups of citizen militia forming in 
support of the Spanish in the Springfield and Tangipahoa 
regions dispersed before rebel contingents arrived. The 
removal of this threat allowed the rebels to proclaim the 
territory the Republic of West Florida. The independent 
republic endured for seventy-four days before its president, 
Fulwar Skipwith, reluctantly allowed William C.C. Claiborne 
to take control of the territory for the United States.
American control did not bring immediate stability to 
West Florida. Claiborne reorganized the territory into four 
parishes but failed to address aggressively the disorder in 
the less populated eastern region. He defended his failure 
to appoint judges for the two eastern parishes, St. Helena 
and St. Tammany, by arguing that "there is in that quarter a 
great scarcity of talent, and the number of virtuous men (I 
fear) is not as great as I could wish."56 The new American 
officials aggravated the dispute over land claims by
56 Amite City News Digest. September 11, 1975; Arthur 
The Story of the West Florida Rebellion, p. 141; the state 
legislature delayed for six years before moving to 
effectively organize the judicial system of the Florida 
parishes thereby aggravating the chaotic conditions there, 
see House Journal Third Legislature, Second Session, January 
14 and 15, 1818.
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confering a blanket recognition of existing claims, while 
issuing new land grants themselves.57 Moreover, the 
seemingly ambiguous status of the territory created further 
problems. An 1811 bill providing for the attachment of West 
Florida to Mississippi Territory failed in Congress. When in 
the same year Congress made provisions to admit the Orleans 
Territory as a state without including West Florida, 
rebellion flared anew. On March 11, 1811 rebellious elements 
again raised the lone star flag of the West Florida Republic, 
forcing Claiborne to dispatch troops to enforce his 
authority. On April 12, 1812 Congress admitted Louisiana to 
the Union. Nearly four months later on August 4, 1812 the 
state assented to the inclusion of West Florida, from the 
Mississippi to the Pearl River, as part of the new state.58
Despite lingering legal problems concerning the status 
of West Florida, statehood allowed for a degree of 
territorial certainty but not for internal stability in the
William C.C. Claiborne to Secretary of State Smith 
December 2, 1810, in U.S. House Documents. Twenty-Fifth
Congress, Second Session, Document No. 4 63 (concerning 
territory south of the thirty-first parallel north latitude) .
58 William C.C. Claiborne to Secretary of State Smith 
December 16, 1810, in U.S. House Documents. Twenty-Fifth
Congress, Second Session, Document Number 463; Journal of the 
House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana. Eleventh 
Legislature, Second Session, "Report of the Select Committee 
Making An Apportionment of Representation in the House of 
Representatives," December 20, 183 3, pp. 17-18 (hereinafter 
refered to as House Journal); Clinton, The Semi-Weeklv 
Patriot Democrat August 28, 1880; Arthur The Story of the
West Florida Rebellion, p. 141; Amite City News Digest. 
September 18, 1975.
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Florida parishes.59 Disputed land claims, resulting from 
the conflicting grants of the various governing powers, 
continued to create problems. As late as 1844 the state 
legislature implored Congress to resolve the disputed land 
claims which continued to impede settlement.60 Yet the 
primary problem continued to lie with the people themselves. 
Composed of various antagonistic ethnic groups, many 
containing hostile internal social and political factions, 
the Florida parishes constituted a volatile melting pot. 
Lingering British, French, and Spanish loyalties, coupled 
with land disputes and continuing rampant criminal activity, 
inhibited the establishment of an effective American system 
of justice. Addressing Congress concerning complaints he had 
received regarding the turbulent conditions in the Florida
59 As noted in chapter one, the Constitution of 1812 
did not include West Florida as a portion of Louisiana. This 
continued to create problems for the legislature which 
persisted in treating the region as distinctive into the 
1830's, see House Journal. Eleventh Legislature, Second 
Session, December 20, 1833, pp. 15-19; the first legislative 
session of 1823 became embroiled in a bitter controversy over 
the status of West Florida: legislators from Orleans Parish 
and the sugar parishes bloc voted to deny the representatives 
from West Florida their seats on the grounds that they were 
not recognized as a part of Louisiana under the Constitution 
of 1812; see Senate Journal Sixth Legislature, First Session, 
January 20-22, 1823.
60 American State Papers. Legislative Documents of the 
Congress of the United States in Relation to Public Lands. 
Nineteenth Congress, First Session, No.'s 455-457, January 
24,1826 (Washington: Duff Green, 1834) pp. 336-338; Ibid., 
Twenty-Second Congress, First Session, No. 1072, July 11, 
1832 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1860) pp. 506-509; House 
Journal, Sixteenth Legislature, Second Session, 1844, see 
annual message of Governor Alfred Mouton, January 2, 1844; 
St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. February 5, 1824;
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parishes, Governor Claiborne asserted that, "civil authority 
has become weak and lax in West Florida particularly in the 
parish of St. Tammany in which the influence of laws is 
scarcely felt."61 Claiborne's dilemma seemed compounded by 
his awareness that many of the residents came to the 
territory specifically because no effective legal authority 
existed. These migrants aggressively resisted the
implementation of American authority. The regional patterns 
of settlement illustrate the significance of the continuing 
disorder in the Florida parishes.
Though the number of settlers coming to West Florida 
increased significantly in the first fifteen years of the 
nineteenth century, the population remained relatively 
sparse. By contrast, in Mississippi Territory, the counties 
bordering the Florida parishes typically contained
populations three or four times the number in West Florida. 
Likewise the parishes to the west and south had considerably 
larger populations.62 These regions, particularly the 
southeastern counties of Mississippi, had benefitted from the 
disorder in West Florida. Many planters, such as William 
Dunbar, removed their operations from West Florida to 
southeastern Mississippi either to avoid the instability and
61 Rowland (ed.) Official Letter Books of W.C.C.
Claiborne VI, pp. 161-162.
62 Third Census of the United States. 1810
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1811) pp. 82-84; William
Darby, Geographical Description of the State of Louisiana
(Philadelphia: John Melish, 1816) p. 175.
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legal confusion prevailing in West Florida, or simply to live 
in territory under American control.63 Since the Florida 
parishes comprised the area just north of the largest market 
in the South, and possessed soil and natural resources very 
similar to the adjacent counties in Mississippi Territory, 
the region's instability had clearly served to inhibit 
settlement.
Beginning in the 1830's, an intricate combination of 
politics and economics ushered in a new era in West Florida. 
The virgin pine forests, numerous clear running streams, and 
the expanding and increasingly profitable market for staple 
crops, virtually necessitated the advent of stability in the 
Florida parishes. Indeed agriculture, and the introduction 
of political dominance by delta planters, led to a state of 
equilibrium in West Florida.
The seeming inability to find a profitable crop in the 
first decades of development retarded progress in the Florida 
parishes nearly as much as did territorial instability. 
Initially, the French encouraged tobacco and indigo farming 
in the lower Mississippi Valley. When tobacco farming proved 
to be a moderate success, numerous plantations emerged along
Eron Rowland (ed.) Life. Letters and Papers of 
William Dunbar (Jackson: Press of the Mississippi Historical 
Society, 1930) p. 10 (hereinafter refered to as Rowland (ed.) 
Life. Letters and Papers of William Dunbar).
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the Mississippi and environs between Baton Rouge and 
Natchez.64 Under British and later Spanish direction 
tobacco farming remained modestly successful. Yet in 1790 
Spain withdrew its tobacco subsidy, which many planters 
relied on, forcing most of them out of business.65 A 
different set of problems hampered indigo production.
The French introduced indigo to Louisiana in the second 
decade of the eighteenth century. Initially, Louisiana 
indigo appeared to be of high quality encouraging further 
production. When the British assumed control of West Florida 
in 1763, indigo remained the primary crop, though financial 
returns proved disappointing. With the advent of Spanish 
rule, indigo declined in importance. Spanish trade policy 
which insisted that Louisiana indigo be shipped only to 
Spanish ports created delays which incurred additional 
expenses and hastened deterioration, Moreover, the Spanish 
procured higher quality indigo from Guatemala, Caracas, and 
even the Spanish Main. Thus, the new masters of West Florida 
exhibited little interest in promoting indigo cultivation. 
Crop destroying insects and blight further eroded the 
prospects for Louisiana indigo. By 1797 these problems,
64 Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the
Southern United States to 1860 V.I (New York: Peter Smith, 
1941) pp. 333-335; DeBow's Review. XI, pp. 252-253.
65 Moore The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the 
Old Southwest, p. 4; Henry E. Chambers A History of Louisiana 
(New York: American Historical Society, 1925) p.144.
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coupled with competition from the British East India Company, 
served to obliterate indigo farming in West Florida.66
Despite this setback, in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century good fortune finally arrived for the delta 
planters of West Florida. Facing financial ruin, as a result 
of the failure of tobacco and indigo as marketable crops from 
their region, the farmers turned to cotton. The introduction 
of the cotton gin in the lower Mississippi valley around the 
turn of the century stimulated this transformation. Planters 
in the Feliciana district and East Baton Rouge experimented 
with an upland cotton of the Siamese black seed variety which 
proved adaptable to the Louisiana environment. Fortunately 
for these planters the slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue, 
occurring at virtually the same time, deprived European 
manufacturers of their principal source of this fiber. As a 
result, cotton prices skyrocketed to unprecedented levels 
creating an economic boom for the emerging cotton planters of 
West Florida. By the 1830's, the delta region of Louisiana 
and Mississippi had surpassed Georgia and South Carolina as 
cotton producers.67
66 Jack D.L. Holmes "Indigo in Colonial Louisiana and 
the Floridas," Louisiana History VIII, No. 4, Fall 1967 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana Historical Association, 1967) pp.331- 
333 and 338-343; Moore The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in 
the Old Southwest, p.4; Gray, History of Agriculture in the 
Southern United States to 18 60. p.294-297.
67 Gavin Wright The Political Economy of the Cotton 
South: Households. Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth
Century (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978) pp.13-22; Moore The 
Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest, p.6;
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High prices encouraged the expansion of the cotton 
economy. Yet the piney-woods territory of the eastern 
Florida parishes appeared unfit for cotton farming. 
Typically the piney-woods regions of the Gulf South contained 
a sandy soil, deposited when the area comprised a part of the 
Gulf of Mexico. Moreover, pine needles did not produce the 
deep rich loess covering above the soil which the remains of 
rotting hardwood leaves created. But the eastern parishes, 
like most of Louisiana and southeastern Mississippi, 
contained numerous rivers and streams. By the late 1830's, 
industrious farmers had demonstrated that cotton could be 
profitably raised in the river bottoms and creek beds of the 
piney woods.68
The introduction of successful commercial agricultural 
pursuits in the piney woods encouraged many Florida parish 
farmers to experiment with crops other than cotton. 
Experiments with rice began as early as the second decade of 
the nineteenth century. By the middle of the 1830's 
enterprising farmers had demonstrated that the marsh lands
Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 
1860. p. 687-689.
68 Sixth Census of the United States. Compendium,
1840, (Washington: Thomas Allen, 1841) p.240 (hereinafter
refered to as Sixth Census of the United States. 1840) ; 
Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old 
Southwest p.7; Amite City Progress. June 25, 1937; Robert
J.Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early Mississippi," Mississippi 
Folklore Register X, No.l, Spring 1976 (Hattiesburg: 
Mississippi Folklore Society of the University of 
Mississippi, 1976) p. 3 (hereinafter refered to as Baxter, 
"Cattle Raising in Early Mississippi").
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along the north shore of lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain as 
well as the abundant swamp lands along the Pearl, Amite, and 
other rivers, proved conducive to rice farming. Rice 
required minimal capital in its cultivation making it a 
viable alternative crop for middling and poorer farmers. Yet 
rice production often produced handsome returns with minimal 
labor. Simply by erecting a system of levees to hold back 
the river and control the water level in the fields, and 
constructing ditches to regulate the water supply and 
facilitate harvesting, farmers could produce a ready food 
source and marketable crop.69 By 1840, rice farming also 
constituted a popular and profitable business in the eastern 
Florida parishes as well as in the southwestern counties of 
Mississippi.70 Despite the presence of a few sugar cane 
fields, located primarily in East Baton Rouge Parish, the
69 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture. .1867, 
U.S. House of Representatives Executive Document, Fortieth 
Congress, Second Session, pp. 174-175 (hereinafter refered to 
as Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture. 1867); J.D.B. 
DeBow The Industrial Resources. Etc.. of the Southern and 
Western States (New Orleans: Published by DeBow1s Review. 
1853) vol. II, pp. 426-427; H.M. Brackenridge, Views of 
Louisiana; Together With a Journal of a Voyage up the 
Missouri River, in 1811 (Pittsburgh: Cramer, Spear and 
Eichbaum, 1814) p. 285 (hereinafter refered to as 
Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana); Darby, Geographical 
Description of the State of Louisiana, pp. 141-142.
70 Sixth Census of the United States. 1840, pp.244- 
246; Amite and Pike counties Mississippi produced about 
150,000 pounds of rice each annually. Marion, Hancock, and 
Wilkinson counties also cultivated rice, though to a far 
lesser extent.
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Florida parishes remained outside the sugar producing 
region.71
This pattern of growing cotton along the fertile stream 
beds and rice in the swamp lands continued in the piney-woods 
parishes through the end of the antebellum period. Although 
by the mid-1850's the increasing profitability of cotton and 
the expanding availability of machinery to process it caused 
production of that staple to increase dramatically and rice 
production to decline. (see table #4) . Census figures 
demonstrate that though cotton remained the crop of choice of 
piney-woods farmers throughout the antebellum period, many 
also planted rice, and some, particularly in St.Tammany 
Parish, planted rice exclusively. This configuration 
deviated from the pattern in the delta region of the Florida 
parishes where, excepting a few isolated fields of sugar cane 
and some scattered patches of rice, cotton dominated. 
Moreover, while it is likely that delta planters employed the 
limited amount of rice they produced to feed their own 
slaves, piney-woods farmers almost certainly raised it for 
market.72
71 Sixth Census of the United States. 1840, p.240;
F.F. Hansell (ed.), Commercial and Statistical Almanac: 
Containing a History of the Epidemic of 1878 (New Orleans: 
James Gresham, 1879) p.22 (hereinafter refered to as Hansell 
(ed.), Commercial and Statistical Almanac) .
72 Figures compiled in the Seventh Census of the
United States. 1850, indicate that almost 400,000 pounds of 
rice were produced annually in the four eastern parishes. An 
amount far more than necessary for home consumption.
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In 18 60, ninety-one percent of Washington Parish farmers 
planted cotton. Twenty-five percent of the same farmers 
planted rice. In neighboring St.Tammany Parish, thirty-three 
percent of the farmers planted cotton while another thirty- 
three percent planted rice. Few if any farmers in St.Tammany 
planted both cotton and rice. In Livingston Parish fully 
seventy-five percent of the farmers planted cotton. Among 
this group slightly over twelve percent also planted rice. 
Essentially the same pattern held true for St. Helena. 
Ninety percent of St. Helena farmers grew cotton, ten percent 
of the same group also planted some rice.73
Among the heads of households in the piney-woods 
parishes who listed their occupations: seventy-three percent
in St.Helena, seventy-two percent in Livingston, thirty-six 
percent in St.Tammany, and fully eighty-six percent of the 
respondants in Washington declared themselves farmers or 
planters. As the vast majority of these farmers planted 
staple crops, the piney-woods parishes seemed to be fully 
incorporated into the cotton economy. Yet unlike the 
plantation parishes, East and West Feliciana and East Baton 
Rouge, where typically larger farms averaged between fifty 
and two hundred bales of cotton annually, farms in the piney-
Eighth Census of the United States. 1860 (Reprint, 
New York: Norman Ross, 1990) These figures are based on a 
three percent sample survey of the heads of households of 
each individual parish.
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woods parishes usually averaged ten bales or less.74 
Nevertheless, shared investments and a mutual dependence on 
the success of the cotton crop, emerged as an important bond 
between the planters and piney-woods dwellers. Cotton, 
corollary agricultural pursuits, and the politics of slavery, 
would serve as the cornerstones for stability in the Florida 
parishes.
Despite the strong ties to the cotton economy, lower 
crop yields, the limited availability of quality land, and 
the ravages of the army worm and rot due to the damp climate, 
encouraged a diversified economy in the piney-woods 
parishes.75 The virtual necessity of, and passion for self- 
sufficiency, prompted most farmers in the eastern parishes to 
devote considerable portions of their land to foodstuffs.76
Eighth Census of the United States 1860; In the 
planter parishes the figures range from a low average of near 
fifty bales in East Baton Rouge to a high of almost two 
hundred bales in West Feliciana. By contrast in the piney 
woods figures range from a low average of less than three 
bales in Livingston, to a high of almost forty bales in 
St.Helena. Land holdings contrasted widely. Holdings in the 
wealthiest planter parish, West Feliciana, averaged about 
1800 acres, in the wealthiest piney-woods parish, St.Helena, 
about 13 50 acres. Holdings in the remaining piney-woods 
parishes averaged notably less: 390 acres in Livingston, 294
in St.Tammany, and 400 in Washington.
75 Greensburq Imperial October 10, 1857; Clinton
Feliciana Democrat September 15,1855; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune September 28, 1852; Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early 
Mississippi," p.3.
76 Clinton, East Feliciana Patriot April 27, 1867; 
provides an excellent example of the intensity of the belief 
among many piney-woods farmers that independence was directly 
related to self-sufficiency.
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In I860, the average farmer in Washington Parish owned 278 
acres. On average, slightly less than twenty-five percent of 
this land, or nearly seventy acres, constituted improved 
acreage. Of the improved land, the farmer usually devoted a 
portion to cotton and possibly some rice. The average 
Washington farmer produced 11.7 bales of cotton typically 
weighing about four hundred pounds each.77 Statistics 
concerning the yield of cotton per acre are at best, 
speculative. Yet considerable evidence indicates that in 
1860, one acre of Louisiana farm land could yield 
approximately 250 pounds of lint cotton. The Report of the 
United States Commissioner of Patents for 1850. demonstrates 
that cotton production in neighboring Marion County, 
Mississippi, a piney-woods county with similar topographical 
features to Washington Parish, ranged from an average of 400 
pounds of lint cotton in the bottom lands to 150 pounds on 
uplands.78 This ratio would of course vary with the quality
77 Average number of bales produced derived from a 
three percent sample of farmers cultivating cotton, taken 
from Eighth Census of the United States. 1860. The 1850, 
1860, and 1870 census stipulate four hundred pounds as the 
average bale weight of cotton.
78 United States House of Representatives Executive
Document No. 32. Thirty-First Congress, Second Session, 
Report of the Commissioner of Patents for the Year 1850 
(Washington: House Printers, 1851) pt. II, "Agriculture,"
(hereinafter refered to as Report of the Commissioner of 
Patents, 1850) p. 257; Report of the Commissioner of 
Agriculture. 1867, pp. 414-416; Ibid. 1862, Thirty-Seventh
Congress, Third Session, pp. 105-106; E.J. Donnell, 
Chronological and Statistical History of Cotton (New York: 
James Sutton Co., 1872) pp. 370-371. William J. Cooper, Jr., 
"The Cotton Crisis in the Antebellum South: Another Look,"
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of the land, but it provides further evidence to support the 
2 50 pound average. Based on these average figures, one bale 
of lint cotton could be produced on slightly more than an 
acre and a half of land.79 Under ideal crop conditions, 
about twenty acres would be necessary to reach the average of 
11.7 four hundred pound bales. These figures indicate that 
the average Washington Parish farmer, ninety-one percent of 
whom raised some cotton, devoted barely one-third of his 
improved acreage to the production of the great staple.80
The remaining cleared land, excluding possible wet lands 
producing rice, constituted acreage devoted to foodstuffs, 
primarily corn, peas, beans, sweet potatoes, and Irish 
potatoes. Virtually all Washington farmers raised
significant amounts of corn; some produced a considerable 
surplus. The heavy emphasis on sweet potatoes also made them
Agricultural History XLIX, No. 2, April, 1975, p. 389; The 
Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for 1862 
demonstrates that the seeds constituted fully sixty percent 
of the weight of unginned "seed cotton;" thus I have employed 
the stated or approximate weight of ginned lint cotton (see 
page 106).
79 This figure indicates that on average Louisiana 
cotton production lagged behind that of Mississippi's Yazoo 
River floodplain which averaged production of slightly over 
a bale per acre (see Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton 
Kingdom in the Old Southwest, p. 122).
80 These figures, particularly those concerning the 
amount of cotton produced per acre, are based on evidence 
which among other problems, provide only a general average 
with no consideration for the different levels of production 
certain to be present among varying qualities of land. They 
do, however, provide evidence of the level of emphasis on 
cotton production in each region.
a mainstay of the piney-woods diet, while Irish potatoes, 
peas, and beans appeared to be of lesser significance.81 
This pattern of land ownership and cultivation typified the 
piney-woods parishes, though overall landholdings were 
considerably larger in St.Helena Parish and somewhat less in 
St.Tammany and Livingston. Delta planters typically directed 
their resources more exclusively toward the production of 
staple crops and corn, though some, particularly in East 
Feliciana Parish, cultivated considerable quantities of 
potatoes and beans.82 Those planters who failed to produce 
adequate amounts of foodstuffs either relied on the New 
Orleans markets or purchased vegetables directly from the 
plain folk.
Row crop farming played an important role in the piney 
woods. Yet perhaps the most important resource of the piney- 
woods farmer, and indeed a significant asset of many 
planters, could be found roaming in the thickets of their 
unimproved land. The importance of livestock herding to the
Eighth Census of the United States 1860, all 
figures based on a three percent sample of the individual 
parish statistics.
82 Ibid. The delta parish planters typically sought 
to maximize the amount of land dedicated to staple crops. 
While most produced considerable amounts of corn, the 
cultivation of other foodstuffs was typically less 
diversified and often disproportionately below the levels 
produced in the piney-woods parishes.
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southern economy has long been established.83 The piney 
woods of eastern Louisiana and southern Mississippi produced 
huge amounts of beef and pork in the antebellum period. 
Visitors to the region frequently expressed surprise at the 
number of cattle and hogs they observed roaming through the 
forests. Timothy Flint described the hundreds and even 
thousands of cattle he observed grazing unattended in the 
woods. J.F.H. Claiborne noted not only hundreds of cattle 
and hogs ranging about in the pine thickets, but also large 
numbers of sheep. Following a tour of the region in 1813, 
Dr. James Perry United States Naval Inspector concluded that, 
"cattle are reared here to as great a perfection, and to 
perhaps as great an extent, on the waters of the Pearl River, 
and particularly in the Choctaw nation of Indians, as in any 
part of the United States."84
In both the plantation region and the piney woods, 
livestock, made identifiable by branding or ear cropping, 
typically roamed free in the forests. Fences served only to
05 Frank Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949); Forrest
McDonald and Grady McWhiney, "The Antebellum Southern 
Herdsman: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Southern History 
XLI, No.2, 1975 (hereinafter refered to as McDonald and
McWhiney, "The Antebellum Southern Herdsman"); John Inscoe 
Mountain Masters. Slavery, and the Sectional Crisis in 
Western North Carolina (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1989).
84 Timothy Flint, Recollections of the Last Ten Years 
in the Valiev of the Mississippi (Reprint, Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University, 1968) pp.236-237; J.F.H. 
Claiborne, "A Trip Through the Piney Woods," pp. 514-515.
protect crops from the foraging animals. Opposition to the 
fencing of livestock rested not only on a strong tradition of 
open grazing rights, but also on the lingering problem of 
disputed land claims. As prosperity in the territory 
increased, most residents appeared willing to accept vague 
property lines in the woodlands in order to preserve the 
peace. Efforts to further the emerging pattern of stability 
necessitated a compromising attitude on the part of local 
farmers. Establishing fences along supposed property lines 
could have reignited old disputes concerning land claims, a 
situation the tumult weary residents seemed eager to avoid.
To make the forests more accommodating to the needs of 
foraging livestock, farmers employed a practice established 
earlier by local Indian tribes, which involved the annual 
controlled burning of woodlands to keep undergrowth down, 
reduce pests, and enhance grass production. Cattle survived 
in this environment by ranging far and wide in search of 
additional sources of grass. The constant movement in search 
of sustenance created the reality of the lean and muscular 
piney-woods cattle. Visitors to the region often expressed 
surprise at the appearance of the piney-woods livestock. 
General Cuvier Grover commanding a United States Army 
expedition through Washington and St. Tammany parishes in the 
Winter of 1864 observed that, "the cattle and sheep are very 
lean and poor, hardly worth driving, they are nevertheless 
the best the country affords." Like many other observers
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unfamiliar with conditions in the piney woods, Grover vastly 
underestimated the value and significance of piney-woods 
livestock.85
Two categories of hogs constituted the bulk of the swine 
population in Louisiana and southeastern Mississippi. The 
wild razorback, which legend maintains escaped from the swine 
herds accompanying DeSoto's Spanish explorers, likely gave 
rise to the piney-woods rooter, which remain abundant in this 
region. These wild pigs intermingled with Berkshires and 
other hogs purchased and released into the forests by local 
farmers. Swine, too, roamed unattended in the woods. Yet 
hogs differed from cattle in that they tended to concentrate 
more in the hardwood bottom lands and creek beds where 
acorns, roots, and grubs flourished in abundance. During 
times of scarcity, farmers frequently released their hogs 
into picked over potato patches or corn fields.86 Abundant
85 Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early Mississippi," 
p.12; McDonald and McWhiney, "The Antebellum Southern 
Herdsman," p.164; Napier, Lower Pearl River1s Pinev Woods 
It's Land and People, pp.26-27; Daily Picayune May 9, 1855; 
"Report of General Cuvier Grover On Expedition From 
Madisonville to Franklinton and Vicinity," in Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 
34, pt.I, p. 104-106.
86 Mrs. R.J. Causey to Causey, November 19, 18 63, in 
R.J. Causey Correspondence (LLMVC); Thomas Ellis to Martina 
Ellis, October 27,1889, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); Eli 
Capell Diary for 1842-1850, November 24, 1842, in Eli Capell 
Papers (LLMVC); New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 12, 1858; 
Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old 
Southwest, p.l; McDonald and McWhiney, "The Antebellum 
Southern Herdsman," p.147.
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and available pork proved essential to southern farmers1 
ability to maintain their independent lifestyle.
As a foodstuff, pork proved indispensable to rural 
southerners. Yet swine and cattle also served as the chief 
marketable resource of many piney-woods farmers. This dual 
purpose made livestock production vital to the economic 
development of the rural South. In 1850, the United States 
Patent Office reported that a two hundred square mile section 
of piney woods in eastern Louisiana, southeastern 
Mississippi, and western Alabama had produced more than one 
million head of cattle annually over the past twenty years. 
The cattle in this region typically went to market at three 
or four years old, selling for from ten to twelve dollars per 
head. In an average year, anywhere from ten to twelve 
million dollars in cattle went to market from this single 
twelve county region. This enormous source of wealth was 
frequently underestimated by census officials distracted by 
the seemingly squalid living conditions of many piney-woods 
farmers, and often by the farmers themselves. During the 
period 1850-1860 livestock holdings in the Florida parishes 
dramatically increased. By 1860, the Florida parishes and 
the southeastern counties of Mississippi contained some of 
the heaviest concentrations of livestock, particularly 
cattle, in the South.87
87 Seventh Census of the United States. 1850, p.250; 
Eighth Census of the United States. 1860, pp. 66-67; Report 
of the Commissioner of Patents. 1850, p. 260; Sam B.
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The increasing popularity and profitability of livestock 
cultivation in the late antebellum period, resulted primarily 
from the shortfall in food production affecting many local 
planters, and the accessibility of the New Orleans markets. 
In their zeal to maximize their yield of profitable staple 
crops, many planters failed to produce enough food to feed 
their families and their slaves. Considerable numbers of 
these planters relied on piney-woods herders to compensate 
for their deficiency in meat production, particularly beef.
This situation provided the piney-woods cattlemen with a 
steady localized demand for their product. Acute shortages 
in food production often occurred on the plantations when 
cotton prices remained high for an extended period.88 As a 
result, cotton prices directly impacted the profitability of 
livestock herding. In 1860, approximately sixty-five percent 
of farmers in the piney-woods parishes possessed levels of 
livestock large enough to indicate herding.89 Thus, whether 
they farmed a few acres of the great staple or not, piney-
Hilliard, Atlas of Antebellum Southern Agriculture (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984) pp. 48-50;
Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 
1860. p. 832; Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in 
the Old Southwest, p. 116.
88 Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United 
States to 1860. pp. 836-837; Hilliard, Hog Meat and Hoe Cake, 
pp. 191-192.
89 This figure is based on a three percent sample
taken from the United States Census. 1860. The percentage is 
an average compiled from the parishes of Washington, 
St.Helena, St.Tammany, and Livingston.
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woods herders also participated in an industry directly 
affected by the cotton economy. Selling their livestock to 
local planters required minimal time and effort. Yet the 
most exciting manner of marketing their stock remained the 
cattle drive.
Prior to the arrival of the railroads, herding livestock 
to market served as the highpoint of the year for many piney- 
woods farmers. Occasionally individual families would act 
alone to drive their own animals to market. More frequently, 
several neighbors banded together for a communal drive. 
Neighboring farmers cooperated in rounding up each other’s 
herds and providing the manpower necessary to make the drive 
successful. Unlike the pickled beef and pork which reached 
New Orleans in ever increasing amounts from the slaughter 
pens at Louisville, Cincinnati, and Nashville, the product 
from the Florida parishes and southeastern Mississippi made 
the relatively short journey arriving fresh and on the 
hoof.90
The drives themselves could be both tedious and 
hazardous. The animals were first located, no easy task in 
the vast expanses of pine thickets, and then driven to a pre­
determined spot for penning. Typically farmers contributed 
not fewer than six, nor more than forty of their own stock in 
each drive. As a result, drives seldom numbered more than
Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United 
States to 1850. p. 841.
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100 to 150 head. The relatively low numbers helped to 
facilitate the need for constant vigilance in the forest, not 
only to prevent the loss of strays and stragglers, but also 
to curb attrition due to possible wolf attacks and poaching. 
The herders typically travelled on horseback with at least 
one ox cart to carry provisions. In this manner cattle, 
swine, and even poultry eventually arrived at the loading 
point for transport to New Orleans, the one exception being 
that turkey and other poultry drovers typically travelled on 
foot using long poles to keep the birds together.91
Unlike the heavily travelled livestock trails of the 
upper Piedmont and hill country Carolina and Georgia, few 
inns and holding pens existed along the market trails in the 
Florida parishes. As a result, preventing the loss of 
animals in the dark proved to be an exhausting process. 
Drovers typically assumed that a small percentage of their 
herds would stray, drown, or simply disappear before they 
reached the port of departure.
Madisonville, on Lake Pontchartrain, served as the 
primary terminus for livestock drives from the upper Florida 
parishes and southeastern Mississippi; considerably fewer 
drives culminated at Springfield. Upon arrival at the port,
91 Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early Mississippi," pp. 
6-12; Arthur Turner, "Turkey Drives; South Mississippi, 
Greene County," Mississippi Folklore Register III, No. 2, 
Summer 1969, pp. 31-32; Amite City News Digest. August 14, 
1975.
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the animals were loaded on steamers or schooners bound for 
New Orleans. The drovers frequently accompanied their stock 
to New Orleans, not only to insure a fair sale, but also to 
procure supplies and enjoy a bit of relaxation and revelry at 
the close of the strenuous drive.92 One such drive 
originating in Marion County, Mississippi destined for 
Madisonville in the late 1830*3, demonstates the taxing 
nature of herding cattle in the piney woods.
Following a difficult and time consuming crossing of the 
Pearl River at Ford's Ferry in Washington Parish, the drovers 
proceeded southward to Ben's Ford, near present day Bogalusa, 
where they turned southwest to reach a suitable crossing of 
the Bogue Chitto River at Alton's Ferry. Each river and 
stream crossing constituted an exhausting process, yet 
managing the herd in the vast expanses of pine forest proved 
even more difficult. Each straying cow had to be pursued and 
returned to the herd, lest the high rate of attrition make 
the drive unprofitable. Unmarked strays were typically sold 
by the local people who captured them to the detriment of the 
drovers. In addition to containing the straying cattle, the 
drovers maintained their guard against gangs of poachers 
rumoured to be operating in the area. All this served to 
wear down the cattlemen physically and mentally. Near the
92 Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United
States to 1850. p. 840; Darby, Geographical Description of 
the State of Louisiana, pp. 173-175; Hilliard, Hog Meat and 
Hoe Cake. pp. 193-194; Amite City News Digest. August 14, 
1975; Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early Mississippi," p. 15.
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close of the drive in the vacinity of Madisonville, one 
drover lost his life when his horse stumbled as he attempted 
to retrieve some strays. The remaining cattleman buried 
their unfortunate comrade along the trail leaving his wife 
and eleven children to mourn their loss.93
The vast expanses of pine forests provided a natural 
habitat for livestock cultivation. Livestock herding proved 
central to the piney-woods residents' ability to maintain 
their independent lifestyle and to regional prosperity. But 
the stands of virgin long leaf pine contributed to the 
emerging state of prosperity in a more fundamental sense. 
Following a survey of the eastern Florida parishes in the 
Fall of 1833, state engineer Charles Crozet reported that the 
section had "a character of richness which it derives from 
the growth of pine timber, for which there is always a ready 
market at hand."94 By 1850, lumbering proved to be the most 
readily available means of economic advancement.
Timber harvesting began in the Florida parishes as early 
as the last decades of the eighteenth century. Enterprising 
lumbermen took advantage of the increasing demand for wood 
necessary to facilitate the construction of New Orleans. By 
1820, numerous crews were employed cutting timber in the
Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early Mississippi," pp.
14-15.
94 House Journal. Eleventh Legislature, Second
Session, "Report of the Civil Engineer of the State," 
December 24, 1833, p. 27.
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territory surrounding many of the abundant streams in the 
Florida parishes. Lumbermen hauled the logs to the banks of 
a nearby stream, cut them into squared timbers, formed the 
timber into rafts, and floated them to Lake Maurepas or Lake 
Pontchartrain where crews on schooners collected them for the 
trip to New Orleans. By the 1840's, timber harvesting 
emerged as a locally controlled industry of increasing 
potential. Planters as well as plain folk engaged in the 
profitable enterprise. Numerous small family owned sawmills 
arose across the piney-woods parishes and East Feliciana. In 
1860, twenty-eight sawmills employing 187 laborers, with a 
total capital investment of $289,900 operated in the parishes 
of St. Helena, St. Tammany, and Washington. Another four, 
valued at $20,200, employed twenty eight workers in West 
Feliciana Parish. By 1880, thirty water-powered sawmills 
operated in St. Helena Parish alone.95 Although most of
95 Map of the Line of the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad 
From Canton, Mississippi to New Orleans, circa 1861, lists 
all sawmills and other industries in the vicinity of the 
railroad in 1861, located in the Illinois Central Railroad 
Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago (hereinafter refered to
as Map of the Line of the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad,
1861); Eighth Census of the United States. Manufactures. 
1860. pp. 197 and 201 (no figures are provided for the
parishes of East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, and 
Livingston); Amite City News Digest. September 18, 1959;
Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United 
States to 1860 Vol.II (Washington: Carnegie Institution,
1933) p. 936, hereinafter refered to as Gray, History of 
Agriculture in the Southern United States: Milton B.
Newton,Jr., "Water-Powered Sawmills and Related Structures in 
the Piney Woods," in Noel Polk (ed.) Mississippi's Pinev 
Woods: A Human Perspective (Jackson: University Press of
Mississippi, 1986) pp. 156 and 164 (hereinafter refered to as 
Newton, "Water-Powered Sawmills and Related Structures in the
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these mills constituted smaller concerns with limited 
processing capacity, some, such as the huge Burton Lumber 
Company of East Baton Rouge Parish produced over sixty 
thousand feet of refined lumber daily.96 Daniel Addison, a 
Livingston Parish farmer, summarized the significance of 
timber to those participating directly in, or on the fringe 
of the cotton economy, "timber is far better business than 
cotton, you can always get something that will bring 
cash."97 Harvesting timber not only provided the owners 
and harvesters of the trees with additional funds, but it 
also made available newly cleared land for planting. 
Planters freguently employed their slaves cutting timber 
during the winter months prior to spring planting. Many 
among the plain folk also cut timber during the off season, 
while others engaged in lumbering year round.98
Piney Woods").
96 George A. Coulon 350 Miles in a Skiff Through the 
Louisiana Swamps (New Orleans: Published By The Author, 1888)
p. 26.
97 Daniel Addison to Jeptha McKinney, July 17, 1848, 
in Jeptha McKinney Papers (LLMVC).
98 Edward Stewart to John Gurley, April 23, 1859 and 
January 18, 1860, in John W. Gurley Papers (LLMVC); DeBow1s 
Review. XIX, 1855, pp. 611-612 and XX, 1856, pp. 354-357; 
R.E. Foster to Asa Hursey, October 29, 1848, in Asa Hursey 
Papers (LLMVC); Letter of James 0. Cosby, St. Helena Land 
Commissioner, to U.S. Land Commissioner Josiah Meigs, 
November 18, 1820, reprinted in Amite City News Digest. July 
17 and 24, 1959; Newton, "Water-Powered Sawmills and Related 
Structures in the Piney Woods," pp.165-167; John Eisterhold, 
"Lumber and Trade in the Lower Mississippi Valley and New 
Orleans, 1800-1860," Louisiana History XIII, No.l, Winter 
1972, p.72 (hereinafter refered to as Eisterhold, "Lumber and
The expansion of the timber industry not only promoted 
prosperity directly, but also contributed to the growth of 
corollary activities. Lumber distributing firms arose, such 
as the Killian and Harry Company of St.Helena Parish, which 
produced precision cut timber and some furniture. This firm 
employed common laborers, skilled craftsmen, and provided a 
delivery service. A small yet ambitious turpentine industry 
developed which began optimistically only to be destroyed by 
the war a few years later. Yet while it lasted, the 
turpentine industry proved to be lucrative. After boxing, 
making a single chop in the tree just above the swell of the 
roots, and draining the pines of their sap, the exhausted 
trees were of nearly equal value in the production of tar. 
In 1860, one such turpentine distilling firm in St. Tammany 
Parish employed twenty-six laborers and boasted a net profit 
of $20,750 after expenses. Some lumbermen also produced 
charcoal to be used as heating fuel in New Orleans. With the 
coming of the railroad in 1854, numerous brickyards emerged 
in conjunction with the sawmills. In 1861, at least four 
brick yards operated in St. Helena and one in Livingston. 
William Dixon supplemented his meager finances while a 
student at Centenary College in Jackson, Louisiana, by 
working at a nearby brickyard for seventy-five cents a day. 
The four functioning brick factories in St. Tammany Parish in
Trade in the Lower Mississippi Valley1') ; Moore, The Emergence 
of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest, pp. 150-151.
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1860, employed 115 laborers with a total capital investment 
of $208,700."
Perhaps most significantly, the lumber industry 
stimulated, and in turn was stimulated by the emergence of a 
small ship building industry along the north shore of Lake 
Pontchartrain. Ship building began as early as 1797 in the 
vicinity of Madisonville. By 1813 the United States Navy 
Department had recognized the value of Madisonville as a 
ship-building center. In January of that year, a naval 
inspector wrote that the north shore "is understood to be 
chosen by the agent of the Navy Department for repairing and 
even building small vessels of war for the southern station; 
and it seems peculiarly adapted to these purposes: the
vicinity abounds with oak, pine, and cypress: here also tar
is made in great abundance, with as great a facility as in 
any part of the union." The growing shipping and ship 
building concerns along the north shore not only increased 
the demand for local lumber, but also helped to free planters 
and farmers in the Florida parishes from the exorbitant 
shipping rates charged by many New Orleans shippers. Like
"  Greensburq Imperial. April 25, 1857; Killian and 
Harry Account Books, 1839-1852 (LLMVC); Daniel Addison to 
Jeptha McKinney, July 17, 1848, in Jeptha McKinney Papers
(ibid.); DeBow's Review XIV, 1853, p. 181 and XI, 1851, pp. 
303-305; Eighth Census of the United States. Manufacturers, 
I860, p. 201; William Y. Dixon Diary, August 14, 1860 in
William Y. Dixon Papers (LLMVC); Map of the Line of the New 
Orleans-Jackson Railroad, 18 61 (Newberry Library, Chicago); 
Amite City NewsDiaest. September 18, 1959; Napier, "Piney
Woods Past: A Pastoral Elegy," p. 18; Eisterhold, "Lumber 
Trade in the Lower Mississippi Valley," p.78.
many other north shore firms, Christian Koch, who operated a 
shipping service out of Madisonville and nearby Pearlington, 
Mississippi always charged reasonable rates for his services. 
Yet as a result of his successful shipping concerns Koch's 
family enjoyed a comfortable living. The growth of shipyards 
and port facilities along the north shore also encouraged the 
development and expansion of summer resorts at Mandeville and 
neighboring towns which pumped additional sums into the 
piney-woods economy. By the early 1850's the north shore 
resorts attracted hundreds of New Orleans residents each 
month. Roundtrip steamship tickets to Madisonville, 
Mandeville, or Lewisburg could be purchased for fifty cents, 
allowing the New Orleanians to enjoy a day or weekend "in one 
of the most healthful regions our citizens have 
available.,,1Q0
As with livestock herding, the cotton economy influenced 
the fortunes of the timber industry. The temporary decline 
in cotton prices in the early 1850's dramatically affected 
the timber industry, which already suffered from waning 
demand in New Orleans. High freight charges inhibited the
Letter of Dr. J. Perry U.S. Navy, January 12, 
1813, located in Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana, pp. 285- 
286; William G. Stovall to Christian Koch, June 1854 and 
Christian Koch to Annette, April 16, 1863, in Christian D. 
Koch Papers (LLMVC);New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 17, 
1853, May 26 and August 28, 1855; St. Tammany Historical
Society Gazette, IV, Madisonville Issue, p.75.
shipping of lumber to northeastern ports where demand 
remained high, forcing woodcutters to rely more exclusively 
on local purchasers. Local planters had always accounted for 
a significant proportion of purchased lumber. Andrew 
McCollam, a wealthy planter who owned a sawmill near 
Donaldsonville below Baton Rouge in Ascension Parish, sold 
virtually all of his processed lumber to regional planters. 
This trade proved to be so lucrative that McCollam abandoned 
plans to buy an additional plantation and instead determined 
to erect a second sawmill under the belief that "it will 
bring more money than planting." John Gurley, absentee owner 
of Oak Lawn Plantation in lower Livingston Parish, instructed 
his overseer to purchase all of his lumber from local mills, 
bartering on some transactions with tobacco purchased in New 
Orleans. In the winter of 1831 the Baton Rouge Gazette 
called for the construction of a railroad into the piney 
woods to supply Baton Rouge with turpentine, charcoal, and 
the thousand cords of wood which could be sold there 
annually. Yet low cotton prices also discouraged many 
planters and other local residents from buying wood products 
for personal use or as an investment. As cotton prices 
recovered in the middle of the 1850's timber prices also 
rebounded.101
101 R.E. Foster to Asa Hursey, September 1, 1849, and 
Foster to Hursey October 23, 1853, John Henderson to Asa
Hursey, August 19, 1850, all in Asa Hursey Papers (LLMVC); 
Diary and Plantation Record of Ellen McCollam, in Andrew and 
Ellen E. McCollam Papers (LLMVC), Vol. Ill, pp. 237, 245,
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As the prosperous economic conditions which had 
characterized the delta parishes for decades spread into the 
eastern Florida parishes the need for labor also increased 
dramatically. Cotton and rice farming, livestock herding, 
and activities associated with the timber industry all 
depended on large numbers of reliable laborers to insure the 
levels of production necessary to turn a profit. The sparse 
pattern of settlement in Louisiana necessitated the 
importation of foreign laborers. As a result, chattel 
slavery proved central to the emerging prosperity in the 
piney woods.
By the time large numbers of African bondsmen were 
introduced as laborers in the piney woods, slavery had long 
been established in Louisiana. The earliest French settlers 
brought slaves into the Florida parishes to compensate for 
the absence of white labor in the territory. Unlike the 
initial Atlantic coast settlers, little evidence exists to 
indicate that the early pioneers in West Florida made an 
effort to enslave the local Bayou Goula, Acolapissa, or
247, 262a, 266, and 268; Edward Stewart to John Gurley, March 
27, 1859, March 5, 1860, and undated letter 1858? (see folder 
1), all in John W. Gurley Papers (LLMVC); Receipt for lumber 
purchased by Lewis Stirling, a West Feliciana planter, 
December 1850, in Lewis Stirling Family Papers (LLMVC); 
Duncan W. Taylor to Eugene Hunter, September 13, 1856,
indicates cost differentials in lumber operations piney-woods 
parishes and plantation parishes; Baton Rouge Gazette. 
January 29, 1831; Donnell, Chronological and Statistical
History of Cotton, pp. 388, 425, and 447; Moore, The
Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest, p. 153; 
Eisterhold, "Lumber and Trade in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley," p. 77.
78
Choctaw Indians. French designs to clear and settle the 
territory, in the absence of adequate numbers of European 
laborers, therefore necessitated the introduction of a 
foreign labor force. In the 1750's African slaves comprised 
a part of the first lumbering crews engaged in cutting timber 
along the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain and on the banks 
of the Mississippi. Yet, it remained for the early British 
settlers to introduce large numbers of Africans and establish 
an enduring system of slavery.102
When the first group of Africans arrived in West 
Florida, slavery had existed in the British Atlantic colonies 
for over 100 years. Retired British army officers staking 
claims in West Florida viewed the slaves as a ready source of 
labor and as a sign of social status. Many of the initial 
slaves brought to Louisiana came from the sugar islands of 
the British West Indies. The North American climate proved 
to be more salubrius than that of the Caribbean, and 
conditions, which permitted slaves to have families, allowed 
for procreation reducing discontent. Clearing land and
102 Eron Rowland (ed.) Life. Letters and Papers of
William Dunbar pp. 9-10; Joe Gray Taylor, Negro Slavery in 
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1963) p. 8; James McGowan, Creation of a Slave Society: 
Louisiana Plantations in the Eighteenth Century (Ph.D . 
Dissertation, University of Rochester, 1976) p.24; Moore, The 
Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest, pp. 73- 
74; Holmes, "Indigo in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas," 
pp. 331-333.
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tending crops, slaves labored on the early tobacco and indigo 
plantations along the Mississippi.103
With the successful introduction of cotton to the 
region, the number of slaves increased dramatically. By 
182 0, the slave population of East Baton Rouge and the 
combined Feliciana parishes slightly outnumbered the total 
white population there. As cotton production expanded into 
the piney woods parishes so did the slave system. In 1850, 
the slave population of the Florida parishes numbered 32,969, 
greatly exceeding the white population which totalled 22,767. 
The proportion of slaves in the population ranged from a high 
of almost eighty percent in West Feliciana to a low of 
twenty-four percent in Livingston.104
During the 1850's slavery flourished in the Florida 
parishes (see tables 5 and 6). As cotton prices climbed in 
the middle of the decade, and emphasis on cotton production 
increased, the advantages of the slave system increased as 
well. In the piney-woods parishes slave holding extended 
beyond merely the cotton farmers. Slaves served as lumbermen 
felling trees and working in sawmills. They also functioned 
as herdsmen rounding up livestock and participating in
103 Rowland (ed.), Life. Letters, and Papers of
William Dunbar, see diary pp. 23-74; Moore, The Emergence of 
the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest, pp.73-74.
104 Fourth Census of the United States. 1820, p.31; 
Seventh Census of the United States. 1850, pp.246-249; In the 
remaining Florida parishes in 1820 the slave population 
numbered 2,02 0, the white population 10,887.
T a b l e  5
IS  §.P—ELECTION. RESULTS
£ M I S U _________________ BRECKINRIDGE__________ BELL___________ DOUGLAS
EAST BATON ROUGE 490 569 136
EAST FELICIANA 377 277 131
LIVINGSTON 425 249 117
ST. HELENA 331 292 18
ST. TAMMANY 164 243 132
WEST FELICIANA 272 188 33
WASHINGTON 387 112 5
T a b l e  6
POPULATION STATISTICS I860
PERCENT OF
PARISH WHITE SLAVE
FREE
BLACK
SLAVES IN 
POPULATION
TOTAL
POPULAT
EAST
BATON ROUGE 6, 944 8,570 532 53.4 16,046
EAST FELICIANA 4,081 10,593 23 72 14,697
WEST FELICIANA 2,036 9,571 64 82 11,671
LIVINGSTON 3, 120 1, 311 0 29.5 4,431
ST. HELENA 3,413 3,711 6 52 7, 130
ST. TAMMANY 3,153 1,841 412 34 5,406
WASHINGTON 2,996 1,690 22 35.8 4,708
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Table 7
SLAVEHOLPING
PARISH
PERCENT HEADS 
OF HOUSEHOLDS 
OWNING SLAVES 
- 18.59_________
PERCENT HEADS 
OF HOUSEHOLDS 
OWNING SLAVES 
.186.0___________
PERCENT OWNING 
SLAVES IN 1850 
WHO INCREASED 
HOLDINGS IN 
1850-1860______
EAST
BATON ROUGE 29 17 50
EAST FELICIANA 76 68 66
WEST FELICIANA 55 57 60
LIVINGSTON 28 16 50
ST. HELENA 66 58 80
ST. TAMMANY 37 22 66
WASHINGTON 50 31 90
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drives, often mounted on horseback.105 As a result, high 
rates of slaveholding existed in all the piney-woods 
parishes. In 1850, the number of piney-woods heads of 
households owning slaves ranged from a high of sixty-six 
percent in St. Helena, to a low of twenty-eight percent in 
Livingston, (see table 7) .
The piney-woods folk often worked side by side with 
their slaves felling timber, herding cattle, or increasingly 
as the 1850's progressed, picking cotton. Numerous letters 
of the period indicate that despite increasing racial 
sensitivity, many piney-woods farmers considered their slaves 
to be an extension of their family, a phenomena shared by 
many planters.106 Many northeners, versed in the
abolitionist preachings evident in many Yankee newspapers, 
were baffled by the close relationship existing between many
Diary of Eli Capell, January 13, 1850 and second 
week of September 1850, in Eli Capell Papers (LLMVC); Edward 
Stewart to John Gurley, April 22, 1859 and March 5 and 25,
1860, describes the lease and management of slaves cutting 
timber, in John W. Gurley Papers (LLMVC); Eisterhold, "Lumber 
and Trade in the Lower Mississippi Valley," p. 79; Milton 
Newton, "Water-Powered Sawmills and Related Structures in the 
Piney Woods," pp. 165-166; Roger Shugg, Origins of the Class 
Struggle in Louisiana: A Social History of White Farmers and 
Laborers During Slavery and After 1840-1875 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1939) pp. 157-163; Moore, 
The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest, p. 
152; Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United 
States, p. 936.
106 Mary E. Taylor to Stella Hunter, February 9, 1856 
and July 22, 1856, in Hunter-Taylor Family Collection
(LLMVC); Diary of Eli Capell, April 21, 1861, in Eli Capell 
Papers (Ibid); John Houston to William Allen, September 29,
1861, in William Allen Papers (Ibid); John Ellis to Mother, 
November 16, 1860, in Ellis Family Papers (Ibid).
masters and slaves. Emma Lay Lane, a recent emigrant to the 
Florida parishes from Connecticut, described the condition of 
slaves to a friend in New England; "they are just as merry a 
set of beings as you ever saw." Lane continued that she had 
never seen so many milk cows in her life, "the negroes all 
have all the milk and butter they want, which accounts for 
it."107 F.M. Kent, writing to his family in New Hampshire, 
argued that the cruelest masters were Yankees who failed to 
understand the mutual dependence between masters and slaves 
inherent in the philosophy of southerners.108 Yet that the 
close relationship between master and slave remained tempered 
by racial sensitivity is exemplified in a letter of Eugene 
Hunter, an East Feliciana Parish attorney, to his wife. 
Hunter noted that, "in your last letter you say the servants 
all send love and kisses. Now I am fond of kissing as a 
general thing but am very particular whom I kiss. Politeness 
however would require that I return the love and kisses. You 
need not do so if this was a mistake of your pen which I 
suppose it was."109
The slave system increased the contact and reduced the 
divergence in lifestyle between the planters and plain folk.
IU' Emma Lay Lane to "My dear Mrs. Rogers," October 6, 
1857, in John Q. Anderson Papers (LLMVC).
108 F.M. Kent to Uncle Moody, May 17, 1858, in Amos 
Kent Papers (LLMVC).
109 Eugene Hunter to Stella, October 22, 1864, in
Hunter-Taylor Family Collection (LLMVC).
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Despite the vast difference in mean slaveholding between the 
plantation and piney-woods parishes, which ranged from a high 
of 88 slaves per-household in West Feliciana to a low of 5.8 
in Livingston, slave holding emerged as an important bond 
between the planters and plain folk. Slave transactions 
furthered this relationship. Although several slave 
auctions, such as the one at Bayou Sara, operated on a 
regular basis in the Florida parishes, the principal 
mechanism for purchasing slaves involved personal 
transactions between planters and farmers.110 Though piney- 
woods farmers also occasionally purchased slaves in the 
markets at New Orleans, arrangements with local planters 
remained the primary means of obtaining bondsmen.111 After 
purchasing the Roncal Plantation in northeastern St. Helena 
parish Charles Gayarre, a prominent New Orleans attorney and 
historian, secured the bulk of his slaves from local farmers 
and planters. John W. Gurley, an absentee owner of a 
Livingston Parish plantation, consistently endorsed his
110 H.J. Noble to Aunt Maria, May 20, 1853, in W.M.
Barrow Family Papers (LLMVC); Edward Stewart to John W. 
Gurley, January 24, 1858, in John W. Gurley Papers (Ibid);
Jefferson McKinney to Jeptha McKinney, April 21, 1856,
(Ibid) ; Receipt of sale for two slaves purchased by Amos 
Kent, June 11, 1860, in Amos Kent Papers (Ibid) ; Edwin A.
Davis, Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes of Louisiana 
1836-1846. As Reflected in the Diary of Bennett H. Barrow 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1943) p. 39; William 
Warren to D.L. McGehee, September 20, 1863, in D.L. McGehee 
Papers (LLMVC); Two receipts of sale for slaves in 1846, and 
receipt of sale for slave Joseph Bruin to Charles Gayarre, 
February 20, 1862, in Charles Gayarre Collection (Ibid).
Amite City News Digest. August 14, 1975.
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overseer's slave transactions with local fanners in the area. 
Though in at least one instance, Gurley compained that the 
sale price had been too low. Taking advantage of the state's 
indebtedness, Amos Kent purchased two slaves from the 
Louisiana Department of Internal Improvements later selling 
one at a profit to a local farmer. In April 1856, Jefferson 
McKinney wrote his brother Jeptha, a leading physician and 
farmer at Greensburg, that after saving for years he had 
finally purchased a prime negro girl from a local planter. 
He noted that the cost incurred would put him into debt and 
force him to do without many things for years, but would 
eventually serve to raise his status in life.112 With the 
rising importance of the cotton economy in the piney woods, 
slaveholding increasingly came to be seen as the key to 
success. To accommodate farmers of little means, planters
112 Receipt for sale of six slaves Joseph Bruin to 
Charles Gayarre, February 20, 1862, also notes on purchases 
of slaves in 1859, see box 16 (LLMVC) ; Edward Stewart to 
John Gurley, January 24, 1858 and March 5, 1860, in John W. 
Gurley Papers, Ibid.; Reciept for sale of slaves to Amos 
Kent, June 11, 1860, located in miscellaneous file box, Amos 
Kent Papers, Ibid.; Jefferson McKinney to Jeptha McKinney, 
April 21, 1856, in Jeptha McKinney Papers, Ibid.; Official 
recording of sale of slaves between St. Helena Parish farmers 
and planters recorded by S.B. Draughon notary public for St. 
Helena Parish, includes slave sales: John W. Stigall to
Hezekiah Thompson May 1, 1838, Jesse Hill to William Brown 
May 1, 1838, Reney Mercer to Rebecca Dikes June 1, 1838,
Abner Womack to James Strickland September 22, 1838, Henry 
Strickland to Daniel Miller October 25, 1838, all in S.B.
Draughon and Company Account Book, Ibid.; Slave Sale 
Broadside, lists eleven slaves to be sold at the plantation 
of Mr. Griffith near Plaquemines across the river from Baton 
Rouge, one, two, or three years credit offered as terms to 
potential purchasers, 1820, (in Misc. file LLMVC).
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also leased slaves to their less wealthy neighbors. William 
Warren agreed to lease a female slave to D.L, McGehee, who 
farmed a modest tract near Greensburg in St. Helena Parish, 
for $100 a year. The only stipulation being that McGehee 
himself would have to persuade the girl to accept the 
arrangement.113
As the slave system expanded in the piney woods, the 
influence of the delta planters increased among the plain 
folk. Many piney-woods farmers incurred debts to the 
planters by purchasing or leasing slaves. More importantly, 
as with cotton production, when the plain folk's involvement 
escalated, they increasingly looked to their powerful 
neighbors for guidance and leadership.
As abolitionist agitation increased in the North, the 
large slaveholders sought to insure southern unity at home. 
Many assumed that the best means to protect their peculiar 
way of life involved presenting a united front to the 
abolitionist menace. The New Orleans Daily Picayune 
emphatically argued that a natural unity of thought and 
conviction existed between the planters and the plain folk. 
Proslavery ideology increasingly stressed the connection 
between white freedom and black slavery. J. Mills Thornton
113 William Warren to D.L. McGehee, September 20,
1863, in D.L. McGehee Papers (LLMVC); Edward Stewart to John 
Gurley, February 19 and March 5, 1860; Diary of Eli Capell, 
in Eli Capell Papers (LLMVC), Capell kept meticulous records 
of the daily activities of his slaves, his records indicate 
that he often leased slaves to local farmers, see second week 
of September 1850.
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has demonstrated that slavery insured that few whites would 
be entirely dependent on others for sustenance. Jacksonian 
ideology, which played a central role in the political 
perceptions of the plain folk, emphasized that freedom is 
autonomy, and black slavery helped insure the piney-woods 
dwellers autonomous existence. Proslavery advocates argued 
that support for slavery was concomitant to support for 
republicanism. An 1856 article in DeBow1s Review noted "the 
perfect spirit of equality so prevalent among the whites of 
all the slaveholding states," a condition the author found 
absent in the class conscious North. The article continued 
"it is this spirit of equality which is both the generator 
and preserver of the genuine spirit of liberty." 
Abolitionist attacks on slavery were therefore equivalent to 
attacks upon the republican institutions of the South which 
insured white liberty. As a result, by the late 1840's the 
political rhetoric of the planters, which equated support for 
slavery with support for republicanism, greatly impacted the 
political philosophy of the plain folk. According to John 
Inscoe, slavery took on "a centrality in political rhetoric 
far out of proportion to any commitment which the extent of 
slave ownership alone would have justified."114
114 New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 3, 1856; 
Drew Gilpin Faust (ed.), The Ideology of Slavery: Proslaverv 
Thought in the Antebellum South. 1830-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1981) pp. 10-21; J. Mills 
Thornton, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama. 
1800-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1978) p. XVIII; DeBow's Review. XX, pp. 474-475; John Inscoe,
Increasing popular political participation beginning in 
the 1840's, forced the planters to rely more on persuasion to 
maintain their control of the mechanisms of government.115 
Concern that independent minded piney-woods farmers would 
either fail to understand the severity of the menace, or 
provide only lukewarm support for a cause which benefitted 
the planters far more than themselves, led to increasing 
amounts of proslavery rhetoric. This rhetoric often emerged 
as a defense of southern honor, or as a statement on the 
superiority of southern republican institutions which 
safeguarded the rights of all southern whites. But the 
underlying meaning usually remained a defense of the 
southern, slaveholding, way of life, and a reaction to 
threats against it.
Initially the pro-slavery rhetoric of the planters 
centered on the belief that North American slavery benefitted 
the slaves. Moreover, the proponents of slavery argued that 
only blacks could perform the type of labor on which southern 
prosperity depended. Alex Barrow, one West Feliciana's 
largest slaveholders, argued that "every man acquainted with 
the nature of our agricultural labours, and the destructive 
influence of our climate upon the white population must
Mountain Masters. Slavery, and the Sectional Crisis in 
Western North Carolina (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1989) p. 9.
115 For a detailed description of the nature and
evolution of planter dominance of the mechanisms of 
government see chapter three.
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acknowledge that without our negroes, we should be poor 
indeed." An attack on the hypocrisy of northerners whose 
economy allegedly depended on the products of slave labor 
often accompanied these arguments. In the summer of 1857, 
the New Orleans Daily Courier asserted that, "cotton cannot 
be raised profitably in the South by other than African slave 
labor. Without slavery the cotton growing region of the 
South would become a spiritless colony of the north."116 
This statement incorporated all the issues of persuasion 
employed by the proslavery advocates: loss of honor,
economic chaos, and northern domination. These issues 
carried an immense appeal to piney-woods farmers motivated by 
concerns for honor, independence, and self-sufficiency.
Similar arguments could be found in local papers. The
Feliciana Democrat defended slave labor as more efficient
than free labor, and claimed that the entire economy of the 
North depended on the products of the slave system.117 In 
the Spring of 1855, the same paper argued that if southerners 
did not present a united front to abolitionist attacks then, 
"our people are so dead to every feeling of independence and 
manly courage as to suffer themselves to be absorbed after a 
faint, and reluctant struggle, into the North, and to become
116 Alex Barrow to Colonel Hamilton, January 25, 1830, 
in William S. Hamilton Papers (LLMVC); DeBow's Review. XXIV, 
pp. 477-491, XI, pp. 184-197, and XVI, pp. 524-528; provides 
examples of this manner of argument; New Orleans Daily 
Courier. August 1, 1857.
117 Clinton Feliciana Democrat. May 5, 1855.
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the ready and cringing slaves to all its arrogant and 
unreasonable demands."118 Piney-woods newspapers also 
adopted the proslavery line. The Greensbiira Imperial 
published articles praising North American slavery for 
liberating the blacks from heathen oppression in Africa, and 
arguing that the labor required of slaves "would, in nine 
cases out of ten, prove fatal to a white man."119
This propaganda blitz served two primary purposes. 
First, it helped convince the plain folk that their manner of 
republican lifestyle was under attack as a result of the 
increasing assaults on slavery. Furthermore, it encouraged 
the belief among piney-woods dwellers that the great planters 
championed their cause against their enemies. The history of 
the Florida parishes, which exemplified the relationship 
between ineffective leadership and instability, strengthened 
the appeal of determined leadership. In the legislative 
session beginning in January 1856, the messages of both 
outgoing Governor P.O. Hebert and incoming Governor Robert 
Wickliffe exemplified the determined leadership presented by 
the planter aristocracy in the mid-1850's. In reference to 
the growing political friction with the North, Hebert argued 
that "the time for concessions on our part and compromises 
has past." Similarly Wickliffe maintained that if the South
118 Ibid, April 14, 1855.
119 Greensbura Imperial. June 6, 1857 and May 29,
1858.
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did not rise and present a united front to northern 
aggression "we shall have forfeited deservedly our heritage 
of freedom and the memory of our ancestors be but the brand 
of our own shame." In furtherance of this appeal Wickliffe 
argued for the sanctity of political participation and 
demanded that the laws to secure the suffrage "be stringent, 
stern and free from all ambiguity." The appearance of a 
strong reaction to external threats and seeming emphasis on 
securing the rights of the common man played well with the 
piney-woods dwellers. Local newspapers condemned the 
abolitionists and applauded the planter leadership who 
confronted the enemies of southern republicanism. The 
Feliciana Democrat commended "the old patriarchs of [St. 
Helena] Parish who are roused in opposition to this wild 
crusade against the Constitution and liberties of the 
republic." The Greensbura Imperial relentlessly attacked the 
enemies of the South and urged unqualified support for the 
proponents of southern rights.120
Annual Message of Governor P.O. Hebert, January 
22, 1856, and Inaugural Message of Governor Robert Wickliffe, 
January 28, 1856, both in Senate Journal. Third Legislature, 
First Session, 1856; The annual message of Governor Isaac 
Johnson, delivered January 21, 1850, also combines
condemnation of abolitionist agitation in the North with an 
aggressive demand for unrestricted suffrage, further 
demonstrating the correlation of these two principles which 
Louisiana politicians increasingly advocated as the sectional 
crisis escalated, Senate Journal, Third Legislature, First 
Session, 1850; Clinton Feliciana Democrat. September 8, 1855 
and December 29, 1855; Greensbura Imperial. April 25, May 30, 
June 6 and 13, 1857.
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The appeal of determined leadership helped to insure 
that the planters would maintain control over the piney-woods 
regions even as the plain folk became increasingly 
politically active in the 1840's and 1850's. Proslavery 
ideology or defense of southern rights, coupled with 
increasing stability and prosperity, served to consolidate 
planter dominance in the piney woods.
The hysterics and seemingly logical arguments presented 
by the newspapers, combined with the persuasive power of 
local politicians and men of wealth and standing, had an 
enormous impact on the piney-woods dwellers.121 By 1850, 
the combined effect of the intrusion of the cotton economy 
and fears of an abolitionist threat to their traditional way 
of life, encouraged the plain folk to defer to the wisdom and 
political skill of the planters, whose stake in the crisis 
appeared much greater. As a result, despite the liberalizing 
trend initiated in the 1840's, delta planters, who had always 
dominated the mechanisms of state government, maintained 
political dominance in the piney woods. Yet the political 
ascendancy of the planters was based on fear and economic
121 This is exemplified by the collapse of Jacksonian 
unionism and its replacement by the solid support for 
secession which emerged in the decade of the 1850's. For a 
description of the increasing intensity of the political 
appeal emphasizing the abolitionist threat to the southern 
way of life see - Annual Message of Governor Isaac Johnson, 
Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana. First 
Session, Third Legislature, January 21, 1850, and Annual
Message of Governor Robert Wickliffe, Journal of the House of 
Representatives of the State of Louisiana. First Session, 
Fifth Legislature, January 1860.
exploitation. With the Constitution of 1845, the ruling 
aristocracy granted the plain folk of Louisiana a few of the 
basic rights which had been enjoyed by commoners in most of 
the other southern states for decades. These concessions, 
partially designed to insure the piney-woods dwellers 
continued support in the face of growing abolitionist 
sentiment, succeeded in sustaining the political status quo 
during the brief liberalizing trend of the 1840's and early 
1850's. But during the early 1850's, their persistent 
success at the polls and resulting continued domination of 
the mechanisms of state government inspired a conservative 
backlash. The Constitution of 1852 restored unqualified 
political power to the planter aristocracy.122
The political dominance exercised by delta planters 
related directly to their increasing control over the economy 
in the piney woods.123 Though the piney-woods folk 
pugnaciously retained their traditional values, the 
increasing prosperity and stability of the late 1840's and 
early 1850's, coupled with increasing agricultural ties and 
shared fears, made the planter appeal very attractive. The
122 Chapter three provides a detailed discussion of the 
political fluctuations and the ramifications of those changes 
up to the secession crisis.
123 This statement conflicts with the interpretation 
presented by Steven Hahn in The Roots of Southern Populism: 
Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia 
Upcountrv 1850-1890. Hahn argues that though planters 
increased their contacts and political influence in the 
upcountry during the 1850's, their role in the economic life 
of the region actually receded.
sum of these circumstances combined to produce a brief moment 
of security in the Florida parishes. Unprecedented 
stability, prosperity, and governance by less than benevolent 
masters characterized all of the Florida parishes on the eve 
of disaster.
Chapter Three 
Government Behind the Times in Which We Live: 
The Seeds of Chaos
As the residents of the Florida parishes struggled with 
the enormous problems facing them in the early years of the 
nineteenth century, a political system emerged in Louisiana 
which would shape the destiny of the state through the end of 
the antebellum period. A coalition of planters and their 
commercial allies in New Orleans created a constitution that 
ensured their absolute dominance of the mechanisms of state 
government for decades. As conditions stabilized in West 
Florida, the planters in the delta parishes became a vital 
component of the ruling coalition. The plain folk 
essentially remained outside the political realm. The 
expansion of the cotton economy into the piney woods allowed 
the delta planters to exercise increasing control over the 
means of access to market, thus diversifying their power and 
reinforcing their political dominance in the eastern 
parishes. Substantive politics remained behind closed doors, 
while the campaigns themselves constituted quiet affairs with 
limited participation. But in the last years of the
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antebellum period this situation changed dramatically. In 
the first week of November 1855, J.B. Harris the editor of 
the Clinton American Patriot. asserted, "the political 
excitement between the two parties in this section for the 
last week has been too high for comfort. The election is 
over and we are glad at the returning prospect of peace and 
quietude."124 The candidates endorsed by the American 
Patriot had been defeated in every major contest. Yet 
Harris' concern centered less on the defeat, and more on the 
highly charged atmosphere surrounding the election. The 
volatile nature of this election symbolized circumstances in 
the Florida parishes at the close of the antebellum period.
Intense political campaigns, such as the one which 
concerned Harris, were a relatively new phenomena in the 
Florida parishes. For over thirty years, following the 
incorporation of West Florida into Louisiana, politics 
remained in the realm of the privileged few, generating 
little interest among the plain folk. This retarded 
political development resulted from a combination of 
evolving, though inclusive, circumstances.
Initially, the chaotic conditions of the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century inhibited the development 
of an aggressive political system in the Florida parishes. 
Continuing uncontrolled criminal activity, disputed land 
claims, and the emerging prosperity accompanying agricultural
124 Clinton American Patriot. November 10, 1855.
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success, interested the residents more than politics. The 
absence of effective means of communication and 
transportation in the sparsely populated parishes also 
contributed to this condition. More importantly, the popular 
perception of the role and nature of politics created by the 
restrictions inherent in the Louisiana Constitution of 1812 
determined the course of political development.
The 1812 document, like many state constitutions of the 
period, served the interests of the elite. The right to vote 
extended only to those white males, twenty one years of age, 
who had resided in the state at least one year prior to the 
election, and had paid state taxes in the six months 
preceding the election. This restrictive constitutional 
provision, particularly the clause concerning the payment of 
taxes, served to prevent large numbers of residents from 
voting.125 Yet the lack of interest in politics did not 
result solely from the constitutional limitations on the 
franchise. Despite these restrictions, most Louisianians, 
through the early 1840's, exhibited little interest in 
politics. In 1822, 47.9 percent of white males over twenty 
one qualified as electors. Barely 50 percent of this group 
typically voted. Over twenty years later little had changed. 
Of the 50,110 males twenty-one years and older in 1844,
125 Constitution or Form of Government of the State of 
Louisiana (New Orleans: Joseph Baird, Printer to the
Convention, 1812), (hereinafter referred to as Constitution 
of Louisiana. 1812) Article II, Section VIII, pp.6-7.
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32,508 or 64.8 percent qualified to vote. Yet only 43 
percent of those qualified actually cast their ballots.126 
This trend continued through the middle of the 1840's. The 
percentage of qualified electors who actually voted ranged 
from a low of 19.2 percent to a high near 45 percent. The 
pattern established prior to 1845 contrasted with voter 
turnout in the late 1840s and 1850s when an average of nearly 
55 percent of the electorate cast their ballots.127
The 1812 Constitution and the mechanisms of government it 
produced denied the masses of Louisianians any substantive 
political influence. Enormous power was concentrated in the 
hands of the legislature. As late as 1824 Louisiana remained 
one of only six states in which the legislature persisted in 
selecting presidential electors. The absence of popular 
participation in the selection of presidential electors so 
thoroughly exemplified the anti-democratic tendencies of
126 Figures for 1822 based on - Journal of the House 
of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, (hereinafter 
referred to as House Journal) Fifth Legislature, Second 
Session, January 29, 1822, pp. 26-27; Fourth Census of the 
United States. 1820. "Compendium" (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, 1821) p. 31; Figures for 1844 based on - House 
Journal. Sixteenth Legislature, Second Session, January 9, 
1844, p. 11; "Report of the Special Committee," Journal of 
the Convention Called for the Purpose of Re-adopting. 
Amending, or Changing the Constitution of the State of 
Louisiana (New Orleans: Besancon, Ferguson, and Company,
1845) p.56; Sixth Census of the United States. 1840. 
Compendium (Washington: Thomas Allen, 1841) p. 60.
127 Historical Statistics of the United States
Colonial Times to 1970. pt.II (Washington: United States
Government Printing, 1975) p. 1072 (hereinafter referred to 
as Historical Statistics^.
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Louisiana government that the St. Francisville Asylum urged 
its readers to follow the policy advocated in the Journal. 
another local newspaper, and write the name of their choice 
for president on their congressional ballot so that, "a 
tolerably correct idea of the public sentiment may be 
obtained." Moreover, the legislature enjoyed the privilege 
of selecting the governor from among the top two candidates 
in the general primary. Once installed, the governor 
exercised sweeping powers of appointment increasing the 
possibilities for patronage and cronyism.128 A strong 
executive contrasted with government in many other states 
where concentrations of power continued to be viewed with 
suspicion. These features of the 1812 document not only 
denied the voters the right of popular election for statewide 
and national offices, but also further entrenched the power 
of the governing elite.
The safeguards erected to maintain the political 
dominance of the elite increased voter despondency. Strict 
property requirements insured that only men of means would 
seek public office.129 Indeed the entire political
128 Constitution of Louisiana. 1812. Article III,
Section 9 and 10, pp.13-14 and Article III, Section II, pp. 
11-12; Historical Statistics, pt. II, p.1072; Emmett Asseff 
The History of the Government of Louisiana (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana Legislative Council, 1964) p.53; St. Francisville 
The Asylum and Feliciana Advertiser. July 3, 1824.
129 Constitution of Louisiana. 1812, Article II,
Section IV, p.5 required that state representatives possess 
at least $500 worth of property; Article II, Section 12, p.8 
required state senators to possess $1000 worth of property;
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structure of Louisiana in the first half of the nineteenth 
century emerged as the exclusive domain of the privileged 
few. The coalition of delta planters and New Orleans 
commercial interests which dominated state government 
jealously guarded their power. This coalition initially 
developed as a result of the mutual economic interests shared 
by planters and their lawyers and factors in New Orleans. 
The efforts of this combination to protect their own economic 
position translated into ungualified political power. All 
efforts to liberalize the political system were rejected by 
the legislature. An 1824 bill entitled "An Act for Enlarging 
the Privilege of Voting," failed in the Senate by a nine to 
five vote. Excepting the vote cast by the senator from 
Lafourche, all votes in the affirmative came from piney-woods 
representatives from north Louisiana and the Florida 
parishes.130
The ruling politicians also secured and traded offices 
regularly, further entrenching their powers of patronage. In 
the fall of 1824, T.B. Robertson resigned as governor to 
accept a less demanding judicial position. Robertson's 
resignation occurred with the understanding that United 
States Senator Henry Johnson would resign and be elected 
governor. A candidate endorsed by both Robertson and Johnson
Article III, Section IV, p. 12 required the Governor to 
possess $5000 worth of property.
130 Senate Journal. Seventh Legislature, First
Session, December 16, 1824.
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would in turn receive the Senate seat. The collusion between 
these two powerful political figures exemplified the 
restrictive nature of office holding in Louisiana and earned 
them the nickname "willing despots." In response to those 
critical of his seeming absolute power Robertson asserted, 
"the people have no right to say who is to govern them - the 
constitution places the power in my hands." This manner of 
arrogance and seeming misappropriation of power served to 
weaken the planter elite in the last years preceding 
secession.131
Through the end of the antebellum period, despite 
efforts to the contrary, the eastern Florida parishes never 
secured the nomination of a local candidate for a statewide 
office. This contrasted sharply with the enormous political 
power exercised by the delta region of the Florida parishes. 
In the Summer of 1855, G.W. Munday, state senator from East 
Feliciana Parish, declined the nomination for state treasurer 
noting that the nominees for governor and state auditor lived 
less than twenty-five miles from his home and the ticket 
would therefore be "geographically imbalanced."132 West 
Feliciana politicians in particular exercised immense power
131 House Journal. Seventh Legislature, First Session, 
November 1824, pp. 2-8; Quote of then Governor T.B. 
Robertson, found in letter John B. Dawson to William 
Hamilton, April 6, 1825, William S. Hamilton Papers (LLMVC), 
Dawson not only referred to Robertson and Johnson as willing 
despots but also as cowards.
132 Clinton Feliciana Democrat. April 21, 1855 and
June 23, 1855.
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in state government. Two of the last four governors prior to 
secession, Isaac Johnson and Robert C. Wickliffe, hailed from 
West Feliciana. The political fortunes of the native sons of 
West Feliciana further demonstrated the correlation between 
financial success and political power.
Despite Louisiana's separate development under the 
French and Spanish, restrictive politics were not unique to 
the Bayou State in the early nineteenth century. Numerous 
southern and border states employed similar practices. South 
Carolina, in particular, employed the most restrictive 
political system in the nation. Yet with the exception of 
South Carolina, voter apathy remained far more pronounced in 
Louisiana than any other southern state through the 184 0's. 
Voter turnout in Louisiana paled in comparison with Alabama, 
Mississippi, and other neighboring states. In the 1840 
presidential election the turnout reached a high of 89.7 
percent in Alabama and 88.2 percent in Mississippi while only 
39.4 percent of Louisiana voters cast their ballots.133
The isolated condition of much of Louisiana, 
particularly the bayou and piney-woods parishes, certainly 
contributed to low voter turnout. No newspapers existed in 
the piney woods until the late 1830's. Their absence made it 
hard to advertise elections, and travel to the polls could be 
both difficult and dangerous. Yet during the 182 0's and 
1830's virtually all of the southern states contained
133 Historical Statistics, pt. 2, p.1072.
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isolated regions facing similar problems. Moreover, voter 
turnout typically remained low in the delta parishes as well, 
even though newspapers there regularly advertised for 
candidates and elections. Though the seeming lack of 
interest in politics reflected the national trend in this 
period, several issues of particular significance to the 
regions development contributed to this condition in the 
Florida parishes.
In the same way they accepted vague land claims, 
emerging prosperity and stability encouraged the residents to 
avoid potentially divisive issues, politics being one of the 
most apparent. Into the early 1840's local political 
contests stimulated little public interest. This indifferent 
attitude contrasted sharply with the boisterous campaigns of 
the late 1840's and 1850's, which witnessed the aggressive 
courting of voters through heated political meetings, 
barbecues, and other practices associated with mass political 
processes. In the first decades after statehood politics 
followed a consistent pattern in eastern Louisiana. 
Gentlemen of means allowed their names to be placed before 
the voters with little if any indication of the candidates 
position on significant issues presented to the public. 
Regarding his decision to seek election to a local judicial 
post, West Feliciana planter and physician Thomas W. Chinn 
explained, "at first I thought it would be wrong for me to 
countenance the applications [to run for office] in my favor,
but upon more mature reflection, I concluded to let the thing 
take such a course as the people thought proper to give 
it."134 Voters typically aligned themselves with the most 
powerful regional candidate regardless of his political 
views. To avoid offending candidates, newspapers such as the 
St. Francisville Louisianian repeatedly asserted the neutral 
nature of their politics. In the summer of 1824, another 
West Feliciana newspaper, the Asvlum aggressively maintained 
its neutral position: "we shall not attempt, although in
common with all thinking persons, we have our individual 
preferences, to draw any invidious comparisons between the 
candidates, or to bias the minds of our fellow citizens in 
their choice - the people have sufficient intelligence to 
choose for themselves." Though this noncommittal attitude 
likely related to their desire to sell more newspapers, the 
failure to take a firm stand discouraged both commitment 
among the voters and an interest in politics in general. 
Discouraged by the refusal of several planter candidates to 
campaign and the lack of voter interest in an 1824 election 
in the Florida parishes, a West Feliciana politician wrote 
"there seems to be a total absence of enthusiasm or even
134 Thomas W. Chinn to William S. Hamilton, August 9, 
1823, in William S. Hamilton Papers (LLMVC).
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public spirit here...what indifference will not take at this 
moment.11135
Throughout the 182 0's though they provided extensive 
coverage of congressional debates, local newspapers typically 
announced candidates and results, but said little if anything 
regarding the candidate's position on the issues. On October 
2, 1819, the Louisianian announced a special election to
replace a local member of the state legislature who had 
resigned to accept the parish judgeship. Not only did they 
fail to mention any specifics concerning the candidates, but 
in the weeks that followed the successful candidate was never 
identified. Similarly, in reference to a coming municipal 
election in the Spring of 1826, the Louisiana Journal 
asserted, "though we do not know who the candidates are we 
hope good men will be chosen." To fill the blank spaces 
created by their failure to stimulate public debate of 
significant issues, candidates often appealed to the baser 
emotions of the electorate. An 182 2 election to the 
Louisiana House of Representatives in West Feliciana Parish 
focused exclusively on the honor of the candidates. The
St. Francisville Louisianian. October 2, 1819 and 
March 23, 182 0; St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. March 2, 
1826; St. Francisville The Asylum and Feliciana Advertiser. 
June 19, 1822 and July 3, 1822; DeBow's Review. XI, p. 266
notes the neutral political stance always taken by the 
Jackson Southern Mirror; John Hebron Moore, The Emergence of 
the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988) p. 145; John B. 
Dawson to Colonel Hamilton, July 3, 1824, in William S.
Hamilton Papers (LLMVC).
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substance of the contest centered on candidate Edward R. 
Chew's contention that his opponent Charles Woodrooff had, 
"refused after suitable application to render the author such 
satisfaction as one gentleman ought to render another." 
During the course of the campaign Chew distributed broadsides 
throughout the parish condemning Woodroof's alleged cowardice 
and asking the voters if they could accept a man as 
representative "whose pusillanimity of public spirit tamely 
submits he cannot be expected to be a bold defender of public 
rights." Chew's allegations obviously carried weight with 
the voters as he led Woodroof in the polling by nearly two to 
one.136
Actions of the state legislature also frequently 
received little if any special notice in the local papers. 
In the spring of 182 0, numerous editorials in the Louisianian 
condemned the efforts in Congress to restrict the spread of 
slavery into Missouri. Yet the same paper shrugged off the 
actions of the state legislature noting that, "little of 
general interest" had occurred. Another article in the same 
issue acknowledged that a group of state representatives was 
visiting St. Francisville, but asserted that they had not
13 St. Francisville The Asylum and Feliciana
Advertiser. June 19, 1822; see also Edward R. Chew broadside 
"To The Public," June 25, 1822, in William S. Hamilton Papers 
(LLMVC); the feud between these two continued for years, Chew 
challenged Woodroof repeatedly only to have Woodroof accept 
then employ friends to mediate the dispute, see A. Harralson 
to Colonel Hamilton, June 17, 1826, in William S. Hamilton 
Papers (LLMVC).
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revealed anything interesting concerning the actions of the 
legislature.137
The less the average citizen knew about the actions of 
the state legislature, the better for the planters and their 
allies who controlled the mechanisms of state government. As 
always, the absolute dominance of the rulers depended upon 
the ignorance of the ruled. Yet a precious few voices did 
urge the legislature to grant more power to the people. In 
the winter of 1824 one such appeal read, "we have been 
anxiously looking for some effort to be made in our 
Legislature, to place in the hands of the people, the 
election of electors of President and Vice President. As yet
we have seen nothing of the kind attempted. The people
should receive this inestimable right."138 This entreaty, 
though extremely rare in the 1820s, foreshadowed the strategy 
of the planters in the 1850s.
The nature and substance of newspaper reporting in the
first three decades after statehood suggested the designs of 
the controlling elite. As always, newspapers played a 
fundamental role in shaping the inclinations of the public.
St. Francisville The Louisianian. October 2, 1819, 
March 23 and 30, 182 0; St. Francisville Louisiana Journal.
July 22, 1824, March 2 and 9, 182 6. Larger urban newspapers 
such as the Baton Rouge Gazette did provide details on 
significant debates in the state legislature. These papers, 
however, had few subscribers among the plain folk in rural 
areas.
St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. February 5,
1824.
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The power of newspapers is particularly significant in 
regions with high rates of literacy. By 1850, fully 82 
percent of the white population of the Florida parishes over 
twenty years of age could read and write. Literacy extended 
to almost 90 percent of white residents in the plantation 
parishes and to slightly more than 77 percent of the 
residents in the piney woods.139 As a result, the planters, 
who usually either owned or exercised direct influence over 
local newspapers, skillfully employed the press to arouse the 
plain folk against the growing menace to their way of life 
presented by an increasingly aggressive North. Of the five 
primary nespapers published in the Florida parishes in this 
period three belonged to planters. One of these the 
Louisianian, belonged to G.W. Munday who served repeatedly in 
the Louisiana legislature. The Asylum and the Louisiana 
Journal belonged to F. Bradford and William Hamilton, both 
prominent planter politicians. Each of the other two were 
heavily influenced by planter interests.
In summarizing the role played by the newspapers in a 
congressional race in the Florida parishes, one disgruntled 
supporter of the defeated candidate concluded "thus you see 
what means the holders of power have adopted to prolong the
These figures are based on a survey of the heads 
of households listed in the Seventh Census of the United 
States. 1850. Exact figures for each parish are as follows: 
East Baton Rouge 91 percent, East Feliciana 94 percent. West 
Feliciana 85 percent, St. Helena 84 percent, Livingston 74 
percent, St. Tammany 74 percent, Washington 76 percent.
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reign of their masters and what dreadful odds we have had to 
contend against."1*0 Yet at the same time the planters, 
through the newspapers, sought not only to limit the 
commoners participation in politics, but also to contain 
their awareness of the actions of state government. The 
scarcity of reporting concerning state government, and the 
minimum of election coverage, likely contributed 
significantly to the piney-woods dweller's disinterest in 
politics. Not only did politics appear to be exclusively in 
the realm of the elite, but sparse coverage made it boring.
The election process itself did little to stimulate 
voter interest. Unlike other states of the Gulf South, 
notably Alabama and Mississippi, where universal white male 
suffrage often contributed to a festive atmosphere at the 
polls on election day, the restrictive nature of Louisiana 
politics in the early antebellum period did not encourage a 
jovial mood at the voting precincts. Election guidelines, 
which varied slightly concerning the specifics in each 
parish, contained detailed regulations backed by stiff 
penalties to ensure that only those qualified voted. These 
regulations encouraged those not qualified to avoid the polls 
on election day. The absence of large gatherings at the
P.K. Wagner to William Hamilton, July 30, 1826, in 
William S. Hamilton Papers (LLMVC).
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precincts, particularly in the rural parishes, contributed to 
the somber atmosphere surrounding elections.141
The parish judge, who served as the overseer of each 
election, appointed three commissioners for each precinct. 
At each precinct the judge himself or a justice of the peace 
served as one of the commissioners to enhance the perception 
of legitimacy. Typically three sites in each parish 
constituted the only polling places. Public buildings and 
general stores served as precincts, as did the homes of 
prominent gentlemen. During an 1819 election in the 
Feliciana district, polling took place at "Wilsons Store in 
Bayou Sara, Evangelist Edwards house on the Comite, and at 
the Jackson Courthouse." Normally the sites selected as 
precincts were widely scattered to compensate for 
difficulties in travel. To give those qualified time to 
reach the polls, the election extended for a three day 
period. On the day of the election voters cast their ballots 
on one ticket listing the names of their preference in each 
race. The ballots could be either printed or handwritten 
with no apparent standard format required. By contrast, 
specific regulations controlled the construction and 
maintenance of the ballot boxes. The requirements stipulated 
that the boxes must contain a device which concealed the
141 A New Digest of the Statute Laws of the State of 
Louisiana. From the Change of Government to the Year 1841. 
Inclusive (New Orleans: E. Johns and Company, 1842), herein 
after referred to as Digest of the Statute Laws of the State 
of Louisiana. 1841.
112
ballots cast from the eyes of the commissioners. Three 
separate locks secured the ballot box with each commissioner 
given possession of one key. At 4:00 P.M. on the third day 
of voting, the commissioners would gather at the parish 
courthouse, open the boxes and count the ballots before the 
observers there gathered. Departures from this procedure 
constituted grounds to nullify the election. The use of a 
hat covered by a handkerchief at one precinct in St. Helena 
Parish during a legislative race, instead of the prescribed 
ballot box, provoked weeks of bitter controversy in the 
legislature regarding the legality of the election.142
Elections for state legislators, as well as those for 
Congress were held on the first Monday in July. The Creole 
politicians who dominated the 1812 constitutional debates 
insisted on this date to take advantage of many American 
residents' tendency to be absent during Louisiana's sultry, 
plague-ridden summer months. Upon arrival at the polls, 
voters typically encountered the most affluent and respected 
gentlemen each candidate could muster, who greeted them and 
solicited their support. The candidates dispatched carriages 
into the countryside to bring in their known supporters who
142 Digest of the Statute Laws of the State of
Louisiana. 1841. p p .  386-392; St. Francisville The Asylum and 
Feliciana Advertiser. June 26, 1824, provides a good example 
of a parish judges proclamation of election; St.Francisville 
The Louisianian. October 2, 1819, provides the example of the 
location of voting precincts; Hous e J ourna1 . Third 
Legislature, First Session, see February 16, 1856 for the
majority and minority reports and conclusion of the 
controversy.
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might otherwise fail to vote. Inside the precincts, the 
commissioners sat at tables observing the process and 
guarding against irregularities. Voters entered the 
precinct, announced their name and stated their 
qualifications to vote, which the commissioners verified by 
checking the tax rolls. Upon verification of eligibility, 
voters then placed their folded ballot in the box. 
Occasionally ballots were cast viva voce, particularly in the 
country parishes where ballots often proved scarce. Yet 
announcing one's choice vocally increased the opportunity for 
intimidation, which always remained a problem, particularly 
in New Orleans. In an effort to combat illegal practices the 
law dealt harshly with those who sought to purchase votes 
with whiskey or outright monetary gifts. Despite these 
efforts, both intimidation and buying votes constituted a 
common aspect of Louisiana elections. Yet election trickery 
remained even more common. An election seldom passed where 
assessors did not omit known political opponents from the tax 
rolls or fabricated rumors of yellow fever did not keep 
dozens of voters away from the polls.143
143 A.M. Harralson to Colonel Hamilton, July 15, 1826, 
and T.F. Hunt to Hamilton, July 30, 1826, both in William S. 
Hamilton Papers (LLMVC), describe prominent gentlemen 
greeting voters at the polls; Digest of the Statute Laws of 
the State of Louisiana. 1841 pp. 386-392; St. Francisville 
Louisiana Journal. February 5, 1824; St. Francisville The
Louisianian. October 2, 1819; Senate Journal. First
Legislature, First session, February 1846; Joseph G. Tregle, 
"Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Study in Ego Politics"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1954) pp. 99 
and 126; Clinton Feliciana Democrat. November 10, 1855,
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In the first decades of the nineteenth century voter 
apathy in Louisiana, and the Florida parishes in particular, 
related directly to two additional and seemingly obvious 
aspects of the region's development. First, until Louisiana 
became a part of the United States, most of her citizens had 
no experience whatsoever with representative government. 
Unlike neighboring southern states whose dominant American 
majorities contained many who had experienced this type of 
government, most Louisianians enjoyed no tradition of 
political representation. Louisiana residents therefore 
required time to acclimate themselves to the significance of 
representative government. This delay assisted the better- 
educated and more worldly planters to establish political 
dominance. Rather than seeing planter political dominance as 
a threat, the commoners, lacking experience in such matters, 
instead welcomed this authority because of the unprecedented 
stability which accompanied it. Furthermore, as the cotton 
economy expanded, bringing prosperity with it to the piney 
woods, the farmers there naturally sought economic security 
first. Full stomachs and a self-sufficient lifestyle free of 
the economic exploitation Jefferson warned about, not 
politics, dominated the thinking of the plain folk.144
provides a good example of a calculated effort on the part of 
a political party to create a yellow fever panic in Jackson, 
Louisiana in order to keep voters away from the polls.
144 Perry Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana 
1812-1852 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1957) hereinafter referred to as Howard, Political Tendencies
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Yet as the region stabilized and increasing numbers of 
piney-woods farmers achieved economic security, Louisiana's 
antiquated political system came under increasing attack. 
Jacksonian politics which emphasized the threat to republican 
institutions posed by the monster bank and other sources of 
undemocratic privilege, stimulated many Louisiana farmers to 
reassess their fealty to the existing political order. 
Increasing migration of settlers from other states already 
accustomed to democratic privilege furthered this 
transformation. As both the Whigs and Democrats canvassed 
the state insisting that their program constituted the best 
means to preserve republican ideals, increasing numbers came 
to recognize the restrictive nature of Louisiana's political 
system. The inconsistencies between the republican tradition 
they held so dear and their state's political structure 
became ever more apparent to many commoners. The removal of 
the state capital from Donaldsonville and its return to New 
Orleans in the early 183 0s prompted one embittered farmer to 
write the Baton Rouge Gazette:
in Louisiana, pp. 25 and 49; Roger Shugg, Origins of the 
Class Struggle in Louisiana: A Social History of White
Farmers and Laborers During Slavery and After. 1840-1875 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1939)
hereinafter referred to as Shugg, Origins of the Class 
Struggle in Louisiana, p. 31.
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For many years the Aristocrats have given law to the 
state - they can not bear the idea of sharing the 
government with honest farmers and mechanics of the 
country. They are aware that should the seat of 
government be permanently fixed out of the vortex of 
their intrigues, the good sense of the country members 
of the Legislature will enable them to introduce reform 
into the state. This may be emphatically termed the 
time for asserting the rights of the people - for 
laughing unto scorn the machinations of those knots of 
Aristocrats who regard the working man as nothing. And 
it will be disgraceful to the people of Louisiana if - 
at a time when the popular cause is so nobly progressing 
in France and the Netherlands, it should cower to a band 
of Aristocrats on the banks of the Mississippi.145
Increasing agitation for political change, led in part 
by Soloman W. Downs of Ouachita Parish, swept the northern 
part of the state. Initially the representatives of the 
eastern parishes, including the piney-woods region of the 
Florida parishes, did not take part in this movement. The 
plantation system which had developed and the level of
145 Baton Rouge Gazette. January 1, 1831; Marvin
Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957) pp. 8-9; James K. 
Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly. XII, No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as Greer, 
"Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861") p. 409.
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planter dominance there, prompted these representatives to 
vote with the delta planters. On several crucial votes at 
the 1845 constitutional convention the piney-woods delegates 
from the Florida parishes demonstrated their reluctance to 
support substantive reform. Most significantly two of the 
four piney-woods representatives voted against the abolition 
of property requirements for office holding.146
The failure of the piney-woods representatives from the 
Florida parishes to vote as a bloc in support of democratic 
reform contrasted sharply with their position twenty years 
earlier. In the 1820's and 183 0's the representatives from 
the eastern Florida parishes, along with those from northern 
Louisiana, unanimously supported the few bills presented 
advocating democratic reform.147 This change of attitude 
exemplified the significance of the expansion of the 
plantation economy into the piney woods and its impact on 
political ideals. Indeed by the late 1840's the
representatives from the piney woods of the Florida parishes
146 Journal of the Convention Called for the Purpose 
of Re-Adopting. Amending or Changing the Constitution of the 
State of Louisiana. 1845 (New Orleans: Besancon, Ferguson and 
Co., 1845) hereinafter referred to as Journal of the 
Constitutional Convention of 1845. p. 63; Minnie Ruffin and 
Lilia McClure, "General Soloman Weathersby Downs, Democratic 
Leader of North Louisiana, 1840-1854," Louisiana Historical 
Quarterly. XVII, No. 1, pp. 11 and 14 (Downs served as a 
principal proponent of the constitutional convention of 1845 
and as a leader of the reformers at the convention) ; Howard, 
Political Tendencies in Louisiana p. 67.
147 Senate Journal. Seventh Legislature, First
Session, December 16, 1824; House Journal. Tenth Legislature, 
First Session, February 2, 1831.
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frequently voted with the planter representatives, often at 
the expense of the plain folk in their own region. An 1850 
bill designed to exclude from sheriff seizure the property or 
home of a debtor whose total estate did not exceed $450 would 
have served to protect large numbers of Florida parish 
farmers from possible confiscation of their homesteads. Yet 
the bill failed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 
58 to 21. All of the piney-woods representatives from 
upstate Louisiana voted in favor of the bill while their 
counterparts in the Florida parishes unanimously opposed 
it.148
Despite the stiff opposition to change, the momentum for 
political reform continued to increase. Twice in the late 
1830's the Senate rejected proposals made by the lower house 
authorizing the calling of a constitutional convention. By 
the early 1840's the ruling elite could no longer ignore the 
increasing voices demanding political reform. In his annual 
message to the Louisiana legislature, Governor Alexander 
Mouton noted that "an entire revolution in public opinion" 
had occurred. Mouton continued:
House Journal. Third Legislature, First Session, 
March 12, 1850; Ibid., Fourth Legislature, First Session,
February 21, 1852; Senate Journal. Third Legislature, First 
Session, February 14, 1850; Ibid., February 27 and 28, 1854; 
Ibid., Session of 1848, February 16, 1848 and March 3, 1848; 
Milton Rickels, "Thomas Bangs Thorpe in the Felicianas, 1836- 
1842," Louisiana Historical Quarterly XXXIX, No. 2, pp. 175- 
176.
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it must fill the Patriot's heart with joy to behold 
people peaceably assembling in the exercise of their 
natural rights and Sovereign Power; to alter or abolish 
their government when necessary: and to institute a new
government - in such a form as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their safety and happiness. It would 
be a degrading reverence for the darkness of antiquity, 
to adhere to governments far behind the times in which 
we live. Let us organize a government for ourselves, 
adapted to the virtuous and enlightened state of society 
to which we are elevated, and framed by the high 
political wisdom to which we have attained.149
The 1844 election called to determine popular support 
for a constitutional convention resulted in a massive 
outpouring of support for pro-convention forces. Nearly 80 
percent of those voting cast their ballots in support of a 
new constitution. In the piney-woods region of the Florida 
parishes support for the convention ranged from 100 percent 
in Livingston to 93 percent in St. Helena. Though less so 
than in the piney woods, the plantation parishes also 
provided large majorities in support of the convention. The 
vote in favor of the convention totalled: 95 percent in East
Annual Address of Governor Alfred Mouton, House 
Journal. Sixteenth Legislature, Second Session, 1844, pp. 2- 
5; James K. Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly XII, No. 3, p. 409.
120
Feliciana, 86 percent in West Feliciana, and 89 percent in 
East Baton Rouge. The plantation parishes around New Orleans 
and the sugar belt parishes returned the only significant 
anti-convention majorities.150
The resulting 1845 constitutional convention overcame 
bitter rivalries between New Orleans and the country parishes 
and made sweeping democratic reforms in the organic law of 
the state. The new constitution curtailed the power of the 
legislature and prohibited monopolies and special charters, 
long sources of abuse of legislative power. Other features 
provided for the establishment of free public education and 
for the protection of basic civil liberties. Perhaps most 
importantly, the changes made in the election laws created 
unprecedented opportunity for the mass of plain folk. The 
new constitution forbade all property tests for voters and 
candidates for public office. This provision dramatically 
expanded the franchise and allowed men of modest means to 
seek public office. The level of democratization of the 
state law was exemplified by the preamble of each document. 
Whereas the 1812 document began with "We the representatives 
of the people," and ended with "do mutually agree with each
150 Figures derived from percentages of total vote 
listed by parish in House Journal. Sixteenth Legislature, 
Second Session, January 9, 1844; numbers in support of the 
convention from the remaining piney-woods parishes totalled 
98% in Washington and 95.8% in St. Tammany. Significant 
majorities against the convention were recorded in; St. 
Charles, St. John, St. Bernard, Lafourche, Terrebonne, and 
Iberville.
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other to form ourselves into a free and independent state," 
the new constitution exemplified the democratic spirit which 
produced it. The preamble to the 1845 document read, "We the 
people of the state of Louisiana do ordain and establish this 
Constitution. "151
The new constitution fulfilled the democratic 
aspirations of the vast majority of Louisianians. Opposition 
to the new document, found primarily among Whig planter and 
commercial interests, received a devastating setback on 
February 18, 1845 when the convention voted 38 to 28 to
remove property qualifications for officeholding. 
Recognizing defeat, the opponents of the constitution found 
solace in the argument that their economic power could be 
translated into political power, thereby negating the need 
for property requirements.152 Senator Soloman Downs and 
other supporters of the new constitution repeatedly reminded 
the recalcitrants that property had always been capable of 
taking care of itself regardless of who dominated the 
mechanisms of government. Downs insisted that in his 
judgement poorer whites had always been and would continue as 
the protectors of the property of the rich, and therefore it
151 Constitution of Louisiana. 1812. p. 1;
Constitution of the State of Louisiana. 1845 (Herein after 
referred to as Constitution of Louisiana. 1845) found in 
Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1845. p. 342.
152 Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1845. 
p. 63; Shugg, Origins of the Class Struggle in Louisiana, p. 
127.
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remained for the ruling elite to grant the commoners the 
political rights they so earnestly desired.153
Downs comments foreshadowed developments in Louisiana 
through the end of the antebellum period. Increasing 
economic control over the plain folk would prove even more 
beneficial to the planter elite than had simple political 
control. Though forced by popular demand to relinquish some 
political power, their increasing control over the economy in 
the piney woods not only abrogated the lost political ground, 
but also served to make the plain folk ever more dependent on 
services provided by the planters.
Whether piney-woods farmers raised surplus vegetables, 
herded livestock, or cut timber, large planters had always 
constituted a significant market for their goods. This 
relationship between the planters and the plain folk, though 
beneficial to both, gave the planters a degree of economic 
leadership over the piney-woods farmers. Planters frequently 
allowed farmers to grind corn in their mills or transported 
goods to market for their less wealthy neighbors. Yet the 
growing emphasis on cotton, during the 1840's and early 
1850's, provided the planters with an unprecedented
153 Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1845f 
This argument served as a constant theme in Downs repeated 
efforts throughout the convention to persuade the old guard 
to accept reform as inevitable and just. For a brief
synopsis of Downs argument see Shugg, Origins of the Class 
Struggle in Louisiana, p. 127.
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opportunity to increase their influence in the piney-woods 
parishes.
To be profitable, cotton production required both 
capital and machinery. As farmers invested their limited 
resources in land and labor, most lacked the means to 
purchase gins, oxen, and other essentials necessary to 
process and transport the precious fibre to market. As a 
result, a system developed whereby farmers, lacking 
sufficient resources, would sell their cotton to a nearby 
planter to be ginned and transported to market. This process 
allowed the planters a direct influence over the economic 
fortunes of the smaller cotton farmers. Planters either 
purchased the farmers cotton outright, or charged a fee or 
percentage to gin the cotton and an additional amount to 
transport it to market. This arrangement, allowing the 
planter to act as factor for the small farmer, benefitted 
both parties. The farmer profited from the immediate cash 
payment he usually received for his crop. Though the payment 
he accepted typically remained below the premium market 
value. The planter in turn benefitted from the markup on the 
farmer's cotton, or from fees charged for ginning and 
transporting it. Yet the advantage clearly lay with the 
planter, not only in terms of profit, but in the increasing 
level of control he exercised over the farmer. Planters were 
not alone in procuring cotton from the smaller farmers. Many 
country merchants also purchased cotton. In larger towns
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such as Clinton, numerous storeowners and commercial agents 
such as the firms of A. Levi and R.H. Draughon actively 
participated in the cotton trade. Most of these small town 
merchants, however, had direct connections to planter 
interests and in most cases, complemented rather than 
competed with the trade carried on by the planters.154
Abel John Norwood, a prominent planter and politician in 
East Feliciana Parish, epitomized the planter serving as 
factor for local farmers. Norwood's operations involved 
processing and transporting cotton for local farmers as well 
as buying crops outright which he later sold in the New 
Orleans markets. By the late 184 0's his extensive purchases 
of the crops of local farmers, and of those in neighboring 
parishes and counties, gained him a partnership in a major 
New Orleans factorage firm. Norwood also translated his
1:* S.M. Gafsarray to A.J. Norwood, December 5, 1870, 
in Abel John Norwood Papers (LLMVC); List of five purchases 
of cotton ranging from 5 to 70 bales by Robert Barrow, 
October 1834 to February 1835, in James P. Bowman Family 
Papers, Ibid.; Receipt for $53.50, Joseph Embree to Daniel 
Tousinau, July 10, 1851, in Joseph Embree Papers, ibid.; R.H. 
Draughon Record Book, 1860, one volume containing numerous 
entries winter and spring 1860; Ralph Haskins, "Planter and 
Cotton Factor in the Old South; Some Areas of Friction," 
Agricultural History XXIX. No. 1, p. 12; Moore, The Emergence 
of the Cotton Kingdom in the Old Southwest, pp. 234-235; 
Harold Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers; Financing and 
Marketing the Cotton Crop of the South. 1800-1925 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1968) p.68; Lacy Ford, Origins 
of Southern Radicalism; The South Carolina Upcountrv. 1800- 
1860 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) pp. 65-66;
Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers
and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountrv. 1850-1890 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) p. 33.
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economic power into political fortune securing election as 
judge from East Feliciana Parish.155
As the demand for cotton increased, so did the need for 
reliable routes of access to the markets at New Orleans. 
This necessity required the construction of new roads into 
isolated areas and the clearing of obstructions from numerous 
streams and rivers. These necessary improvements created 
additional opportunity for the capital rich planter elite. 
Control of the routes of market access proved vital to the 
planters' ability to dominate the economy, and concomitantly, 
regional politics.
In the first decades after statehood, and into the early 
1840's, the planters consented to the construction and 
improvement of numerous avenues of market access. On January 
23, 1827 the state legislature approved, virtually without
opposition, a bill appropriating state funds "to improve the 
road leading from Covington through Washington Parish to 
Holmesville, Mississippi." This measure marked one of the 
first state appropriations to improve roads in the piney- 
woods region of the Florida parishes. The substance of this 
bill also demonstrated the growing importance of the north
Receipt for purchase of 460 pounds of raw cotton 
from C. Morgan, September 1, 1849, receipt for $149.50 for
purchase of cotton from J.D. Nettles, February 1854, list of 
cotton shipped for John L. Lee, J. Robinson, John Pritchard, 
and Henry Scott, August 1855 to March 1856, all in A.J. 
Norwood account books (see ledger 3 and 4) in Abel John 
Norwood Papers (LLMVC).
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shore of Lake Pontchartrain as a collecting and transporting 
center for the markets of New Orleans.156
During the 1830's, the state legislature appropriated 
large sums to promote the growth of the cotton economy in the 
piney woods. Following a report by the state engineer in 
December 1833, indicating that the wealth of the eastern 
Florida parishes remained virtually untouched due to the 
absence of reliable roads and obstructed streams, a flurry of 
bills of improvement were introduced in the legislature. In 
January 1834 the legislature overwhelmingly approved a bill 
appropriating substantial funds to "improve navigation on the 
Tangipahoa, Bogue Falaya, and West Pearl rivers," all major 
streams in the eastern Florida parishes. This bill 
constituted a major state appropriation. Clearing the 
waterways of obstructions involved employing significant 
labor on snag boats, an expensive and time consuming process. 
In addition to this major appropriation, the House, in the 
same session approved by voice vote a bill appropriating 
funds "to improve the road from Springfield to the line of 
St. Helena on the way to Mississippi." Each of these bills 
was specifically designed to improve market access and 
stimulate the growing cotton economy in the piney woods, and 
each passed with overwhelming support of the planters. In 
February 1846, State Engineer P.O. Hebert reported that as a
156 Senate Journal Eighth Legislature, First Session, 
January 15 and 23, 1827.
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result of state appropriations, the West Pearl River and 
other regional streams had been cleared of their 
obstructions. Hebert continued, "these streams should remain 
so as they go through some of the richest cotton territory 
and best and most valuable timber regions. Steamboats can 
now carry 600 to 800 bales of cotton safely and receipts at 
New Orleans have demonstrated this."157
By the 1840's, the rapidly increasing volume of trade on 
the market trails and waterways in the Florida parishes 
inspired some enterprising individuals to seek a means to tap 
this lucrative source of profit. In antebellum Louisiana, as 
in much of the South, individuals had frequently opened 
privately operated bridges, ferryboats, or roads to the 
general public for a small user's fee. In the decade prior 
to secession private ownership of the mechanisms of travel 
would dramatically increase. Moreover, actions of the state 
legislature and local police juries made possible the 
transformation of public routes of travel into private ones.
157 House Journal Eleventh Legislature, Second
Session, "Report of the State Engineer," December 24, 1833, 
in the same session a bill to improve the navigation on the 
various streams in the eastern Florida parishes received 
final approval on January 31, 1834; also in the same session 
see "Bill to Improve Springfield Road," January 24, 1834;
ibid., Twelfth Legislature, First Session, March 10, 1835;
Louisiana State Legislative Documents Fifth Legislature, 
First Session, 1860, "Report of the State Engineer," outlines 
the difficulty involved in clearing snags from the rivers, 
found in Louisiana State Secession Debates. 1859-1862 (New 
Haven; Research Publications, 1970); Senate Journal First 
Legislature, First Session, "Report of State Engineer P.O. 
Hebert," February 9, 184 6.
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The privatization of avenues of travel increasingly 
encumbered the means of access to market creating further 
economic burdens and sources of dependency for the piney- 
woods farmers. This privatization process exemplified the 
transition from political to economic exploitation of 
Louisiana's plain folk.
Essentially, privatization involved the selling of 
transportation improvements to wealthy individuals. Under 
the guise of relieving the state of a major financial burden, 
the legislature and most police juries typically assented to 
the privatization of roads, bridges, and ferryboats. Those 
wealthy enough to construct bridges and ferries, or to 
maintain roads, petitioned their representative with promises 
of support, and possibly bribes, to seek legislative sanction 
for their endeavor. The privatization process did serve to 
relieve state and local government of a major source of 
indebtedness. It also freed local residents and slaves from 
the necessity of maintaining public roads. But despite these 
obvious benefits, privatization allowed wealthy individuals 
to secure greater control over the means of access to market. 
Private control of the roads and bridges in the Florida 
parishes furthered the increasing economic power of the 
planters.
Notwithstanding the liberalizing trend occurring in 
state government, the legislature proved central to 
accommodating the privatization process. On February 1, 1850
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Senator John P. Waddill, representing Rapides and Avoyelles 
parishes, introduced a bill granting Michael and Joseph 
Tarras "exclusive privilege of keeping a ferry across the 
Mississippi at Shreve's Cut Off in Pointe Coupee and West 
Feliciana parishes." Six days later Waddill introduced 
another bill granting "Joseph Kirk and his heirs exclusive 
privilege of operating a ferry across the Atchafalaya at the 
mouth of Bayou Des Glaize." By these measures Waddill, with 
the overwhelming assent of the legislature, placed into 
private hands the most direct connection between West 
Feliciana Parish and north-central Louisiana. This stratagem 
served not only to increase his own personal patronage but 
also to enrich the few at the expense of the many.158
The disposition of the legislature to support 
privatization became readily apparent in the first session of 
1852. Legislative committees defeated efforts of opponents 
of privatization to strengthen an act to provide for the 
policing of public roads. This measure would have insured 
the standard of quality on public roads thereby reducing the
15 Senate Journal Third Legislature, First Session, 
February 1 and 7, 1850; House Journal Third Legislature,
First Session, January 1, 1850; Ibid., Fourth Legislature,
First Session, January 30 and February 3 and 10, 1852; Ibid., 
Sixteenth Legislature, Second Session, January 30, 1844 (bill 
to grant an individual the right to establish "toll gates" on 
a market road) see also Ibid., Tenth Legislature, Second 
Session, January 13 and February 9, 1832, and Ibid., Twelfth 
Legislature, First Session, March 4, 1835, for some earlier 
privatization bills; for an example of the problems 
associated with securing labor to work on public roads see 
James Turnbull to William S. Hamilton, August 27, 1823, in
William S. Hamilton Papers (LLMVC).
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chance for individuals to argue the need for private 
endeavors. In addition, proponents of privatization sought 
to strip from the various police juries the exclusive right 
to establish and regulate ferries and toll bridges, thus 
expanding and streamlining privatization efforts.159
Perhaps most significantly, rather than improving the 
means of transportation, privatization often resulted in 
inferior roads, bridges, and ferryboat service. In the 
winter of 1850 the state legislature succumbed to public 
pressure and revoked the privilege of maintaining a private 
road in Jefferson Parish, granted three years earlier to 
Soloman Cohn, due to the inferior condition of the turnpike. 
In September 1850, the West Feliciana Police Jury received a 
petition from residents of the fifth ward requesting an 
appropriation to improve access to their primary market at 
Jackson, in East Feliciana Parish. The petition noted the 
significance of Jackson to the residents of the fifth ward in 
terms of business, religion, and education. The petitioners 
begged for relief arguing that ’’the only way of travel to 
said town is by means of some paths and badly made private
159 House Journal Fourth Legislature, First Session, 
February 3, 1852; ibid., January 30, 1852. The bill to strip 
the police juries of their exclusive right to establish 
ferries and toll bridges naturally faced tough opposition 
from supporters of local government, yet this measure 
demonstrated the aggressive nature of the proponents of 
privatization; in the same session the Committee on Internal 
Improvements reversed a measure allowing for the construction 
of a public road in Catahoula Parish at the urging of several 
influential residents of that area, see ibid., February 12, 
1852.
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roads which are often difficult and Dangerous to travel." A 
similar petition presented to the West Feliciana Police Jury 
requesting the construction of a public road from Bayou 
Tunica to the Mississippi state line below Pinckneyville 
pleaded, "we respectfully represent that it is with utmost 
difficulty that they {residents} can now pass over on 
horseback and have no power to force hands to work on any of 
the roads."160 This petition highlighted another problem 
inherent in privatization, the absence of state quality 
control over private endeavors.
Though they entertained requests for relief, local 
government also contributed to the privatization of the means 
of access to market. In the spring of 1846 the St.Tammany 
Parish Police Jury granted the right to build "a toll bridge 
across the Bogue Falaya River near Covington," to Abraham 
Penn and C.H. Allemand. In the spring of 1849 Allemand was 
granted the "exclusive right to a toll bridge across the 
Tchefuncte River near Covington." Penn and Allemand each 
possessed considerable resources. Penn not only remained one 
of the largest slaveholders in the parish, but had also 
served as state representative from St.Tammany. By its 
action the police jury had awarded two of the wealthiest 
planters in the parish exclusive control of the most
160 House Journal Third Legislature, First Session, 
January 24, 1850; West Feliciana Parish Police Jury Minutes, 
September Session, 1850, in W.P.A. Louisiana Police Jury 
Minutes Collection (LLMVC) hereinafter referred to as West 
Feliciana Police Jury Minutes; Ibid., June Session, 1847.
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available means of access to the north shore of Lake 
Pontchartrain. This pattern continued through the end of the 
antebellum period in St.Tammany, though the financial crisis 
prompted by the war caused the police jury to place a ceiling 
on the amount that could be charged for the use of roads, 
bridges, and ferries.161
Privatization also inhibited government appropriations 
for public internal improvements. Public projects which 
frequently served to antagonize as many voters as they 
pleased, often were delayed or permanently tabled in response 
to private endeavors which carried rewards of patronage and 
political support. In the summer of 1847, the East Baton 
Rouge Parish Police Jury appointed a committee to change the 
direction of the Comite River Road so that it would intersect 
with a new private bridge being constructed across that 
stream. In approving this privatization measure, which 
directly benefitted several powerful planters in the region, 
the jurors altered the course of the road to serve special 
interests on the upper Comite to the detriment of the more
St.Tammany Parish Police Jury Minutes, May session 
1846 and May session 1849, also see December session 1845, 
July session 1847, and January session 1852; a- good 
description of the price ceiling enacted during the war can 
be found on March 17, 1862, all found in W.P.A. Louisiana
Parish Police Jury Minutes Collection (LLMVC), hereinafter 
referred to as St.Tammany Police Jury Minutes; Police Jury 
Code for the Parish of East Feliciana. Louisiana. Containing 
a Digest of the State Laws Relative to Police Juries, and 
also a Digest of the Ordinances of East Feliciana Having the 
Force of Laws up to Mav 1. 1859 (Clinton: G. Wilson Reese 
Printing, 1859) herein after referred to as Police Jury Code 
for the Parish of East Feliciana.
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populous lower Comite area. With this measure approved, a 
separate motion to build a public bridge across the Comite 
was defeated by more than a two-to-one margin. Moreover, in 
the same session the police jury proceeded to reject at least 
two motions to provide funding for bridges over lesser 
streams which could improve alternative routes to the 
proposed private bridge. Similarly the St.Tammany Parish 
Police Jury rejected a proposal to construct a new public 
road to Covington, which would necessarily compete with the 
existing private toll road.162
The privatization of transportation routes did not 
involve a calculated plan on the part of the moneyed elite. 
The trend emerged as both a money making-scheme and as a way 
planters could assure themselves the most direct access to 
market. As a result, an argument can be made that 
privatization actually benefitted the state. Private 
endeavors resulted in roads, bridges, and ferries which may 
otherwise never have existed, particularly so in a state 
notoriously deficient in the scope of its internal 
improvements. But like Louisiana's political system, 
privatization clearly served the interests of the elite.
162 East Baton Rouge Parish Police Jury Minutes, June 
Session 1847, in W.P.A. Collection, Louisiana Police Jury 
Minutes (LLMVC), see in particular June 7-8, 1847 and the
scattered largely undated sheets following. The issue of the 
Comite River road and bridge had long been debated, it was 
one of the first major privatization efforts in the 
Felicianas and East Baton Rouge, see House Journal Tenth 
Legislature, Second Session, January 5 and 12, 1832;
St.Tammany Parish Police Jury Minutes, January 5, 1860.
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More often than not, private roads and bridges proved 
inferior to state-funded and maintained ones. Furthermore, 
because politicians granted individuals the right to build 
private toll roads and bridges, they were naturally reluctant 
to appropriate money to fund competing public endeavors. 
Though this underscored the power of patronage wielded by 
elected officials, it also often deprived the plain folk of 
adequate, inexpensive means of travel. Poorer farmers 
thereby became increasingly dependent upon planter interests 
who possessed the political clout and the resources to 
develop and maintain roads, bridges, and ferries.
In sharp contrast to the trend evident in the 1830's, by 
the 1850's the state legislature repeatedly denied requests 
to improve or expand means of access to market. Planter 
interests, which increasingly controlled the routes of market 
access, aggressively sought to protect their investments by 
encouraging the legislature to defeat bills designed to 
improve existing public market trails or to create new ones. 
Powerful local figures such as Henry Marston, a prominent 
planter and commercial agent in East Feliciana Parish, 
exerted great effort to promote their own private ventures 
and to discredit public endeavors. Marston, a major 
stockholder in the Clinton-Port Hudson Railroad Company and 
the Baton Rouge-Clinton Plank Road Company, tirelessly 
advocated support for these projects. One of Marston's 
biggest rivals, William Elder, a wealthy Clinton merchant and
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slaveholder, promoted his line of stages and transport wagon 
teams with equal vigor. Both men encouraged state support 
for private endeavors. By the early 1850's efforts to create 
new market roads or improve old ones routinely failed in the 
legislature. An 1852 bill to provide funds to improve the 
market roads in Washington and St.Tammany parishes failed by 
a large margin. These roads, the same ones the legislature 
overwhelmingly approved in the 1830's, consistently failed to 
secure any state funds for maintenance, which in part 
demonstrated the shift away from public support for market 
trails. Throughout the 1850's efforts to improve existing 
public roads or to provide funds to develop new ones into 
isolated areas of the piney woods usually either died in 
committee or faced defeat on the floor of the 
legislature.163
By encouraging the restriction of funding for developing 
new public roads and for maintaining existing market trails 
and bridges, privatization financially impacted the region in 
another obvious sense. Tolls assessed for travel cut into 
farmer's income. With the price of cotton at eleven cents
163 Multiple items in Henry Marston Papers (LLMVC), 
see Clinton-Port Hudson Railroad Flier, 1850, William Pike to 
Henry Marston, September 10, 1852, numerous scattered
receipts for transport of goods on railroad; also Clinton- 
Port Hudson Railroad Company Records, Minute Book 1852-1879 
(LLMVC), p. 4 provides list of stockholders; Clinton American 
Patriot. September 8, 1855 provides an example of the
competing interests of Marston and Elder; House Journal 
Fourth Legislature, First Session, March 12 and January 26, 
1852; ibid., First Legislative Session 1856, March 1, 1856; 
ibid.. First Legislative Session 1857, March 14, 1857;
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per pound in I860, a poor farmer independently attempting to 
haul one four hundred pound bail of cotton across Washington 
and St. Tammany parishes had little to be optimistic about. 
The forty cent toll he paid to cross the Bogue Falaya River 
bridge on the military road to Madisonville, both coming and 
going, cut significantly into his profit. The St.Tammany 
Police Jury's inclination to privatize indicates several 
tolls likely encumbered travellers on the road to the vital 
collecting and transporting center at Madisonville. The cost 
incurred encouraged smaller farmers to sell their cotton to 
local planters at a reduced price to avoid the trouble and 
expense involved in transporting their own goods to market. 
This condition necessarily threatened the traditional 
lifestyle and independence of many piney-woods farmers.164
The privatization process contributed directly to a 
trend emerging in the Florida parishes and environs in the 
last decade before secession. Though prosperity continued to 
prevail, farmers found it increasingly difficult to break
164 Figures for Bogue Falaya Bridge toll based on St. 
Tammany Parish Police Jury Minutes, March 17, 1862; price of 
cotton found in E.J. Donnell, Chronological and Statistical 
History of Cotton (New York: James Sutton and Co., 1872) p. 
498; also the New Orleans Price Current and Commercial 
Intel1iqencer lists the price of good middling cotton in 1860 
at eleven cents per pound, middling at ten and a half cents, 
see December 31, 1859 and January 1, 1860; see St.Tammany
Police Jury Minutes, December 1, 1845, May Session 1846, May 
Session 1849, January Session 1852 for further evidence of 
privatization in that parish; House Journal Twelfth 
Legislature, First Session, March 4, 1835, indicates an
exclusive right to operate a toll ferry across the Bogue 
Chitto River in Washington and St.Tammany parishes was also 
in place; Amite City News Digest. August 14, 1975.
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class lines and improve their socio-economic position. 
Parish tax assessment rolls demonstrate that excepting an 
unusual pattern of development in St.Tammany Parish, all of 
the Florida parishes flourished in the last decade before 
secession.165 Following the boom years of the early 1850's, 
the relative wealth of each parish levelled off by the close 
of the decade. In addition, livestock and land holdings of 
the freeholders generally increased in the same period.(see 
table 8) Yet though the relative wealth of the region 
increased, social mobility actually stagnated. Despite the 
generally prosperous times, real wealth remained concentrated 
in the hands of the few. Indeed in the midst of abundance, 
aspiring farmers found it increasingly difficult to improve 
their socio-economic position.
Employing slaveholding as a measure of success, 
statistics indicate that excepting West Feliciana Parish, 
each of the Florida parishes experienced a decline in the 
number of freeholders owning slaves. But among those owning 
slaves in 1850, the vast majority in each parish increased
Though the exact reasons for St.Tammany's separate 
pattern of development remain unclear, it likely related to 
the environment there. Following the virtual collapse of 
rice production in the piney-woods parishes during the 
1850's, St.Tammany alone among the eastern parishes proved to 
have soil inconsistent with the needs of cotton production 
(see Graph 4 in chapter 2) . In addition, St. Tammany lagged 
behind most of the other parishes in livestock and timber 
production. For a good description of the prevailing 
prosperity of the period see Governor Alfred Mouton's 
farewell address in Senate Journal First Legislature, First 
Session, 1846.
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T a b l e  8
RELATIVE WEALTH BY PARISH
PERCENT WHO
INCREASED PERCENT WHO PARISH
LIVESTOCK INCREASED TAX
HOLDINGS LANDHOLDINGS ASSESSMENTS
PARISH 1850-1860 1850-1860 1852 1855 1858
ST. HELENA 58 20 $3,609 $7,198 $8,787
LIVINGSTON 50 40 $2,263 $5,122 $4,939
ST. TAMMANY INSUFFICIENT
DATA
- $3,940 $7,695 *$2,500
WASHINGTON 60 66 $2,109 $3,989 $3,813
EAST FELICIANA 25 66 $14,508 $26,512 $22,351
WEST FELICIANA 62 33 $15,729 $30,620 $26,267
EAST BATON ROUGE 50 45 $14,326 $31,940 $31,523
* RELATED TO COLLAPSE OF RICE PRODUCTION AND FAILURE TO REPLACE IT 
WITH COTTON.
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their holdings during the course of the decade (see table 7) . 
Considering the popularity and profitability of slavery in 
the Florida parishes, and the virtual necessity of slave 
labor in a cotton-dominated economy, the evidence indicates 
a sharp contraction in social mobility in the decade before 
secession. In short, as the rich got richer the plain folk 
found it increasingly difficult to get ahead.
Just as substantive wealth and economic power remained 
in the hands of the planters despite the preeminence of the 
cotton economy throughout the Florida parishes, political 
control also remained in their hands despite the liberalizing 
trend. The consummation of the planter's political dominance 
in the piney woods, and the state in general, was realized in 
the Constitution of 1852. But even during the 1845-1852 
interim, planter interests, partially due to their economic 
power, continued to dominate politics in the piney-woods of 
the Florida parishes as they would through the end of the 
antebellum period.
Initially, the restrictions inherent in the Constitution 
of 1812 limited officeholding to only the wealthiest 
residents. As a result, planter interests had always 
dominated politics in the Florida parishes. Though the elite 
dominated their respective regions in both the eastern and 
western Florida parishes, the piney-woods representatives 
frequently remained independent of the delta parish planter 
interests. The failure of the piney-woods legislators to
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follow the "natural leadership" of the planter 
representatives from the Felicianas and East Baton Rouge 
frustrated the delta political leaders. Piney-woods
opposition to bills of particular interest to large 
slaveholders, such as an 1818 measure entitled, "an act 
respecting [the ownership] of slaves imported into the state 
in violation of the act of congress" deeply concerned the 
planter representatives. Many planter politicians,
recognizing both the importance of piney-woods voters and 
their willingness "to take their opinions from powerful 
others," encouraged efforts to secure greater influence in 
the eastern parishes. Appeals to increase the authority of 
the planter region in the piney woods of the Florida parishes 
circulated among the delta planters.166 Simple discussion 
of the issue ended in 182 3 when a potential crisis served as 
the catalyst inspiring the planters to assert their power 
aggressively in the piney woods.
As the increasing number of Americans migrating to north 
and central Louisiana steadily eroded their political 
strength, Creole politicians from the sugar parishes and New 
Orleans ventured a bold maneuver to preserve their power.
166 House Journal Third Legislature, Second Session, 
March 7, 1818; Isaac Baker to William S. Hamilton, December
26, 1822 and January 14 and 21, 1823, Senator A.M. Harralson 
to Colonel Hamilton, July 15, 1826, P.K. Wagner to Hamilton, 
July 30, 1826, F.H. Stackhouse to Joseph Johnson, June 3,
1822, all in William S. Hamilton Papers (LLMVC) ; for patterns 
of voting in the legislature in this period see House Journal 
Third Legislature, Second Session, January 19 and February 
13, 23, and 27, 1818.
Believing they had the votes necessary, and with the apparent 
support of Governor Robertson, on January 20, 1823, the 
members of this coalition introduced a bill to remove the 
Florida parish senators from the legislature. This stratagem 
constituted an effort to eject a voting bloc often 
antagonistic to their interests on a constitutional 
technicality. The bill asserted that as the Florida parishes 
did not comprise a part of the state of Louisiana 
incorporated under the Constitution of 1812, the senators 
from that region "had been unconstitutionally elected and can 
no longer retain their seats." The proposal failed by the 
narrowest of margins, seven senators in favor and seven 
opposed. Though the coalition voting to reject the bill 
sustained itself, heated debate continued in the Senate for 
days. Despite the failure of the effort, the motion 
exacerbated the bitter feelings between the American and 
Creole factions in the legislature. Moreover, it highlighted 
the centrality of ethnic rather than party divisions within 
the Louisiana political establishment. The outrage generated 
by this maneuver prompted one indignant planter to write, "an 
effort was made yesterday in the senate to exclude the 
Florida members from that body on a constitutional scruple. 
No measure since we became a state has been so mischievous or 
smelled so strongly of treason. We are all horrified about 
it here." But even more galling to planter interests in the 
Felicianas and East Baton Rouge was the fact that Elisha
1 4 2
Clark, senator from the piney woods of the Florida parishes, 
failed to vote. In addition Clark, after condemning the 
measure as "repugnant to the honor of state government," 
departed the capital on a brief leave of absence. This 
flagrant disregard for responsibility proved unbearable to 
some. The same planter continued:
the measure was lost but it is to be revived today. 
Clark and McNutt are absent strolling around to some 
distant part of the state on private business - they 
deserve to be guillotined for it. After the dirt kicked 
up last fall every American at least in the legislature 
should have been at his post till he was certain that 
all was right. The conduct of some of the Florida folks 
in this particular was not right since nothing can 
justify the length to which the French seem disposed to 
go. Would to God you were here as a member of the lower 
house. Some leadership in Florida is greatly needed.
Clark's decision to avoid this crucial vote may have resulted 
from his desire to antagonize neither his American 
constituents nor the large bloc of Creole residents in his 
home parish of St.Tammany. It may also have been pure 
coincidence and poor timing concerning personal business. 
Regardless of his motives, Clark's action galvanized the 
planter politicians in the delta region of the Florida 
parishes who intensified their efforts to secure for
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themselves control of the politically strategic piney-woods 
parishes.167
Throughout the 1820's and 1830's planters in the 
Felicianas1 and East Baton Rouge endeavored to expand and 
secure their influence in the piney woods. The pretext being 
to unify American areas in opposition to their Creole 
antagonists. To do so, the planter politicians were forced 
to abandon their traditional distaste for electioneering and 
seeking favors. Prestigious delta planters such as Alex 
Barrow and Daniel Turnbull abandoned customary scruples to 
promote their interests in the piney woods. Timidly 
asserting the need to engage in this displeasing necessity, 
prominent West Feliciana planter-politician F.H. Stackhouse 
advised, "I would recommend to no honorable man a course of 
electioneering servility and I know your friend Colonel 
Hamilton would revolt at anything of the kind, but it will be 
highly important for him to visit immediately the parishes of 
St.Helena, Washington, and St.Tammany... and I do believe he 
may secure an interest in the eastern parishes that will
1 Senate Journal Sixth Legislature, First Session,
January 20-22, 27 and 28, 1823; Isaac Baker to William S.
Hamilton, January 21, 1823, F.H. Stackhouse to Major Joseph 
Johnson, June 3, 1822, Senator A.M. Harralson to Hamilton, 
June 17 and July 15, 1826, P.K. Wagner to Hamilton, July 30, 
1826, Alex Barrow to Hamilton, April 22, 1830, Robert Fluker 
to Hamilton, June 30, 1830 (notes the power of Creole voters 
in St.Tammany Parish), all in William S. Hamilton Papers 
(LLMVC); Obviously stung by the criticism his actions 
produced, Clark returned to the Senate to participate in the 
last debates concerning this issue. Yet his inconsistency 
remained a bitter memory for many Feliciana planters.
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render his election highly probable if not certain, by a 
proper exertion being made." In furtherance of this process 
the delta planters compiled a list of gentlemen of influence 
in the piney woods parishes who should be contacted to secure 
their support in each election.168
By the early 1830's this process had transformed 
politics in the piney woods. The delta planters boasted of 
their success in uniting the Americans of the eastern 
parishes behind their leadership. As political unity 
expanded among the Americans, party differences became 
increasingly significant as the rivalry between the Whigs and 
the Jacksonian Democrats intensified. The Jacksonians 
brushed off the Adams-Clay supporters and their Whig heirs as 
"yankees." Although the Jacksonian appeal dominated, the 
Whigs continued to draw significant support throughout the 
Florida parishes. The delta planters ability to secure 
backing across party lines in the piney woods, exemplified 
the strength of their increasing power in the eastern 
parishes. In the spring of 1830, prominent anti-Jackson 
agitator William Winfree of St.Helena Parish, though
168 F.H. Stackhouse to Joseph Johnson, June 3, 1822,
A.M. Harralson to William S. Hamilton, May 13, 1822, in
William S. Hamilton Papers (LIMVC); Both provide lists of 
prominent gentlemen to contact in the piney woods. Among the 
planter politicians advocating a calculated aggressive 
political effort in the eastern parishes were: Alex Barrow, 
Frank Hardesty, William Hamilton, A.M.Harralson, John Dawson, 
Daniel Turnbull, and William Boatner. The most comprehensive 
list of influential gentlemen in the piney woods can be found 
in the letter Stackhouse to Johnson, June 3, 1822, Hamilton 
Papers (LLMVC).
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maintaining his opposition to Jackson, acknowledged the 
necessity of unity in the Florida parishes and offered his 
support to the Jacksonian candidate for governor. Other 
Adams supporters, such as Montgomery Sloan of East Baton 
Rouge, also sacrificed party solidarity in favor of ethnic 
unity.169
The burden of securing support across party lines was 
eased somewhat by the candidacy of native sons of the Florida 
parishes, such as perennial candidate William S. Hamilton of 
West Feliciana and John Dawson. Both enjoyed immense 
popularity in the piney woods. Drumming up support for 
regional candidates helped secure for the delta planters 
political dominance in the eastern parishes. Acknowledging 
the defection of Florida parish Whigs from the gubernatorial 
candidacy of the highly popular E.D. White to local favorite 
and Jacksonian John Dawson, the Whig Baton Rouge Gazette 
asserted, "this should not cause surprise when we reflect 
that General Dawson is personally acquainted and highly 
esteemed as a gentleman by three quarters of the residents,
169 Alex Barrow to William Hamilton, January 25, April 
22 and June 4, 1830, William Boatner to Hamilton, June 4,
1830, John McNeil to Hamilton, January 25, 1830 (all boasting 
of their power and the unity in the piney woods), William 
Winfree to Hamilton, May 2, 1830, Montgomery Sloan to
Hamilton, February 10, 183 0, all in William S. Hamilton
Papers (LLMVC); for patterns of voting and party support in 
this period see Baton Rouge Gazette July 3 and 10, 1830, and 
July 12, 1834.
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and in addition to this a large number of the Whig party 
voted for him through sectional feelings.1,170
The calculated effort to secure their political base in 
the piney woods, coupled with their growing economic control 
of the region, created conditions favorable for delta 
planters to achieve absolute dominance in the eastern 
parishes. Yet the receptibility of local political figures 
proved to be the most decisive factor allowing the delta 
planters to dominate the piney woods. Almost to a man, the 
brokers of political power in the piney woods were themselves 
planters, and therefore natural allies of their counterparts 
in the delta parishes. Through the early 1850's, though 
planters constituted only a small fraction of the population 
in the piney woods, under the guidance of their delta allies 
they exercised virtually complete control of local politics.
Though separated by regional, cultural, and in some 
cases religious differences, the political leaders in the 
delta and piney woods of the Florida parishes shared two 
important determinants. In general, both sought to sustain 
American power in state government. The considerable numbers 
of Creole residents along the lakeshore in the eastern 
parishes did have a limited mitigating effect, but overall 
American sympathizers dominated in the Florida parishes. 
Second, and most importantly, they shared the bond of 
slaveholding. In the decade preceding secession every
170 Baton Rouge Gazette July 12, 1834.
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representative and senator elected to the state legislature 
from the Florida parishes owned slaves. Recognizing that in 
this same period the number of slaveholders substantially 
declined (see table 8) makes this a detail of particular 
significance. More importantly, virtually every piney-woods 
member of the state legislature in this period qualified as 
a planter.
In 1852 the legislative delegation from the Florida 
parishes exemplified the dominance of the planters (see table 
9) . Seventeen of the officials representing the Florida 
parishes in the early 1850's declared themselves to be 
planters or farmers. The remaining legislators who listed 
their occupations included: six attorneys, one sawmill
operator, two physicians, and one engineer. While most of 
those engaged in other occupations also owned farms, all were 
slaveholders. Excepting one attorney from Livingston and a 
sawmill operator from St.Tammany, all of the piney-woods 
legislators declared themselves farmers or planters.171
The dominance exercised by planter interests in the 
piney-woods of the Florida parishes deprived the plain folk 
of an active voice in government. In the 1820s and early 
183 0s piney-woods representatives supported efforts at
171 Seventh Census of the United States. 1850: these 
statistics are based on the legislative delegation from the 
Florida parishes during the period 1850-1854. These years 
represented the period surrounding the implementation of the 
1852 constitution, and in 1854 the opening of the New 
Orleans-Jackson railroad created an unprecedented challenge 
for the planters.
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Table 9
_STATE_ LEGISLATORS FROM FLORIDA PARISHES 1652-1854
PARISH .ms POSITION
VALUE OF 
ESTATE__
NUMBER OF 
SLAVES
ST. HELENA 
LIVINGSTON 
ST. TAMMANY 
WASHINGTON
H. THOMPSON 
F.H. KEMP
REPRESENTATIVE $25,000 39
SENATOR $16,000
T.G. DAVIDSON REPRESENTATIVE $08,550 
G.S. LACEY SENATOR (E.B.R) HOT AVAILABLE
37
60
HOT AVAILABLE
A. F . COOPER 
R.H, KEMP
J.F. ARD 
P.H. KEMP
REPRESENTATIVE $10,550 21
SENATOR (ST.HELENA) NOT AVAILABLE. NOT AVAILABLE
REPRESENTATIVE not available 2 1
SENATOR (ST. HELENA) NOT AVAILABLE NOT AVAILABLE
EAST
BATON ROUGE J.P. CHAPMAN REPRESENTATIVE NOT AVAILABLE 2
J.M. McCUTCHEN REPRESENTATIVE $ 5,000 43
G.S. LACEY SENATOR NOT AVAILABLE 2
EAST FELICIANA G.W. MUNDAY REPRESENTATIVE $23,380 32
WM. PATTERSON SENATOR $42,500 19
WEST FELICIANA V.B. PHILLIPS REPRESENTATIVE $ 9,000 
R.C. WICKLIFFE SENATOR $ 2,100
5
5
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democratic reform. The failure of these same legislators to 
take the lead in promoting the reform constitution of 1845 
exemplified the growing power of the planter elite in the 
piney woods. Recognizing the will of their constituents, 
the representatives from the eastern parishes did eventually 
support the new constitution. But the position taken by the 
piney-woods legislators on key votes in the late 1840's and 
early 1850's demonstrated the vacuous nature of their support 
for democratic reform and the excessive influence of planter 
interests.
Politically speaking, the control enjoyed by the 
coalition of delta and piney-woods planters served to injure 
the interests of the plain folk who constituted the vast 
majority of the region's residents. This situation in turn 
contributed to the piney-woods dwellers increasing alienation 
from government. The planter elite continued to present 
themselves as the defenders of southern rights against the 
threat posed by an increasingly hostile North, but their 
actions demonstrated that they took little interest in the 
basic needs of the commoners. Numerous bills passed by the 
legislature and local government exempting slave property 
from taxation and appropriating state funds as renumeration 
to owners of slaves convicted of crimes.172 Though these
172 Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. February 3, 1854;
House Journal Fourth Legislature, Second Session, January 17, 
1859 State Treasury report delineates ten thousand dollars 
paid out for "Refunds to owners of slaves convicted of 
criminal offenses;" St. Tammany Parish Police Jury Minutes,
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measures assisted the small slaveholder, they benefitted the 
planter far more. In supporting bills of this nature the 
piney-woods legislators demonstrated their fealty to the 
planters but contributed to the reduction of state funds 
available to improve the quality of life of the plain folk.
In February 1850 the legislators from the piney-woods voted
against a bill to establish free public schools statewide. 
This measure would have substantially increased funding for 
existing public schools and provided for the creation of new 
ones at a time when parish superintendents of education 
relentlessly bemoaned the absence of state support for 
education.(see table 10) The annual report of Henry Duncan, 
Livingston Parish superintendent of education, exemplified 
the deplorable status of public education in Louisiana and 
the increasing tendency in the piney woods to see government 
as abusive rather than ameliorative.
The general condition of our public schools is not very
flattering, and there seems to be a strong sentiment
prevailing in this parish against the whole system, and 
particularly as it works at present. Teachers manifest 
a strong desire to advance pupils, but I cannot say so 
much for parents; and the reason is obvious. The funds 
apportioned to this parish will hardly keep a school 
three months, and parents think they are oppressed, that
M a y  5 ,  1 8 4 2 .
1 5 1
they have to pay their taxes and receive no benefit of 
any importance from it; what their children learn in one 
school, they forget before there is another school in 
operation. One thing is certain, this system of 
apportionment has reduced the number of schools 
materially, and retarded the progress of education.
In the same session the piney-woods representatives voted 
against a bill designed to protect the property of 
impoverished families from sheriff seizure. A similar bill 
dominated the first legislative session of 1853. This 
measure concerned swamp lands donated to the state by the 
federal government. The original bill allowed settlers to 
claim "not less than forty nor more than three hundred and 
twenty acres," provided the purpose of the claim remained 
cultivation, not speculation. But the point of contention in 
the 1853 session involved the clause requiring that the land 
be paid for within one year of the claim. Failure to 
complete payment within the allotted year would result in 
state seizure of the claim regardless of the improvements 
made. Supporters of a one year extension on the time for 
payment argued that "a refusal to grant the indulgence 
contemplated in the bill, will be to take from the hardy, 
honest and industrious settler his home, and to turn it over
T a b l e  1 0
EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS 1850
PARISH
NUMBER OF 
OPERATING 
PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS
PRIVATE
SCHOOLS
OTHER
THAN
PRIMARY
SCHOOLS
NUMBER OF
POSSIBLE
PUPILS
CONDITION
OF
SCHOOLS
LEVEL OF 
MONETARY 
SUPPORT
PUBLIC
SUPPORT
FOR
EDUCATION
LIVINGSTON 5 0 0 613 POOR INSUFFICIENT VERY LOW
EAST FELICIANA * BAHT AT LEAST 3 676 * * HIGH
EAST BATON ROUGE 24 FEW FEW 1259 FAIR INSUFFICIENT LOW
ST. HELENA 6 NONE LISTED 0 731 FAIR INSUFFICIENT IMPROVING .
WASHINGTON 13 NONE LISTED 0 GOOD INSUFFICIENT GOOD
WEST FELICIANA 7 NONE LISTED NONE LISTED 5 H GOOD FAIR INDIFFERENT
ST. TAMMANY 15 NONE LISTED 0 760 NONE LISTED NONE LISTED NONE LISTED
* PRESENCE OF MANY PRIVATE SCHOOLS PRECLUDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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to the hands of the public speculator." Sadly for those who 
supported the extension, Senator P.H. Kemp of St. Helena cast 
a crucial vote with the majority to limit that extension to 
only eight months rather than the requested twelve. These 
measures and others of a similar nature furthered the erosion 
of public confidence in government, which increasing 
stability from the late 1820's to the early 1840's had 
promoted.173
Throughout the 1850s the pattern of neglecting the needs 
of the plain folk in the Louisiana legislature continued. 
The nature of these bills ranged from removal of the 
restrictions on rates of interest money lenders could charge 
to conservative Governor Robert Wickliffe's program to reduce 
the amount of state expenditures in support of "objects of an 
educational and charitable nature."174 Collectively these 
bills and others of a similar disposition served to make life 
more difficult for Louisiana's plain folk. In combination
173 House Journal Third Legislature, First Session, 
February 26 and March 12, 1850; Louisiana Legislative
Documents Fourth Legislature, First Session, 1852 (New 
Orleans: Bee Printing, 1852) see "Report of Superintendent of 
Livingston," (submitted August, 1851) p. 27; Senate Journal 
First Legislature, First Session, February 4-March 10, 1853, 
see comments of Senator George Lacey in support of the 
extension, February 4, 1853 (in a compromise move the
legislature later by voice vote agreed to the full one year 
extension, but the issue remains that the piney-woods senator 
from the Florida parishes voted with the moneyed elite 
against a proposal designed to benefit the majority of the 
constituency he represented); Ibid., February 28, 1854.
174 Clinton American Patriot. February 28, 1855; House 
Journal Fourth Legislature, First Session, January 17 and 20, 
1858.
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with the planters' increasing control over the economy in the 
piney woods, these measures helped frustrate the plain folk's 
efforts to enjoy their fair share of the prosperity occurring 
in this period. More importantly to the region's pattern of 
development, the exploitation of the less privileged impugned 
the very value system of the piney-woods dwellers, creating 
a potentially destabilizing force in the secure yet planter 
dominated society of the Florida parishes.
By the mid-1850's three events of enormous consequence 
created a challenge to the planters dominance over and 
exploitation of the plain folk. This watershed in planter- 
plain folk relations in the Florida parishes resulted 
primarily from the social and political fallout associated 
with the construction of the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad, 
the "sellout" election of 1855, and the disillusionment 
created by the Constitution of 1852.
Perhaps more so than any other single issue, the 
Constitution of 1852 represented the presumptuous character 
of the delta planters' efforts to dominate state politics. 
Frustrated by the expansion of the suffrage and the 
commercial restrictions resulting from the Constitution of 
1845, delta planters sought to compensate for the curtailment 
of their absolute power by creating a new constitution. In 
this effort they received strong support from Whig banking 
and commercial interests in New Orleans and from railroad 
promoters. The principle sources of contention involved in
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the constitutional debates focused on the manner of 
apportioning legislative seats and on the granting of 
monopolies. When the debates ended, the planters had 
unguestionably obtained their goals. The new document 
allowed slaves to be counted as part of the population in 
apportioning seats in the legislature.175 This measure 
dramatically increased the power of the delta parishes at the 
expense of the piney woods. The new constitution also 
allowed for the creation of certain monopolies which pleased 
banking and railroad interests.
During the campaign for ratification supporters of the 
new constitution, and correspondingly those favoring 
increasing the power of the delta planters, followed their 
typical electioneering practices. Opponents of the new 
constitution were depicted as traitors to the cause of the 
South. Supporters equated opposition to the constitution 
with resistance to the defenders of the South who defied the 
avaricious aggressions of the North. A few days before the 
election the Whig Baton Rouge Gazette accused opponents of 
providing northern abolitionists with propaganda to be used 
against the South. "They would say it is a Whig document and 
we must defeat it if possible...the very articles which have 
been penned against the basis of representation {in the new
Unlike the federal three-fifths basis of 
representation for slaves, the Constitution of 1852 allowed 
all slaves to be counted in apportioning representation, 
Constitution of Louisiana. 1852.
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constitution} are taken hold of at the North and are
republished and exulted over and commented upon as free soil 
principles. Not so with the articles penned in favor of the
new constitution. Then citizens if the one are free soil
principles the other must be the cherished principles of the 
South." The more moderate Baton Rouge Daily Comet asserted 
that after initially opposing the convention they now 
supported the new constitution as the product of labor of 
"many of our old and most respected citizens." In short, the 
Comet rescinded its opposition to the power play of the 
newspapers' planter patrons.176
Opponents of the new constitution condemned the
perceived attack on republican institutions inherent in the 
document. Many argued that the new apportionment put slaves 
on an equal footing with white men or that it essentially 
extended the franchise to slaves. The New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. which supported the commercial aspects of the new 
document, conceded that its primary purpose "is to give the 
slaveholders the power to protect their own rights. This is 
a strong ground of defense for such a basis in a slaveholding 
state, but we still adhere to the opinion that the true, the 
just, and therefore the proper basis {of apportionment}, is 
that of the present constitution." The Clinton American 
Patriot argued that the new constitution represented a
Baton Rouae Gazette. October 30, 1852; Baton Rouge 
Daily Comet. October 20, 1852.
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calculated effort to reduce the political power of regions 
where the black population remained sparse. "This is beyond 
a doubt a glaring political injustice. Negroes by this basis 
are openly recognized as a portion of the people which is not 
consistent with the spirit of southern institutions, and such 
an acknowledgement by our state is anything but comfortable. 
Negroes should only be looked on as property and if, under 
this view, they enter as a consideration into the basis of 
representation, why not allow all kinds of property, land, 
bank stock, etc. to be represented." Opponents railed 
against the "anti-republican elements" of the new document. 
A delegation of opposition legislators released a statement 
asserting that "the discrepancy in representation between the 
heavy slaveholding parishes and those where soil, locality, 
and atmosphere are more congenial to the laboring white man 
will not perpetuate the liberty of the yeoman and the people 
will not stand for it." This appeal made a strong impression 
upon many voters. Unlike the 1845 constitution which easily 
secured approval by an overwhelming majority of Louisiana 
voters, the 1852 document passed by a narrow margin.(see 
table 11) 177
177 New Orleans Daily Picayune. October 24, 1852;
Clinton American Patriot February 7, 1855; "Report of the
Committee on Amendments to the Constitution," in Louisiana 
Legislative Documents. 1852; Annual Address of Governor
Joseph Walker to the Louisiana Legislature, 1852 and 1853, 
found in House Journal Fourth Legislature, First Session, 
1852 and Senate Journal First Legislature, First Session, 
1853; New Orleans Daily Delta November 11 and 27, 1845; Baton 
Rouae Gazette November 13 and 20, 1852.
T a b l e  1 1
CONSTITUTIONAL RATIFICATION ELECTIONS
CONSTITUTION 1845 CONSTITUTION 1852
PARISH FOR AGAINST FOR AGAINST
EAST BATON ROUGE 402 29 504 480
EAST FELICIANA 507 34 449 321
WEST FELICIANA 280 34 294 248
LIVINGSTON 222 2 73 320
ST. HELENA 312 1 246 191
ST. TAMMANY 201 8 280 163
WASHINGTON 275 0 140 237
NOTE: CONSTITUTION 1845 RESULTS TAKEN FROM NEW ORLEANS
DAILY DELTA NOVEMBER 11 AND 27, 1845.
CONSTITUTION 1852 RESULTS TAKEN FROM BATON ROUGE 
GAZETTE NOVEMBER 13 AND 20, 1852.
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The approval of the Constitution of 1852 underlined the 
power of the planters and their commercial allies in 
Louisiana. The permanence of their control of state 
government seemed assured when Governor Joseph Walker's 
effort to secure repeal of "anti-democratic" portions of the 
constitution failed in the legislature. But the large 
negative vote indicated that many electors opposed placing 
greater power in the hands of the planters. Large majorities 
against the constitution in the piney woods of upstate 
Louisiana were offset by strong support for the document in 
most of the delta parishes. The extremely close vote in the 
Florida parishes concerning a measure so obviously 
detrimental to the political power of the piney woods, 
exemplified the continuing strength of the planters in that 
region. But the close vote also indicated an erosion of the 
unqualified power of the planters. Excepting Washington and 
Livingston parishes which compiled large majorities against 
the constitution, the results proved to be very close in all 
of the Florida parishes including the delta.178
17 Baton Rouge Gazette November 13 and 20, 1852;
Senate Journal First Legislature, First Session, Annual 
Address of Governor Walker, January 18, 1853, Walker pleaded 
with the legislature to reverse the clauses in the new 
constitution allowing for slaves to be counted as a part of 
the population in apportioning legislative seats and 
permitting the establishment of certain monopolies. He 
argued that "after the next apportionment of representatives, 
based on this {new} provision, it may well be nigh impossible 
to effect what can now be done with comparative ease." The 
Constitution of 1852 did include some democratic measures, 
such as making almost all state offices elective and 
shortening the terms of office, but by far its most
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The close vote returned in the Florida parishes in 1852 
foreshadowed political contests in the area for the remainder 
of the decade. A once passive political arena developed a 
reputation for fiercely contested elections. This change 
resulted in part from the increasing significance of party 
politics, particularly so as the Whigs gave way to the 
vitriolic politics of the Know-Nothings. Moreover, by the 
1850s Americans dominated their Creole adversaries in state 
government reducing the necessity of American unity behind a 
single regional candidate. But it also ensued from the 
political awakening of the masses. By the mid-nineteenth 
century the vast majority of Louisiana's residents were 
acclimated to the dynamics of representative government, and 
since 1845 the vast majority of white males could vote. 
Writing home to his family in Massachusetts, F.M. Kent 
marvelled at the extent and manner of electioneering in the 
Florida parishes in the late 1850s. "In political contests 
it is usual for men here who are prominent or well acquainted 
with the subject to take the stump and address the people, 
and as both sides of any question are argued men of good 
sense generally get very nearly correct ideas on any matter 
of public interest. This practice of stump speaking is
significant contribution involved the apportionment of 
political power; Roger Shugg, "Suffrage and Representation in 
Antebellum Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIX, 
pp. 398-403.
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perused even by the parish/county candidates for every 
office.1,179
In the decade preceding secession spirited politics 
characterized every local and statewide campaign. Perhaps no 
single contest exemplified the tumultuous character of 
political campaigns in the mid-nineteenth century Florida 
parishes than did the 1855 election for statewide and 
congressional candidates. The local newspapers focused on 
the congressional race pitting Democratic candidate Thomas 
Green Davidson against the Know-Nothing Preston Pond. This 
very bitter contest incorporated all of the pertinent 
political issues of the day, including national issues, 
focusing on which party best represented the needs of the 
South, and local issues such as the railroad controversy. 
Furthermore, this election exemplified the breakdown of 
planter unity and the growing political power of the masses 
in the Florida parishes. But it also demonstrated that 
despite the erosion of planter solidarity due to the decline 
of Creole power and the increasing significance of party 
politics, planters continued to dominate the region 
politically. Both Pond and Davidson represented the elite of 
planter politicians in the Florida parishes.
Preston Pond, later to become Colonel Pond, epitomized 
the wealth and power of the political elite in the
F.M. Kent to "Dear Uncle," February 19, 1857, in 
Amos Kent Papers (LLMVC).
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Felicianas. Though far from being one of the largest
slaveholders in East Feliciana Parish, Pond came from a long 
line of politically prominent gentlemen. As with most of the 
affluent families in the Florida parishes, his personal 
wealth dramatically increased in the last decade before 
secession. In 1860 Pond owned thirty-six slaves and placed 
the value of his plantation at ten thousand dollars. Like 
his father Pond embraced the philosophy of the Whigs. But 
unlike many of the "old line Whigs," Pond enthusiastically 
made the switch to the Know Nothings as the Whigs began to 
fade. His frequent speeches indicate that this switch may 
have resulted as much from political opportunism as from 
conviction. Pond proved to be a brilliant orator, 
incorporating Whig ideas on internal improvements with the 
anti-immigrant bigotry of the Know Nothings.180
180 Eighth Census of the United States. 1860. Heads of 
Households; In 1850 Pond owned eight slaves and placed the 
value of his plantation at one thousand dollars, exemplifying 
the pattern which saw wealth increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of the affluent in the decade prior to the war. Many 
of the former Whigs in the Florida parishes joined the 
Democrats as Whig power declined and abolitionist agitation 
at the North increased. Others considered both the Democrats 
and the Know Nothings offensive and therefore continued to 
cling to the hope that the Whig party would be renewed, see 
W. Wall to Tom Ellis, March, 1856, John Ellis to Tom Ellis, 
June 11, 1856, Tom Ellis to J.J. Slocum, undated (1856?), 
John Ellis to E.P. Ellis, January 9, 1862, all in Ellis
Family Papers (LLMVC); Thomas G. Morgan to Henry Marston, 
October 23, 1859, in Henry Marston Papers (Ibid.); Baton
Rouae Gazette. October 23, 1852; Clinton Feliciana Democrat. 
October 13, 1855; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. July 26, 1856; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. June 28, 1857.
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His opponent symbolized the power of the piney-woods 
planter aristocracy. In 1855, fifty year old Thomas Green 
Davidson owned sixty slaves, making him the single largest 
slaveholder in Livingston Parish. With an estate valued at 
more than $88,000, Davidson constituted one of the preeminent 
power brokers in the piney-woods of the Florida parishes. A 
seasoned politician, Davidson served in numerous elected 
positions both in the state legislature and Congress before 
his political career ended in the late 1870s. Throughout his 
long tenure of public service Davidson proved to be a 
political chameleon, seemingly changing parties and 
philosophies whenever necessary to secure election. In 1855, 
Davidson headed the Democratic ticket for Congress.181
The congressional election focused on the character of 
the candidates, their position concerning the New Orleans- 
Jackson Railroad and its proposed branch lines through the 
region, and the increasing obsession with the issue of which
Seventh Census of the United States. 1850. Heads 
of Households; Davidson was briefly a member of the Whig 
party and temporarily tested the political waters as a Know 
Nothing, but the strongest criticism of his role as a 
political opportunist came during Reconstruction. A good 
example of the anger and frustration many felt regarding 
Davidson's politically opportunistic behavior can be found in 
the Clinton American Patriot. August 18, 1855. Davidsons
first position of public service appears to have been his 
183 3 tenure as a trustee of the Montpelier Academy in St. 
Helena Parish (see St. Helena Parish Records, LLMVC). He 
also served as representative from both Livingston and St. 
Helena parishes. His political career concluded with his 
1878 defeat in a last bid for a seat in the legislature, (see
B.F. Jonas to Hardy Richardson, November 7, 1878, in Hardy 
Richardson Papers, LLMVC).
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party more aggressively promoted southern rights. Each party 
attacked the opportunistic behavior of the opposing candidate 
and the lukewarm position both took concerning support or 
opposition to the railroad. The Democrats condemned the 
anti-Catholicism of the Know Nothings and implied that in 
their secret circles the American Party actually supported 
the abolitionists. The Know Nothings in turn argued that 
foreign elements universally opposed slavery and suggested 
that many Democratic leaders lacked the intelligence to 
recognize this threat. Both sides hosted barbecues where 
prominent stump speakers praised the position taken by their 
favorite and condemned the opposition. In addition, several 
huge barbecues attended by more than one thousand people gave 
the masses an opportunity to hear both Davidson and Pond 
ramble for nearly three hours on their own qualities and 
their opponents' faults. The campaign concluded with a week 
of almost explosive tension, a yellow fever panic concocted 
by the Know Nothings to discourage voters, rampant 
accusations of fraud, and a narrow victory for Davidson.182
In itself the 1855 campaign contributed to the socio­
political transformation occurring in the Florida parishes.
182 Clinton Feliciana Democrat. May 5 and 19, 1855, 
June 16,1855, August 4, 1855, September 1, 1855, October 13, 
1855, and November 10, 1855; political speech written by
Thomas C.W. Ellis, dated July 20, 1856, in Ellis Family
Papers (LLMVC); Clinton American Patriot. August 18, 1855, 
September 1, 1855, October 13, 1855, and November 10 and ?4, 
1855; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. November 10, 1855; Baton 
Rouge Weekly Advocate. March 1, 1856.
This resulted in part from the acrimonious debate surrounding 
the congressional election, but primarily from a maneuver 
within the Democratic party which led the defeated faction to 
christen the election the "sellout of 1855." Believing the 
time had come to reward the piney-woods parishes for their 
loyal support of the Democratic party, politicians from 
upstate Louisiana and the Florida parishes determined that 
prominent men from their regions should head the state ticket 
in the 1855 gubernatorial election. Accordingly, in the two 
years preceding the state convention supporters of this 
proposition lobbied to have Colonel John M. Sandidge, a 
powerful north Louisiana politician, and F.H. Hatch, state 
representative from St.Helena, nominated for governor and 
lieutenant governor respectively. No apparent opposition to 
this proposal materialized and only weeks before the 
convention most state Democratic newspapers took their 
nominations for granted. But at the convention the power 
brokers in the delta parishes and New Orleans staged a coup 
and instead nominated Robert C. Wickliffe for governor and
C.H. Mouton for lieutenant governor. Acknowledging the 
treachery seemingly inherent in this maneuver, the Clinton 
American Patriot asserted that the results proved "adverse to 
the arrangement that north Louisiana was to have the Governor 
in the person of the late speaker Colonel Sandidge. What 
must then be his disappointment and that of his section when 
they learn how they have been cheated." Noting also that Mr.
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Hatch had been deprived of the nomination for lieutenant 
governor che same paper queried, "what will St. Helena and 
the other parishes which recommended him say and do? Grin 
and Bear it?" Attempting to minimize the damage to the party 
in the piney woods, the Democratic Baton Rouge Weekly 
Advocate expressed disappointment that the ticket was not 
more geographically balanced, but still urged Democrats to 
unite to defeat the menace posed by Know Nothingism. The 
same paper noted that after the election the delegates who 
remained unanimously nominated Wickliffe but failed to do the 
same for Mouton further dramatizing the disappointment 
associated with Hatch's defeat.183
The absence of a unanimous mandate in support of the 
delta parish favorite C.H. Mouton may have resulted from the 
sense of betrayal felt by many piney-woods delegates from the 
Florida parishes. The level of disappointment with the 
Democratic state ticket in much of the region became evident 
in the general election when Robert C. Wickliffe carried his 
home territory by only thirteen votes over the Creole 
Catholic Charles Derbigny.184 More so than any other single
183 Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate. June 7, 1855;
Clinton Feliciana Democrat. April 21, 1855, June 2, 1855, and 
June 23, 1855; Clinton American Patriot. June 23, 1855; Baton 
Rouge Weekly Advocate. June 21 and 28, 1855.
184 The 1855 governors race resulted in a 2277 to 2264 
majority for Wickliffe in the Florida parishes. Large Know 
Nothing majorities in St.Tammany and East Baton Rouge were 
offset by large Democratic majorities in Livingston and 
Washington. In East Feliciana and West Feliciana the race 
was very close with only one vote separating the candidates
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event, the 1855 political campaign manifested the lack of 
political influence wielded by the piney woods in state 
politics. After months of canvassing to secure the 
nomination of a favorite son for statewide office, the piney- 
woods delegates were rebuffed by a powerful coalition which 
included many delta planters from their own region. But even 
more frustrating to the piney-woods politicians from the 
Florida parishes, it highlighted their decreasing power in 
state government.
By the 1850's, the piney-woods residents of the Florida 
parishes were among the least represented of Louisiana 
citizens in state government. Though each parish received at 
least one representative to the lower house, the method of 
apportionment stipulated in the Constitution of 1852 allowing 
slaves to be counted as part of the population created 
excessive representation from the delta parishes. More 
significantly, as a result of the 1852 apportionment by the 
end of the decade the eastern parishes constituted the least 
represented region in the state senate.
During the course of the first half of the nineteenth 
century representation from the eastern parishes in the 
senate steadily declined. The 1852 apportionment
in F.H. Hatch's home parish of St. Helena, Senate Journal. 
Third Legislature, First Session, 1856, p. 9; the damage to 
the Democratic party in St. Helena continued through the end 
of the decade, in 1857 St. Helena elected the only Know- 
Nothing representative from the Florida parishes, New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. November 15, 1857.
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dramatically intensified this process. By 1854 the imbalance 
of senatorial representation proved to be painfully apparent 
to piney-woods politicians. One senator represented the 
10,405 free white residents of Livingston, St. Helena, St. 
Tammany, and Washington parishes. One senator also 
represented the 2,299 white residents of Tensas and Concordia 
parishes and the 3,670 citizens of St. Mary. At the close of 
the decade the eastern Florida parishes constituted by far 
the largest district to have only one senator both in terms 
of territory and population. The striking contrast between 
the level of representation in the delta and the piney woods, 
created deep resentment in the eastern Florida parishes. The 
piney-woods representatives led by F.H. Hatch of St.Helena 
aggressively denounced this system of misrepresentation 
designed to secure the dominance of the delta planters. To 
many piney-woods dwellers, the refusal to heed the call for 
fairness in representation exemplified the level of planter 
arrogance and disregard for the needs of the common man in 
Louisiana. Increasing voices addressed the perceived 
exploitation of the plain folk. Prominent attorney Thomas 
Ellis repeatedly condemned the lavish expenditures of the 
legislature which lacked all consideration for the wants of 
common people. But planter haughtiness had always been 
readily apparent in the Florida parishes. Whether it 
appeared in the form of Robert Barrow's obtrusive and 
unrepentant murder of a farmer who challenged the right of
169
Barrow's slaves to cross his land, or George Lacey's securing 
election as senator from Livingston and East Baton Rouge and 
promptly returning to more comfortable environs at his home 
in New Orleans. In whatever form, planters had frequently 
taxed the patience of the plain folk. But the Democratic 
refusal to allow a candidate from the piney woods a spot on 
the statewide ticket despite the region's traditional support 
for the party provoked surprise and disappointment in the 
eastern parishes. This rebuff, coupled with their decreasing 
influence in state government and the intensifying economic 
control of the planters, promoted increasing disaffection 
among the plain folk. With conditions favorable to change, 
a new element emerged in the early 1850's which provided the 
impetus to challenge the economic and political dominance of 
the planters. This implement of modernization created 
unprecedented opportunity in the Florida parishes. Yet it 
also produced a serious challenge to the value system of the 
piney-woods dwellers. The new element therefore provoked 
both adoration and condemnation and contributed directly to 
the circumstances which converged into the chaotic conditions 
of the late nineteenth century.185
185 House Journal. Session beginning January 1854, pp. 
25-26; Ibid., Fourth Legislature, Second Session, February
18, 1859; as late as 1846 two senators represented the piney 
woods of the Florida parishes, see Senate Journal. First 
Legislature, First Session, February 1846; Clinton American 
Patriot. January 24, 1855; "Minority Report of the Committee 
Appointed to Apportion the Representation of the State," 
Louisiana Legislative Documents. First Session, Second 
Legislature, 1853; Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana.
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Debate concerning the feasibility of constructing a 
railroad to join New Orleans with the interior had been a 
staple of Louisiana politics since the 1830's. Commercial 
interests in New Orleans argued that the survival of the 
great river port depended on the construction of a 
transportation network to expedite the shipping of cotton and 
other commodities to the Crescent City. Failure to do so the 
argument went, would result in the loss of cotton traffic to 
Mobile and other ports just as the construction of railroads 
and canals had redirected shipments of mid-western foodstuffs 
to Atlantic ports. The success of small independent lines 
such as the West Feliciana and Clinton-Port Hudson railroads 
encouraged support for this argument. But the initial major 
state-supported effort, the proposed New Orleans-Nashville 
line, failed after proceeding only 18 miles north of New 
Orleans. The New Orleans-Nashville Railroad Company 
collapsed for want of effective organization and backing, and 
as a result of its inability to overcome problems associated 
with crossing the swamps about New Orleans. Opening the 
legislative session which debated the wisdom of a new 
endeavor, Governor Joseph Walker acknowledged the loss to the 
state in connection with the New Orleans-Nashville line, but
p. 72; Thomas Ellis to Father, February 10 and undated, 1857, 
in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); Robert Barrow Letter, January
15, 1858 (Ibid.); Edwin Davis (ed.) Plantation Life in the
Florida Parishes of Louisiana 1836-1846. As Reflected in the
Diary of Bennett H. Barrow (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1943) see entry March 1, 1842.
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demonstrated his support for a new effort asserting, "there 
is no one feature of the age in which we live more strikingly 
illustrative of its progress than this accelerated mode of 
travel and communication, and it is with no ordinary emotions 
of pride that our countrymen may point to their achievements 
in this valuable mechanic art."186
The legislature removed a powerful obstacle to the 
construction of new railroads when it approved the calling of 
a constitutional convention. The Constitution of 1845 
prohibited the pledging of state support for internal 
improvements of this nature. The 1852 constitutional 
convention provided railroad supporters with an opportunity 
to reverse this prohibition. After a bitter debate, the 
Whigs secured approval of a measure allowing for state 
backing of railroads. The creation of the New Orleans- 
Jackson Railroad Company later that year opened a veritable 
Pandora's Box of controversy.
Supporters of the New Orleans-Jackson line and the 
recently created New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western 
Railroad, continued to argue that railroads constituted the 
source of future prosperity. Under the capable leadership of
186 Clinton-Port Hudson Railroad Flier, located in
Henry Marston Papers (LLMVC); "Tangipahoa Parish," 
unpublished manuscript located in Velmarae Dunn Collection 
(Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana 
University); "Annual Address of Governor Joseph Walker," 
Senate Journal. Fourth Legislature, First Session, January 
20, 1852; Merl Reed New Orleans and the Railroads: The
Struggle for Commercial Empire 1830-1860 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 19 66) pp. 28-3 0.
172
James Robb, the New Orleans-Jackson and Great Northern 
Railroad Company received strong support from the New Orleans 
business community. Resolution of the controversy concerning 
the proposed route of the new railroad allowed plans to 
begin. The route finally agreed upon would depart New 
Orleans, pass through the Manchac swamp and cross the piney 
woods of the Florida parishes before arriving at the initial 
terminus at Canton, Mississippi.187
The primary motive for building the railroad remained the 
desire to increase commerce at New Orleans. But supporters 
also assumed that residents in the vicinity of the proposed 
line would recognize the prosperity it would create and thus 
enthusiastically support the endeavor. Considerable support 
did in fact materialize in the piney woods. But the primary 
supporters proved to be local merchants hoping to tap the 
lucrative business prospects the railroad would bring and 
speculators who recognized the opportunity the sudden 
intrusion of a railroad into a semi-isolated society would 
create. Noticeably absent among the declared supporters of 
the railroad were the vast majority of Florida parish 
planters. Their absence constituted a major source of 
concern for proponents of the railroad. In the past, efforts
w  "Southwestern Railroad Convention at New Orleans," 
DeBow1s Review. Vol. X, 1851, pp. 690-694; strong support 
emerged to construct the new railroad via Baton Rouge to 
Jackson, or for a steamer connection to Madisonville linking 
with the railroad to Jackson, see ibid., p. 693; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. January 6, 1852.
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to develop railroads in the Florida parishes had failed 
because of the opposition of powerful planters. In the 183 0s 
several planters had initially prevented and then reluctantly 
permitted the construction of the West Feliciana Railroad. 
Yet a small branch line dominated by local planter interests 
lacked the far-reaching implications a major trunk railroad 
supported by northern capital and controlled by city 
interests necessarily included. In particular, a major 
railroad would threaten the planters' control of the regional 
economy. Many planters resented the high costs associated 
with railroads while others opposed the disruption to their 
plantations created by the construction of a railroad. Yet 
by the early 1850s, much of the overt hostility exhibited by 
delta planters toward the railroads had abated. Throughout 
the controversy many planters remained uncharacteristically 
silent, as if torn by their recognition of the benefits a 
railroad would bring but reluctant to support an endeavor 
which they suspected would create a massive restructuring of 
their world. By their silence, they failed to provide the 
leadership expected of them at a critical moment when 
direction mattered most. But the legislature did act. On a 
crucial vote to provide state aid to the proposed railroads, 
all of the senators from the Florida parishes voted yes with 
the majority paving the way for construction of the line.188
188 "History of the West Feliciana Railroad,"
unpublished undated manuscript compiled by C.R. Calvert, 
located in James Stewart McGehee Papers (LIiMVC); "Rules and
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Despite the appearance of tacit approval on the part of 
the delta planters occasioned by the near unanimous support 
of the legislature, strong opposition to the New Orleans- 
Jackson Railroad developed in the piney woods. Though the 
trunk railroad would pass only through the eastern parishes, 
the controversy extended to the entire region. With the 
advent of construction on the trunk line, numerous calls were 
issued by railroad supporters to create branch lines 
connecting the Felicianas and East Baton Rouge to the 
mainline. The two most important of these proposals involved 
the connection to Clinton via Greensburg, and the Baton Rouge 
via Springfield connection. Local newspapers relentlessly 
promoted the trunk line and the branch railroads, frequently 
listing prominent supporters pledging funds. Those providing 
financial support included merchandising firms and factors
Bylaws of the West Feliciana Railroad Company," demonstrates 
that local planters exercised absolute control over the 
branch railroads in the region, located in the West Feliciana 
Railroad Collection (Newberry Library); local planters' fear 
of constant expenses associated with the railroad were not 
unfounded as exemplified in the New Orleans-Jackson and Great 
Northern Railroad Ledger, Vol. I, June 1851-March 1858 
(Newberry Library) ; the Southwestern Railroad Convention held 
at New Orleans in 1851 served as the catalyst to promote the 
New Orleans-Jackson line in the legislature and among 
business interests. Noticeably absent among the committee 
members and power brokers at the convention were 
representatives from the piney woods of the Florida parishes, 
the region which would experience the greatest disruption of 
its society and private property due to the railroad. 
Excepting Alfred Hennen, a New Orleans attorney who owned a 
cottage on the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain and 
therefore presumed to represent St.Tammany Parish, no 
representatives from the piney woods were evident, DeBow1s 
Review. Vol. X, 1851, pp. 690-694; Senate Journal. First 
Legislature, First Session, April 22, 1853.
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such as Abraham Levi, Bloom and Company, Robert Germany, and 
Levi Spiller, as well as prominent gentlemen such as John 
Bach, Cade Strickland, and Eli Capel. The lists of prominent 
supporters of the railroad demonstrate that the merchant 
community overwhelmingly supported the endeavor. But the 
same lists indicate that excepting a few individuals, the 
planters either remained silent or opposed the railroad.189
Political rhetoric during the railroad controversy 
demonstrated the planter's lack of leadership. Pressed to 
take a position concerning a branch railroad during a hotly 
contested election in East Feliciana, prominent planter and 
state representative Bythell Haynes responded, "should they 
(the people} be in favor of the road, and desire the state to 
subscribe for one fifth of the capital stock as provided for 
in the Constitution, and that knowledge is made known to me, 
in a tangible form, then I will support the measure? but on 
the contrary should the people be opposed to the road and 
against asking or receiving such assistance from the state, 
then I as their representative would oppose it and vote 
against it." Haynes further sidestepped the issue by adding, 
"the Democracy of the parish having as a party made 
nominations to be supported at the election in November next, 
by said party, it does not, in my opinion become those
189 Clinton American Patriot. August 4, 11, and 18, 
1855; Clinton Feliciana Democrat. June 16, 1855; Greensburg 
Imperial. June 13, 1857; Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. August 
22, 1854? Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate. May 10, 1856; New
Orleans Daily Delta. December 14, 1854.
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nominees to raise any side issues, on the railroad, or any 
other question, which may embarrass the voters in their 
choice." Haynes's position was indicative of the strength of 
opponents of the railroads. Though he indicated he 
personally favored the proposed line, he cautiously avoided 
being labelled a supporter or opponent of the railroad.190
Opposition to the railroad centered on different issues 
in different areas. Many planters feared that the power they 
exercised in a closed homogeneous society would decrease as 
a result of new opportunities created by the railroad. The 
fear that hordes of new residents unaccustomed to conditions 
in the Florida parishes would challenge their political power 
created alarm among some planter politicians. Many resented 
the arrogance exhibited by outsiders connected with the 
railroad. Commenting on the role of the company's leadership 
during the controversy, prominent New Orleans attorney and 
historian Charles Gayarre informed a piney-woods supporter, 
"the director is an utter stranger to Louisiana, and he 
ignores probably that there is a sensitiveness in this state 
which may not exist in the cooler atmosphere of Illinois, 
where he may have forgotten the habits, manners, and feelings 
of South Carolina which is said to be his native state."191
190 Bythell Haynes Letter, "To The Voters of East 
Feliciana," (LLMVC).
191 Charles Gayarre to N.R. Jennings, November 20, 
1859, in Hennen-Jennings Family Papers (LLMVC); "Report of 
the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad," Louisiana Legislative 
Documents. 1853.
Others among the elite feared the challenge to their 
political and economic power posed by merchants and 
opportunists certain to follow in the wake of the railroad. 
Positions created by the railroad provided many laborers with 
an opportunity to work for a company free of the economic 
control of the planters. Moreover, like the plain folk, many 
planters resented the increasing taxation the railroad 
represented. From the beginning, it appeared certain that to 
secure construction of the line, taxes would be increased to 
fund the state subsidy. In the winter of 1853 the New 
Orleans Daily Picayune reported that a lawsuit had been filed 
challenging the legality and constitutionality of the 
railroad tax. Four months later in an article urging people 
to demonstrate their support for the railroad, the same paper 
noted that opponents of the line "appear to have fearful 
strength at the polls." Attempting to contain the growing 
anti-railroad agitation in the piney-woods, Superintendent 
James Robb, in a series of letters to the New Orleans Daily 
Crescent addressed the opposition resulting from the 
increasing tax burden. Robb expressed sympathy for the 
country residents who "are already taxed oppressively and 
loudly object to it." He asserted that he had intended to 
visit every property holder along the proposed line but that 
illness had prevented him from "dissipating the objections 
which need only the assisting hand of truth to remove them." 
Railroad promoters further antagonized many citizens by
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calling for a special tax to be placed on parishes along the 
proposed route which failed to raise sufficient funds through 
voluntary subscriptions. This proposal created outrage among 
country residents who already resented paying taxes in 
support of fundamental institutions such as schools.192
The financial burden created by the railroad angered 
many plain folk as well as planters. But in the piney woods, 
the core of the opposition rested in an inherent suspicion of 
outside interference into their affairs. To many of the 
piney-woods dwellers these suspicions proved well founded 
when their society and their value system came under 
immediate assault as a result of the intrusion of the 
railroad. Though qualified by the planter's economic and 
political control of the region, an independent lifestyle 
constituted the very essence of the piney-woods existence. 
This involved the freedom to travel, hunt, and fish where one 
pleased unencumbered by legal or physical restraints. It
192 New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 6 and October 
12, 1852, May 22 and December 15, 1853, April 21, 1854, April 
22, 1856; DeBow's Review. Vol. X, 1851, p. 692; "Report of 
the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad," Louisiana Legislative 
Documents. 1853; Charles Gayarre to N.R. Jennings, November 
20, 1859, in Hennen-Jennings Family Papers (LLMVC); New
Orleans Dai1v Crescent. March 6, 7, 8, and 10, 1856; C.D. 
Strickland to John Calhoun, August 27, 1852, J.Y. Kilpatrick 
to A. Wang, March 10, 1857, both found in New Orleans-Jackson 
and Great Northern Railroad Collection (Mississippi State 
Archives); E.D. Frost to H.S. McComb, November 3, 1875, in
W.M. Francis and E.D. Frost Out Letters Collection (Newberry 
Library); Margaret L. Duval, "Legends of Wilkinson County and 
the Surrounding Area," Louisiana Folklore Miscellany III, No. 
4, p. 47; Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism p. 34-37; 
Thornton, Politics and Power in a Slave Society pp. 3 05-311.
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meant a farmer could raise crops on unoccupied land or allow 
his livestock to graze wherever they pleased in an 
environment which accepted these rights as fundamental. 
Though their independent and self-sufficient lifestyle had 
been redefined somewhat by modernization and the implications 
of a market intrinsically part of the cotton economy, their 
value system based on the primacy of honor and independence 
continued. But the railroad threatened this manner of 
existence. The railroad brought government directly into the 
lives of the piney-woods dwellers in the form of increasing 
taxation, stock laws, and legal hassles involving land 
claims.
Beginning with the surveys along the proposed route, 
long dormant land disputes came to the surface. Many 
residents deeply resented the encroachment of an outside 
force determined to complicate an aspect of their lives which 
had long appeared resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all. 
Even more menacing, the action of the Federal government 
donating to the railroad all public lands within six miles of 
either side of the line threatened to uproot hundreds of 
homesteaders residing on those lands. This donation not only 
created outrage among the squatters, many of whom farmed the 
land in the hopes of one day owning it, but it also disturbed 
nearby landowners who anxiously considered the prospect of
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scores of uprooted landless families in their 
communities.193
Even more damaging to the traditional piney-woods 
existence, the railroad necessitated the fencing of stock. 
Promoters recognized the importance of the open range to 
piney-woods farmers. In an effort to reduce opposition to 
the railroad, they initially rejected the use of legal 
coercion to force farmers to fence in their livestock. But 
the earliest excursions along the road demonstrated that it 
would be impossible to allow livestock to range in the 
vicinity of the railroad. An outing designed to demonstrate 
the partially completed railroad's cotton carrying capacity 
in November 1854 ended in disaster when the train hit a cow 
overturning several cars and damaging much of the cotton. A 
few weeks later, a trip up the line attended by Governor 
Hebert and other state dignitaries proved less than 
satisfactory when the train again hit a cow forcing the 
passengers to wait for hours until another train could be 
brought up from New Orleans. The resulting restrictions on 
the open range assaulted a central component of the piney- 
woods economy. The constraints placed on their traditional
19 The reaction to the Federal grant and the
implications involved with uprooting the homesteaders on the 
public lands, induced Governor Robert Wickliffe to urge the 
state legislature to petition the company to reject the 
donation, see Annual Message of Governor Robert C. Wickliffe, 
House Journal. First Legislature, First Session, January 19, 
1857; New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 17, 1855 and August 
25, 1856.
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way of life and disruption of their economy, coupled with the 
increasing influx of immigrants, all constituted a direct 
attack on the piney-woods existence.194
Yet in addition to the disruption of their traditional 
existence and economic livelihood, many residents of the 
Florida parishes and the southwestern counties of Mississippi 
considered the railroad a harbinger of death - death in the 
form of the plague of the period, yellow fever. Called by 
many names, the fever, yellow jack, or the black vomit, this 
seemingly incurable disease constituted the single greatest 
health fear of Louisianians in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Unfortunately for railroad promoters, some of the most severe 
yellow fever epidemics occurred in the early 1850's.
Physicians experimenting with the disease in the mid­
nineteenth century never determined the correct cause or 
treatment for the fever. Most believed that yellow fever was 
introduced to Louisiana from abroad, most likely from the 
Caribbean islands, and that gases created by the swampy, 
often filthy conditions about New Orleans allowed it to gain 
a foothold and then spread. Despite the uncertainty 
surrounding its cause, no shortage of evidence existed to
194 New Orleans Daily Picayune. November 10, 1854; New 
Orleans Daily Delta. December 14, 1854; Shugg, Origins of the 
Class Struggle in Louisiana p. 46; Folklife in the Florida 
Parishes. publication of the Louisiana Folklife Program, 
Office of Cultural Development and Center for Regional 
Studies, Southeastern Louisiana University, 1989, p. 32; 
Police Jury Code for the Parish of East Feliciana, describes
open range stock laws.
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demonstrate the panic yellow fever created. The horror 
associated with the fever is exemplified in an 1853 letter 
written by N.R. Jennings of St. Tammany Parish. In the 
letter Jennings confided to his friend that a close associate 
of his wife had recently died. The deceased woman's doctor 
assured his wife that her friend died of dropsie. Yet his 
wife and only one other woman attended this popular woman's 
funeral. While there, the attending physician informed Mrs. 
Jennings that her friend had indeed died of yellow fever. 
Mrs. Jennings confided that the physician appeared extremely 
agitated at his failure to determine a cause of the fever or 
prescribe any effective treatment. Before they departed the 
funeral, the doctor urged Mrs. Jennings to remain silent to 
prevent a mass flight of suffering people who were likely to 
die anyway. A sense of hopelessness and despair permeated 
Jennings' words. He closed the letter with a note of near 
panic concerning the health of his wife.195
The epidemics of 1853, 1854, and 1855 killed thousands 
in Louisiana. The epidemic of 1853 in particular
depopulated whole regions of the state. One half the
195 Official Report of the Homeopathic Yellow Fever 
Commission. Ordered bv the American Institute of Homeopathy 
For Presentation to Congress (New Orleans: A.H. Nelson
Printing, 1879) herein after referred to as Report of the 
Homeopathic Yellow Fever Commission; W.B. King to E.P. Skene, 
September 15, 1897, and J.B. Kemp to E.P. Skene, September 
15, 1897, both in Illinois Central Railroad Collection
Overflow Reports, E.P. Skene Outletters (Newberry Library)? 
"Report of the Joint Committee of Public Health," Louisiana 
Legislative Documents. 1853; N.R. Jennings to Dimitry, 1853, 
in Hennen-Jennings Papers (LLMVC).
population of the villages of Port Hudson and Bayou Sara died 
from the fever. Panicked residents abandoned New Orleans and 
the surrounding parishes by the thousands, heading for drier 
cooler environs to the north. Clinton, Jackson, Greensburg, 
and other towns in the Florida parishes were almost 
universally abandoned by their residents. The sheriff of 
East Feliciana Parish succumbed to the fever; his replacement 
died in the same manner four months later. Work on the 
railroad came to a complete halt in the summer of 1853 when 
yellow fever decimated the labor force and most of the 
survivors fled for their lives. Sadly, during each of the 
epidemics all efforts to contain the disease failed. As late 
as the 1870s the primary defense against the fever remained 
repeated artillery discharges in the affected areas. Some 
physicians believed the concussion created by these 
discharges killed the yellow fever toxin, while others 
believed the ozone created by the burnt powder cleaned the 
atmosphere. All agreed that the only means to contain the 
spread of yellow jack involved a rigid system of 
quarantine.196
196 Annual Address of Governor P.O. Hebert, House
Journal, Second Legislature, Second Session, January 1855; 
Report of the Homeopathic Yellow Fever Commission. 1879; Mary 
E. Taylor to Stella Spence, August 14, 1855 and Sereno Taylor 
to Eugene Hunter, May 26, 1855 in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers 
(LLMVC); E.D. Frost to H.S. McComb, June 28, 1875, in W.M. 
Francis and E.D. Frost Out Letters Collection (Newberry 
Library); "Report of the Joint Committee of Public Health,11 
Louisiana Legislative Documents. 1853; Clinton American 
Patriot, August 25, September 15, and November 17, 1855;
Clinton Feliciana Democrat. September 1 and September 29,
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Since most physicians agreed that the epidemics spread 
to the interior after first being introduced into New 
Orleans, quarantine attempted to prevent the arrival of 
plague carrying ships at New Orleans. Once the fever was 
identified in New Orleans, the country parishes sought to 
repel travelers from the Crescent City. A typical quarantine 
station consisted of armed residents, frequently supported by 
crude breastworks, determined to prevent anyone having been 
in or passed through an infected region from entering their 
locality. Quarantine usually remained in place for months 
until the threat of fever had passed. On the roads and 
trails crossing the Florida parishes the guards could easily 
turn back any traveller attempting to enter their region. 
But the railroad also disrupted this arrangement. It 
provided New Orleans with an unbreakable link to the piney 
woods. In January, 1854 Governor P.O. Hebert addressed this 
new menace. "The sanitary condition of New Orleans is no 
longer a question of local interest. When the meshes of 
railroads which must eventually connect every part of the 
state with its great emporium shall have been completed, the 
most distant villages on our frontiers shall be suburbs of 
New Orleans." Thus Hebert concluded, the epidemics which
1855; New Orleans Daily Picayune. October 6, 20, and 22, 
1853, November 10, 1853, September 6, 1855; John Ellis to Tom 
Ellis, August 20, 1855, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); Baton 
Rouge Daily Advocate. October 10, 1854.
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always begin in great cities will easily spread 
statewide.197
Based on the threat posed to their very manner of 
existence, and in some opinions to their very lives, much of 
the opposition to the railroad seemed justified. The menace 
of yellow fever transported from New Orleans to the 
countryside broadened the appeal of railroad antagonists. 
Yet despite the ferocity of some opponents, the railroad 
could not be halted. By the summer of 1854, regular rail 
service traversed the Florida parishes. The power of New 
Orleans commercial interests, northern capital, and the 
silence of the planters guaranteed the construction of iron 
rails across the Florida parishes. In the spring of 1856 the 
New Orleans Daily Picayune reported, "we hope we have now 
seen the last of the railroad controversy. With all 
deference to the parties engaged in this warfare with each 
other, we may be permitted to express the opinion that 
nothing is to be gained for themselves, or the public 
interest in prosecuting it further." Three months later the
197 F.F. Hansell (ed.) Commercial and Statistical
Almanac: Containing a History of the Epidemic (New Orleans: 
James A. Gresham, 1879) pp. 45-53; E.D. Frost to H.S. McComb, 
September 4, 1875, in W.M. Francis and E.D. Frost Out Letters 
Collection (Newberry Library); New Orleans Daily Picayune. 
August 31, 1858 and September 16, 1897; J.B. Kemp to E.P. 
Skene, September 15, 16, and 17, 1897 and W.B. King to E.P. 
Skene, September 15, 1897, in Illinois Central Railroad
Collection Overflow Reports, E.P. Skene Outletters, 1897 
(Newberry Library);"Report of the Joint Committee on Public 
Health," Louisiana Legislative Documents. 1853; Clinton 
American Patriot. August 25, 1855.
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same paper proclaimed the death knell for the opposition 
asserting, "the grand enterprise has passed through its 
perils and the way to success is clear and open. Croakers 
and ill wishers have been foiled in their evil auguries and 
there is with the Company and friends a confident spirit and 
unity of purpose." Yet the issues raised in the controversy 
surrounding the New Orleans-Jackson line served to stiffen 
opposition to the proposed branch railroads. Confronted by 
strong resistance and lacking the necessary capital, all of 
the branch railroad companies either failed or postponed 
their plans indefinitely.198
The New Orleans-Jackson Railroad transformed the 
territory along its route. In just a few years the railroad 
converted the thinly settled territory along the Tangipahoa 
River into the most densely populated and thriving region in 
the piney woods. Several new towns including Pontchatoula, 
Tickfaw, Amite City, and Osyka emerged at ten mile intervals 
in conjunction with the stations established by the railroad. 
Previously established villages such as Manchac and 
Tangipahoa also thrived as a result of the railroad.
In each of these villages sawmills, cotton warehouses, 
stockyards, and in many cases brickyards, arose to facilitate 
construction and traffic along the railroad. Hotels,
198 New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 25 and July 9, 
1856; Greensburq Imperial. April 30, 1859; Clinton Feliciana 
Democrat. July 21, 1855; Clinton American Patriot. February 
21, 1855.
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restaurants, general stores, and saloons also emerged to 
facilitate travellers and the rapidly increasing local 
population. Real estate prices quickly escalated as 
speculators from New Orleans and other areas purchased all 
available property in the vicinity of the railroad. The 
region's rapid development frustrated many of the older 
Florida parish families. The contempt which many of the 
established families felt for the hordes of speculators and 
opportunists who arrived in the wake of the railroad is 
evident in a letter of Thomas Ellis to his brother John. 
Writing from the newly created Amite City, Ellis underscored 
this feeling while expressing dismay at the level of 
speculation occurring along the railroad. "One must get 
located here to have an equal chance with those fresh water 
sharks and would be large land holders who are trying to 
induce good natured people to give whole fortunes for a few 
feet of pinev wood land for the sake of the railroad, as if 
the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad were the only communication 
in the state with New Orleans." The Ellises, natives of East 
Feliciana Parish, moved to Amite City only upon the 
completion of the railroad.199
199 Map of the Line of the New Orleans-Jackson
Railroad From Canton, Mississippi to New Orleans, 1861, in 
Illinois Central Railroad Collection (Newberry Library);New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. July 19, 1854, August 1, 1854, and 
September 16, 1855; Thomas Ellis to John Ellis, January 26, 
1858, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
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The masses of immigrants and city dwellers who 
established residences in the piney woods in conjunction with 
the railroad changed the face of the territory along the 
Tangipahoa River and environs. Moreover, the rapidly 
increasing wealth and population of this region gradually 
shifted significant political power away from the delta 
parishes to the piney woods. Recognizing the significance of 
this transformation, many delta parish families, such as the 
perennially political Ellises, relocated along the route of 
the railroad. But most importantly for the future 
development of the region, the railroad controversy 
contributed to the changing relationship between the Florida 
parish planters and plain folk. This relationship, based on 
the dominance of the planters, had brought stability to a 
seeming perpetual state of chaos in the Florida parishes. In 
short, from the perspective of peace and security, planter 
dominance had been good for the region.
The relationship between the planters and plain folk had 
always been one of patron and follower. Though this 
situation allowed the planters to dominate the region, both 
groups benefitted in terms of the services each provided the 
other and most importantly, in terms of the security and 
stability which resulted. The railroad controversy
jeopardized this relationship. While conditions associated 
with the railroad appeared likely to challenge the absolute 
dominance of the planters, it also created an opportunity for
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piney-woods dwellers had surrendered their political power, 
failed to take the lead in protecting their interests. This 
absence of leadership following the 1852 constitution and the 
sellout of 1855, threatened to unravel a time tested 
arrangement in the Florida parishes. Yellow fever epidemics 
aggravated the anxiety prevailing in the period. The absence 
of a strong religious community denied the residents a 
fundamental means of ventilating their frustration. As a 
result, by the close of the decade, on the eve of the crisis 
of the Union, the plain folk's fealty to the planters was in 
doubt.200
C.D. Strickland to John Calhoun, August 27, 1852, 
and J.Y. Kilpatrick to A. Wang, March 10, 1857, both found in 
New Orleans-Jackson and Great Northern Railroad Collection 
(Mississippi State Archives) provide examples of 
opportunities created for the plain folk by the railroad; 
though Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Catholic, and a few 
Episcopalian churches were evident in the Florida parishes, 
the region was characterized by the absence of a strong 
religious community. Records and newspaper accounts of these 
churches indicate that ministers and directors frequently 
complained of the failure of their communities to support 
their church. Visitors to the region, particularly 
northerners, often expressed outrage at the lack of regard 
for religion and the Sabbath in the Florida parishes. Though 
some churches, such as the Hephzibah Church near Clinton and 
the East Fork Baptist Church in Amite County, Mississippi 
attempted to police their members and mediate disputes, few 
churches in the region were this aggressive. Family 
collections indicate a widespread lack of religious 
commitment across the Florida parishes. See: John Durnin to
Dear Sister, January 11, 1868, in James and John Durnin
Papers (LLMVC); Eugene Hunter to Stella, March 20, 1862
(Ibid.); Abigail Amacker Diary, July 13, 1862, in O.P.
Amacker Diary (Ibid.); S.F. Snell Letter, April 26, 1863
(Ibid.); Mary Carter to Anna McGehee, November 12, 1851(7), 
in John C. Burruss Papers (Ibid.); F.M. Kent to Uncle Moody, 
February 19, 1857, in Amos Kent Papers (Ibid.); Records of 
Hephzibah Church, May-September, 1863 (Ibid.); Records of 
East Fork Baptist Church, Amite County, Mississippi, July,
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Much of the ruling elite's concern centered on the 
results of local political contests. Increasing sectional 
strife and the decline of two party politics in the deep 
South insured the supremacy of the Democrats in statewide and 
national campaigns. But on the local level the dominance of 
the planters seemed challenged. The 1856 legislative 
delegation from the piney woods contained no incumbents. 
More importantly, the social status and wealth of those 
elected demonstrated that though the power of the planters 
remained unbroken, it had been weakened. Some of the newly 
elected legislators, such as W.E. Walker of Livingston, 
benefitted from the incumbents' failure to seek re-election.
Sabbath in the Florida parishes. Though some churches, such 
as the Hephzibah Church near Clinton and the East Fork 
Baptist Church in Amite County, Mississippi attempted to 
police their members and mediate disputes, few churches in 
the region were this aggressive. Family collections indicate 
a widespread lack of religious commitment across the Florida 
parishes. See: John Durnin to Dear Sister, January 11,
1868, in James and John Durnin Papers (LLMVC); Eugene Hunter 
to Stella, March 20, 1862 (Ibid.); Abigail Amacker Diary,
July 13, 1862, in O.P. Amacker Diary (Ibid.); S.F. Snell
Letter, April 26, 1863 (Ibid.); Mary Carter to Anna McGehee, 
November 12, 1851(7), in John C. Burruss Papers (Ibid.); F.M. 
Kent to Uncle Moody, February 19, 1857, in Amos Kent Papers 
(Ibid.); Records of Hephzibah Church, May-September, 1863 
(Ibid.); Records of East Fork Baptist Church, Amite County, 
Mississippi, July, 1866, (Mississippi State Archives, 
Jackson); Greensbura Imperial. August 6, 1859; Greensbura
Journal. July 20, 1866; Clinton American Patriot. June 16, 
1855; Davis (ed.) Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes of 
Louisiana. p. 66; Timothy Flint, Recollections of the Last 
Ten Years (Boston: Cummings, Hilliard, and Company, 1826) p. 
327.
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Others, such as J.B. Strickland of St. Helena, defeated 
powerful incumbents in extremely close races.201
Creating perhaps the most concern among the ruling 
hierarchy in the Florida parishes, the election of Steven 
Albitron in Washington Parish heralded the arrival of a new 
breed of politician in the piney woods. A highly educated 
man though of modest means, Albitron served as a school 
teacher in Franklinton. Unlike most of his predecessors, he 
owned no slaves, farmed no cotton, and possessed an estate 
valued at less than six hundred dollars.202 Though Albitron 
played a minor role in the state legislature, his election 
symbolized the dawning political power of the masses in the 
piney woods and the deterioration of the absolute power of 
the planters.
Circumstances in the mid and late 1850s combined to 
create a new political atmosphere in the Florida parishes, in 
which the traditional power of the planters was qualified by 
the perception of failed leadership and an absence of concern
201 Walker filled the seat vacated by Thomas Green
Davidson who was elected to Congress. In St. Helena,
Strickland's narrow victory over F.H. Hatch was marred by 
allegations of fraud on both sides. The extremely close vote 
necessitated legislative scrutiny. Hatch's defeat so angered 
many of the power brokers in the legislature that they 
permitted Hatch to attend the legislative sessions and 
receive compensation until the conflict was resolved, see 
House Journal. Third Legislature, First Session, January 23 
and February 20, 1856.
202 House Journal. Third Legislature, First Session, 
January 21, 1856; Seventh Census of the United States. 1850. 
"Heads of Households;" Albitron is also frequently spelled 
Albriton.
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for the plight of the plain folk. But on the threshold of 
their greatest opportunity the increasing influence of the 
piney-woods dwellers was circumvented. The apparent chance 
for social and political change slipped away as a result of 
national issues which overwhelmed the local transformation 
occuring in eastern Louisiana. As the sectional crisis 
dramatically intensified at the close of the decade it 
essentially negated the opportunity for choice among the 
plain folk. Just as the Creole-American conflict in state 
politics had necessitated unity and reduced the choice 
available to common voters, the reduction in the number of 
political parties sympathetic to conditions in the South also 
reduced the choices available. The replacement of the Know 
Nothings by a powerful Republican organization in the North 
essentially negated the options open to southern voters. As 
a result, the growing sectional crisis allowed the planters 
to maintain their political dominance in the Florida parishes 
at the moment of its greatest challenge.
Planter propagandists relentlessly depicted themselves 
as the defenders of southern society in the face of 
increasingly hostile attacks. The appeal to southern honor 
and the bond of slaveholding amidst the growing northern 
threat served to dissuade the plain folk from continuing 
their challenge to planter dominance. In his farewell 
address to the legislature, January 17, 1860, Governor Robert 
Wickliffe demonstrated the power of this appeal:
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The times that are upon us are rapidly precipitating a 
crisis which must be met manfully. In any event I know 
that the people of Louisiana will not be found wanting 
in a practical vindication of their assailed rights, and 
a proper defense of their honor. The character of 
Louisiana has not yet been stained with the servility or 
dishonor, and I know her people in the present, like her 
people in the past, would gladly accept any alternative 
which carries with it honor and insures self respect, 
than take a position which might secure temporary profit 
at the sacrifice of every principle of manhood, every 
element of independence, every attribute of the lofty 
sovereignty upon which we have so justly prided 
ourselves... the slaveholding states have not 
wronged nor attempted to wrong their northern brethren 
in any manner; and in all controversies they have been 
the first to yield; they have compromised and 
compromised for the sake of peace, when they had rights 
and interests at stake and the North had none - but ever 
yielding, and each compromise has been followed by fresh 
demands and renewed aggression, until fanaticism grown 
bold by our yielding as well as by its wondrous growth 
of power in the North threatens to prevail.203
d "Farewell Address of Governor Robert C.
Wickliffe," House Journal. Fifth Legislature, First Session, 
January 17, 1860.
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Following the election of Abraham Lincoln, Governor Thomas 0. 
Moore's call for a special session of the legislature in 
December, 1860 resulted in the passage of a convention bill 
authorizing the Governor to call an election for delegates to 
a secession convention.204 If any doubted the power of the 
appeal to honor and the defense of southern rights, the 
secession convention must have convinced them. At the 
convention, the tradition of denying important positions to 
the favorite sons of the piney woods continued. Despite 
strenuous efforts, the piney-woods representatives failed in 
their efforts to secure election of one of their own to a 
position of leadership. Yet despite the constancy of this 
rebuff, when the vote to sever Louisiana's ties to the old 
union came, the piney-woods representatives stood beside 
their traditional leaders.205
On January 26, 1861, the Louisiana Secession Convention 
voted 113 to 17 to take the state out of the union. Every
For a discussion of the 1860 election and its 
implications in the Florida parishes see chapter four.
205 Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of 
the State of Louisiana. 1861 (microfilm reprint, New Haven: 
Research Publications, 1970) pp. 7-18; Records of the 
Louisiana State Government. 1850-1888. in the War Department 
Collection of Confederate Records. Doc. F-75 (National 
Archives) pp. 1-3; the secession convention election in 
Louisiana returned 84 committed secessionists and 46 
cooperationists. In the Florida parishes East Baton Rouge 
elected straight cooperationist delegates, East Feliciana, 
St. Helena, and St. Tammany elected split delegations, and 
Livingston, Washington, and West Feliciana elected straight 
secession delegations, see Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. 
January 17, 1861.
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representative from the Florida parishes voted in support of 
this measure. The fear of the yankee menace to their 
peculiarly southern way of life and the assumed affronts to 
their honor occasioned by the rhetoric of the abolitionists 
and Republicans, proved more important than challenging the 
power of the planters. Yet the seeds for the chaos of the 
late nineteenth century had been planted. If the sectional 
controversy had not derailed the increasing assertiveness of 
the plain folk, the implications of the breakdown of planter 
dominance in the postwar period may have been reduced. But 
the crisis Louisianians willingly embarked upon would for 
some, be enduring. The Florida parishes, and particularly 
the piney woods of that region, had commenced upon a journey 
of unmitigated catastrophe which would convulse the territory 
for the next fifty years. As the celebrations in support of 
the independence of Louisiana echoed across the state, 
perhaps a note of sadness should have sounded in the Florida 
parishes. A sorrowful portent for the blood of the scores of 
her residents that would stain the soil for decades, and a 
sadness for lost opportunity as the storm waxed close.
Chapter Four
"Liberty's What We're Marching For Boys But We Ain't
Gettin Nearer To It:" War
On a cool spring morning in April 1862, the Fourth 
Louisiana Infantry Regiment C.S.A. received orders to abandon 
its encampment near Corinth, Mississippi and move forward in 
support of the Confederate advance against Union positions in 
the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee. The rapid 
advance was occasioned by the Confederate high command's 
awareness that the evenly matched opponents would not remain 
that way for long. The approach of a second Union army would 
give the combined Federal forces the strength to overwhelm by 
sheer force of numbers the hastily assembled Confederate 
Army. As the Fourth approached the front, a Tennessee 
regiment mistakenly fired on them from the rear creating 
temporary disorder in the ranks. Once reformed, the 
Louisianians, ranging in age from 15 to 48, received orders 
to assault a virtually impregnable Union position later named 
the "Hornets Nest." Under orders from General Braxton Bragg, 
the Louisianians gallantly launched three frontal attacks 
against the position sustaining horrific losses. When the
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day ended, few among the regiment realized that for them this 
was only the beginning. Of the more than 1,000 men who 
initially enlisted in the regiment, forty survived the war 
unscathed.206
The Fourth Louisiana Regiment of Volunteers, Confederate 
States Army represented one of the first Confederate units 
recruited in the Florida parishes. Organized in the fall of 
1860, this regiment embodied the jubilation which 
characterized the secession winter in the Florida parishes. 
With the northern states steadily increasing their influence 
in Congress following the break of the balance of power in 
the Senate, many southerners regarded the presidency as the 
final bond of the old union. The election of a sectional 
candidate in 1860 who did not appear on the ballot in the 
South, provoked the withdrawal of the states of the Deep
206 Eugene Hunter to Stella, March 15 and 19, 1862, in 
Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC); E. John Ellis Diary, in 
Ellis Family Papers (ibid.) pp. 15-16; Thomas C. Robertson to 
Dear Mother, April 9, 1862, reprinted in "Battle of Shiloh, 
Letter of a Soldier to his Mother" (ibid.); John S. Kendall 
Biography, typed manuscript entitled "Recollections of a 
Confederate Officer," (herein after refered to as John S. 
Kendall Biography) pp. 5-40; John S. Kendall (ed.) "Muster 
Rolls of the Fourth Louisiana Regiment of Volunteers, 
Confederate States Army," reprinted from Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly. XXX, No. 2 (herein after referred to as 
Kendall (ed.) "Muster Rolls of the Fourth Louisiana,") p. 4. 
The Fourth Louisiana lost a staggering 209 of the 575 men 
engaged at Shiloh. Though severe, this tragedy would pale in 
comparison with the loses it sustained in other engagements, 
particularly during the Georgia campaign where at the single 
Battle of Jonesboro the unit lost 62% of its remaining troops 
forcing its consolidation with other Louisiana regiments, 
Arthur Bergeron, Guide to Louisiana Confederate Military 
Units (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989) 
pp. 80-81.
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South. The nucleus for the Fourth Louisiana emerged in the 
same month that Abraham Lincoln secured election as 
president.207
Yet many Louisianians lamented the collapse of 
compromise and the triumph of fanaticism. Large numbers of 
voters in the Florida parishes demonstrated their Unionist 
sympathies by supporting the Constitutional Union Party and 
the national Democrats. Headed by John Bell, the 
Constitutional Unionists carried East Baton Rouge and St. 
Tammany parishes outright. In East Feliciana, the combined 
vote of Bell and the national Democrat Stephen Douglas 
exceeded that of southern Democratic candidate John C. 
Breckinridge. Breckinridge surpassed the combined total of 
the other candidates in Washington, West Feliciana, 
Livingston, and St. Helena. But excepting Washington, the 
vote in each of these parishes proved close, particularly so 
in St. Helena where Breckinridge outpolled the combined total 
of the other candidates by only twenty one votes (see table 
12) .208
In the months following the election a rapid 
transformation of opinion occurred in the Florida parishes. 
Previous to the crisis occasioned by the perception of 
Republican domination of the Federal government, many
Greensburq Imperial. February 2, 1861; Kendall
(ed.) "Muster Rolls of the Fourth Louisiana."
208 Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. November 18, 1860.
T a b l e  1 2
1.860, ELECTi.QN-_.RSS.ULTS
EARI.SH_________________ BRECKINRIDGE__________ BELL___________ DOUGLAS
EAST BATON ROUGE 490 569 136
EAST FELICIANA 377 277 131
LIVINGSTON 425 249 117
ST. HELENA 331 292 18
ST. TAMMANY 164 243 132
WEST FELICIANA 272 188 33
WASHINGTON 387 112 5
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residents of the Florida parishes had been vocal in their 
support of the union. Thomas G. Morgan of Baton Rouge 
aggressively urged his friends to help "secure the defeat of 
the Great Southern States Thought alias dissolution of the 
union branch of the Democracy, for these fellows who are 
eternally preaching northern despotism - southern oppression 
and peaceable withdrawal from the union, I have a most 
sovereign detestation." As early as 1856 F.M. Kent 
prophesied that disunion equated catastrophe for all. 
Writing to his sister Kent warned "if Fremont is elected it 
will lead to disunion and bloodshed for I do not think this 
union can be dissolved peaceably." Similarly W.H. Pearson of 
Livingston Parish equated the secession impulse with divine 
retribution. Writing to his friend John Gurley, Pearson 
lamented, "can it be that an offended God has given us over 
to anarchy and confusion that we may feel the consequences of 
our own folly." St. Helena Unionist E. John Ellis excused 
himself from church services on account of his minister's 
propensity to preach "disunion sermons." Ellis and his 
brother Tom helped organize the Amite City Bell and Everett 
Union Club to promote the candidacy of the Constitutional 
Union party nominees. This club boasted fifty-nine members 
including some of the region's most prominent men.209
209 Henry Marston to Editor of the (Boston ?) National 
Aegis. August 12, 1856 and Thomas G. Morgan to Marston,
October 23, 1859, both in Henry Marston Papers (LLMVC); F.M. 
Kent to Dear Sister, August 11, 1856, in Amos Kent Papers
(ibid.); W.H. Pearson to John Gurley, December 3, 1860, in
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But the Republican victory in the presidential election 
stunned most of the Florida parish Unionists. Many felt 
betrayed by their northern brethren who they believed opted 
for the fanaticism of the radicals rather than the middle 
ground offered by the parties of compromise. The Republican 
success seemed to symbolize their minority status in the 
union and presaged the vulnerability of their peculiar way of 
life. John Ellis angrily condemned the decision of the 
majority of Northerners who voted in support of "a sectional 
candidate elected upon a platform of avowed hostility to the 
rights and equality in the union of the southern states." 
Abandoning his past unionist sympathies, Ellis declared the 
actions of the Yankees had created "just cause for alarm." 
Many equated the triumph of the Linconites with an 
endorsement of the bloody antics of John Brown and his 
followers creating extreme fear and resentment among the 
former unionists. Shortly after the election the Greensburcx 
Imperial fanned the flames of panic with an article entitled, 
"A John Brown Raid Anticipated." The article indicated that 
a schooner had recently departed Boston loaded with 
"Redpaths" and other John Brown followers and was presently 
lurking somewhere off the southern coast awaiting the 
opportunity to strike. The transformation was complete and
John W.Gurley Papers (ibid.); John Ellis to Mary, September 
2, 1860, Ellis to Mother, November 12, 1860, Ellis to Mother, 
November 31, 1860, and Constitution of the Bell and Everett 
Union Club, all in Ellis Family Papers (ibid*)•
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immediate. Just days after the election Charles Johnson 
noted that all party differences had been cast aside and that 
preparations were being made for a common defense. According 
to Johnson, " the night after the election all partisanship 
was thrown away and nothing spoken of but the union. The 
spirit of disunion ran much higher here than I had 
supposed.1,210
The secession of the deep South and the firing on Fort 
Sumter hastened the collapse of unionist sentiment. 
Newspapers across the region proclaimed the failure of 
compromise and heralded the arrival of the southern nation. 
The New Orleans Daily Picayune printed a letter asserting 
"East Baton Rouge gave the largest majority they had ever 
given for any cause against separate state action, but now 
the cooperationists and unionists have disappeared and all 
are united in opposition to northern aggression.11 Announcing 
Mississippi's secession from the Union the Woodville 
Wilkinsonian Gazette noted, "the news was received here with 
great rejoicing, every house on the public square was 
brilliantly lighted up as the Wilkinsonian Rifles paraded in 
dress uniform firing volleys, everybody seemed to participate 
in the rejoicing." The Greensburq Imperial appealed to its 
reader's sense of honor to promote secession proclaiming, "if
210 E. John Ellis Diary 1863-1865, see first section 
concerning recollections of Confederate service, in Ellis 
Family Papers (LLMVC); Greensburq Imperial. February 2, 1861; 
Charles Johnson to "My dear Lou," November 19, 1860, in
Charles Johnson Papers (LLMVC).
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our rights are worth maintaining, and our freedom worth 
keeping, let us gird on our armors and be prepared to meet 
those who have drawn the offensive blade and victory will be 
ours. "211
The newspapers reflected the sentiment of the local 
population. Writing to a friend in Pike County, Mississippi, 
John Houston asserted the necessity of secession despite his 
love for the Union. "I hung on to the old union as long as 
I could. But when Lincoln's advisers proclaimed their future 
policy with the South to be "no compromise" we drew our 
swords and placed them upon the altar of our country and 
pledged our lives and property and sacred honor never to lay 
down our arms until we were free from the Vandals of the 
North." Perhaps the most conclusive statement concerning the 
collapse of unionist sentiment in the Florida parishes came 
from the formerly staunch unionist Thomas G. Morgan. In 
June, 1861 Morgan wrote his friend Henry Marston, "whatever 
may have been my opinion and feeling a few months ago - I now 
feel that we are struggling for existence - and I for one 
want nothing more to do with a people who will not only 
tamely submit to the violent outrages on the Constitution and 
laws perpetuated by Mr. Lincoln, but who are ready to wage a
211 New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 25, 1861;
Woodville Wilkinsonian Gazette. January 12, 1861; Greensburq 
Imperial. February 2, 1861.
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war of extermination to aid him in his nefarious 
proj ects."212
Fear, resentment, sense of honor, and increasing southern 
nationalism combined to produce spirited celebrations in 
support of secession. The New Orleans Daily Picayune 
reported "from every quarter of the state the same 
enthusiastic cry to arms resounds, and no one can remember 
the time when such a whirlwind of united patriotic feeling 
has swept over Louisiana." In one sense, the practically 
complete collapse of unionism could be traced to the absence 
of a strong unionist tradition in the Florida parishes. The 
legacy of their Tory forefathers and other fugitives from the 
American system hindered the emergence of a commitment to the 
American union among many of the original inhabitants. This 
tradition remained an issue for many older families into the 
mid-nineteenth century. A full year before the outbreak of 
war the Greensburq Imperial noted the absence of patriotic 
sentiment in the region. The editor marvelled at the 
complete lack of interest among the people for Fourth of July 
celebrations. Much of the enthusiasm for secession also 
likely related to the excitement of the process and the 
southern penchant for a good fight. But most important was 
the perception created by southern statesmen and the press 
that northern politicians, speaking for the majority in their
212 John Houston to William Allen, September 29, 1861, 
in William M. Allen Papers (LLMVC); Thomas G. Morgan to Henry 
Marston, June 14, 1861, in Henry Marston Papers (ibid.).
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region, had insulted the South and now posed a direct threat 
to their very way of life. The perceived insult to their 
sense of honor and threat to their independence motivated 
Louisianians in a way nothing else could.213
During the initial months of the crisis, Louisianians 
flocked to the Confederate army. In the fall of 1861 the 
Bavou Sara Ledger, announced that the West Feliciana Parish 
Court had been suspended as a result of the large numbers who 
had volunteered for Confederate service. Three hundred of 
four hundred and eighty total voters had volunteered for the 
army making it impossible to fill jury pools, summon 
plaintiffs, and dozens of witnesses could not be present. In 
the same month the Greensburq Imperial noted that four 
companies had already been formed and outfitted from St. 
Helena alone. Many schools and colleges suspended for lack 
of male pupils. The faculty minutes of Centenary College on 
October 7, 1861 read, "students have all gone to war.
College suspended and God help the right." On May 7, 1861, 
the Daily Picayune provided a list of the rates of enlistment 
for numerous parishes. The article noted that six full 
companies numbering more than 600 men had been outfitted in 
East Baton Rouge. In West Baton Rouge, whose population 
contained only 350 white men compared to nearly 8,000 slaves, 
150 men had already volunteered. Similarly in East Feliciana
213 New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 7, 1861;
Greensburq Imperial. June 23, 1860.
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160 out of 400 voters had entered the ranks of the 
Confederate army.214
Volunteers for Confederate service continued to enlist 
at a high rate through the spring of 1862. By the fall of 
that year the potential for a slave revolt and increasing 
likelihood of a Union invasion in the absence of most of the 
region's white males dampened, though did not destroy the 
enthusiasm for volunteering. Throughout the war, recruiting 
in the Florida parishes slightly exceeded that of the state 
as a whole. The highest rate of volunteering occurred in the 
upper Mississippi delta region. Parishes with small white 
populations and huge numbers of slaves such as Tensas, 
Concordia, and Pointe Coupee produced the greatest proportion 
of volunteers. Volunteers from the upstate piney-woods 
parishes equaled the rates in the Florida parishes. The 
lowest number of volunteers came from the lower Mississippi 
delta parishes and parts of Acadiana. As late as March, 
1862, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. John, Vermillion, and
214 Bavou Sara Ledger. reprinted from New Orleans
Daily Picayune. October 3, 1861; Greensburq Imperial. October 
12, 1861; Faculty Minutes of Centenary College, reprinted
from Arthur M. Shaw, Centenary College Goes to War in 1861 
(Shreveport: Centenary College, 1940) p. 3; Daily Picayune. 
May 7, 1861; Howell Carter, A Cavalryman's Reminiscences of 
the Civil War (New Orleans: American Printing Company, 1900)
pp. 9-10 indicate that the enthusiasm for the war prevailing 
in the Florida parishes made it very easy to recruit an 
entire regiment of cavalry in a very short time; Frank to 
Dear Anne, April 13, 1863, found in Anonymous Civil War
Letters (LLMVC), in this letter a Federal soldier expresses 
dismay that seemingly all eligible white males in Louisiana 
are in the Confederate army.
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Calcasieu parishes had produced no companies of Confederate 
volunteers.215
Though some recruits complained of the harsh conditions 
of army life and many families bemoaned the absence of their 
men, the majority of Louisianians enthusiastically supported 
the war effort in its initial phase. The conflict of 
interests created by the necessity of service to country and 
concern for family is evident in a letter of John A. Harris.
215 For evidence concerning fears of a possible slave 
revolt see: Eugene Hunter to Stella, January 1, 1862, in
Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC); Mary Wilkinson to 
Micajah Wilkinson, August 1, 1862 and November 9, 1862, in 
Micajah Wilkinson Papers (ibid.); Mrs. R.J. Causey to Causey, 
November 19, 1863, in R.J. Causey Correspondence (ibid.) ; St. 
Tammany Parish Police Jury Minutes, January 7, 1862, pp. 29- 
3 0 demonstrates tightening slave controls. For evidence of 
the absence of men in the area occasioned by the war see: 
Dearest Pat to J.G. Kilbourne, February 23, 1862, in J.G.
Kilbourne Papers, (ibid.); Mary Wilkinson to Micajah 
Wilkinson, August 1, 1862 and October 19, 1862, in Micajah 
Wilkinson Papers (ibid.); Serrano Taylor to Eugene Hunter, 
January (?), 1864, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (ibid.); 
John S. Kendall Biography, typescript entitled "Recollections 
of a Confederate Officer," pp. 46-57 notes only women and 
children remained in the area all others in the army (ibid.) ; 
Records of the East Fork Baptist Church, scattered minutes 
1861-1865 demonstrate large numbers of members away in the 
army (Mississippi State Archives) ; Covington Weekly Wanderer. 
April 19, 1862, notes that the conscript law was received 
well in the Florida parishes; Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate. 
March 2, 1862, provides a complete list of all volunteer
companies from every Louisiana parish. The number of 
volunteer companies formed in the Florida parishes by the 
spring of 1862 totalled: East Baton Rouge - 7, East
Feliciana - 4, Livingston - 3, St. Helena - 4, West Feliciana 
- 3, Washington - 2, and St. Tammany - 0. The Advocate 
sharply criticized residents in the parishes which had raised 
no companies and parishes with large populations, such as 
Lafourche and Terrebonne, which produced proportionately few 
volunteer companies, see also Louisiana Legislative 
Documents. First session, Sixth Legislature, "Report of the 
Adjutant General," 1862.
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While training at Camp Moore in St. Helena Parish, Harris 
wrote his wife explaining his decision to enlist in the 
Confederate army. "How I miss you and the children, it is 
you I have come to defend, and as long as I have strength I 
am willing to shoulder my musket and stand for my country, 
the land of the South, the fairest and happiest of all the 
Earth, all I ask is that you remember me in your devotions to 
God and pray for peace."216
Some soldiers stoically reflected on the possibility of 
their own death while many family members on the home front 
sought to place the insecurity of the times in a positive 
light. Informed that his regiment would soon depart for the 
scene of fighting in Kentucky, John G. Smith advised his 
sister to shed no tears for him if he died because his death 
would be "for one of the best causes we have ever 
experienced." Likewise Alice Jennings predicted the growth 
of southern womanhood as a result of the suffering occasioned 
by the war. Writing her father from Eureka Plantation in St. 
Helena Parish in the fall of 1862, Jennings asserted, "Hurrah 
for southern independence. The day has come when southern 
ladies are freed from that luxury which has ever been their 
bane...fear not for us then, the Yankees will never conquer 
our southern spirit. My fervent prayer is that God would 
give us strength to meet the coming difficulties." On the
216 John Harris to Geroam, Becky, Children and Darkys, 
December 7, 1861, in John A. Harris Letters (LLMVC).
209
day he volunteered for Confederate service young Willie Dixon 
vowed, "I am willing to shed the last drop of mv blood on the 
altar of my country. if that could be the means of saving us 
from northern treachery." Dixon perhaps best summarized the 
attitude of most residents of the Florida parishes in the 
initial phase of the war with a series of poems he produced 
in the fall and winter of 1861 while a student at Centenary 
College:
We are a band of brothers - and native to the anil 
fighting for the property - we gained by honest 
toil
The unjust war is now at hand - and we fight for 
our blessed land - On every hill and every glen - 
We'll fight till we are free - We'll fight till 
every limpid brook - runs crimson to the sea.217
In spite of the celebrations in favor of the South's 
defiant response to the perceived northern domination of the 
Federal government, the preoccupation with death and the 
premonitions of suffering exposed another, darker side of the 
secession hysteria. Like the ancient Spartans who feared 
their helots and maintained their society as an armed camp to
217 John G. Smith to Dear Sister, March 12, 1862, in 
D.L. McGehee Papers (LLMVC); Alice Jennings to Father, 
October 21, 1862, in Hennen-Jennings Family Papers (ibid.); 
Diary of Willie Dixon, entries March 1, 1862, November 30 and 
December 31, 1861, in William Y. Dixon Papers (ibid.).
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discourage would be invaders, the Confederates now faced war 
with an immensely powerful foe handicapped by a potentially 
dangerous enemy within. Though slave rebellions never 
materialized, the very possibility remained a constant source 
of anxiety for soldiers in the field as well as for their 
families at home. But the fear of invasion constituted a 
realistic concern. As the South embarked upon the bold 
stroke for independence few residents of the Florida parishes 
could have dreamed of the horror that awaited them. The 
brutality of war struck quickly and with vengeance, providing 
the inhabitants with an unforgettable lesson in the 
effectiveness of cruelty and violence. Though far less 
publicized than events in more crucial theatres of the war, 
military operations in the Florida parishes would leave the 
region devastated and the residents with an enduring legacy 
of bitterness.218
Compared to the military significance of Richmond, 
Charleston, Wilmington, or New Orleans, the Florida parishes 
pale. But like many areas in the interior South, eastern 
Louisiana constituted a region which Union strategists 
considered essential to their plan of breaking both the
Nannie C. to Cornelia Stewart, April, 1864, in 
Albert Batchelor Papers (LLMVC); Eugene Hunter to Stella, 
January 1, 1862, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (ibid.); Mary 
Wilkinson to Micajah Wilkinson, August 1 and November 9, 
1862, in Micajah Wilkinson Papers (ibid.); Mrs. R.J. Causey 
to Causey, November 19, 1863, in R.J. Causey Correspondence 
(ibid.) provide examples of the lingering fear of a possible 
slave revolt.
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South's ability and will to fight, and which the 
Confederacy's policy of cordon defense left vulnerable. The 
tendency of many Civil War historians to overlook or give 
only casual mention to these smaller regional theatres of the 
war has created a gap in our efforts to obtain a precise 
understanding of the circumstances determining the nature and 
outcome of the war.219 Without an accurate discernment of 
the steady erosion of Confederate power and the suffering 
occuring in large areas of the southern interior away from 
the highly publicized battlegrounds, one may infer that 
following Union reversals in climactic struggles in Virginia 
the South was actually winning the war. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. Moreover, without an awareness of 
the unmitigated catastrophe the war represented in seemingly 
insignificant areas of the South, it is impossible to explain 
the tumultuous conditions which convulsed these regions in 
the late nineteenth century. The great struggle between 
North and South disrupted the process of societal 
transformation occuring in many regions of the piney-woods 
South, destroyed the sources of stability, demonstrated the
Recent studies by Stephen Ash, Wayne Durrill, 
Michael Fellman and others have done much to correct this 
imbalance, but a great deal of research in this area remains 
to be done. See: Stephen Ash, Middle Tennessee Transformed.
1860-1870: War and Peace in the Upper South (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Wayne Durrill, War 
of Another Kind: A Southern Community in the Great Rebellion
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Michael Fellman,
Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the
American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
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effectiveness of brutality, and let slip the dogs of chaos by 
creating a socio-political vacuum where order once prevailed. 
This legacy of the war emerged as a primary determinant 
affecting the development of the Florida parishes for 
generations.
Eastern Louisiana contained many diverse resources which 
collectively heightened its strategic significance. Most 
obviously, the region's proximity to New Orleans meant that 
any movement against the Crescent City would necessitate 
close observation of the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain. 
Throughout the war both armies would regard the region as a 
potential staging and collecting point for any effort 
designed to recapture the great river port. In addition, a 
Confederate presence on the north shore of lakes Maurepas and 
Pontchartrain would gain for them contol of the narrow passes 
connecting those lakes as well as command of the Rigolets 
connecting Lake Pontchartrain with the Gulf of Mexico. 
Control of this territory would facilitate Confederate 
commerce between the many rivers and streams culminating in 
the lakes and expedite trade between the interior of 
Louisiana and the Mississippi Gulf coast. At the same time 
these avenues of travel and commerce would be denied to the 
Federals.
Eastern Louisiana's western border on the Mississippi 
River also contributed to its military significance. A 
principal component of the Union grand strategy involved
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securing control of the great river in order to cut the 
Confederacy in two. Failure to gain command of the fertile 
bluffs along the Mississippi which characterized the Florida 
parishes would negate this essential aspect of the union 
plan. Baton Rouge, Louisiana's capital since 1849, and the 
Confederate bastion at Port Hudson guaranteed particular 
Union interest. As a result constant fighting permeated the 
area throughout the war.
But the delta and the lakeshore region were not the only 
strategically significant territory in the Florida parishes. 
The vast herds of livestock and the hundreds of farms located 
in the piney woods constituted an important source of food 
production, an importance that increased as the war dragged 
on. As the blockade increasingly denied necessities to the 
residents, considerable industry emerged primarily along the 
railroad. Several machine shops, initially developed to 
maintain the railroad, also produced heavy industrial 
products for the Confederate army. At least two shoe 
factories arose which produced brogans for the local 
population and the army. Several tanneries and at least one 
gun factory also were established in the region.220 In
220 Clinton-Port Hudson Railroad Company Records,
numerous entries minute book 1852-1879 (LLMVC); Daily 
Picayune. February 11, 1862, describes the Cate Shoe Factory 
at Hammond and the Confederate Leather Manufactory at 
Magnolia, Mississippi; Ronald Evans, "Evans, Gates, and 
Packwood Families of Southeastern Louisiana," typed 
transcript describes Southern Car Works at Independence 
(LLMVC); John S. Kendall Biography, p. 62 describes gun 
factory at Osyka (ibid.); J.G. Lea to Lemanda, October 9,
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addition to food and manufactured goods the overwhelming 
support for the Confederacy demonstrated by the local 
residents made the piney woods an important source of 
reliable manpower. Most importantly, the New Orleans-Jackson 
Railroad underscored the importance of men and material by 
enabling both to be transported efficiently.
Finally, the presence of the largest training base in 
the Deep South dramatically increased the military 
significance of the piney-woods of the Florida parishes. 
Initially the masses of volunteers travelled to Camp Walker 
near New Orleans to be mustered into Confederate service. In 
an effort to create a permanent training base in a more 
healthful region free of the problems associated with the 
immediate vicinity of New Orleans, the Adjutant General's 
office selected a sight near Tangipahoa Station in St. Helena 
Parish. The new location contained abundant available land 
for training, plenty of fresh water, and easy access to the 
New Orleans-Jackson Railroad. In May, 1861 the first 
Confederate troops arrived at the newly established base, 
appropriately named Camp Moore in honor of Louisiana1s 
secession governor. During the course of the war thousands 
of troops from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas would
1862, describes shoe factory at Liberty, in Lemanda Lea 
Collection (ibid.); Map of the Line of the New Orleans- 
Jackson Railroad, 1861, identifies all industrial enterprises 
along the line of the railroad, in Illinois Central Railroad 
Collection (Newberry Library).
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pass through Camp Moore on their way to distant theatres of 
the war.221
Camp Moore's purpose involved more than simply training 
volunteers for Confederate service. Following the enactment 
of the Conscription Act by the Confederate Congress in April, 
1862, Camp Moore served as a center for collecting and 
instructing conscripts from the Florida parishes and all of 
the lower Mississippi delta parishes. The constant presence 
of troops made the camp a valuable supply depot for 
operations in eastern Louisiana and southwestern Mississippi. 
Camp Moore also frequently served as the headquarters for the 
Confederate Department of Southwestern Mississippi and 
Eastern Louisiana functioning as the nerve center for 
offensive and defensive operations in that department. In 
the spring of 1862 President Jefferson Davis authorized the 
retention of Camp Moore as the primary base for protecting 
the railroad from Manchac to Jackson, Mississippi and urged
221 Powell Casey, The Story of Camp Moore (New
Orleans: Bourque Printing, 1985) pp. 5-22 (herein after
refered to as Casey, Story of Camp Moore); in October, 1861, 
Lt. Col. Edward Fry, Asst. Adjutant General at Camp Moore 
reported a total of approximately 5,000 soldiers in training 
at the base, see The War of the Rebellion: Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 Vols. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1882) herein after refered to as 
Official Records. Series I, Vol. 6, p. 594; a corollary base 
also apparently temporarily operated in the same area, Camp 
Pulaski, located at Amite City ten miles below Camp Moore 
allegedly served as a training base for the "Polish Regiment" 
of Louisiana volunteers in the summer and fall of 1861, see 
ibid., p. 17, also several letters exist dated from Camp 
Pulaski which could have come from the Amite City encampment 
or a similarly named camp near New Orleans, see Z. Yacks to 
T.C.W. Ellis, July 1, 1861, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
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the organization of a force of 5,000 rangers to assist in 
confining Union forces to New Orleans.222
Containing Union forces and protecting the residents and 
resources of the Florida parishes would prove to be an 
overwhelming challenge for Confederate troops. Part of the 
difficulty involved defending a region surrounded by water 
and penetrated by numerous navigable streams without a navy. 
The effort to secure the region against an enemy possessing 
irresistible naval power and seemingly limitless assets, 
eventually strained Confederate resources to the breaking 
point. But in their hour of despair the residents would 
prove resourceful, learning to rely on themselves rather than 
government. This lesson, internalized by many, would 
contribute directly to popular attitudes in the late 
nineteenth century.
The celebration of independence and the excitement over 
the war prevailed unabated in the Florida parishes until the 
spring of 1862 when the consequences of their bold endeavor 
first became apparent. In April, 1862, a two pronged 
catastrophe befell the western Confederacy. The feared 
invasion from the north necessitated the removal of all
222 Casey, Storv of Camp Moore, pp. 21-24; Official 
Records Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 652-653 and 888; immediately 
following the fall of New Orleans a threatened Union invasion 
of the Florida parishes stimulated plans to abandon Camp 
Moore as untenable. The failure of this invasion to 
materialize and the significance of the camp as a base of 
operations in the Florida parishes insured its continued 
usefulness until late in 1864, see Ibid., vol. 53, pp. 805- 
808.
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available manpower from the lower Mississippi in an effort to 
check the Union advance. The ensuing Battle of Shiloh 
resulted in heavy losses and particularly severe casualties 
for units recruited in the Florida parishes which for the 
first time brought the bloody cost home. Mary E. Taylor's 
words of mourning for her dead son Captain Bunyan Taylor 
illustrate the suffering and saddness which enveloped the 
region:
Our cottage home is in mourning now - its inmates all 
away, no wife or child or kinsmans voice - to heaven to 
sing and pray
Our cottage home's in mourning now - our children number 
7, six live in these Confederate States - but "Bun" we 
hope's in heaven
Our cottage home's in mourning now - he led, fought, 
fell on Shilohs plain - in freedoms blest and righteous 
cause he gave his life - this to sustain 
Our cottage home's in mourning now - our birds add sad 
tones to their songs - our flowers weep our trees sigh 
grief and nature mourns - a nations wrongs 
Our cottage home's in mourning now - our circle broken1 
is formed no more - on Earth we're sereened for all time 
in heaven to meet - and god adore 223
223 The Fourth and Sixteenth Louisiana infantry
regiments and the First Louisiana Cavalry, among other units 
recruited largely in the Florida parishes, suffered heavy 
casualties at Shiloh and the ensuing skirmishing around 
Corinth, Mississippi. Captain Bunyan Taylor, Co. F "St.
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Despite the heavy casualties the Federal army remained 
unbroken and continued to menace the lower Mississippi valley 
from the north giving the residents no relief from the 
burdensome fear of invasion by a hostile army.
But unlike the northern threat, the menace from the 
south came unexpectedly. In late April, 1862 a powerful 
Federal fleet passed the forts on the lower Mississippi and 
forced the capitulation of New Orleans. The fall of New 
Orleans deprived Louisiana and southwestern Mississippi of 
their principal market and effectively sealed the region off 
from contact with the outside world. Suddenly the residents 
of the Florida parishes faced the threat of imminent invasion 
on two fronts and, for the first time, starvation. As the 
remnants of Mansfield Lovell's tiny force streamed north from 
New Orleans to Camp Moore they brought despair and 
apprehension with them. A Confederate official observing the 
scene at Camp Moore described it as "very much disorganized," 
but added "there was no greater confusion than was natural 
and to be expected under the circumstances." Watching the
Helena Rifles," died as a result of wounds received leading 
his company in a charge against Union positions at Shiloh. 
Poem found in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers, October 9, 1862 
(LLMVC). For other examples of the high rates of caualties 
sustained by Florida parish units and mourning for the 
regions dead after Shiloh see: Eugene Hunter to Stella, June
1, 1862, Mary Taylor to Riah, September 8, 1862 and Mary E. 
Taylor Diary, May 6 and July 8, 1862, (ibid.); Diary of
Abigail Means Kent Amacker, April 21, 1862 and July 9, 1862, 
in 0.P. Amacker Papers (ibid.); Muster role of the Fourth 
Louisiana Infantry Regiment, in James G. Kilbourne Papers, 
April 26, 1862 (ibid. ) ; J.S. Kendall Biography, pp. 5-40
(ibid.).
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trains unload their melancholy cargoes near her home in 
Tangipahoa, Louisiana, Abigail Amacker described the 
depression prevailing in the area: "the Federals have taken 
New Orleans, the hour seems very dark for us, God grant we 
may have peace shortly. A great many soldiers have come and 
are coming into this neighborhood, we fear starvation just 
now more than the Lincolnites.11 A few days later she added, 
"the suffering, the deaths in camp are awful, I pray God we 
may have peace speedily, on any terms. To be subjugated to 
be slaves would not be worse than this. Starvation stares us 
in the face and defeat too."224
As outlined by Major General George B. McClellan, 
overall commander of Union Forces, the plan for the 
subjugation of eastern Louisiana and the lower Mississippi 
valley began with the capture of New Orleans. After seizing 
New Orleans, Federal forces were instructed to secure the 
avenues of approach to the city and particularly, gain 
control of Pass Manchac and the surrounding lakeshore area in 
lower Livingston Parish. The plan also called for the 
capture of Baton Rouge as soon as possible following the fall 
of New Orleans. To fulfill this mission Washington 
dispatched a land force 18,000 strong augmented by a powerful
224 Testimony of C.M. Conrad, Confederate Congressman 
relative to the fall and evacuation of New Orleans, in 
Official Records. Series I, Vol. 6, p. 624; Diary of Abigail 
Means Kent Amacker, April 26 and May 9, 1862, in O.P. Amacker 
Papers (LLMVC); Dear Sister to Edward, May 4, 1862, in John 
C. Burruss Papers (ibid.).
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naval flotilla, certain to outgun and outnumber anything the 
southerners could gather in opposition.225
Whether the Yankees realized that eastern Louisiana and 
southwestern Mississippi were virtually devoid of Confederate 
troops remains unclear. What is certain is that in response 
to Richmond's call for troops to support operations in 
Virginia and Tennessee the Florida parishes and environs had 
been literally denuded of regular Confederate forces. 
Governor Thomas Moore protested that no state had done more 
in terms of providing troops and armaments to support the 
Confederate war effort yet no state had been so sorely 
neglected by the general government. General Mansfield 
Lovell, commander of the defenses about New Orleans, repeated 
the objections to the war department's neglect of Louisiana. 
Lovell noted that 20,000 well trained Louisiana soldiers had 
been removed to other theaters only weeks before their own 
state was invaded. Moreover, he warned that to abandon 
Louisiana entirely "would have a very bad moral effect upon 
the state," promoting disaffection and encouraging residents 
to open a cotton trade with the enemy. Rebuffed in his pleas 
to the war department, Lovell proposed a solution which 
Governor Moore heartily endorsed. The plan called for the 
creation of at least five regiments of partisan rangers to be 
armed and commissioned by the Confederate government. The 
purpose of this irregular force would be to "contain the
225 O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s . S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  6 ,  p p .  6 9 4 - 6 9 5 .
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enemy in New Orleans and protect the state from his 
ravages. "226
Partisan warfare evoked mixed emotions among civilians 
and military men alike. Many citizens regarded partisans as 
little more than undisciplined outlaws who often provoked 
brutal retaliation for their actions yet offered little 
realistic protection to the civilian population. Military 
men generally condemned partisans as guerrillas whose 
uncontrolled activities accomplished little more than keeping 
qualified soldiers out of the regular army. As early as the 
summer of 1861 General George McClellan condemned the rebel 
partisan operations in western Virginia as "a system of 
hostilities prohibited by the laws of war among belligerent 
nations." But partisan activities could tie down large 
numbers of enemy troops. Their hit and run tactics 
necessitated the committment of significant bodies of troops 
to garrison duty and escort operations. The memory of the
exploits of the South Carolinian Francis Marion the "Swamp
Fox of the Revolution," whether contemptible or heroic 
remained fresh to many. And most agreed that in the absence 
of all else partisan operations provided a means to strike
back at an invader. In June 1861, the Confederate War
Department accepted the formation of partisan forces, 
authorized their inclusion as a branch of the service, and
226 O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s  S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  6 ,  p p .  6 5 2 - 6 5 3  a n d
8 8 5 - 8 9 0 ;  i b i d . . S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  5 3 ,  p .  8 0 5 .
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allowed partisan officers to be commissioned. But lingering 
doubts remained, particularly among certain officers who 
insisted that regular troops were far more effective than 
partisans. As a result of these doubts the war department 
required that each partisan force receive approval directly 
from the secretary of war.227
Efforts to convince doubters of the effectiveness of 
partisan rangers continued throughout the war. But Lovell 
presented a strong case in favor of partisan operations in 
eastern Louisiana. He pointed out that most of the fewer 
than three thousand troops which joined him at Camp Moore 
following the fall of New Orleans consisted of unarmed 
citizen militia who could not be considered reliable. As a 
result, without a motivated partisan force in the area the 
path would be open for the Federals to proceed up the 
railroad unmolested and threaten P.G.T. Beauregard's army 
about Corinth from the rear. Moreover, Lovell argued that 
quite probably the Union navy would gain control of most if 
not all of the Mississippi River, which would necessitate the 
immediate transfer of all forces from eastern Louisiana to 
the west side of the river. Both Lovell and Governor Moore
227 Official Records Series IV, Vol. 1, p. 395;
Jackson, Mississippi Mississippian. February 27, 1863; Virgil 
Jones, Gray Ghosts and Rebel Raiders (New York; Henry Holt, 
1956) pp. VII-VII; John D. Winters, The Civil War in 
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1963) p. 153 (herein after refered to as Winters, Civil War 
in Louisiana); Russell Weigley, The Partisan War: The South
Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782 (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1970).
2 2 3
recognized the absolute necessity of securing western 
Louisiana where the bulk of the state's population and 
materiel was concentrated. Finally, Lovell bluntly requested 
permission to organize "guerrilla parties with authority to 
act as this is the only available force in the swamps of 
Louisiana." Lovell's appeal was strengthened by Governor 
Moore's demand that Louisiana be divided into two departments 
separated by the river. Moore's insistence that the commands 
be separated with an emphasis on the defense of the western 
part of the state, in order to maintain the supplies of beef 
coming from Texas, reinforced the need for Lovell's partisans 
east of the river.228
Though much skepticism concerning irregular forces 
remained, the Confederate war department recognized the logic 
of Lovell's argument. In early May 1862, General Robert E. 
Lee, responding for the war department, gave tacit approval 
to Lovell's plan. Lee's directive concluded, "you will 
organize and prepare the troops that you may collect, to act 
most efficiently against the enemy, should he expose himself 
in any manner." Three weeks later Lee removed any doubt 
concerning Richmond's support for Lovell's proposal. "I 
approve of your purpose to confine the enemy to its (New 
Orleans) limits as closely as possible and to protect the 
state from his ravages. The means with which you propose to
228 Official Records Series I, Vol. 6, p. 885 and 889- 
890; ibid., Series I, Vol. 53, p. 805.
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accomplish this seem to be the best that you can now employ, 
and I must urge you to put them in operation without delay, 
soliciting bold and judicious partisans who can raise proper 
corps."229
To provide a structure for the organization of 
Confederate forces in the region General Earl Van Dorn, 
commanding the troops in Mississippi and eastern Louisiana, 
ordered that a new department be created under the command of 
General Daniel Ruggles. The orders creating the new 
Department of Southwestern Mississippi and East Louisiana 
also contained directions for the formation of partisan units 
to operate in the area. The instructions stipulated that "no 
organization less than a regiment, or at least a battalion of 
five companies" would be accepted as a partisan ranger unit. 
The partisans were to be trained in the same manner as 
regulars and held to the strictest discipline in the 
performance of their operations. According to Van Dorn, "an 
undisciplined rabble is not dangerous to the enemy, is 
extremely injurious to the neighborhood where it may be 
stationed, and is a disgrace to any country." In return for 
their discipline and satisfactory performance the partisans 
would be exempted from regular Confederate military service. 
Though their purpose remained primarily local defense they 
could be pressed into service in other theaters. By July 
1862, nine companies of partisan rangers had been organized
229 O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s . S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  6 ,  p p .  6 5 2 - 6 5 3 .
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statewide, with at least one, the Ninth Louisiana Partisan 
Rangers commanded by J.H. Wingfield, designated to serve in 
the Florida parishes. During the course of the war at least 
four partisan units would operate in eastern Louisiana 
playing a central role in Confederate strategic planning.230
After securing New Orleans the Federals wasted little 
time in expanding their control of the surrounding region. 
Forts Pike and McComb guarding the entrance to Lake 
Pontchartrain via the Rigolets fell into Union hands after 
their Confederate garrisons withdrew following the fall of 
New Orleans. A portion of the Federal fleet rapidly steamed 
north to capture Baton Rouge and intimidate the surrounding 
area. When the fleet droped anchor off Baton Rouge, a 
melancholy crowd gathered to observe the might of the 
invader. While the ships awaited the surrender of the city 
a group of horsemen fired on a longboat approaching the 
shore. In response and without warning the fleet intensively 
shelled the town. Astonished by the severity of the Federal 
response, women and children ran shrieking through the 
streets seeking safety from the bombardment beyond the bluffs 
of the river. Horrified by the results, young Sara Morgan 
mockingly retorted, "hurrah for the illustrious Farragut, the 
Woman Killer!!!" After landing a party which raised an
230 Ibid.. Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 768 and 1061-1062; 
ibid., Series I, Vol. 6, pp. 889-890; ibid.. Series I, Vol. 
41, pt. 2, p. 141; Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, pp. 149 
and 165.
226
American flag over the statehouse, the fleet steamed upriver 
warning that the city would be shelled again if the flag 
should in any way be molested.231
Hoping to exploit the demoralized condition of the local 
residents and the few Confederate troops in the area, the 
Federals moved rapidly to apply irresistible pressure on the 
Florida parishes. These operations aimed particularly at the 
destruction of Camp Moore, the demolition of the New Orleans- 
Jackson Railroad, and the general subjugation of the region. 
To further these goals General Benjamin Butler, commanding 
the department, ordered General Thomas Williams, in charge at 
Baton Rouge, to mount a series of demonstrations against Camp 
Moore. Butler's instructions directed Williams to "punish 
with the last severity every guerrilla attack and burn all
That at least three women and children died as a 
result of the bombardment intensified the growing hatred of 
the Yankees in the Florida parishes. Lt. Colonel J.H. 
Wingfield commanded the scattered cavalry units operating in 
the vicinity of Baton Rouge during the spring and summer of 
1862 (Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 22 and 122- 
123), the only other nearby force was Terrell's Mississippi 
Cavalry guarding the bridges across the Amite River. Sara M. 
Dawson's description of the Confederate troops about Baton 
Rouge in the spring of 1862 disputes the contention that the 
offending parties were merely local renegades, the Federals 
routinely refered to all Confederate forces in the area as 
guerrillas> prompting some locals to use the name as well. 
Joseph Corkern to Jeptha McKinney, August 27, 1862, in Jeptha 
McKinney Papers (LLMVC); Sara M. Dawson, A Confederate Girls 
Diary (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913) herein
after refered to as Dawson, A Confederate Girls Diary. pp. 
40-55; Patrick Geary (ed.), Celine: Remembering Louisiana
1850-1871 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987) herein 
after refered to as Geary (ed.) Celine: Remembering
Louisiana, pp. 69-71; John McGrath Scrapbook, p. 16 (LLMVC); 
Winters, Civil War in Louisiana p. 104.
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the property of every guerrilla found murdering your 
soldiers.1,232
As a preliminary to this expedition Williams launched a 
series of probing raids into the interior to test Confederate 
strength and intimidate the population. On June 7, 1862, the 
Thirtieth Massachussetts Regiment departed on a mission to 
capture several suspected "guerrillas," a term universally 
applied to all Confederate forces operating in the area. The 
raiders failed in their effort to capture any Confederate 
forces but they did lay waste several plantations belonging 
to prominent Confederate sympathizers. The destruction was 
rapid and complete. At each plantation all buildings and 
fences excepting the slave quarters were burned, livestock 
stolen, and ornamental trees cut down. Reporting on the 
success of his endeavor, the commanding officer reported, "I 
burnt every building on the estate of these once beautiful 
plantations, except such as were required to cover the 
negroes left behind...in fact I left nothing but the 
blackened chimneys as a monument to the folly and villainy of 
its guerrilla owner."233
Applauding this destructive raid, Butler urged Williams 
to intimidate the local population rapidly to insure the 
security of the garrison at Baton Rouge. In the last week of
Benjamin Butler to Thomas Williams, in Official 
Records. Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 24-25.
233 O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s . S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  1 5 ,  p p .  1 9 - 2 1 .
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June, 1862, Williams dispatched another raiding party in the 
direction of Camp Moore. At Williams Bridge across the Amite 
River near Greensburg the raiders encountered the camp of 
Vernon Terrell's Mississippi Cavalry and a sharp skirmish 
ensued. The surprised Mississippians initially panicked and 
fled, but regaining their composure, they returned and fired 
on the Yankees from the woods. When the main body of Union 
cavalry came up a determined charge scattered the rebels who 
left several dead and wounded and over a dozen prisoners. 
After destroying the enemy camp the Federals proceeded back 
toward Baton Rouge with their loot and prisoners. But the 
firing had alerted local residents to the presence of the 
raiders, and the alarm quickly spread through the piney 
woods. At a point eighteen miles from Baton Rouge, 
Confederate cavalrymen ambushed the column at a bend in the 
road inflicting six casualties and recovering most of the 
prisoners. The results of this ambush provided an early 
example of the importance of citizen involvement to 
Confederate success in the region.234
To force the Confederates to spread thin their meager 
resources Union forces probed Confederate defenses at Pass 
Manchac and along the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain in 
coordination with the raids from Baton Rouge. On June 17,
234 Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, p. 36; Dunbar 
Rowland, Military History of Mississippi. 1803-1898 
(Spartanburg: The Reprint Company, 1978) p. 409 provides
information on the operations of Terrell's cavalry in eastern 
Louisiana.
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1862, a substantial Union force supported by the gunboat New 
London attacked and overran a hastily assembled Confederate 
battery on the south side of Pass Manchac forcing the 
destruction of the bridge and jeopardizing Confederate 
control of the strategic pass. Union forces then proceeded 
to raid the villages of Mandeville and Madisonville on the 
north shore panicking the civilian population and creating 
confusion among the few Confederate forces in the area.235
The Union plan to put pressure on multiple locations in 
the Florida parishes, and thereby wear down Confederate 
resistance and demoralize the civilian population, proved 
quite successful at first. Through the summer of 1862, Union 
forces kept constant pressure on the north shore of Lake 
Pontchartrain and repeatedly raided the interior of the 
Florida parishes. From July 25 to August 2, 1862, a Union 
raiding party backed by gunboats menaced the north shore and 
environs. On the evening of the twenty-fifth, the gunboat 
Grey Cloud drove Confederate pickets from the village of 
Manchac and landed a party of troops who burned the village 
to the ground. The thoroughness of the destruction led the 
Federal commander, Major Frank Peck to report, "I am aware of 
nothing left remaining at Pass Manchac more combustible than 
railroad iron and water-soaked piles." The raiders also 
visited all of the villages along the north shore between the 
Tchefuncte and Pearl rivers skirmishing with Confederate
235 O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s . S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  1 5 ,  p .  1 1 1 .
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partisans and destroying provisions. During the expedition 
the Federals expressed surprise at the level of destitution 
existing among the people. Major Peck reported that "in many 
places flour had not been seen for months, the poorer classes 
subsisting almost entirely upon the meanest quality of corn 
meal." The raid had exposed a grim reality. Barely one year 
into the war suffering and privation already prevailed in 
large areas of the Florida parishes and southwestern 
Mississippi.236
The frequent raids continued relentlessly into the 
summer of 1862 and served to effectively keep the 
Confederates off balance. On July 24, 1862, a well armed
expedition of 950 men dressed in civilian clothing departed 
Baton Rouge. At daylight the yankees approached a company of 
Wingfield's partisan rangers professing friendship. The 
Federals accordingly advanced to close quarters then suddenly 
fired on the astonished Confederates who fell back in 
disorder. When a few hours later the Federals approached as 
friends a second time, the rangers fired on them killing 
several and holding their ground until Federal artillery 
forced them to withdraw. Frustrated, Wingfield remonstrated 
that he could forge his scattered companies into an effective 
force capable of repelling enemy incursions "if I can be
236 Ibid.. Series I, Vol. 15, p. 124; Diary of Eli
Capell, April 27 and November 30, 1862, in Eli Capell Papers 
(LLMVC) also describes the distress of the local population 
in the first year of the war.
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allowed time to drill, for as you are aware we have never had 
one hour's time for drilling.1,237
The frequency of these raids greatly impacted the 
civilian population and deeply distressed local soldiers away 
in other theaters of the war. John Ellis serving in the 
Confederate army in northern Mississippi excitedly wrote home 
after hearing reports of Union cavalry raids in the vicinity 
of his home at Amite City. "Where are the few remaining men 
in the country, where the boasted guerrillas of Wingfield, 
where the trusty rifles and shotguns? When I hear these 
reports I want to go back home, but surely this report can't 
be true, surely Louisiana is not overrun in that way - it can 
not be." The increasing ease with which the Federals moved 
about the territory had a demoralizing effect. With the men 
away fighting in other theaters of the war, many residents 
felt neglected by the Confederate government. N.R. Jennings 
loudly denounced the government's failure to defend the 
Florida parishes. According to Jennings, "our region of the 
country has literally been cursed and destroyed by the 
incompetence, ignorance, and arrogance of the military 
commanders placed over us. Ruggles and Jeff Thompson have 
only a few guerrilla bands to protect the entire region." 
Governor Thomas Moore reminded the Confederate government of 
the contributions that Louisianians were making to the war 
effort. Moore initially demanded, then later pleaded for the
237 O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s . S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  1 5 ,  p p .  1 2 2 - 1 2 3 .
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general government to make a stronger commitment to 
Louisiana. Citizens also directly petitioned the military 
authorities for protection from the invader. In July, 1862, 
a committee of prominent citizens from the Felicianas and 
East Baton Rouge sent a petition to General Daniel Ruggles 
commanding Confederate troops in the Florida parishes. The 
petition noted that the region had been stripped of men as a 
result of the massive outpouring of support for the 
Confederate Army. Moreover, Florida parish farmers, the 
petition alleged, had followed government instructions and 
reduced their cotton acreage while tripling their output of 
corn and in general "manifested a willingness to sacrifice 
all, even life itself, to advance the common cause." The 
statement continued, "all is at the mercy of an enemy greedy 
for destruction, unless they are met by an adequate 
force...this aid we think is due to so loyal a population if 
it can be afforded consistently with the general interests of 
the service."238
Seemingly abandoned by their protectors, vulnerable to 
the depradations of the enemy and facing starvation, in the 
summer of 1862 the residents of the Florida parishes could 
have easily given up the game. But the brutality of the
238 John Ellis to Ma, June 9, 1862, in Ellis Family 
Papers (LLMVC); W. Greene Raoul to Father, June 28, 1862, in 
W. Greene Raoul Papers (ibid.); N.R. Jennings to Mr.'s Lusher 
and Davidson, (?) 1863, in Hennen-Jennings Family Papers
(ibid.); statement of Governor Moore and responses found in, 
Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 733-736 and 740-741; 
Statement of citizens committee found in, ibid.. pp. 777-778.
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Yankees insured that they would not. Though incidents of 
kindly behavior on the part of the Federals occurred, 
overwhelmingly they extended the torch rather than the olive 
branch to their former brethren. Rather than building on the 
shattered remnants of unionism in the area and the exhausted 
and demoralized condition of the local populace, the iron- 
fisted policy of the Federals encouraged the inhabitants to 
resist the invader. An exasperated Christian Koch later 
declared that the Federals seemed completely unwilling to 
reconcile the people. For the Union it was an opportunity 
lost, and for those involved, both northern and southern, it 
meant escalation and prolongation of the horror.239
The ruthless behavior of the Federals touched both 
soldier and civilian alike. Scores of citizens were seized 
by Federal troops as potential Confederate supporters, or to 
be held as hostages, and whisked away to Federal prison camps 
without a word of notice to their families. Mortified by his 
inability to contain the marauding of the enemy, J.H. 
Wingfield wrote his commanding officer, "the depredations 
committed by the enemy are of the most shameful character on 
private property and on the persons of our fellow-citizens 
and helpless women and children." General Ruggles pleaded 
for more troops to curb the pillaging of the enemy which 
increasingly demoralized the population. The wanton
Christian Koch to Annette, September 1, 1864, in 
Christian Koch Papers (LLMVC).
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destruction committed by many of their troops served to 
outrage some Federal officers who possessed the foresight to 
recognize that a people repeatedly subjected to depredations 
must resist. General Thomas Williams commanding at Baton 
Rouge complained to the Union high command about the constant 
pillaging committed by the Wisconsin and Michigan regiments 
under his command. "These regiments, officers and men appear 
to be wholly destitute of moral sense and I believe that they 
believe in the face of all remonstrances that they regard 
pillaging not only as a right in itself but a soldierly 
accomplishment.1,240
Though many recognized that war is war, the civilian 
population nevertheless expressed dismay at the brutality of 
the Yankees. Anxiously commenting on the increasing Yankee 
raids near her home, Anna Jennings asserted, "the greatest 
outrages are committed throughout the country and we tremble 
as to our fate." Kate Burruss described to her brother in 
the army the anxiety prevailing in the territory. "We hear 
of great suffering in many places from the ravages of our 
dreadful enemies, in this sense we have been blest. One lady 
near Clinton had on Saturday night all that one could wish, 
food, carriages, horses, elegant furniture, and on the next 
Monday she and her family were starving, the yankees have 
taken everything from her and her children." Jane McCausland
Official Records Series X, Vol. 15, pp. 22-23, 80, 
122-123, 778, 787, 1119.
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Chinn recalled the columns of smoke created by burning houses 
"as far as we could see," which identified the route taken by 
Federal soldiers. Horrified by the cruelty of the Union 
troops, Mary A. Stratton, a private tutor from Connecticut, 
embraced the cause of the South. Stratton wrote one of her 
former pupils, "I informed my fiancee (a Federal officer) 
that I would return home, but after seeing the horror Federal 
soldiers have wreaked upon the South I could not marry him 
unless he resigned." The recognition that Union forces would 
likely destroy everything they encountered stiffened 
resistance in the Florida parishes and increased the demands 
that the Confederate government initiate offensive operations 
in the area. But more so than any single event, the actions 
of the Union commander at New Orleans, General Benjamin F. 
Butler, served to mobilize support both for the Confederacy 
and for the residents pleas to strike back against the 
Yankees.241
Ibid., Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 22-23, 80, 122-123, 
778, 787, and 1119; Anna Jennings to Mr. Odel, June 23, 1862, 
N.R. Jennings to Dear Wife, May 24, 1863 and undated letter 
found in 1860-1868 folder, all in Hennen-Jennings Family 
Papers (LLMVC); Kate Burruss to Edward, May 8, 1862, and M.A. 
Stratton to Edward Burruss, May 29, 1864, both in John C. 
Burruss Papers (ibid.) ; Emma Lay Lane to Dear Brother Willie, 
December 13, 1862, in John Q. Anderson Papers (ibid.); Thomas 
Batchelor to Daughters, July 1, 1863, Kate Batchelor to
Brother, August 30, 1863, and J.R. Galtrey to Batchelor,
September 5, 1867, all in Albert Batchelor Papers (ibid.); 
James E. Bradley Diary, entry October 28, 1863 (ibid.);
Dawson, A Confederate Girl1s Diarv pp. 146 and 168-185; 
Reminiscences of a Union Raid, October, 1862, in Josephine 
Pugh Papers (ibid.); W.M. Barrow to Dear Aunt Anna, September 
6, 1862, in W.M. Barrow Family Papers (ibid.); Frank to Dear 
Anne, April 13, 1863, in Anonymous Civil War Letters (ibid.);
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Promptly upon his arrival in New Orleans, Butler's 
actions created international outrage. Butler authorized the 
invasion and looting ' of some foreign consulates, the 
wholesale seizure of the property of suspected Confederate 
sympathizers, and the arrest and imprisonment in the dreary 
and unhealthy forts below New Orleans of many Confederate 
supporters. The seizure of the valuables belonging to these 
unfortunate victims and the pillaging of hundreds of homes in 
the city, whose contents, particularly silver ware, 
mysteriously disappeared, earned Butler the contemptible 
nickname "Spoons." But Butler demonstrated an even greater 
lack of understanding of human motivation and the nature of 
fear and resistance by ordering the execution of a man for 
removing a prominently displayed American flag and by issuing 
his notorious Woman Order.242 The brutal instincts of
Civil War Reminiscences from the diary of Jane McCausland 
Chinn, "The Burning of the Barns" (ibid.); Diary of Eli 
Capell, April 27, May 2, and November 30, 1862, in Eli Capell 
Papers (ibid.); Diary of Abigail Means Kent Amacker, 
September 2, 1862, in O.P. Amacker Papers (ibid.); Diary of 
Willie Dixon, August 28, 1862 and May 24, 1863, in William Y. 
Dixon Papers (ibid.) ; Diary of Mary E. Taylor, June 19, 1862, 
in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (ibid.); John S. Kendall 
Biography, p. 58.
242 Evidence of Butler authorizing the looting of
specific foreign consulates in New Orleans found in Zwei 
Bericht von New Orleans, F.N. Freudenthal (Konsul, Hessen- 
Brunswick) aus New Orleans, these two reports, one by Dutch 
Consul Amedie Couterie1 and the other by Freudenthal describe 
the looting of the Netherlands Consulate by Union troops 
acting under Butler's orders, in particular the theft of 
$900,000.00 in Mexican silver and other items and the abuse 
of the Dutch and Hessen-Nassau consulate staff, located File 
No. 3818, Book No. 210 pp. 85-86 (Hessisches 
Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden, Germany); Butler ordered the
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Butler and his contempt for the conquered Confederates, as 
exemplified by his actions in New Orleans, served as the 
catalyst to reinvigorate Confederate resistance to the 
actions of the man they called "the Beast."
In the eyes of many Louisianians, Butler assumed the 
role of something less than human. An editorial response to 
news that Butler was planning a libel suit illustrates the 
contempt many felt for the Beast:
Libel Ben Butler, why there is not a thief in the 
country but is possessed of more honesty, not a liar in 
the land but has more truth, not a villain but has more 
honor, not a criminal but is less guilty, not a rake but 
has more virtue, not a coward but has more courage, not 
a traitor but has less treachery, not a beast but has 
less brutality, not a bully but has less bluster, not a 
dog that is more of a sneak, and not a mean, miserable, 
scrubby, sniveling, dirty, disgusting, wretch but has 
more claims to the respect of the public. If society
execution of William B. Mumford for removing an American flag 
placed atop the United States Mint in New Orleans. Mumford, 
while facing the gallows refused a bargain to spare his life 
if he renounced the Confederacy and pledged eternal 
allegiance to the United States, see Official Records. Series
I, Vol. 15, pp. 469 and 509; Winters, Civil War in Louisiana 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963) pp.
124-135; Butler's infamous Order No. 28, commanded that any 
lady who failed to show Federal soldiers proper respect 
"shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman 
of the town plying her avocation." Commonly referred to as 
the Woman Order, it created international outrage as a result 
of its brutal implications and seeming insensitiveness to the 
plight of a conquered people.
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were skimmed, and out of the dregs was raked the 
foulest, most offensive stinking spot, it would be 
found to be the bloated carcass of Ben Butler - the 
insulter of women, the oppressor of children, a "thing" 
fit for nothing but a dog post for posterity. Talk 
about libeling Butler. You might as well try to add 
sins to the devil, or stink to a skunk."
Livid with anger at Butler's actions in New Orleans 
Confederate troops charged their enemy shouting "Butler and 
New Orleans" as far away as Virginia theater of the war. W. 
Greene Raoul, a Confederate soldier from Livingston Parish, 
underscored the impact on Confederate morale of Butler's 
perceived outrages. "Every one is exasperated against the 
whole Yankee race by that order No. 28. I can't help it the 
hatred grows, that infamous order of Butler will do more than 
any other thing to deepen the hatred." Employing his 
amateurish poetry Confederate soldier Willie Barrow queried, 
"who is this general? Is he Man? Or came he from those 
regions prepared expressly, we are told, for Satan and his 
legions." The "Woman Order" created a sustained howl for 
protection in the Florida parishes. Deeply anxious about the 
implications of the order Sarah Morgan protested, "oh Gibbesi 
George! Jimmy! never did we need your protection as sorely as 
now. When Charlie joins the army we shall be defenseless 
indeed. Come to my bosom, O my discarded carving knife, laid
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aside under the impression that these men were gentlemen. We 
will be close friends once more. And if you must have a 
sheath, perhaps I may find one for you in the heart of the 
first man who attempts to Butlerize me.” To many the "Woman 
Order" symbolized the evil character of their enemy and gave 
new life to their belief in the righteousness of their own 
cause and the cruelty of the enemy.243
Butler's actions in New Orleans and the depredations 
committed by the troops under his command in the Florida 
parishes attracted the attention of Confederate authorities. 
Eager to stem disaffection in that region and secure their 
base of operations for the planned recapture of New Orleans, 
in late July 1862, General John C. Breckinridge arrived at 
Camp Moore at the head of a small army. He had orders to 
destroy the Union force at Baton Rouge, capture the town, and 
if possible move against New Orleans. Though a spy 
dispatched by Butler reported that Breckinridge was 
concentrating at Camp Moore, Butler assured his subordinates 
that no attack on Baton Rouge would occur. Despite the 
incompetence of the Union commander, success eluded 
Breckinridge from the outset. When he reached Camp Moore, he
243 Undated newspaper clipping from the Democratic 
Watchman. Belleforte, Pennsylvania, found in W.W. Garig 
Papers (LLMVC); W. Greene Raoul to Father, June 28, 1862, in 
W. Greene Raoul Papers (ibid.); Diary of Willie Barrow, 
May(?), 1862, in W.M. Barrow Papers (ibid.); Tom Ellis to
Martina, May 20, 1864, in Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); James 
E. Bradley Diary, entry October 19, 1862 (ibid.); Diary of
Abigail Means Kent Amacker, May 18, 1862, in O.P. Amacker
Papers (ibid.) Dawson, A Confederate Girl's Diary. pp. 35-36.
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found the troops there plagued with illness, chiefly measels. 
As a result, instead of a force of 5,000, including Ruggle's 
troops at Camp Moore, his army consisted of less than 3,500 
men. With half his army barefoot, the long march to Baton 
Rouge with little water or sustenance also took a heavy toll. 
The Confederates arrived before Baton Rouge with a force of 
barely 2,600 effectives, though dozens of civilians armed 
primarily with shotguns joined his army as it massed for the 
attack on the evening of August 4. The southerners also lost 
the valuable element of surprise when overzealous probing by 
elements of Wingfield's partisans betrayed the presence of 
the attacking army. Finally, Breckinridge expected the 
ironclad ram C.S.S. Arkansas, which had courageously fought 
its way through the Federal fleet at Vicksburg, to provide a 
distracting fire against the Union warships in the river. 
Unopposed these warships would certainly determine the 
outcome. Unfortunately for the Confederates, the Arkansas, 
severely damaged while fighting her way down the river was 
destroyed by her own crew four miles above Baton Rouge.244
Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 34, 778, 
and 74-83, in his report Breckinridge described the 
countryside from Camp Moore to the Mississippi as exhausted, 
see p. 1124; T.G. Lea to Lemanda, August 18, 1862, in Lemanda 
Lea Collection (LLMVC); Diary of Abigail Means Kent Amacker, 
August 4, 7, and 12, 1862, in O.P. Amacker Papers (ibid.);
John S. Kendall Biography, pp. 46-57 discusses the horrible 
suffering of the troops as they marched towards Baton Rouge; 
Kendall also notes that the sparsely populated region was 
completely devoid of all military age men.
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Breckinridge's attack drove the yankees from their 
positions allowing him to destroy much of their camp 
equipage. But the intensive gunfire from the Union warships 
in the river and the absence of available drinking water 
forced the Confederates to withdraw outside the city. In his 
report Breckinridge bemoaned the striking contrast between 
the "presence of every comfort, even luxury" found in the 
encampments of the enemy and his own shoeless and poorly fed 
troops. Yet he noted that his troops had fought 
enthusiastically, many contesting the order to withdraw 
despite the severity of the casualties, and that the citizens 
of the surrounding country had exhibited the "warmest 
patriotism" and provided generous assistance to his army.245
Though neither side could claim outright victory 
Breckinridge could boast of one accomplishment, the strength 
of his effort had taken pressure off the badly abused 
surrounding countryside. In his report the General stated, 
"after the battle the enemy, who previously had been 
plundering, burning houses and other property, stealing 
negroes, and seizing citizens through a large region of the 
country, never ventured to send out another marauding force." 
Breckinridge placed a tight picket line about Baton Rouge 
with orders to harass the enemy relentlessly. Constant 
probing of the defenses helped convince the Federals that the 
city was untenable resulting in their evacuation of the area
245 O f f i c i a l  R e c o r d s . S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  1 5 ,  p p .  7 6 - 8 1 .
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a few days later. Before departing, the yankees looted the 
city, burned large portions of it, and released all the 
convicts from the state penitentiary. Several warships then 
steamed up the river and burned the village of Bayou Sara. 
After restoring order in the city and containing the fires, 
Breckinridge placed General Ruggles in charge of fortifying 
the bluffs at Port Hudson above Baton Rouge.246
With a temporary respite achieved in the western 
parishes the Confederates now focused their attention on 
securing the vital New Orleans-Jackson Railroad. Brigadier 
General M. Jeff Thompson of Missouri arrived in Louisiana 
with orders to establish a base at Pontchatoula, in lower 
Livingston Parish, and collect men and materials for the 
movement against New Orleans. Thompson surveyed the area and 
began gathering militia and conscripts from the surrounding
Ibid., Series I, Vol. 15, p. 80, 797, and 129-131, 
General Ruggles reported that he had dispatched the Ninth 
Louisiana Partisan Rangers to drive the remaining Federals 
from Baton Rouge. According to Ruggles the Yankees fled to 
their gunboats and then shelled the city for two hours 
killing six women and children before departing. Ruggles 
also reported that all black convicts released from the 
penitentiary were given Federal uniforms and arms; Diary of 
Abigail Means Kent Amacker, September 2, 1862, in O.P.
Amacker Papers (LLMVC); Frank to Dear Anne, April 13, 1863, 
Federal soldier describes looting in the vicinity of Baton 
Rouge and the destruction his comrades wreaked upon the city, 
in Anonymous Civil War Letters (ibid.); Diary of Willie 
Dixon, August 28, 1862, in William Y. Dixon Papers (ibid.); 
W.M. Barrow to My Dear Aunt Anna, September 6, 1862, in W.M. 
Barrow Family Papers; Edward Bacon, Among the Cotton Thieves 
(Detroit: Free Press Steam and Job Printing House, 1867)
herein after referred to as Bacon, Among the Cotton Thieves, 
p. 31; Dawson, A Confederate Girls Diarv pp. 168-185 and 221.
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region. He also dispatched details to begin reconstructing 
the destroyed bridges over North Pass and Pass Manchac.247
Learning of Thompson's presence and activities Federal 
forces determined to strike Pontchatoula. On September 15, 
1862, the Federals attacked and drove the small Confederate 
garrison from the town. Union troops entered and looted the 
village destroying the bulk of the supplies collected by 
Thompson's men. During the fighting a train which had 
observed the Union approach raced back up the railroad 
sounding the alarm as far north as Camp Moore. In the late 
afternoon a counter attack by the reinforced Confederates 
pushed the Federals back down the railroad. Both sides 
considered the engagement a victory. But the advantage 
clearly lay with the Federals who successfully disrupted the 
Confederate concentration at Pontchatoula, which postponed 
indefinitely any movement against New Orleans.248
The operations about Baton Rouge and Pontchatoula 
secured for the residents of the Florida parishes a temporary 
respite from the fighting. This brief interlude in the fall 
of 1862 provided farmers with an opportunity to harvest their 
crops and tend to their personal affairs virtually 
unmolested. Moreover work continued on the Confederate 
stronghold at Port Hudson. Eager to have the subjugation of
247 Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, pp 139-140 
and 797-798.
248 Ibid., pp. 139-141; Dawson, A Confederate Girl's 
Diarv. p. 236.
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eastern Louisiana as a feather in his cap yet frustrated by 
continuing resistance there, Ben Butler suggested destroying 
the levees holding back the Mississippi River. According to 
Butler this would destroy the enemy at Port Hudson "by 
drowning him out," and would "be a serious blow to the people 
of that country, already great sufferers from the effects of 
the war." Fortunately for the residents Butler's plan failed 
to elicit the support of his successor. But the reduced 
Federal pressure exposed some major problems for Confederate 
authorities in the area, problems resulting primarily from 
the effects of the blockade. Though supplies of beef and 
corn remained adequate to sustain the population through the 
winter, certain staple commodities and medicines had already 
reached a critical shortage. In particular, the shortage of 
salt had reached crisis proportions. Unlike coffee and other 
luxury items, salt constituted an absolute necessity, 
especially for the preservation of meat. By the winter of 
1862 local residents had exhausted their supplies. The 
popular process of sifting the dirt of smokehouse floors also 
produced a meager return. This procedure involved digging up 
the floor of a smokehouse where meat had been salted for 
years and boiling the dirt in water. After a few hours over 
a heavy fire the salt-saturated water was drained off and 
allowed to evaporate revealing the crystalline deposits. The
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residents' inability to secure salt from such sources of last 
resort precipitated a crisis in the territory.249
The emergency reached such proportions that in December, 
1862, Confederate Collector F.H. Hatch based at Tangipahoa, 
petitioned Confederate Secretary of War James A. Seddon to 
allow local residents to barter with the enemy for salt. 
Some citizens embarked on perilous journeys to western 
Louisiana or to the evaporation vats near Mobile to secure 
the precious commodity. On one such expedition, Annabelle 
Pitkins left Washington Parish headed for Mobile accompanied 
by her nine year old son and E.J. Allen who had lost both an 
arm and a leg in the Battle of Shiloh. Accosted by Union 
cavalry near Madisonville, she pleaded that she was merely 
returning home with her husband who had been wounded in the 
fighting near Baton Rouge. When Federal officers
suspiciously examined Allen's neatly healed wounds, Pitkins 
praised the work of Admiral Farragut's private surgeon who 
she claimed had removed the shattered limbs on a ship in the
Loving Sister F.P. Wall to Dear Sister, undated 
letter describing process of "dripping brine from smokehouse 
earth," in Jeptha McKinney Papers (LLMVC); Amite City News 
Digest. February 5, 1976; Official Records. Series I, Vol. 
15, pp. 602-603 "Report of General Benjamin Butler," also see 
ibid., pp. 242 and 797; Eugene Hunter to Stella, October 14, 
1863, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC); Joseph Corkern 
to Jeptha McKinney, January 23, 1863, in Jeptha McKinney
Papers (ibid.); Mary Wilkinson to Micajah, August 1, 1862, in 
Micajah Wilkinson Papers (ibid.); Mrs. R.J. Causey to Causey, 
October 14, 1863, in R.J. Causey Papers (ibid.); John Ball to 
Joel Stokes, February 13, 1863, in Joel A. Stokes Papers
(ibid.); Magnolia Grand Trunk. October 11, 1862; Ella Lonn, 
Salt as a Factor in the Confederacy (Birmingham; University 
of Alabama Press, 1965) p. 41.
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Mississippi. To protect her precious cargo from the Yankees 
who would steal it, and from Confederate cavalry who would 
confiscate a part of it, Pitkins ingeniously fashioned a 
false bottom in her wagon large enough to hold one thousand 
pounds of salt. After taking on a large supply of salt near 
Mobile, she returned by a northerly route via Meridian, 
Mississippi and delivered her cargo to friends and neighbors. 
Her arduous journey required approximately six weeks. Though 
this supply temporarily relieved the suffering of a few 
individuals the salt crisis continued to escalate throughout 
the war.250
The acute shortage of staples which afflicted the South 
as early as the fall of 1862, created severe distress among 
the population and compounded the problems facing Confederate 
authorities. The inability to maintain supplies of basic 
necessities exemplified the rashness and seeming lack of 
foresight involved in the secession effort. But providing 
essential commodities proved to be only a part of the crisis 
confronting Confederate authorities on the home front. The 
immediate necessity of fielding armies to repel invasion on 
numerous fronts severely strained the existing legal system 
in the Florida parishes. With the vast majority of men under
250 Official Records. Series IV, Vol. 2, p. 242; Mrs. 
R.J. Causey to Causey, October 14, 1863, in R.J. Causey
Papers (LLMVC); Eugene Hunter to Stella, October 13, 1863, in 
Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (ibid.); Mary Wilkinson to 
Micajah, August 1, 1862, in Micajah Wilkinson Papers (ibid.); 
Magnolia Grand Trunk. October 11, 1862; Amite City News
Digest. February 5, 1976.
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arms, inadequate resources remained to sustain the pre-war 
legal structure. As a result, Confederate commanders were 
forced to employ their limited means to maintain a semblance 
of civil discipline. In the critical weeks before the late 
summer fighting around Baton Rouge and Pontchatoula, 
Confederate authorities reluctantly dispatched a cavalry 
detachment to seek out increasingly aggressive criminal 
elements in lower Livingston Parish where civil authority had 
ceased to function.251
During the spring and summer of 1862 the Amite River 
swamplands in lower Livingston and Ascension parishes had 
attracted criminal elements who exploited the absence of 
civil authority. Repeated appeals to the military 
authorities at Pontchatoula finally evoked a response 
following the brutal robbery and murder of two Confederate 
soldiers near Springfield. An ardent military response was 
considered warranted by the presence of one Adolph Dies, "a 
notorious desperado who had proclaimed himself a Lincolnite 
and with a supposed fifteen men had threatened citizens in 
the parish." But in reality the purpose of the expedition 
was to contain lawlessness in the Amite River region and 
arrest several fugitives from civil justice.
Bayou Sara Ledger, reprinted in New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. October 3, 1861, demonstrates in detail the
breakdown of the legal system in much of the region. The 
article notes that the number of men under arms had forced 
the suspension of the courts and the calling of jury pools; 
Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, p. 120.
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Accordingly Lieutenant Alfred Bradley proceeded to 
Springfield at the head of a detachment of Caruthers' 
Sharpshooters, Confederate States Army. Bradley made several 
arrests, confiscated a few weapons, and as a bonus, killed 
Dies and captured a few of his associates. Though this 
operation may have afforded some relief to the citizens of 
the territory, the necessity of dispatching troops to police 
civilians deprived the Confederate military of limited 
cavalry resources at the height of the campaign season.252
The spring of 1863 brought with it renewed Federal 
thrusts into the Florida parishes. In preparation for 
operations against Port Hudson, in December, 1862, Union 
forces reoccupied the ruins of Baton Rouge. The propensity 
of local partisans to fire on passing Federal ships had 
resulted in the looting and virtually complete incineration 
of Donaldsonville and surrounding plantations below Baton 
Rouge. As a result, the handful of Confederate troops 
garrisoning the city retreated without opposing the Union 
warships. By the end of December General Nathaniel Banks, 
who had replaced the controversial Butler as commander of the 
Union Department of the Gulf, had 40,000 troops in Louisiana. 
In contrast to the massive Federal buildup, excepting the 
6,000 men concentrated about Port Hudson and a few hundred 
assigned to protect the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad, the
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Florida parishes had been stripped of troops to support other 
theaters of the war.253
The Federal buildup in the Florida parishes demonstrated 
their determination to gain control of the Mississippi and 
secure New Orleans by destroying the Confederates' principal 
transportation artery the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad. The 
masses of men and material being concentrated at Baton Rouge 
led one Union soldier to conclude that the rebels had no 
chance of prevailing against the might of the northern 
states.254 His assessment of the situation proved very 
nearly correct. Federal pressure would now be directed 
against the territory on three fronts from the north, south, 
and east, spreading the nearly exhausted Confederate 
resources to the breaking point. But despite the increasing 
imbalance between the opposing forces the Confederates 
resisted with a renewed vigor, which insured continuing and 
escalating havoc in the Florida parishes.
Outside of the garrison force at Port Hudson and 
affiliated cavalry units, the Confederate Third Military 
District of the Department of Southwest Mississippi and East 
Louisiana consisted of one battalion and several attached
253 John Durnin to Ann, September 25, 1862, notes that 
only one company of Confederate volunteers served as the 
garrison force at Baton Rouge,in James and John Durnin Papers 
(LLMVC); Dawson, A Confederate Girl's Diarv. p. 221; Winters, 
Civil War in Louisiana, pp. 153, 157, and 167.
254 G.T. Harrower to Dear Helen, March 13, 1863, in 
G.T. Harrower Letters (LLMVC).
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companies under the command of Colonel J.M. Simonton at 
Pontchatoula, several hundred trainees at Camp Moore, and two 
units of partisan rangers.255 Concerned that the railroad 
would allow Confederate troops to be transferred rapidly from 
Mississippi to Louisiana to reinforce Port Hudson or threaten 
an attack on New Orleans, Union planners determined to 
destroy it. The beginning of the spring offensive operations 
would thus begin with an attack on the Confederate base at 
Pontchatoula.
On March 21, 1863 a two pronged attack was launced
against Pontchatoula. A body of Union infantry moved up the 
railroad while the main force disembarked from steamers at 
the nearby village of Wadesborough and attacked Pontchatoula 
from the west. Driving Confederate skirmishers before them, 
the flanking force entered the village forcing the few rebel 
riflemen who had contained the attack from the south to 
retire.256
The sleepy village of Pontchatoula had no premonition of 
the horror that would befall it that day. What resulted 
constituted an orgy of pillage and destruction. Panicked 
women and children fled the hapless village as the Federals 
led by their commanding officer, Colonel Thomas Clark, looted
Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 1061-
1062.
256 Official Records Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 280-291; 
Bacon, Among the Cotton Thieves. pp. 64-86; Jackson, 
Mississippi The Daily Southern Crisis. March 30, 1863.
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and destroyed every building they encountered.257 As he 
observed the wanton destruction and abuse of citizens, 
Federal Colonel Edward Bacon noted that the legendary 
savagery of the Turks could not have been more thorough. 
Bacon reflected that the entire command "seemed transfigured 
by the evil spirits that possess them, and appeared more like 
devils of theft and pillage than like mortal men."258
The destruction of Pontchatoula continued unabated 
through the night. At least one civilian was murdered while 
attempting to negotiate the protection of his property. 
Lacking the strength to drive the Federals from the village, 
the Confederates contented themselves with taking up a 
defensive position before the Cate Shoe Factory, near present 
day Hammond. When reinforcements arrived in the afternoon, 
the Confederates drove the more numerous Federals from the 
town so quickly that they were forced to torch much of their 
loot along with most of the town. Confederate efforts to 
contain the fires permitted the Federals to retreat in good 
order back down the railroad. Behind them remained a deeply 
embittered populace whose perception of the war and moral
257 Clark's brutal and cowardly behavior at the head 
of his troops eventually resulted in charges being brought 
against him by several of his own officers for among other 
things; indecent exposure, rape of a colored woman, 
drunkenness, extortion, and the wanton stealing of money, 
silverware, and other household goods from individual private 
homes, see Bacon, Among the Cotton Thieves, pp. 114-118 for 
details of these charges.
Bacon, Among the Cotton Thieves, pp. 64-67.
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responsibility had received a sharp lesson from the enemy. 
The lessons learned from the war were only beginning. But 
hatred for the Yankees would remain for generations, and the 
lessons in brutality would determine the course of social 
development through the end of the century. A Federal 
officer who attempted to return under flag of truce some 
Masonic jewels looted by his troops described the mood 
prevailing among the citizens and soldiers at Pontchatoula: 
"they would hardly treat me civilly; they are terribly 
enraged against us."259
In the spring of 1863 Pontchatoula was not the only 
community to become an unfortunate victim of the war. The 
entire region would find itself squarely in the course of a 
violent storm. As the increasing might of Federal arms 
slowly overwhelmed the Confederates, increasing distress 
overcame the population. During the late spring of 1863 
Union troops briefly captured and destroyed much of Clinton 
wreaking havoc among the once stately plantations in the 
area. The efforts of Confederate cavalry and the citizens 
who joined them proved able to delay but not prevent repeated 
Federal visits to Clinton and nearby Jackson. More 
significantly, in May, 1863 a powerful combined force of 
cavalry and infantry exploited the Confederates preoccupation
Official Records Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 284-291; 
Bacon, Among the Cotton Thieves, pp 64-84; Winters, The Civil 
War in Louisiana, p. 220; Jackson, Mississippi The Daily 
Southern Crisis. March 30, 1863.
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with containing the Federals below Pontchatoula by attacking 
the railroad above that point. The raiding force destroyed 
the Cate Shoe Factory and burned the leather tannery near 
Tickfaw. After driving off a small body of Confederate 
cavalry and citizens who contested their advance at 
Independence, the Yankees destroyed the railroad's car 
manufacturing plant there along with numerous gun carriages. 
The depots and all structures housing supplies were burned at 
both Independence and Amite City and the railroad devastated 
as far north as Tangipahoa. Although this destruction 
greatly affected the Confederate war effort in the area, the 
greatest crisis befell the already suffering residents. 
While approaching and departing the area the raiders burned 
homes, destroyed fences, slaughtered livestock, and generally 
"greatly abused the citizens." Other than a few scattered 
pickets and a handful of partisans deployed in conjunction 
with elements of Terrell's Mississippi Cavalry, no 
significant Confederate forces remained in the area to 
contest the Union marauding. Coordinated pressure from 
numerous points at once allowed the Federals to employ their 
superior resources and stretch Confederate defenses beyond 
the breaking point. By the spring of 1863 the Federals had 
developed a strategy that worked, and for the luckless 
residents, the suffering had only begun.260
260 Diary of Mary E. Taylor, April 29-30, May 14, May 
24, June 3-9, 1863, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC); 
Official Records. Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 406-409; ibid.,
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An incursion from the north became the key to disrupt 
the Confederate defensive perimeter stretching from the 
lakeshore region to the bluffs of the Mississippi. In 
addition to the raids from Baton Rouge and assaults on the 
now inconsequential base at Pontchatoula, the scattered 
Confederate forces in the region were thrown into confusion 
by the unexpected raid originating in Tennessee. On April 
17, 1863 Colonel B.H. Grierson's Sixth and Seventh Illinois 
Cavalry and Second Iowa Cavalry departed La Grange, Tennessee 
with instructions to destroy the length of the New Orleans- 
Jackson Railroad and disrupt enemy supply lines in route to 
New Orleans. Grierson proceeded through the state of
Mississippi destroying the railroad and supply depots but 
generally avoiding the destruction of private property. He 
noted in his report that at several towns along the way 
groups of armed citizens had contested his advance inflicting 
a few casualties on his troopers. Yet rather than burning 
their towns or arresting those who resisted, Grierson instead 
disarmed the citizens, reassured them of the honorable nature 
of his troops and mission, and ordered that private property
be respected. This had a dramatic impact on the citizens.
Grierson cited numerous incidents where local residents
asserted that they "had been grossly deceived as to our real 
character." He continued, "I mention this as a sample of the 
feeling which exists, and the good effect which our presence
S e r i e s  I ,  V o l .  2 6 ,  p t .  I ,  p .  9 .
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produced among the people in the country through which we 
passed." Unlike the wanton destruction of private property 
and outrages on the citizens occurring in the Florida 
parishes, Grierson applied the stick to government property 
and offered the carrot to the citizens. This policy, in 
Grierson's view, did far more to encourage respect for the 
United States government among the citizens than burning the 
roofs above their heads. And unlike regions of central and 
eastern Mississippi where support for the secession effort 
dwindled into disaffection, hatred for the invader continued 
in eastern Louisiana to the end.261
Grierson's destruction of the railroad and rebel supply 
depots constituted a crisis for Confederate authorities. 
Frantic efforts to capture his command failed largely due to 
misinformation spread by scouts dispatched by Grierson in 
civilian clothing. Informed that a sizable Confederate force 
awaited them at Osyka, Mississippi, Grierson abandoned the 
route to New Orleans and headed for Baton Rouge. Travelling 
rapidly toward Greensburg, Grierson determined to cross the 
Tickfaw River at Walls Bridge before it could be destroyed. 
Completely unaware of the raider's approach, Major James 
DeBaun and a contingent of 115 of his Ninth Louisiana
261 Official Records Series I, Vol. 24, pt. I, pp.
522-529; the contrast in Union activities in eastern 
Louisiana and parts of southwestern Mississippi constitutes 
an important element in the focal point of this study. 
Regions where Federal policy had been mild during the war 
experienced much less violence and instability in the post 
war period, as is exemplified in detail in chapter six.
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Partisan Rangers were resting at the bridge before continuing 
to a rendezvous with other forces pursuing Grierson. 
Outnumbered more than ten to one, DeBaun deployed his little 
force and contested the Union advance. The initial Federal 
assault on the bridge received a bloody repulse. The Yankees 
withdrew leaving several casualties including Lieutenant 
Colonel William D. Blackburn who led the charge. After 
regrouping the Federals opened with artillery fire and 
flanked DeBaun1s position on both sides forcing the 
Confederates to retire. Following this encounter the raiders 
proceeded on to the safety of Baton Rouge virtually 
unmolested. Grierson's raid successfully disrupted rebel 
communications, destroyed large stockpiles of supplies, and 
devastated considerable sections of the railroad. Bemoaning 
the success of the raid, Abigail Amacker commented, "it seems 
we have come to a crisis in our revolution and we certainly 
cannot remain in the present state much longer." But most 
importantly Grierson exposed Confederate weakness in the 
Florida parishes, which guaranteed increasing Federal visits 
to the area.262
As the maneuvers which culminated in the siege of Port 
Hudson began in the spring of 1863, Union planners determined
262 Official Records Series I, Vol. 24, pt. I, pp.
523-533, 539-540, and 547-549; Diary of Eli Capell, May 3,
1863, in Eli J. Capell Papers (LLMVC); Diary of Abigail Means 
Kent Amacker, May 22, 1863, in O.P. Amacker Papers (ibid.); 
Andrew Booth, Records of Louisiana Confederate Soldiers and 
Louisiana Confederate Commands (Spartanburg: Reprint Company 
Publishers, 1984) p. 572.
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to employ their planned victory as a catalyst to subjugate 
all of eastern Louisiana and southwestern Mississippi• 
Success there would enable the Federals to remove their 
troops in the region to other theaters. Accordingly, Union 
forces intensified their efforts to interdict the trade in 
foodstuffs and material between the lakeshore region and the 
Gulf coast of Mississippi. Disruption of this trade would 
increase the suffering of the already destitute population 
and hopefully produce growing disillusionment with the war 
effort. Central to this plan was control of the entrances to 
the numerous waterways connecting the rebel held interior 
with lakes Maurepaus and Pontchartrain. Small schooners 
increasingly relied on these rivers to conceal their 
operations from Union vessels which patrolled the lakes. By 
the spring of 1863 the establishment of a fortified post at 
Pass Manchac effectively cut off trade from Lake Maurepaus. 
But continuing Confederate control of the rivers entering 
this lake allowed the rebels to conceal light-draught 
blockade runners and caches of supplies along the numerous 
bayous connecting the streams. Rebel command of these 
waterways necessitated a constant Federal garrison in the 
dreary swampland at Manchac. Consequently as part of the 
Union plan to squeeze the Confederates on as many fronts as
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possible, the Federal navy increasingly probed these 
rivers.263
To implement this plan the Federals relied on a small 
flotilla of light-draught schooners and a few armed barges 
and gunboats. The most powerful ship in the lake squadron 
was the ironclad gunboat Barataria. One hundred and twenty- 
five feet long, fronted by an iron-clad prow, and armed with 
bronze twelve-pounders, the formidable Barataria commanded 
the shipping lanes about the lakes. Finding the name of the 
vessel difficult to pronounce, members of the Sixth Michigan 
Regiment on garrison duty at Manchac affectionately nicknamed 
it the "Bull Terrier." On April 7, 1863, the Barataria
departed Manchac and proceeded across Lake Maurepaus to 
explore the rivers entering the lake. But tragedy struck the 
expedition almost immediately. Near the mouth of the Amite 
River the gunboat stuck fast on a large snag. Throughout the 
morning the Federals tried unsuccessfully to lighten and free 
the boat. Unfortunately for the Yankees several local 
residents informed a nearby patrol from the First Mississippi
263 For evidence of the destitute condition of the
population in the northshore region and continuing 
Confederate shipping activity and blockade running there see; 
Edward Stewart to John Gurley, May 1, 1862, in John W. Gurley 
Papers (LLMVC); Tom Ellis to Martina, September 11, 1864, in 
Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); M.J. Scott to Dear Sister-in- 
Law, June 3, 1864, M.J. Scott Letter (ibid.) Christian Koch 
to Annette, April 6 and 8, 1863, Annette to Christian, April 
21 and 29, 1863, and May 13, 1863, all in Christian D. Koch 
Papers (ibid.); Covington Weekly Wanderer. April 19, 1862;
Official Records Series I, Vol. 15, pp. 284-286; Bacon, Among 
the Cotton Thieves, p. 60.
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Cavalry of the gunboat's predicament. The Mississippians 
attacked the Barataria forcing the Federal sailors to abandon 
their efforts to free the boat and seek refuge inside. 
Unable to drive off the Confederates who found ample 
protection from the gunboat's cannon in the lush cypress 
swamp, the Federals panicked. Observing in the early evening 
that most of the rebels had departed, presumably to secure 
reinforcements, the Federals determined to abandon the craft 
and paddle to safety aboard the Barataria's cutter. Before 
departing the sailors set the gunboat afire ending the career 
of the Barataria.264
The loss of the Barataria temporarily inhibited 
aggressive Federal operations on the rivers of the lower 
Florida parishes. But growing Federal naval strength in the 
lakes, augmented by the Union garrisons at Manchac and Forts 
Pike and McComb on the Rigolets, increasingly disrupted 
Confederate trade there. The Federals made no secret of 
their intention to disrupt all Confederate intercourse and 
starve the rebels into submission as outlined in General 
Orders Number 33. By the summer of 1863 the situation for 
many residents had become unbearable. Denied access to their 
primary market at New Orleans, subjected to destructive Union 
raids, and flooded with hundreds of refugees ordered out of
Official Records Series I, Vol. 15, p. 291; civil 
War Naval Chronology. 1861-1865 (Washington: Naval History 
Division, 1966) pt. VI, pp. 2 02-203; Bacon, Among the Cotton 
Thieves, pp. 57-58 and 87-93.
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New Orleans after being enrolled as registered enemies of the 
United States, the region groaned under the burden of
The transformation of the region had been dramatic. On 
the eve of the conflict Edward Stewart, overseer on a lower 
Livingston Parish plantation, wrote his employer of the 
seemingly limitless harvest of foodstuffs collected on the 
plantation. Two years later facing starvation, Stewart 
complained that the sixteen refugees he harbored had 
overtaxed his supply of provisions. With little hope of 
improving conditions Stewart notified his employer, John 
Gurley, that he must now refuse assistance to everyone 
including close family friends. Concerning the arrival of 
yet another boatload of refugees on the northshore, Annette 
Koch wrote her husband, "I don't know what will become of all 
these people that have come to this poor part of the country, 
there was nothing to eat for them that was already here, and
265 Official Records Series I, Vol. 41, pt. 2, p. 804, 
provides details concerning General Orders No. 33 which 
directed Federal forces to cut off all private and commercial 
intercourse of the rebels; Civil War Reminiscences, from the 
diary of Jane McCausland Chinn, "The Burning of the Barns," 
describes the enactment of Federal policy to destroy all food 
supplies (LLMVC); statement issued by the provost marshall's 
office in New Orleans and signed by John Gurley and his wife, 
October 4, 1862, declaring both to be registered enemies of 
the United States, in John Gurley Papers (ibid.); James E. 
Bradley Diary, entries October 13 and 24, 1862 indicate heavy 
concentrations of refugees from New Orleans in the Amite City 
and Areola Station area (ibid.); John Bettersworth, 
Confederate Mississippi (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1943) p. 203.
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these that come bring nothing with them, they will be sure to 
starve. Oh the misery of this war when will it cease."266
Similar circumstances confronted the entire population 
in the lakeshore region. The Covington Weekly Wanderer noted 
that less than one week's supply of corn remained in the area 
and that in a two day period the cost per bushel had 
increased from $1.75 to $2.25. Sara Sandell grieved for the 
residents about Pontchatoula who had exhausted their personal 
supplies of meat. In April 1863, Sandell informed her 
daughter that no meat could be purchased for any price. The 
deepening crisis forced many residents to make desperate 
decisions. Annette Koch faced the dilemma of feeding her 
children or her servants. When she naturally chose to 
sustain her children, Koch suffered a near breakdown from the 
stress associated with her decision to release her servants 
who would "surely starve." Sadly noting the necessity of 
relinquishing the responsibility of raising his two children, 
M.J. Scott lamented, "it is enough to say that the war has 
ruined me, broken me up. Provisions are scarce and dear and 
clothing is almost entirely out of the question." Scott 
implored his sister-in-law to take the children away and "act 
not only the part of a friend to them, but the more holy one 
- that of the mother." By the summer of 1863 the success of 
the Federal blockade and interdiction of Confederate trade on
266 Edward Stewart to John Gurley, May 1, 1862, in
John W. Gurley Papers (LLMVC); Annette Koch to Christian, May 
13, 1863, in Christian Koch Papers (ibid.).
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the lakes insured that the local residents would face the 
constant threat of starvation.267
Efforts to relieve the suffering of the people proved 
woefully inadequate. The Louisiana Legislature's
appropriation of $150,000 for relief of the citizens in 
January 1862 proved far less than necessary to sustain 
destitute families; besides little of this money reached the 
Florida parishes. The police juries of wealthier parishes, 
such as East and West Feliciana, made large appropriations at 
the outset of the war for the relief of families of 
volunteers. But as the war dragged on, mounting casualties, 
orphaned families, and increasingly devastating Union raids 
overwhelmed these funds. Several Mississippi counties 
borrowed money from the citizens to secure absolute 
necessities, such as salt, for the families of soldiers but 
their limited assets allowed them to do little else. In the 
spring of 1862 the St.Tammany Parish Police Jury passed a 
special war tax intended to raise $20,000 for the support of 
soldier's families. This fund provided ten dollars per month 
to each soldier's wife and five dollars for each child under 
fourteen. In the event of death of the soldier, payments
267 Covington Weekly Wanderer. April 19, 1862;
Christian Koch to Annette, April 6, 1863, Annette to
Christian, April 29, 1863, May 13, 1863, July 1, 1863, April 
24, 1864, and September 18 and 20, 1864, all in Christian
Koch Papers (LLMVC); M.J. Scott to Dear Sister in Law, June 
3, 1864, M.J. Scott Letter (ibid.); unsigned letter from
Humboldt County, California to Asa Hursey, October 20, 1865, 
in Asa Hursey Family Papers (ibid.); Dawson, A Confederate 
Girl's Diary, pp. 370-372.
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would continue for one year. The jurors believed this fund 
would provide for soldier's families for the duration of the 
conflict. Their gross miscalculation of the extent of the 
deprivation in St. Tammany exemplifies the financial 
catastrophe occasioned by the war. The $20,000 appropriation 
received approval in March 1862. By August of the same year 
over sixty percent of the appropriation had been expended. 
With the funds exhausted by January 1863, the jury suspended 
cash payments and resorted to direct purchases of corn to 
supply food for destitute families of Confederate soldiers. 
To support these purchases the police jury increased the rate 
of property taxes. Yet by the spring of 1863, unable to 
maintain adequate supplies of food, the jurors were forced to 
rely on the decreasing charity of wealthy residents to 
provide for the families of soldiers.268
Some municipalities attempted to fund relief efforts on 
their own. The Amite City Board of Aldermen departed from 
their task of completing a list of rules and regulations for
268 House Journal. Sixth Legislature, First Session, 
January 13, 1862; New Orleans Daily Picayune. June 11, 1861; 
West Feliciana Parish Military Board Minute Book, period 
1862-1863 (LLMVC); Magnolia, Mississippi Grand Trunk. October 
11, 1862; Covington Weekly Wanderer. April 19, 1862; St.
Tammany Parish Police Jury Minutes, March 15 and August 6, 
1862, January-March session and July session 1863 (LLMVC); 
F.A. Cousins (President St.Tammany Parish Police Jury) to Asa 
Hursey, May 7, 1863, in Asa Hursey Papers (ibid.); List of
families of Confederate soldiers eligible for relief in St. 
Tammany Parish, lists needy families of Confederate soldiers 
and the amount of relief apportioned to them, in 
Miscellaneous Records, St. Tammany Parish Courthouse, 
Covington.
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the new town to entertain pleas for relief. Through the 
winter of 1861-1862 Amite City apportioned a part of their 
meager finances to aid destitute families of volunteers. But 
like the parish governing bodies, by the spring of 1863, 
lacking funds to meet even the city debt, Amite City was also 
forced to suspend relief payments.269
The desperate circumstances prevailing in the lakeshore 
region and Gulf Coast of Mississippi severely strained many 
residents' commitment to the war effort. Increasingly they 
were forced to barter with the enemy to survive despite 
Confederate efforts to prevent such practices. By the fall 
of 1863 the practice of trading cotton or sugar to the enemy 
for food had become common in the lakeshore region. 
Lieutenant C.M. Allen, on a reconnaissance mission with 
elements of the Second Arkansas Cavalry in October 1863, 
reported that a general system of contraband trade with the 
enemy continued in the lakeshore region. Allen stated that 
this illegal trade had an obvious demoralizing effect on the 
people. He concluded his report by earnestly suggesting that 
a strong force be temporarily deployed there to regain the 
confidence of the people. Many residents no longer trusted 
the ability of the Confederate authorities to protect and 
provide for them. Annette Koch complained to her husband
269 Amite City Board of Aldermen Minute Books, see 
winter 1861-1862 in Book No. 1, located in Amite City Hall; 
Amite City Daily Wanderer, October 20, 1864, provides
evidence of the suffering of destitute families and their 
reliance on the charity of fellow citizens.
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that her youngest son had fled during a recent Union raid. 
Rumors had indicated that the Yankees made "conscripts of all 
such lads as he and all negro men they could catch, you would 
have allowed him to take to the woods too." But the boy's 
departure deprived Koch of her last farm hand forcing her to 
rely on bartered food obtained from the Federal garrison at 
Fort Pike. Mrs. R.J. Causey regretfully informed her soldier 
husband that desperate circumstances had forced her to barter 
with the enemy to provide for their children. Although she 
professed continuing patriotism to the cause of the South she 
wrote fearfully of the efforts of Confederate cavalry to 
interdict this trade.270
Recognizing the severity of the situation F.H. Hatch, 
Confederate Collector for the region, suggested that a policy 
fair to both the people and the government be implemented. 
He informed Richmond that when available corn and sweet 
potatoes sold for ten to fifteen dollars a bushel. According 
to Hatch, "these exorbitant prices of course stimulate that 
questionable class of traders that always flock to the 
confines of warring nations, who, I think, should be 
regulated accordingly as they may be useful in supplying the
C.M. Allen to Colonel John Logan, in Official 
Records Series I, Vol. 26, pt. 1, p. 313; statements of 
General George Hodge, in ibid. . Series I, Vol. 41, pt. 2, pp. 
1084 and 1088; Annette Koch to Christian, April 29 and May 
11, 1863, in Christian Koch Papers (LLMVC); Mrs. R.J. Causey 
to Causey, October 14, 1863, in R.J. Causey Correspondence
(ibid.); P.L. Bonny to Mr.'s Cousins, Jones, and J.A. 
Leblanc, April 23, 1864, in P.L. Bonny Papers (ibid.).
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extreme wants of our Army and people." Hatch continued that 
since the enemy had made clear his intention to starve the 
people, "while I would not sanction or encourage trade with 
the enemy, I would endeavor to regulate these matters in a 
time of war rather by a policy which would work to the 
benefit of our cause and to the injury of the enemy than by 
a rigid application of the law." To dramatize the critical 
circumstances confronting the citizens of the region Hatch 
noted that even as a ranking Confederate official he too 
faced starvation. And he reminded his superiors that the 
only way to halt the contraband traffic with the enemy would 
be to deploy the precious few troops in the territory as 
pickets across the entire region. Hatch's proposal to allow 
limited trade with the enemy to relieve the extreme suffering 
of the people obviously met with tacit approval. By the fall 
of 1863 Mrs. R.J. Causey noted that the people had been 
granted permission to trade two bales of cotton with the 
enemy. But in the end this policy constituted an official 
acknowledgement of the Confederate government's inability to 
sustain its citizens, which hastened the demoralization 
increasingly evident in the region.271
271 Official Records Series IV, Vol. 2, pp. 459-460; 
ibid. Series IV, Vol. 3, pp. 677-680; Mrs. R.J. Causey to 
Causey, October 14, 1863, in R.J. Causey Correspondence
(LLMVC); for further evidence of government sanctioned 
trading with the enemy see copy of letter signed James A. 
Seddon and endorsed by Judge George W. Martin, December 19, 
1862, and J.B. Eustis to P.L. Bonny, November 28, 1863, in 
P.L. Bonny Papers (ibid.).
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Adding to the despairing conditions prevailing in the 
lakeshore region were increasing numbers of deserters, both 
Union and Confederate, who camped in the woods along the 
lakes or secreted themselves in the Pearl River swamps. Many 
of these war weary men had families in the area and simply 
returned home to be rear them. The letters many Confederate 
soldiers received describing the desperate circumstances 
prevailing at home induced some of them to abandon the army. 
R.J. Causey received constant letters from his wife 
describing their perilous circumstances and pleading with him 
to return home and relieve their suffering. In November 1863 
Mrs. Causey reinforced the plea to her husband by noting that 
a conspiracy to launch a "negro uprising" had been uncovered 
in their neighborhood. She continued, "I am afraid we will 
have some troublesome times down here the men are patrolling 
all of the time but the men are so few in the country that 
they can not do much good." Overcoming his contempt for 
deserters from his regiment Steven Ellis granted the 
offending parties a moment of understanding. "Poor fellows 
some of them have large families at home entirely dependent 
on the world and cold charities if they are not there to see 
to them - some instances I know of among these men where they 
have a wife and 5 or 6 kids, the oldest not more than 6 or 7 
years old and not another person on the place - are their 
cares not to be pitied." Others among the deserters 
constituted desperate characters who preyed upon the already
268
suffering population. Regardless of their motives, the bands 
of deserters collecting in the lakeshore region added to the 
unhappy state of affairs.272
The demoralization evident in the lakeshore region did 
not translate into the development of significant Unionism. 
Some historians, influenced by propaganda in the Federally 
censored New Orleans press, have suggested that large 
sections of eastern Louisiana and southwestern Mississippi 
experienced a revival of Unionist sympathies at the height of 
the war. That war weariness and a certain degree of 
disaffection emerged in this region is indisputable. But 
little evidence exists to indicate that significant Unionism 
emerged. Infrequent reports submitted by Federal raiders 
declaring that local residents had professed loyalty to the 
Union must be qualified by the circumstances under which 
these statements were made. Only an exceptionally committed 
or foolish person would fail to say what seemed appropriate 
to preserve their homestead and possibly their life. But 
this is not to say that the region contained no Union 
sympathizers. A small group of Unionists remained evident 
from the beginning to the end of the conflict. The evidence
272 Official Records Series I, Vol. 26, pt. 1, pp.
313-314? ibid. Series I, Vol. 32, pt.3, p. 755 Daniel Logan 
reported that it was dangerous to travel in parts of Marion 
County, Mississippi and Washington Parish due to the presence 
of deserters; Your Loving Wife to R.J. Causey, October 14 and 
November 19, 1863, in R.J. Causey Correspondence (LLMVC);
Steven Ellis to Ma, March 5, 1865, in Ellis Family Papers
(ibid.).
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merely suggests that the decreasing quality of life 
associated with the war resulted in no significant upsurge of 
Unionism. Indeed some of the most acclaimed "Unionists" in 
the territory also appear to have been motivated by suspect 
principles.273
The Christian Koch family constitutes one of the most 
frequently cited "Unionist" families in the lakeshore region. 
Residents of Hancock County, Mississippi near Pearlington and 
of Danish descent, the Koch's had not resided in the 
territory long before the outbreak of hostilities. Though 
Koch is often cited for his unionist beliefs the evidence 
suggests that his true motivation remained primarily profit
273 The New Orleans newspapers operating under the
direction of Federal occupation forces consistently equated 
the suffering in the Florida parishes and environs with an 
upsurge in Unionism. Many reports in the New Orleans press 
seemed designed to discourage Confederate sympathies in the 
Crescent City by suggesting that Confederate support was 
collapsing in the countryside. The New Orleans Era, edited 
directly by Federal officers, served as a particularly 
aggressive propaganda tool. Limited evidence suggests that 
some Unionists remained in the Florida parishes for the 
duration of the war; see Unsigned letter (possibly from one 
Evans) to Dear friend brother Ellis, January 30, 1864, in
Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); testimony of Johnson E. Yerks 
and William Wilder, both professed to be Union men during the 
war during Congressional Reconstruction hearings, Yerks 
estimated their were ten Unionists in the region, United 
States Congressional Hearings Supplement. House Committee on 
Elections. No. 1, Forty-first Congress, Second Session, 
Testimony Taken by the U.S. Sub-Committee of Elections in 
Louisiana, May-June 1869, HE 1 No. 1, 41-A-l and HE 1 No. 1, 
41-A-2; New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 10, 1863 and 
October 9 and 11, 1864; Ted Tunnell, Crucible of 
Reconstruction; War. Radicalism and Race in Louisiana 1862- 
1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984) 
pp. 8-25; for evidence of Federal reports indicating latent 
allegiance to the Union among the people see Official Records 
Series I, Vol. 15, p. 406.
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and sadly, cowardice. Throughout the course of the war Koch, 
a steamship captain by trade and an extremely practical man, 
made a comfortable profit transporting goods and prisoners 
for the United States government. Federal guidelines 
required that Koch take the oath of allegiance in order to do 
business with the authorities at New Orleans. Yet as late as 
the spring of 1863, with a son fighting in the Confederate 
army, Koch expressed concern that as a result of his trading 
with the enemy his neighbors would not believe that "I am a 
good southerner." Koch's cowardice is readily apparent in 
his letters. He frequently wrote his wife describing rumors 
of the treatment accorded those who traded with the enemy. 
Yet just as often in his wife's letters pleading with him to 
visit the family and relieve their suffering she noted that 
nothing of the kind had occurred. Koch himself admitted that 
almost no Union men resided in the territory, and he 
frequently expressed concern for his business and personal 
safety in the post-war period. Annette and Elers Koch's 
letters indicate their fear and resentment for both armies. 
Both comforted themselves with the argument that they would 
be safe since they had done nothing to anger either side. 
The Kochs, like many families in the region, simply wished 
for peace on whatever terms would bring it swiftly.274
274 Numerous letters in Christian Koch Papers, see
boxes one and two, period 1863-1865 (LLMVC); two recurring 
themes in these letters reveal important information to 
consider when evaluating the Koch family. The Kochs appeared 
to be more committed to Denmark than either the Confederacy
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The Federal ability to employ warships to raid the 
lakeshore area greatly aggravated the desperate conditions 
there. By the summer of 1863 Union warships increasingly 
raided the towns and countryside along the northshore of Lake 
Pontchartrain destroying precious food stores, stealing 
livestock, and devastating farming operations. P.L. Bonny, 
commanding the Confederate lakeshore post at Mandeville, 
noted that an occasional blockade runner continued to slip 
through the Federal net but the provisions they brought met 
only a fraction of the need. Bonny complained to his 
superiors that the absence of heavy ordnance allowed the 
Federal navy to hold the entire region hostage. The frequent 
intensive raids which continued into the spring of 1864 so 
decisively decimated the region that Union commanders 
complained of their inability to find anything else to 
destroy. Reporting on a Federal expedition he directed in 
the lakeshore region, Major Martin Pulver asserted, 
"prospects for doing serious damage to the enemies of our
or the Union. Numerous letters demonstrate a nationalistic 
concern for the Danes in their war with Germany which did not 
seem to extend to either side in the American war. Excepting 
letters written in the last few months of the war when it was 
apparent the Federals would win, few indicate a preference 
for either side. Not only did the family recognize the value 
of siding with the victor, but Confederate efforts to arrest 
Elers for desertion and Christian for trading with the enemy 
naturally influenced their position. This lack of commitment 
to either cause created an obsessive concern for their 
personal safety among the family members not found in similar 
family collections. This concern contributed to Elers1 
decision to desert from the Confederate army and to 
Christian's abandonment of his family for the duration of the 
war.
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country in that direction looked extremely doubtful, as the 
inhabitants, what few there were, were very poor." Similarly 
Union General Cuvier Grover commented that the livestock his 
troops had stolen during a raid near Madisonville appeared 
extremely unhealthy and in his words "were hardly worth 
driving." Through the end of 1863 Federal raiders enjoyed 
the privilege of devastating the region virtually unmolested. 
Excepting a handful of partisan rangers almost no Confederate 
forces remained in the area.275
Though conditions prevailing in the lakeshore region 
remained particularly critical, as the second year of the war 
came to an end, increasingly desperate circumstances 
dominated the entire territory. The massive buildup of 
forces along the Mississippi occasioned by the fighting at 
Port Hudson exposed the upper Florida parishes to constant 
maneuvering on the part of both armies. On May 21, 1863 the 
two pronged Union drive against the garrison at Port Hudson 
resulted in a sharp skirmish at Merritt's Plantation near 
Plains Store. The arrival of massive Federal reinforcements 
forced the Confederates to retire within the defenses of Port
Copy of Special Orders Number 27 Colonel Edward 
Dillon to P.L. Bonny, Lieutenant P.L. Bonny to Lieutenant 
J.C. Robert, May 5, 1864, J.B. Eustis to P.L. Bonny, November 
28, 1863, all in P.L. Bonny Papers (LLMVC); Official Records 
Series I, Vol. 34, pp. 104-106 and 869; ibid. Series I, Vol. 
15, pp. 786-787; ibid. Series I, Vol. 41, pp. 756-758.
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Hudson completing the encirclement of the garrison. The 
longest siege in American history had begun.276
Outside the siege lines fighting raged along Thompson's 
Creek as both sides attempted to consolidate their lines. 
Recognizing the precarious position of his small command in 
the midst of the besieging army Colonel John Logan, 
commanding the Eleventh Arkansas Mounted Infantry and 
partisan units cooperating with him, withdrew to concentrate 
at Clinton. In a special report to General Joseph E. 
Johnston, Logan pleaded for additional forces to relieve Port 
Hudson and to secure a valuable region from the degradations 
of the enemy which would certainly follow. According to 
Logan, "the country along the Mississippi and east of it for 
fifty miles is a very wealthy one; there is a large amount of 
stock in it, and the people are doing everything they can for 
our cause, raising large crops of corn and potatoes for the 
army.,l277
Logan's fear that Federal forces would aggressively seek 
to destroy the war-making potential of the upper Florida 
parishes proved true. Union raiding parties destroyed crops
276 Official Records Series I, Vol. 26, pp. 120-122, 
137, and 144; Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, pp. 244-245; 
for descriptions of the destruction of Bayou Sara see, Diary 
of Abigail Means Kent Amacker, September 2, 1862, in O.P. 
Amacker Papers (LLMVC) , and W.M. Barrow to My Dear Aunt Anna, 
September 6, 1862, in W.M. Barrow Papers (ibid.).
277 Official Records Series I, Vol. 26, pp. 128-129 
and 179-181; Stewart Sifakis, Compendium of the Confederate 
Armies; Florida and Arkansas (New York: Facts on File, 1992) 
pp. 90-91.
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and scattered cattle along the Amite River and plundered the 
territory about the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad. The main 
Federal effort was directed at Clinton. Determined to secure 
the rear of the besieging Federal army, a strong Federal 
force commanded by Colonel Grierson departed Port Hudson on 
June 3, 1863 with the intention of destroying the Confederate 
base at Clinton. A series of well executed ambushes slowed 
the Federal column allowing Logan to concentrate along Pretty 
Creek, on the outskirts of the town, where he bloodily 
repulsed the Yankees. Clinton, for the moment was 
spared.278
But the Confederate advantage proved temporary. Four 
days later a heavily reinforced Federal column departed Port 
Hudson for Clinton. In the face of this powerful force Logan 
wisely retreated north leaving only a handful of partisans to 
harass the Union advance. The Federals entered Clinton, 
burned all government property including the railroad depot 
and a cotton factory and relieved many citizens of their 
private property. Despite the commanding presence of the 
Federals, General Halbert Paine, commander of the expedition, 
observed that many citizens "exhibited in their demeanor as 
well as their language great confidence that their army would 
fall upon us before the capture of Port Hudson." Indeed
Official Reports Series I, Vol. 26, pp. 134-136 
and 181; Diary of Mary E. Taylor, June 3, 1863, in Hunter- 
Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC).
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Logan continued to generate some optimism by the sheer 
audacity of his actions in the face of vastly superior 
forces. In a one month period beginning in the first week of 
June, 1863, a portion of Logan's force under the command of 
Colonel Frank Powers attacked two fortified Union picket 
posts taking over one hundred prisoners including numerous 
officers. The aggressive Powers supported by partisans under 
the command of Captain John McKowen successfully raided the 
Union supply depot at Springfield Landing seven miles below 
Port Hudson, destroying over a million dollars of government 
stores and creating panic among the Federal garrison there. 
And as a highlight to the month's activities, partisans under 
Powers command captured the notorious Union General, Neal 
Dow.279
Among Federal generals operating in the Florida parishes 
Dow, whose "stealing capacities surpassed those of Ben 
Butler," had secured first place in infamy in the opinion of 
local residents. Dow allegedly not only encouraged his 
troops to rob the households of citizens but took pleasure in
Official Records Series I, Vol. 26, pp. 72, 111, 
126-127, and 181-182; Diary of Mary E. Taylor, June 7 and 9, 
1863, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC); Geary, Celine: 
Remembering Louisiana, p. 119; Winters, Civil War in 
Louisiana. pp. 277-278; Captain John McKowen commanded a unit 
of partisan rangers recruited in eastern Louisiana and 
southwestern Mississippi which replaced the Ninth Louisiana 
Partisan Rangers under Lieutenant Colonel Wingfield and Major 
DeBaun when the latter became trapped within the siege lines 
at Port Hudson. McKowen's unit operated in conjunction with 
Logan's cavalry. Copy of authorization for McKowen's unit 
issued by the Confederate Secretary of War, December 29, 
1863, in John McKowen Papers (LLMVC).
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personally looting homesteads of their valuables. In an 
effort to bolster local morale and encourage a sense of moral 
responsibility in the Yankees, Powers determined to capture 
Dow. Dartmouth-educated Captain McKowen and five of his 
partisans eagerly accepted the responsibility. Powers placed 
great faith in the partisan leader. Following a severe wound 
early in the war which exempted him from further service, 
McKowen returned to his home in East Feliciana and recruited 
an independent company of cavalry. His exploits provided 
constant encouragement for local residents but none surpassed 
his capture of Dow.280
In the days preceding the raid a young woman slipped 
through the Federal lines, informed the Confederates of the 
location of Dow's headquarters at the Cage house, and agreed 
to act as a guide. On the evening of June 3, 1863, McKowen's 
raiders slipped deep into the midst of the vast Federal army 
besieging Port Hudson. The partisans swiftly and silently 
captured the sentries and several fine horses about the house 
but found Dow absent. Undeterred, McKowen, advised by one of 
the sentries that Dow had ridden to a neighboring plantation, 
proceeded deeper into the Federal lines while his men stood
New Orleans Times Democrat. February 27, 1898;
certificate signed by Thomas R. Cosby examining surgeon at 
Camp Moore, October 2, 1862, declaring John McKowen unfit for 
duty due to a wound received, and notice of authorization 
from the Confederate War Department for McKowen's cavalry 
unit, December 29, 1863, both in John C. McKowen Papers
(LLMVC); Diary of Willie Dixon, April 4, 1864, in William Y. 
Dixon Papers (ibid.).
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guard over the prisoners at the Cage House. The partisan 
waited in ambush for more than an hour amidst the Federal 
camps. When Dow finally appeared McKowen surprised and 
disarmed him holding a pistol to his head as they returned to 
the Cage house. To avoid attracting attention the partisans 
walked slowly with their prisoners through the Union lines. 
Upon striking the Bayou Sara road the raiders employed the 
horses "liberated" from Dow's staff and dashed to their camp 
near Centreville, Mississippi.281
Powers and McKowen1s exploits did encourage the local 
population. Celine Fremaux, a youthful resident of Jackson 
regarded them as "very little short of demi-Gods." But the 
surrender of Port Hudson in July 1863, cast a shadow of gloom 
over the region. Fremaux vividly described the general 
weeping occasioned by the fall of the Confederate bastion and 
the appearance of the starved tearful defenders trudging 
slowly by in defeat. G.T. Harrower, a Federal soldier 
stationed at Baton Rouge, commented on the depression evident 
among the local population. "There are very few
secessionists to be found here now. They all begin to wish 
for peace. They are at our mercy. They can never recruit
New Orleans Times Democrat. February 27, 1898;
Official Records Series I, Vol. 26, p. 182; undesignated 
newspaper clipping, found in John C. McKowen Papers, see 
folder 5 (LLMVC) ; John McGrath Scrapbook, pp. 16 and 20 
(ibid.); Reminiscences of Neal Dow: Recollections of Eighty
Years (Portland: Evening Press Publishing, 1898) pp. 699-703.
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that army - nor can their British and French friends furnish 
them with arms - the end is near."282
Port Hudson did constitute a major setback for the 
Confederates, but the war was far from over. On August 3, 
1863 Logan fell upon a Union force, including a regiment of 
the Corps D Afrique, impressing blacks to serve in the 
Federal army near Jackson. The outnumbered Confederates 
thoroughly routed the Yankees capturing all their artillery 
and supply wagons. As the survivors straggled back to the 
safety of Port Hudson, powerful Union columns departed from 
that garrison and Natchez forcing Logan to retire. In his 
report concerning the operations about Jackson, General 
George Andrews, commanding the garrison at Port Hudson, 
expressed outrage that Logan's force had received 
considerable assistance from local residents. Andrews noted 
that among the over one hundred Union soldiers taken prisoner 
in the battle, "several were captured through the aid of so 
called citizens." This brief campaign exemplifies the 
pattern the conflict took in the Florida parishes for the 
remainder of the war. The character of the war in this final 
phase would serve as a blueprint for the violence which 
prevailed in the region in the late nineteenth century.283
282 Geary, Celine; Remembering Louisiana, pp. 119- 
120; Diary of Mary E. Taylor, July 9, 1863, in Hunter-Taylor 
Family Papers (LLMVC); G.T. Harrower to Dear Helen, August 2, 
1863, in G.T. Harrower Letters (ibid.).
Official Records Series I, Vol. 26, pp. 238-240.
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By the late summer of 1863 it was apparent that 
Confederate forces lacked the strength to repel Union thrusts 
into the interior of the Florida parishes. The Federal 
garrison at Baton Rouge remained seven to ten thousand strong 
providing them with ample resources to overcome the regular 
Confederate forces in the area. Moreover, the Federals 
established a powerful base at Morganza across the river in 
Pointe Coupee Parish and maintained strong garrisons at 
Natchez and New Orleans. Each of these bases could provide 
support for any incursion into eastern Louisiana and 
southwestern Mississippi. Confederate forces would continue 
to confront the Federals, but for the remainder of the war 
the proximity of the Union bases would permit speedy 
reinforcement of any raiding party in trouble. Recognizing 
their strength and perhaps frustrated by their inability to 
subjugate the region effectively, the Federals initiated an 
intensified campaign of terror against the local 
population.28* In response, exasperated citizens
increasingly took an active part in operations against the 
invaders.
284 The Federals also had a profit motive to crush
resistance in eastern Louisiana. Virtually surrounded by 
Union bases and only weakly defended by the rebels, the 
territory seemed perfect for farming operations to supply the 
huge demand for cotton and sugar. By the summer of 1863 many 
plantations in lower Livingston Parish and along the 
Mississippi in Ascension and East Baton Rouge parishes were 
operated by the Federals. Confederate raids on these 
operations stimulated an aggressive Federal response. See 
Official Records Series I, Vol. 41, p. 878; ibid., Series I, 
Vol. 26, p. 313.
As in the lakeshore region by the fall of 1863 many 
residents of the upper Florida parishes faced starvation. 
Mary Taylor, whose prewar tables contained such sumptuous 
feasts that she resented dining elsewhere, complained to her 
sister, "breadstuff has risen to an enormous price, we will 
never be able to buy it while the war lasts." With affluent 
families suffering the situation facing less fortunate 
families proved critical. Taylor continued, "flour is 
selling for $150 per bushel... God only knows what is to 
become of one half of the poor soldiers wives and children." 
Federal soldier Robert Tyson found it fascinating that they 
could starve the rebels while abundantly providing for 
themselves. Tyson compared the sparse fare of the citizens 
with his evening meal consisting of, "beans baked in a soup, 
beefsteak, gravy, potatoes in all forms, fried ham, codfish 
balls, tomatoes, cranberries, bread, biscuit, condensed milk, 
pies and pudding, tea and coffee." In contrast Celine 
Fremaux expressed delight at having found a few wild turnips 
to mix with the weevil-laden corn meal a neighbor kindly gave 
her family. A slice of boiled turnip, a rancid piece of corn 
bread, and a cup of tea made from "an infusion of tender 
blackberry leaves" constituted a feast for the local 
residents. The food shortage reached such acute proportions 
that upon cessation of hostilities the first actions of the
281
Freedmans Bureau involved securing food to relieve the 
starving people in the territory.285
Local residents attempted to combat the desperate 
shortages of food and other supplies by employing ersatz 
materials. Sara Morgan noted that everything from sweet 
potatoes to burnt sugar and parched corn constituted a 
supplement for coffee. But she found that no substitute 
approached the satisfaction derived from the "real 
unadulterated berry." Lemanda Lea created a stir by 
employing cochineal as a dye for clothing. Unable to obtain 
any traditional dyes, Lea, to the delight of her neighbors, 
discovered that the crushed remains of the little beetle 
provided an adequate substitute. Many other items such as 
medicines, farm implements, and paper became critically short 
as the war continued. The nature and format of the Amite
Eugene Hunter to Stella, January 1862 and April 
15, 1863, Mary Taylor to Sister Riah, September 8, 1862,
Diary of Mary E. Taylor, June 22, 1863, all in Hunter-Taylor 
Family Papers (LLMVC); Mary Wilkinson to Micajah, August 1, 
1862, in Micajah Wilkinson Papers (ibid.); John Ball to Joel 
Stokes, February 13, 1863, in Joel A. Stokes Papers (ibid.); 
Sara Sandell to Lemanda Lea, April 19, 1863, in Lemanda Lea 
Papers (ibid.); Tom Ellis to Martina, September 11, 1864, in 
Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); Diary of Eli Capell, April 7 and 
November 30, 1862, in Eli Capell Papers (ibid.); Amite City 
Daily Wanderer. October 25, 1864; Robert A. Tyson Diary, May 
2 and June 5, 1864 (ibid.); Records of the Assistant
Commissioner for the State of Louisiana Bureau of Refugees. 
Freedmen. and Abandoned Lands. Record Group 105, see reports 
submitted to agency headquarters at New Orleans from: James
DeGrey agent at Clinton April 8, 1867, A. Finch agent at
Bayou Sara December 10, 1867, and W.H. Haugen agent at
Madisonville January 10, 1868; Geary (ed.), Celine:
Remembering Louisiana. pp. 135-136; Howard White, The 
Freedmans Bureau in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1970) p. 70.
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City Daily Wanderer underscored the paper problem. When the 
Wanderer first appeared in mid-1864, it had one full sized 
page with details on front and back. By the fall of that 
year it was made up of one medium sized sheet of brown 
wrapping paper printed only on the front. Throughout the 
fall of 1864 the editor made desperate appeals to the public 
for glue, tallow, and any type of unprinted paper. On 
November 29, 1864 the Wanderer announced that it would
continue to appear but in a different form as "the owner 
travels about seeking paper." His efforts appear to have 
been at best, modestly successful, since in early 1865 the 
Daily Wanderer became the Tri-Weekly Wanderer and appeared on 
one sheet of paper no larger than a mans hand.286
The war disrupted almost all activities in the region. 
Constant Union raids severely disrupted the functioning of 
local schools. Many suspended operations altogether while 
others met only sporadically when circumstances allowed. 
Churches too suffered from the effects of the constant raids. 
Union forces looted and burned some churchs. Many others 
suspended operations out of concern for the safety of their 
congregations, particularly when the Federals began the
286 Dawson, A Confederate Girls Diary, p. 377; Sarah 
Sandell to Lemanda Lea, November 16, 1862, in Lemanda Lea
Collection (LLMVC) ; Amite City Daily Wanderer. October 2 5 and 
28, and November 11, 27, and 29, 1864; Amite City Tri-Weeklv 
Wanderer. April 29, 1865; other local papers experienced
similar problems, see Bavou Sara Ledger. September 14, 1861. 
Among the other substitutes employed as coffee were roasted 
Irish potatoes, parched corn, and peanuts, see Carter, A 
Cavalryman's Reminiscences of the Civil War, p. 115.
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wholesale "pressing" of boys into their army and arbitrary 
arrest of citizens. Though civil government continued to 
function throughout the war and elections usually occurred as 
scheduled, its effectiveness was sharply curtailed. Every 
Federal raid forced local officials to flee or go into hiding 
for their own personal safety. Moreover, the increasing cost 
of the war forced both the national and local governments to 
increase taxes repeatedly compounding the suffering of the 
population. The vast majority of the citizens of the Florida 
parishes stoically accepted these hardships as burdensome 
necessities. But few, if any, among them accepted the 
atrocities committed by the invader.287
In the last eighteen months of the war the outrages 
committed by Federal forces on the increasingly defenseless 
civilian population assumed a disturbing character. In a
287 Diary of Abigail Means Kent Amacker, June 2, 1862, 
in O.P. Amacker Papers (LLMVC); Diary of Eli Capell, December 
5, 1862, May 28, June 14, October 3 and 18, 1864, in Eli
Capell Papers (ibid.); N.R. Jennings to Dear Wife, May 24, 
1863, in Hennen-Jennings Family Papers (ibid.); Geary (ed.), 
Celine: Remembering Louisiana, pp. 117, 126-127, and 136;
Records of the East Fork Baptist Church, entries 1861-1865, 
(Mississippi State Archives); Records of Hephzibah Church, 
October 2, 1864 (ibid.); St Tammany Parish Police Jury
Minutes, January 6 and March 15, 1862, March 18,1863, January 
and July Session 1864, and March Session 1865 (ibid.); 
Covington The Wanderer. October 15, 1864; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. October 11, 1864; Records of the Louisiana State 
Government, 1850-1888, in the War Department Collection of 
Confederate Records in the National Archives, Doc. F-75, see 
role 9 detailing Confederate local elections; Amite City 
Board of Aldermen Minute Book, see period 1861-1865 in Book 
No. 1, located in Amite City Hall; Mrs. R.J. Causey to 
Causey, October 14, 1863, in R.J. Causey Correspondence
(LLMVC); receipts for Confederate taxes 1863-1864, in Maston 
S. Newsom Papers (ibid.).
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letter to a friend serving in Lee's army in Virginia, J.M. 
Doyle described the intensification of Federal actions 
against the citizens. "The yankees did much more damage this 
time. Captain Fagan taken off prisoner and much beaten up. 
Hodges mansion destroyed, all eligible men taken prisoner. 
McVea's fine dwelling and costly carpets and furniture laid 
in ashes. Citizens around William's Bridge broken up. Rumor 
says they are coming again." Abigail Amacker expressed 
dismay at the changed appearance of an elderly aunt who had 
been robbed of everything by Federal soldiers. She confided 
in her diary, "I believe that grief is killing her." Elers 
Koch complained that the Yankees stole all of the family's 
eating utensils leaving them without a single knife. Celine 
Fremaux described a Union raid on Jackson in early 1864 in 
which a large body of soldiers drove them from their school 
house. According to Fremaux, the Yankees burned their books 
and slates and used their desks as troughs to feed their 
horses. A separate raiding party entered the only drug store 
and destroyed all of its contents leaving the community 
without any medicine on the eve of yellow fever season. 
Fremaux commented that the raids occurred with increasing 
frequency and "just such sort of narrow, mean, unmanly, sort 
of acts were perpetuated by every raiding gang."288
288 J.M. Doyle to Eugene Hunter, October 16, 1864, in 
Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC); Diary of Abigail Means 
Kent Amacker, November 19, 1863, in O.P. Amacker Papers
(ibid.); Elers to Christian Koch, September 15, 1864, in
Christian Koch Papers (ibid.); Geary (ed.), Celine:
Robert Tyson expressed outrage at what he termed the 
"excessive looting" of his fellow Federal soldiers. During 
a raid coordinated with troops based at Morganza, Tyson 
watched with aversion as Union soldiers looted every house 
encountered of all their contents and "disgracefully used" 
the unfortunate families. Tyson graphically described the 
wanton devastation inflicted on the population asserting "the 
thieving cavalry are a disgrace to the army, the relations 
and boasts of one of them last evening were disgusting.11 As 
the raiders returned to Morganza bringing with them "at least 
ten wagons loaded with plunder," a small force of Confederate 
cavalry attacked their pickets. Tyson noted dryly that these 
courageous plunderers refused an order to counterattack and 
instead threw down their weapons and fled resulting in the 
death of several of them. The intensity of Federal 
depredations in his village prompted Methodist minister James
E. Bradley, who regularly prayed for the soldiers in both 
armies, to declare "I had rather be united with death than 
linked in any way with such devils." J. Burruss McGehee, Eve 
Brower, and Carrie McGehee all vividly described the looting 
and burning of Bowling Green Plantation south of Woodville. 
Union troops under the command of Colonel J.B. Cook entered 
and looted the house smashing everything they did not steal
Remembering Louisiana, pp. 112-127.
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before brutally beating the elderly couple and burning the 
home and all outbuildings.289
Yet even more savage attacks occurred. At least two 
Jackson women were raped by Federal soldiers in early 1864. 
In one instance Union troops battered their way into the home 
of an elderly lady and her granddaughter. The Yankees bound 
and tied the old woman and gang raped her attractive 
granddaughter. The next day the girl was found bleeding and 
left for dead in a swamp outside of town. On the same day 
Union soldiers murdered two residents of Jackson. Dr. J. 
Barkdull the chief physician at the Louisiana state insane 
asylum was murdered by laughing Federal soldiers even as he 
attempted to produce papers demonstrating that he had taken 
the Federal oath to secure provisions for his patients. In 
a callous display of their contempt for the local residents 
Union troops staged an congratulatory ceremony for the 
doctor's murderers in the cemetery during his funeral. 
Joseph Fluker, sixteen year old son of an elderly lady who 
had lost her husband and six other sons to the war, was 
clubbed to death in the center of Jackson by Union soldiers 
who threw the dying young man face down into a gully filled
289 Robert A. Tyson Diary, see entries September 13 - 
November 24, 1864 (LLMVC); James E. Bradley Diary, entries
October 28 and November 2, 1863 (ibid.); J. Burruss McGehee 
to James S. McGehee, February 5, 1904, Eve Brower to James S. 
McGehee, February 22, 1904, and Carrie McGehee to James S. 
McGehee, undated, all in James Stewart McGehee Papers 
(ibid.); Official Records Series I, Vol. 39, pt.l, pp. 829- 
832 .
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with water. Celine Fremaux described the grieving of a 
mother whose Confederate soldier son was taken prisoner by a 
column of Federal soldiers. According to Fremaux, the 
Federal commander turned the unfortunate young man over to a 
group of black troops who hacked him to pieces and scattered 
his body parts about the countryside. Ms. Fremaux also 
remembered Federal soldiers stripping a severely wounded 
Confederate soldier of his clothing and taunting her one- 
armed school marm who attempted to assist the dying man. 
Moreover, she recounted rumors which attributed to the 
Federals the mysterious appearance of several barrels of 
poisoned flour in her town. Josephine Pugh credited the 
pleas of her slaves with saving her life during the looting 
of her home by a party of Federal soldiers who had murdered 
her neighbor only moments before. Frightful accounts of the 
mistreatment and murder of captured Confederate soldiers 
circulated among the citizens. Bemoaning his miserable and 
starved existence as a Federal prisoner, Willie Barrow 
summarized the feeling of many in the Florida parishes with 
his plea, "Lord deliver me from such hardships.1'290
The sum of the increasing Federal outrages against 
soldiers and civilians alike was the emergence of an
290 Geary (ed.) Celine: Remembering Louisiana, pp.
111-121, 142, 144-148, and 155; Reminiscences of a Union
Raid, in Josephine Pugh Papers (LLMVC); Eugene Hunter to 
Stella, June 16, 1865, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers
(ibid.); John Ellis to Martina, September 16, 1864, in Ellis 
Family Papers (ibid.); Diary of Willie Barrow, April 10, 
1862, in W.M. Barrow Papers (ibid.).
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unqualified hatred for the Yankees. The strength of their 
loyalty to friends and relatives away in the Confederate 
army, combined with the mutually shared suffering which 
forced neighbors to rely on one another to an unprecedented 
degree, created a bond of determination and togetherness. 
This bond helped to overcome the defeatism the Federals 
expected to result from their war on the civilian population. 
J.N. Waddel summarized the position taken by many families: 
"I lost all my property, my home and my furniture, had been 
driven from all I held dear and was in exile, a wanderer 
among strangers frequently, but I felt I could endure all 
this with patience, and in the hope that my country some day 
or other would be free."291
As the war entered its final months hatred helped to 
sustain the cause of the South in eastern Louisiana. 
Outraged by the ruined condition of his home town Clinton and 
reports of Yankee boasts of the thoroughness of their work, 
Robert Patrick, on leave from the Confederate army in 
northern Georgia, vented his contempt over the grave of a 
Union soldier. "You were not satisfied to remain at home and 
let us alone; you must come to the South to murder our
291 J.N. Waddel to Eli Capell, January 9, 1866, in Eli 
Capell Papers (LLMVC); John Ellis to Ma, March 11, 1862, in 
Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); John Connell to Dear Pet 
(Cornelia Stewart), May 1, 1865, and Lizzie Hamilton to
Albert Batchelor, May 21, 1865, both in Albert Batchelor
Papers (ibid.); Geary (ed.), Celine: Remembering Louisiana,
pp. 137-144; Amite City Tri-Weekly Wanderer. April 29, 1865; 
Amite City Sunday Wanderer. February 12, 1865;
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citizens, burn our houses, desolate our homes, and lay waste 
our country; to make war upon women and children, turning 
them out to die of cold and want, without the slightest 
compunctions of conscience. You for one have met your just 
reward, which is a grant of land from the Confederates of 
three feet by six." Writing from below Woodville, 
Mississippi a grieving mother declared, "you can never 
imagine my hatred for the Yankees. I despise everything that 
is connected with them in any way. From henceforth and 
forever I will school mine to despise more than I now do if 
it is possible the Yankees, but my hatred for them is so 
intense I don't think I can increase it." Commenting on its 
attack on a Federal raiding party in the spring of 1865, 
Steve Ellis declared that anger alone propelled his unit to 
victory. Hatred proved to be a powerful motivating force. 
Instead of embracing the cause of the Union many local 
residents, having little left to lose, took desperate steps 
to strike back against the Yankees.292
F. Jay Taylor (ed.) Reluctant Rebel; The Secret 
Diary of Robert Patrick. 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge; Louisiana 
State University Press, 1959) pp. 132, 201, and 223; Nannie 
C. to Dear Friend Cornelia Stewart, April 1864, and John 
Connell to Dear Pet, May 1, 1865, both in Albert Batchelor 
Papers (LLMVC); W. Greene Raoul to Pa, June 28, 1862 and May 
24, 1863, in W.Greene Raoul Papers (ibid.); Steve Ellis to 
Dear Brother, April 9, 1865, and John Ellis to Dear Sister, 
March 18, 1862, in Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); Serrano
Taylor's travel journal 1862-1863, see entry October 2, 1862, 
in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (ibid.); Geary (ed.), Celine; 
Remembering Louisiana, p. 118.
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In the spring of 1864 Colonel John S. Scott replaced 
Logan as commander of Confederate forces operating in eastern 
Louisiana. Scott, at the head of the First Louisiana 
Cavalry, had established a reputation as a cunning and 
courageous, albeit controversial commander during operations 
in Virginia and Tennessee. But more importantly Scott, like 
most of the survivors of his cavalry unit, was a native of 
the Florida parishes. General Leonidas Polk specifically 
requested Scott's transfer to eastern Louisiana in the hope 
that he would be able to recruit replacements for his command 
and "break up the operations of the enemy" in that region. 
The arrival of the First Louisiana Cavalry created great 
rejoicing among the men of the command and inspired a new 
confidence among the long suffering residents.293
Scott moved quickly to consolidate his new command. 
Aggressive recruiting and conscripting efforts backed by a 
stern warning to shirkers and to those who harbored deserters 
resulted in the formation of a new battalion for service in 
eastern Louisiana. The Federals provided further incentive 
to join the Confederate army by impressing eligible men into 
their army or arbitrarily arresting them. Dozens of refugees 
from New Orleans and others eager to fight the Yankees 
rallied to the call of the charismatic leader. Yet the 
deprivation resulting from years of war was apparent.
293 Carter, A Cavalryman's Reminiscences of the Civil 
War, pp. 104-107 and 117; Steven Ellis to Dear Brother, April 
9, 1865, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
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Serrano Taylor described the appearance of Scott's force to 
his son-in-law, "we have refugees from New Orleans in Colonel 
Scott's command -barefoot- a coarse shirt and pants, unwashed 
for months - for they have no change." Jane McCausland 
Chinn related that the Confederate force on which the hopes 
of the residents depended consisted of "old grey bearded men, 
soldiers in their prime with fiery angry looks, and flustered 
young lads."294
Despite appearances, Scott expressed great confidence in 
their ability to contain the invader. In order to keep the 
Yankees off balance he determined to take the offensive. 
Partisans operating under his command attacked Federal 
raiding parties near Madisonville creating panic among the 
Union garrison there and encouraging them to remain near the 
protection provided by their gunboats in the lakes. During 
the late spring and early summer of 1864, in a series of hit 
and run raids cavalry units commanded by Colonel Powers 
disrupted Federal communications and supply trains between 
Baton Rouge and Port Hudson. During one such raid Captain 
Thomas Ellis, commanding a company of Power's Cavalry
294 Amite City Daily Wanderer. December 8, 1864;
Serrano Taylor to Eugene Hunter, June 1864, in Hunter-Taylor 
Family Papers (LLMVC); Alex Stuart to Dear Uncle, December 
27, 1863, in William R. Bell Papers (ibid.); Civil War
Reminiscences from the diary of Jane McCausland Chinn, "The 
Burning of the Barns," p. 2 (ibid.). Descriptions of Federal 
efforts to "press" young men into their army found in Annette 
Koch to Christian, April 29, 1863, in Christian D. Koch
Papers (ibid.) Geary, Celine; Remembering Louisiana, p. 
136.
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reported destroying large quantities of Federal stores, 
killing at least twenty-eight Union soldiers and capturing 
thirty-one while sustaining only eight casualties. Elements 
of Scott's cavalry repeatedly established mobile batteries 
along the Mississippi and shelled Federal steamers and 
transports. A Federal raid designed to destroy Scott's base 
of operations failed when Scott ambushed the Federal column 
at the Comite River and repulsed them. According to W.W. 
Garig, a Livingston Parish soldier fighting with Scott, the 
rout proved so complete that the Yankees "ran all over the 
field in every direction" to the amusement of the pursuing 
Confederates.295
Emboldened by the early success of his new command, 
Scott determined on an offensive maneuver designed to reduce 
the Federal defenses about Baton Rouge. If successful the 
Confederates could disrupt Federal farming operations on 
plantations seized across the river from Donaldsonville. In 
the early morning hours of August 5, 1864 the rebel
cavalrymen secretly crossed the Amite River and surrounded 
the Union stockade at Doyal's Plantation below Baton Rouge in
295 Amite City Daily Wanderer. December 8, 1864;
Serrano Taylor to Eugene Hunter, June 1864, in Hunter-Taylor 
Family Papers (LLMVC); Robert A. Tyson Diary, see entries 
February 1 and 11, 1864 (ibid.); Tom Ellis to Martina, May 
20, 1864, in Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); Diary of W.W.
Garig, see entry April 7, 1864, in W.W. Garig Papers (ibid.); 
Diary of Willie Dixon, April 7, 1864, in William Y. Dixon
Papers (ibid.); Official Records. Series I, Vol. 34, pt. I, 
pp. 136-138, 877-879 and 906; ibid. Series I, Vol. 41, pt. 2, 
pp. 833, 919, and 932; Carter, A Cavalryman's Reminiscences 
of the Civil War, p. 107-108.
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Ascension Parish. Scott demanded the surrender of the 
garrison granting the Federals a few minutes to determine 
their course of action. During the interval a portion of the 
garrison broke out denying Scott a decisive victory. After 
destroying part of the stockade and taking over one hundred 
prisoners the Confederates retreated before Union 
reinforcements arrived.296
Scott's offensive maneuvers in the Florida parishes 
created consternation among Union commanders in the lower 
Mississippi region. Outraged Federal officials at Baton 
Rouge placed a $10,000 bounty on Scott's head.297 But in a 
substantive military sense his efforts did little more than 
provide tempoi-ary relief and a bit of hope for the local 
population. The critical contribution resulting from Scott's 
command of the department concerns his policy toward citizens 
under arms.
Little evidence exists to indicate that Scott actively 
encouraged guerrilla warfare. But that he tolerated this 
method of combat is indisputable. Unlike Confederate 
commanders in other theaters of the war, Scott issued no
296 Official Records. Series I, Vol. 41, pt. I, pp. 
213-218; ibid. pt. 2, p. 833; copy of orders issued by 
Colonel Scott to Colonel Powers from Camp Polk, May 26, 1864, 
in John McKowen Papers (LLMVC); Carter, A Cavalryman's 
Reminiscences of the Civil War, pp. 108-109.
297 Loving Sister F.P. Wall to Dear Sister, undated 
letter (1864?) describing reward of $1,000 for the capture 
dead or alive of Naul and $10,000 for Scott, found in Jeptha 
McKinney Papers (LLMVC); Official Records Series I, Vol. 41, 
pt. 2, p. 833.
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directives governing, or statements condemning guerrilla 
warfare. By adopting a policy of total war against a brutal 
enemy, Scott sanctioned a grisly development of enormous 
consequence for the future development of the Florida 
parishes.
Proposals to launch a guerrilla war in eastern Louisiana 
had been entertained as early as the spring of 1862. But 
guerrilla warfare constituted something far different from 
partisan operations. Unlike partisan units, whose usefulness 
resulted from their adherence to the commands of the regular 
army, guerrillas operated independently. Autonomous bodies 
of armed men almost always created problems for both friend 
and foe. Frequently the civilian population suffered as much 
from unrestrained fighters as did the enemy. A March 1862 
proposal recommended, "let 2 00 determined men in each county 
take to the woods with their horses and rifles, swear never 
to bend their necks to the yoke, but war upon our tyrants and 
all who give them aid and comfort, night and day, as long as 
the foot of the Yankee presses upon southern soil." In 1862 
this ominous suggestion received little support. By late 
1864 the situation proved very different.298
Recognizing the odds which faced him, Scott sanctioned 
the participation of citizens in the war effort by 
encouraging the formation of citizen's militia. Previous 
efforts to create and employ militias in eastern Louisiana
298 New Orleans Daily Picayune. March 13, 1862.
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had proved of little consequence. Scott's plan called for 
the creation of home-guard units consisting of men over 
forty-five to act as localized reserves in support of 
regulars when their communities were threatened. These units 
performed duty as garrison forces and pickets and 
occasionally supported the army in repelling attacks. But 
unlike the militia which recognized the authority of the 
regular army, by the fall of 1864 increasing numbers of 
citizens engaged in attacks upon the Yankees independent of 
any civil or military control. W. Greene Raoul expressed the 
exasperated sentiment of these men. "We had as well raise 
the black flag at once. They (Federals) are fighting almost 
upon that principle. We, I think ought to take some measure 
to retaliate. There is no reason to fear that they will do 
more, for they are doing all they possibly can now. 
Submission we can not have, we must fight it out to the 
last."299
The Amite City Daily Wanderer, one of the few newspapers 
still publishing by the fall of 1864, encouraged guerrilla 
activity. The Wanderer reminded its readers that Spain had 
survived the burning of its cities and destruction of its 
armies only to prevail over the French by employing guerrilla 
tactics. Responding to increasing Federal atrocities, the
299 Official Records Series I, Vol. I, pt. 2, p. 19; 
W. Greene Raoul to Pa, May 24, 1863, in W. Greene Raoul
Papers (LLMVC); Diary of Mary E. Taylor, April 28, 1863, in 
Hunter-Taylor Family Papers (ibid.); Amite City Daily 
Wanderer, December 8, 1864.
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Wanderer urged the people to "strain every nerve to hold in 
check the northern horde." Beginning in the summer of 1864, 
guerrillas increasingly preyed upon Union forces operating in 
the area. Occasionally guerrillas cooperated with regular 
Confederate units in confronting Union raiders. But in most 
cases the citizens established prearranged points of ambush 
and waited in hiding for a Federal patrol. In almost all 
cases the guerrillas took no prisoners.300
These tactics produced fear and outrage among the 
Federals. The guerrillas proved difficult to catch, and 
their methods were effective. One group operating in 
Livingston and lower East Baton Rouge parishes sought out and 
killed any Federal stragglers they encountered. The same 
party frequently ambushed whole patrols tying up considerable 
numbers of Federal soldiers in pursuit. The fighting along 
both the east and west bank of the Mississippi became 
increasingly brutal. Both sides were accused of murdering 
prisoners and looting homesteads. Confederate guerrillas and 
partisans wreaked bloody vengeance on Federal soldiers 
encountered with looted goods. By the fall of 1864 guerrilla 
activity made considerable portions of the territory unsafe 
for Federal soldiers. In response the Federals burned entire 
towns, executed many Confederate soldiers as suspected
Official Records Series I, Vol. 41, pt. 1, pp. 
277-278; John Burruss to Edward, February 18, 1864, in John 
C. Burruss Papers (LLMVC); Carter, A Cavalryman1s 
Reminiscences of the Civil War, pp. 113-114.
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guerrillas, and intensified their efforts to arrest every 
adult male of combat age. In most cases the guerrillas 
confined their activities to killing Yankees. But in the 
lakeshore and Pearl River region the war assumed a 
particularly ugly character. Determined to exterminate one 
another, guerrilla bands, occasionally operating with 
Confederate cavalry, and Union forces engaged in wanton acts 
of murder and destruction. The unfortunate residents became 
victims of the suspicions and requisitions of both sides. 
Overcome by the scenes of devastation and mangled bodies by 
the roadside, Annette Koch lamented, "I have found so much 
that is bad in the hearts of so many people. They have taken 
the law in their own hands and do just as they please and I 
think when things come to that no man is safe."301
In early October 1864 the Federals initiated a major 
offensive designed to drive Scott's force from the territory 
and exterminate the guerrillas by crushing their base of 
support. This operation effectively devastated the region. 
On October 5, 1864 the Yankees moved out of Baton Rouge in
301 John Burruss to Edward, February 18, 1864, in John
C. Burruss Papers (LLMVC); Annette Koch to Christian, 
September 18 and 20, October 3 and 9, 1864, February 6 and 
11, 1865, Elers to Christian, September 20 and October 3,
1864, all in Christian Koch Papers (ibid.); Priscilla Bond 
Diary, March 6 and May 3, 1864 and June 16, 1865, in 
Priscilla Bond Papers (ibid.); Dominique Pochelu to W.R. 
Bell, March 23, 1864, and Alex Stuart to Dear Uncle, December 
27, 1863, in William R. Bell Papers (ibid.); Carter, A 
Cavalryman's Reminiscences of the Civil War, pp. 113-115; 
Official Records Series I, Vol. 41, pt. 1, pp. 294 and 880- 
883; ibid. pt. 2, p. 933; ibid. Series I, Vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 
263; Winters, Civil War in Louisiana, pp. 392-396.
298
two columns backed by cavalry and artillery. A third column 
landed at Bayou Sara and proceeded toward Clinton while a 
large supporting force dispatched from Natchez landed at 
Tunica Bend in route for Woodville. At Thompson's Creek, 
Scott's command supported by local militia attacked and 
routed the column advancing from Bayou Sara. In response 
Federal gunboats in the Mississippi began an intensive 
shelling of the town of St. Francisville. The pleas of local 
residents, including former Governor Robert Wickliffe, 
persuaded Scott to break off the engagement. The other 
columns marched eastward virtually unmolested. As they 
proceeded through East Feliciana and St. Helena parishes and 
the southwestern counties of Mississippi, they burned all 
government and huge amounts of private property. The 
Federals destroyed all food and crops they encountered and 
slaughtered or dispersed all livestock. The towns of 
Liberty, Woodville, Greensburg, Osyka, and Camp Moore were 
devastated by the raiders. The Covington Wanderer reported 
that the Federals "committed hellish degradations, robbing 
and plundering indiscriminately." The Amite City Daily 
Wanderer gave voice to the anxiety of the people. "If the 
Yankees continue the destruction and heathenish pilfering 
that they have practiced heretofore upon the residents in the 
vicinity of Liberty and the adjacent country, if absolute 
want and starvation do not ensue, something akin will 
certainly follow." The New Orleans Daily Picayune reported
299
that the Federals had destroyed over 40,000 pounds of bacon, 
one hundred dozen shoes, and limitless amounts of clothing 
and other goods noting that "the general deemed it a military 
necessity in taking several citizens." The Picayune 
continued calling the raid "the most successful expedition 
emanating from Baton Rouge, it cleared the area of 
Jayhawkers.1,302
The October 1864 raid did devastate the region, but it 
did not dissuade citizens from attacking Federal soldiers. 
On the contrary, the despoiling raid seemed to promote 
continued resistance which increasingly relied on citizen 
involvement. In his report concerning his unit's role in the 
October raid, Major N.F. Craigue, Fourth Wisconsin Cavalry, 
described his movement through lower St. Helena Parish. 
Among his accomplishments Craigue noted the capture and 
destruction of over two thousand pounds of salt, a precious 
commodity of unequaled value to the local residents. As his 
command continued through the region they encountered no 
regular Confederate units. But his column suffered the 
heaviest casualties of the raid. Craigue reported that as he 
departed the region a citizen followed his regiment killing 
and wounding several of his men by "firing into them from the
3 2 Official Records Series I, Vol. 41, pt. 2, pp 880- 
883; Covington Wanderer, October 15, 1864; Amite City Daily 
Wanderer. November 29, 1864; New Orleans Daily Picayune.
October 9 and 11, 1864; Carter, A Cavalryman's Reminiscences 
of the Civil War, p. 118; James Durnin to Dear Sister, 
September 13, 1864, in James and John Durnin Papers (LLMVC).
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bushes." He concluded his report with an ominous note for 
Federal authorities, "the guerrilla could not be taken." In 
the Florida parishes bushwhacking was becoming an art 
form.303
Bushwhacking involved concealing a gunman in the 
undergrowth along a roadside and cutting a small opening in 
the bushes facing the opposite direction from which the foe 
approached. Unobserved, the assailant then fired into the 
rear of his victim. The confusion created by shotgun blasts 
from the rear gave a bushwhacker with knowledge of the 
terrain an excellent opportunity to escape undetected only to 
strike again at another pre-arranged location. The Federal's 
frustrated and vain efforts to capture bushwhackers in the 
last months of the war demonstrated their effectiveness. 
Sadly, this phenomena would be a lesson well learned in the 
Florida parishes.
The October raid and corollary operations in the upper 
Florida parishes did accomplish a primary objective. As a 
result of the devastation of the region, Scott who relied 
heavily on requisitions from local farmers to feed his troops 
and horses withdrew into southwestern Mississippi. Though 
elements of Scott's force under the command of Colonel Daniel
303 Official Records Series I, Vol. 41, pt. 1, pp. 
881-882; ibid. Series I, Vol. 39, pt.l, pp. 831-832 Colonel 
E.D. Osband in command of the column which sacked Woodville 
and burned several surrounding plantations also reported that 
he had suffered casualties as a result of bushwhackers firing 
on his command "while concealed in the bushes."
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Gober continued to operate in the region, no force capable of 
offensive operations remained in the area. But the 
bushwhackers had also accomplished an important objective. 
Their efforts helped to contain the marauding of small groups 
of Federals who were more likely to commit atrocities in the 
absence of a senior officer. As a result the local press 
continued to urge resistance to c,the bloodhounds of the 
Lincoln despotism." In an effort to console its readers 
concerning Scott's departure from the region the Daily 
Wanderer reminded them that eastern Louisiana did not 
constitute the whole of the Confederacy. According to the 
Wanderer, "if our enemy held every foot of our territory, 
with our army still in tact, still we would not be 
subjugated. The bone and sinew of the Confederacy is the 
army." The same paper maintained, "we have a firm and never 
ceasing conviction that this struggle is near at a close and 
that a happy peace and a glorious independence will soon 
crown our efforts."304
304 Diary of Eli Capell, entries March 29, May 28,
June 14, June 22, July 15, September 6-8, October 18, and 
October 25-29, 1864, January 31, 1865, in Eli Capell Papers 
(LLMVC); Annette Koch to Christian, September 25 and 28, 
1864, November 14, 23, and 27, 1864, Elers Koch to Christian, 
October 3, 1864, in Christian Koch Papers (ibid.); Liz Ellis 
to Steven, October 30, 1864, Steve Ellis to Ma, June 28,
1864, Tom Ellis to Pa, October 8, 1864, E.P. Ellis to Emily, 
November 15, 1864, all in Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); St. 
Helena Parish Succession Records, Succession Bin W-3, 
numerous entries January-July, 1863 and May-June, 1864, 
demonstrate reliance of Confederate units on the local 
population for sustenance, located St. Helena Parish 
Courthouse, Greensburg; Amite City Daily Wanderer. December 
8, 1864; Official Records Series I, Vol. 48, pt. 1, pp. 128
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Though many residents continued to insist through the 
final weeks of the war that the South would prevail in the 
end, reality proved contrary to their hopes. Increasing 
reports of fourteen year old boys giving up their lives in 
support of a seemingly mortally wounded cause, letters from 
loved ones in Union prisons, and the realization that their 
world had been shattered caused many to long for peace. Yet 
Federal boasts that they intended to desolate the region so 
that no one could ever live there again continued to incite 
a population obsessed with the importance of independence and 
honor. Through the dreary winter of 1864-1865 new 
Confederate units emerged in eastern Louisiana. But the 
surrender of the Confederate armies under Robert E. Lee and 
Joseph E. Johnston in April 1865, highlighted the reality of 
failure. Suddenly the Federals adopted a policy of 
appeasement toward the rebels. Yet four years of brutality 
did not simply disappear. Even after the cessation of 
hostilities between the regular armies in eastern Louisiana 
and southwestern Mississippi, guerrilla operations, 
occasionally on a large scale, persisted. A Federal force 
travelling through parts of Alabama, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana to "secure by conciliation and kindness the good 
will of the people for and toward the representatives of the 
Federal government" was bushwhacked north of Osyka in late 
May. The war did not end simply because Washington pronounced
a n d  1 5 7 - 1 5 8 .
3 0 3
it over and staged a great celebration in honor of their 
victory. And in the Florida parishes the violence had only 
begun.305
As the official war waned, the Florida parishes, like 
many areas of the South, were devastated. Countless members 
of the pre-war elite and their offspring succumbed to the 
ravages of war. With them went the vestiges of stable 
government. The survivors faced starvation, a society turned 
upside down, and an uncertain future as a conquered people. 
In many cases hate and bitterness had replaced hospitality 
and kindness. Most importantly, the war challenged in an 
unprecedented fashion the value system of the people. The 
presence of the Union army thrust Federal authority into 
their lives. Confederate efforts also intruded upon their 
independent lifestyle but the harsh policy of the Federals 
made clear the enemy. In the Florida parishes brutality 
engendered brutality. The Federal government sanctioned 
murder and cruelty, and the residents responded effectively 
in like manner. Bloodshed solved problems permanently. The 
solution was learned; the war had only begun.
305 Amite City Daily Wanderer. October 15, 1864; F.P. 
Wall to Jeptha McKinney, December 17, 1864, in Jeptha
McKinney Papers (LLMVC); Father to Albert Batchelor, 
September 7 and December 26, 1864, in Albert Batchelor Papers 
(ibid.); Civil War Reminiscences of Jane McCausland Chinn, 
"The Burning of the Barns," p. 1 (ibid.); Official Records 
Series I, Vol. 48, pt. I, pp. 262-264.
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C h a p t e r  5
"Oh GodI Grant Us Rest From This Weariness": 
Chaos Ascendant
In the spring of 1865 the sectional conflict moved into 
another far more complex phase. Thousands of Union soldiers 
marched home to a hero's welcome in a land which the war had 
transformed into one of the most prosperous and productive 
regions on earth. Except for the loss of many of its sons 
the North had remained insulated from the true horror of the 
war. And, after the war, the North persisted as a region at 
the forefront of recasting a national identity. The next 
phase of the conflict, though similar in many ways to the 
former, would be a struggle not of armies but of individuals, 
ideas, and policies. Hope and opportunity would fall victim 
to the tempestuous cauldron of chaotic circumstances 
collectively gathered under the name Reconstruction. Instead 
of opportunity, many areas of the South would experience a 
fierce revival of traditional values, which unburdened by the 
restraints inherent in the antebellum social order, would 
contribute directly to a continuing cycle of suffering. What
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could have emerged as a time of healing and fulfilled dreams 
instead became one of darkness and failed will. Amidst the 
reality of defeat the residents of eastern Louisiana 
struggled to revive the sources of stability and prosperity 
from a world which existed no more. The result of their 
efforts demonstrated the incompatibility between fealty to 
the old order and the inevitability of the new. But more 
importantly, the chaotic conditions associated with 
Reconstruction reinforced latent suspicions of government and 
the effectiveness of violence.
The shock of defeat wore off slowly in the Florida 
parishes. Many solemnly refused to accept that their 
homeland had been vanquished. The Amite City Tri-Weekly 
Wanderer manifested the desperate pretensions of many 
residents: "I cannot banish the thought that ere the God of 
battle will manifest himself in our midst, and by the 
interposition of his strong arm, rescue us from the abyss of 
ruin which seems yawning to engulf us...our nation must unite 
in one fervent supplication, that Jehovah may deliver us out 
of the hands of our enemies." But the initial dismay 
eventually gave way to sensations of anger and despair. The 
efforts of grieving families to ascertain the value of 
extreme sacrifice culminating in defeat contributed to the 
prevailing depression. Mary L. Wall who lost her three sons 
and only brother to the war prayed for a means of 
understanding their sacrifice. Similarly, J.N. Waddell wrote
306
that his son's death had deprived him of the only thing he 
truly valued in life. Unlike their northern counterparts who 
realized a sense of accomplishment in the death of their 
loved ones, southerners enjoyed no such consolation. Linus 
Parker concluded, "here we are like people blown up in a 
steamboat, hardly knowing what has happened, how it happened 
or where we are left.1,306
The grief prevailing in the Florida parishes had a clear 
focus, but the anger did not. Widespread hatred of the 
Yankees was deepened by the occupying Federals' refusal to 
permit the erection of monuments to dead Confederates or to 
allow the decoration of individual soldier's graves. 
Outraged by the Federals' seeming insensitiveness in denying 
the young ladies of Clinton the right to decorate Confederate 
graves, J.M. Godfrey declared that he would make a tribute to 
the dead "even if they hung him." Fortunately for the peace 
of the region the people persuaded him to demur.307
War-related anger and frustration assumed various forms. 
Thomas Ellis proclaimed before a congressional investigating 
committee that his bitterness stemmed from his conviction
306 Amite City Tri-Weeklv Wanderer. April 29, 1865; 
Mary L. Wall to Kate Burruss, November 7, 1866, in John C. 
Burruss Papers (LLMVC); J. N. Waddel to Eli Capel, January 9, 
1866, in Eli Capel Papers (ibid.).
307 Ellie Knighton to Terrie Minse, April 26, 1867, in 
Josiah Knighton Papers (LLMVC); Clinton East Feliciana 
Patriot. August 4, 1866; Greensburq Journal. July 20, 1866; 
Greensburg Weekly Star and Journal. April 27, 1867; Amite 
City Times. August 31, 1867.
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that he could have fought harder for the Confederacy. 
Similarly, many former Confederates expressed boundless 
contempt for those who sought to cooperate with the Federals. 
Prominent Baton Rouge attorney James 0. Fuqua exemplified 
this attitude in a letter to his Clinton associate James G. 
Kilbourne. "Keep these people away from me or I may do them 
mischief, tell them to keep away that I am armed and 
dangerous, have got a knife, a big stick, and a little nigger 
to collect brickbats." An aged Henry Marston expressed 
resentment with the whole business declaring that the 
"suicidal acts of secession" had robbed him of his health, 
wealth, and happiness. Frustrated efforts to understand 
exactly what had happened produced numerous scapegoats. In 
his private letters Charles E. Kennon condemned the 
Democratic party as the source of southern troubles.308
As white southerners grappled with the problems 
associated with defeat, blacks experimented with their new 
found freedom. The freedmen assumed that Confederate defeat 
would create unprecedented opportunity for them, and in terms 
of their liberation from bondage it did. Blacks universally
Testimony of Thomas C.W. Ellis, U.S. Congressional 
Hearings Supplement. House Committee on Elections. No. 1, 
Testimony Taken by the U.S. Subcommittee of Elections in 
Louisiana, May-June, 1869; James 0. Fuqua to James G. 
Kilbourne, June 8, 1865, in James G. Kilbourne Papers
(LLMVC); Henry Marston to Dear Brother, February 25, 1883, in 
Henry Marston Papers (ibid.); Lizzie Hamilton to Albert 
Batchelor, May 21, 1865, in Albert Batchelor Papers (ibid.); 
Charles E. Kennon to Thomas Ellis, February 24, 1870, in
Ellis Family Papers (ibid.).
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applauded the destruction of the slave system. Some whites 
also expressed ambivalence at the changed state of affairs. 
Stella Hunter declared, "I am delighted to know that my yard 
will now be clear of little negroes and our expenses will now 
be much less though I will be sad to see them say 
goodbye. "309
But the vast majority of whites expressed outrage with 
the implications of emancipation. Most planters deeply 
resented the enormous loss in capital they experienced as a 
result of the collapse of the slave system. J.N. Waddell 
declared, "the emancipation of the negro is the greatest 
injustice ever done to property owners; being nothing more, 
nothing less than rank robbery."310 Still others chafed at 
the notion of extending social and political rights to their 
former bondsmen. In the months immediately following the 
surrender many whites simply refused to treat the freedmen as 
anything other than slaves. Charging a grand jury in the 
spring of 1867, Judge E.P. Ellis declared that the 
"ignorance, prejudice, and superstitions" of the blacks 
required that an 1855 law concerning the insubordination of
Diary of Eli Capel, see entries December 25, 30, 
and 31, 1866, January 6 and 7, 1867, in Eli Capel Papers
(LLMVC); Stella Hunter to Eugene, June 27, 1865, in Hunter- 
Taylor Family Papers (LLMVC).
310 J.N. Waddel to Eli Capel, January 9, 1866, in Eli 
Capel Papers (LLMVC).
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slaves "should be still rigidly enforced with regard to the 
free colored population in our midst."311
White contempt for emancipation frequently provoked 
racial incidents. During the summer of 1865 Lieutenant 
Edward Ehrlich, commander of the Federal garrison at Amite 
City, and Captain H.H. Rouse, Freedmen's Bureau agent there, 
reported daily incidents of racial violence in the area. In 
one instance Ehrlich reported that the city marshall at Amite 
City had requested to see the pass of a freedman named Hardy. 
The pass, which exemplified the rigid restrictions on black 
mobility in the antebellum period, constituted one of the 
most hated aspects of the slave system for freedmen. When 
Hardy proudly announced that he had none and "did not 
consider it necessary now," the marshall hit him with his 
pistol and fired several shots at him as he tried to escape. 
The shooting attracted the attention of several patrons at a 
nearby coffeehouse who proceeded to empty their pistols at 
the fleeing Hardy striking him twice. Ehrlich noted that 
military authorities had attempted to arrest the offending 
parties but failed. Both Rouse and Ehrlich pleaded for 
additional troops to curb the violence. Along with his 
report Ehrlich included several letters from prominent white
Judge E.P. Ellis's charge to the sitting grand 
jury, found in Greensburg Weekly Star and Journal. April 27, 
1867.
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citizens, including Amite City Mayor John Wentz, who also 
requested assistance in curbing the disturbances.312
Under the prevailing highly charged circumstances the 
freedmen needed and aggressively sought protection. But that 
some whites also requested Federal aid exemplified the 
desperate state of affairs. Racial violence in particular 
aggravated the problem of rebuilding the shattered economy. 
The war so completely devastated the region that the most 
pressing problem involved procuring adequate supplies of 
food.
Starvation loomed close in large areas of eastern 
Louisiana and southwestern Mississippi. Faced with an acute 
shortage of meat, prominent Livingston Parish planter, John 
Gurley, directed his overseer to kill as much wild game as 
possible while he sought provisions in New Orleans. Through 
the fall and winter of 1865 his employees killed hundreds of 
squirrels and ducks selling some to their equally destitute 
neighbors. Freedmen's Bureau agents across the region 
regularly petitioned the bureau headquarters at New Orleans
312 Captain H.H. Rouse to Lt. D. Fenno, September 9, 
1865, Lt. Edward Ehrlich to Lt. D. Fenno, October 10, 1865, 
and December 19 and 20, 1865, included in the December 20, 
1865 letter are notes from J. Bach and John Wentz requesting 
Federal assistance to quiet racial disturbances, all in 
Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of
Louisiana Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 
Record Group 105, herein after refered to as "Freedmen's 
Bureau Reports" (National Archives). See also "Records
Relating to Murders and Outrages," Lt. Edward Ehrlich to Lt.
D. Fenno, July 5, 9, and 10, 1865, August 20, 1865, September
18, 1865, October 20, 1865, ibid.
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for provisions. Like many local farmers John Haney virtually 
ceased planting cotton and concentrated exclusively on food 
production, though the initial results were less than 
encouraging. Governor J. Madison Wells desperately sought 
assistance from a reluctant Washington. Wells informed 
President Andrew Johnson that in the last phase of the 
military campaign the Federals confiscated a large number of 
the horses and mules used for agricultural purposes by the 
population. The governor concluded that this more than 
anything else contributed to the "great distress and fear of 
pestilence and starvation plaguing the country." Most 
unconfiscated cattle and hogs had been slaughtered or 
dispersed by the Federals which greatly exacerbated the food 
crisis.313
As in many areas of the defeated South, the war promoted 
drastic economic restructuring in eastern Louisiana. Fully 
seventy-six percent of Florida parish farmers suffered acute
313 Charles Daggs to John Gurley, November 8, 1865, 
and Edward Stewart to John Gurley, November 13, 1865, both in 
John Gurley Papers (LLMVC); reports submitted to Freedmen1s 
Bureau headquarters at New Orleans from: A. Finch agent at
Bayou Sara, November 10 and 20, 1867, December 1 and 10,
1867, and January 8, 1868, James Hough agent at Amite City, 
December 31, 1867, and W.H. Haugen agent at Madisonville, 
January 10, 1868, March 6 and 31, 1868, all in "Freedmen's 
Bureau Reports" (National Archives); John P. Haney to E.P. 
Ellis, April 26, 1868, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); J. 
Madison Wells to Andrew Johnson, May 27, 1865, in J. Madison 
Wells Collection (National Archives); Forrest McDonald and 
Grady McWhiney, "The Antebellum Southern Herdsman: A
Re interpret at ion," Journal of Southern History. XLI, No. 2, p. 
164; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed. 1863-1877 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974) p. 65,
herein after referred to as Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed.
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reductions in the value of their overall wealth. Merchants 
and professional men fared little better, nearly seventy 
three percent experienced analogous reductions as a result of 
the war. Similar patterns prevailed statewide. Much of this 
decline related directly to the loss of slave property. But 
other indicators demonstrate that the financial catastrophe 
was pervasive. During the period 1860-1870 seventy-six 
percent of Florida parish farmers experienced a reduction in 
corn production while eighty-three percent witnessed a 
decline in their cotton yields. Most farmers faced similar 
reductions in their livestock holdings (see table 13) . 
Though significant decreases occurred among all types of 
livestock, mules and horses incurred the sharpest losses 
declining by seventy-nine and eighty-four percent 
respectively.314
But acute reductions in landholdings provide the most 
conclusive evidence of the economic catastrophe wrought by 
the war in eastern Louisiana. Between 1860-1870 fully sixty- 
four percent of Florida parish property owners experienced a 
significant decrease in landholdings. The decline in 
holdings sharply contrasts with the trend in the 1850's.
314 Eighth Census of the United States. Heads of
Households and Selected Statistics. 1860 (Washington:
Government Printing, 1864); Ninth Census of the United 
States, Heads of Households and Agricultural Statistics 
(Washington: Government Printing, 1872). Figures derived
from a three percent sample of the heads of households of 
each parish.
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Table 13
L aaA oldlnp 1(W-I«7*
Parish Remained
jnrrreaorf Decreased Sara*
East Baton Rouge 68% 32%
E*jt Feliciana 11% 72% 12%
Livingston 33H 60% 7%
St Helene — 67% 33%
St Tammany 40% 30% 10%
Washington 23% 30% 23%
Wert Feliciana - 33% 67%
Increased
Horae* i t  Muk*
Rerained 
Decreased Same
livestock 1860-1870
Cattle
Increased Decreased
Remained
Same Increased
Hop
Decreased
Renamed 
Smm
East Baton Rouge 28% 71% 73% 25% _ 33% 66% _
East Feliciana 12.30% 77% 10% 11% 77% 11% - 87.50% 12.50%
Livingston 28.60% 71% - 20% 80% - 20% 80% -
St Helena - 16% 14% - 90% 10% 33% 67% -
St Tammany 40% 40% 20% 50% 50% - 10% 50% 40%
Washington 17% 83% - 10% 80% 10% - 67% 33%
Wert Feliciana 30% 50% - 20% 10% - 20% 80% -
Crop Yield* 1860-1870
Corn Production Cotton Production
Remained Remained
Increased Decreased Same Increased Decreaaed Sams
East Baton Roup 60% 20% 20% _ 100% _
East Feliciana - 88.80% 11% - 87.30% 12%
Livingston - 80% 20% - 80% 20%
St Helena - 75% 23% - 100% —
St Tammany ~ 30% 50% - 40% 60%
Washington 33% 67% - - 100% -
West Feliciana - 86% 14% - 60% 40%
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Local merchants and professional men who had weathered the 
war well or found favor with the Federals appropriated much 
of this property. Land served as the medium to settle many 
debts in the face of a severe credit contraction. Some 
planters as well as merchants who suffered comparatively 
minor losses during the war also seized the opportunity to 
buy up devalued land or assisted needy neighbors by 
purchasing a part of their holdings. During the period 1860- 
1870 Livingston Parish planter Thomas Green Davidson 
dramatically increased his landholdings. Davidson's total 
acreage rose from 2900 to 8100 acres though much of the 
increase constituted uncultivated woodlands. Former Federal 
soldiers who remained in the area, Freedmen's Bureau agents, 
and others associated with the postwar administration 
accounted for smaller purchases of land. James DeGrey, 
Freedmen's Bureau agent at Clinton, secured a homestead, set 
up a farm, and in 1868 ran for sheriff.315
Eighth Census of the United States. Heads of 
Households and Selected Statistics. 1860; Ninth Census of the 
United States. Heads of Households and Agricultural 
Statistics. 1870. Figures derived from a three percent
sample of the heads of households of each parish. Fuqua to 
J. G. Kilbourne, June 8, 1865, December 11 and 25, 1865, and 
January 14, 1866 all in J.G. Kilbourne Miscellaneous File
(LLMVC); transfer of the estate of Thomas A.G. Batchelor to 
the firm of Levy and Deiter, concluded December 7, 1866, copy 
found in J.G. Kilbourne Family Papers, also J.G. Kilbourne 
Record Book No. 23, 1860-1867, numerous entries pp. 66-74
(ibid.). J. Addison to Robert Corbin, July 23, 1874, in
Robert A. Corbin Papers (ibid.); statement of purchase of 
debtors note of Mrs. Nancy L. Norwood by Abraham Levi, June 
15, 1869, see also preparations for seizure of Norwoods
property and record of indebtedness to A. Levi from December 
5, 1866 to August 1874 in letter A. Levi to James Fuqua,
315
Most disturbing to local residents were the scores of 
northern speculators who purchased vast tracts of farm and 
timberland. H.S. McComb purchased huge tracts of timberland 
at twelve dollars per acre along the line of the New Orleans- 
Jackson Railroad and eventually seized control of the 
railroad itself. By the mid-1880's none other than the 
northern millionaire and railroad entrepreneur Jay Gould 
served as the largest landowner in several upstate parishes. 
Addressing this trend in a speech before the legislature, 
J.C. Kathman, chief of the Bureau of Immigration, reported 
"some entire portions of the state are rapidly passing into 
the hands of northwestern farmers." Kathman acknowledged 
that this transition created "great excitement" among the 
former slaveowners who held two thirds of Louisiana's land 
prior to the war. Though Kathman included some letters from 
Florida parish entrepreneurs extending northern farmers a 
welcome, the majority of local whites deeply resented the 
purchasing power of northern capital and the political 
implications of northern immigration.316
November 9, 1874 (six items), A.L.D. Conrad to A.Miltenberger 
and Co., April 10, May 15, and June 3, 1871, all pertaining 
to lien against Cottage Plantation. Security note on 3 0 
arpents of land in East Baton Rouge Parish for debts due John 
McGath to S.H Smith, July 24, 1872, H. McGuffy to A. Levi, 
May 25, 1873, concerns McGuffy's efforts to sell all land, 
livestock, and dwellings at his plantation on the Comite 
River to relieve debts, all in James O. Fuqua Papers (ibid.).
316 Documents of the Legislature of the State of
Louisiana. 1868 (New Orleans: A.L. Lee State Printer, 1868)
herein after referred to as Legislative Docs., "Report of 
J.C. Kathman Chief of the Bureau of Immigration to the
3 1 6
Indebtedness deprived many landowners of a significant 
portion of their holdings. But the destruction caused by the 
war also left many families homeless, creating a further 
strain on many local communities. Martina Ellis noted that 
it was impossible to locate a house in Amite City which 
rented for less than thirty dollars a month, an extremely 
high figure in the aftermath of war. As a result Ellis 
reluctantly opened her home to many destitute relatives and 
acquaintances. James 0. Fuqua proclaimed house-hunting in 
East Baton Rouge Parish a virtually hopeless task. He 
informed an associate seeking to locate in Baton Rouge that 
the few houses available rented for no less than seventy-five 
dollars per month and even then "one must do without a garden 
or porch."317
General Assembly of Louisiana," July 1868, p. 51. New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. April 22, 1873; E.D. Frost to H.S. 
McComb, June 27, 28, 29, and October 18, 1875, in W.M.
Francis and E.D. Frost Out Letters Collection, portion of 
Illinois Central Railroad Collection (Newberry Library, 
Chicago); copy of Democratic circular found in Report of the 
Joint Committee of the General Assembly of Louisiana on the 
Conduct of the Late Elections and the Condition of Peace and 
Order in the State. 1869 (New Orleans: A. L. Lee State
Printer, 1869) p. 7, herein after referred to as Report on 
the Conduct of the Late Elections; ibid., 1868, p. 25. Frank 
Smith to Dr. Jeptha McKinney, November 19, 1870, in Jeptha 
McKinney Papers (LLMVC); John Hutchins to B.F. Flanders, 
October 6, 1867, in B.F. Flanders Papers (ibid.); Evan Harris 
to Willie McKowen, November 29, 1867, in John Clay McKowen
Papers (ibid.); Greensburq Journal. February 23, 1866;
William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana
Politics. 1877-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1969) pp. 48 and 112.
317 Martina Ellis to Tom, December 2 and 7, 1865, in 
Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); J.O. Fuqua to J.G. Kilbourne, 
December 11, 1865, in James G. Kilbourne Papers (ibid.).
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Federal confiscation acts also contributed to the 
prevailing misery. Many prominent families lost their homes 
and all their property. The widow and five minor daughters 
of N.R. Jennings watched helplessly as the Federals 
confiscated all their property leaving them perfectly 
destitute, desperate efforts to recover their property 
remained unresolved as late as 1867. Some families fell 
victim to unscrupulous merchants whose aggressive efforts to 
collect all debts due forced many to relinquish their homes 
and other property. Abraham Levi, a prominent Clinton 
merchant who frequently spied for the Federals during the 
war, pugnaciously sought to collect from his debtors in the 
immediate aftermath of the surrender. Levi's assertiveness 
led his attorney James Fuqua to proclaim, "look out for his 
store when the military leave." Martina Ellis also
described the acute shortage of cash in the area which 
contributed to the moribund economy.318
318 S.B. Buckner to General 0.0. Howard, Director
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, October 
15, 1865, in Hennen-Jennings Papers (ibid.). In this letter 
Buckner pleads for reconsideration of Mrs. Jennings case 
because her husband died before ever assuming the position of 
Confederate subsistence officer for which the deceased's 
properties were confiscated. James Fuqua to James G. 
Kilbourne, June 9, 1865, in James G. Kilbourne Papers, also 
J.G. Kilbourne Record Book No. 23, 1860-1867, numerous
entries pp. 66-74 (ibid.); Statement of purchase of debtors 
note of Mrs. Nancy L. Norwood by Abraham Levi, June 15, 1869, 
and record of Norwood's indebtedness in lieu of seizure of 
property by Levi December 1866 to August 1874, in letter 
A.Levi to James Fuqua, November 9, 1874, in James 0. Fuqua 
Papers (ibid.); William Watson (Sheriff of Livingston Parish) 
Sheriff's Fee Book, 1866-1870, lists number of property 
seizures in 1866 (ibid.); Official Records Series I, Vol. 41,
318
The efforts of some Federal officers and former 
Unionists to obtain personal wealth at the expense of the ex- 
Confederates further aggravated attempts at economic recovery 
of the area. By 1865 cotton commanded a fabulous price. 
Many planters counted on the surviving supplies of the 
precious staple to provide capital to begin the process of 
rebuilding. But Federal authorities seized much of the 
cotton on the pretext that it actually belonged to the 
Confederate military or by extracting healthy bribes to 
permit shipment. Scores of Federal officers and northern 
speculators enriched themselves in this manner. R.C. 
Cummings, a New Orleans factor, complained that General 
Andrew Herron repeatedly demanded a percentage of his cotton 
before he would allow it to be shipped. Similarly, treasury 
agent Alfred Reid informed treasury secretary Hugh McCulloch 
that General Herron and others had stolen thousands of bales 
of cotton, thus swindling the government out of huge sums of 
money. Reid noted that many of these same officers now lived 
in luxury and that some had threatened to kill any agent who 
exposed their crimes. Chad McRae, special agent for the 
treasury department at Baton Rouge, reported that Generals 
Herron and Lee "have interested themselves personally very 
much in preventing me from investigating abandoned and seized 
property." McRae cited numerous cases of $1000 bribes paid
pt. 2, p. 22 9; New Orleans Daily Picayune. November 14, 1865; 
Clinton East Feliciana Patriot. November 6, 1869; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. November 14, 18 65.
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by individuals to Federal officers to free their cotton for 
shipment and multiple cases of theft of personal belongings 
by officers professing to seize the property on behalf of the 
treasury department. He concluded "I am convinced that much 
corruption has prevailed here in relation to property, less 
than one tenth of the confiscated goods have been placed in 
the hands of the treasury department." D.G. Duncan, a New 
Orleans Unionist, promised to secure evidence against ex- 
Confederates if the government would grant him five percent 
of the cotton they seized as a result of his efforts. The 
rampant seizure of cotton belonging to private individuals 
finally produced a response from Washington. Writing to 
acting Governor Benjamin Flanders, William P. Mellen, general 
agent for the treasury department, acknowledged that many 
treasury agents in Louisiana had abused their positions "for 
self profit or for the profit of friends." Mellen demanded 
that such seizures be halted even if it required the use of 
Federal troops.319
319 R.C. Cummings affidavit, August 26, 1865, D.G. 
Duncan to Hugh Mcculloch, May 15, 1865, William P. Mellen to 
Benjamin F. Flanders, April 3 and 27, 1866, Chad McRae to B. 
F. Flanders, in undated letter folder, also see unsigned and 
undated letter describing theft of privately owned cotton by 
Federal officers and J.E. Jewett in undated folder, and 
Alfred Reid to Hugh McCulloch, February 14, 1867, all in
Benjamin F. Flanders Papers (LLMVC); New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. November 14, 1865; quotation from Chicago Tribune, 
in Daily Picayune. November 13, 1872; Joseph Dawson, Army
Generals and Reconstruction Louisiana. 1862-1877 (Baton 
Rouge; Louisiana State University Press, 1982) herein after 
referred to as Dawson, Army Generals and Reconstruction, pp. 
11, 27, and 34; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed p. 69.
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The problems of promoting economic recovery and curbing 
racial violence were integrally intertwined. Mass
unemployment characterized the region in the immediate 
aftermath of the war. Many among the hundreds of soldiers 
returning home could find no work. Farming suffered from a 
lack of draft animals for plowing and a blight of army worms. 
Almost all industrial concerns had been destroyed during the 
war and little capital remained available for rebuilding. 
Perhaps most significantly, the railroad had been completely 
devastated across the length of the Florida parishes.320
In June, 1865, the military returned control of the 
railroad to its governing board. All of the depot buildings, 
platforms, water stations, and storage houses, excepting the 
depots at Osyka, Magnolia, and Summit in southwestern 
Mississippi had been destroyed. Though the track remained in 
fair condition from New Orleans to Pontchatoula and in 
"usable" condition north of Brookhaven, Mississippi, the 
portion from Pontchatoula to Brookhaven remained completely 
devastated. Few serviceable locomotives remained available 
for use anyway. Recognizing that the railroads constituted 
the key to economic recovery in Louisiana, Governor Wells
320 J.R. Galtrey to Batchelor, September 5, 1867, in 
Albert Batchelor Papers (LLMVC); J. Madison Wells to Andrew 
Johnson, May 27, 1865, in J. Madison Wells Papers (National 
Archives); Amite City Times. August 10, 1867; John Ellis to 
Thomas Ellis, August 10, 1867, in Ellis Family Papers
(LLMVC); "Affairs of Southern Railroads," United States House 
of Representatives Report. Thirty-Ninth Congress, Second 
Session, Report No. 34.
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attacked the corruption of the military authorities. 
According to Wells, the armies' hand-picked directors refused 
to permit repair of the roads unless the stockholders 
released the government "from reclamations on account of the 
enormous sums received by its officers since the road had 
been in their hands."321
The dramatic changes associated with defeat, 
emancipation, and military rule created a profoundly 
perplexing state of affairs. The transition from slave to 
free labor seemingly necessitated a period of adjustment but 
the prevailing crisis demanded immediate action. Most 
fundamentally, recovery depended on getting people back to 
work. Eli Capell summarized the existing state of affairs, 
"there is a great confusion in the country among whites and 
blacks as regards hiring for next year." Capell's monthly 
labor record exemplified the inconsistent working conditions. 
Of nineteen field hands employed at his Pleasant Hill 
Plantation in early 1867, only four received daily wages 
ranging from thirteen and a half cents to seventy-five cents
321 "Affairs of Southern Railroads," United States
House of Representatives Report. Thirty-Ninth Congress, 
Second Session, Report No. 34; see also ibid., Fortieth 
Congress, Second Session, Report No. 15; Journal of the House 
of Representatives of the State of Louisiana (herein after 
referred to as House Journal) "Statement of Governor J. 
Madison Wells," Extra Session Beginning November 23, 1865, p. 
14. See also J.R. Galtrey to Batchelor, September 5, 1867, 
for a good description of the importance local residents 
placed on railroads as the mechanism of regional recovery, in 
Albert Batchelor Papers (LLMVC); Amite City Times. July 27, 
1867.
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a day. The others presumably worked for a share of the crop. 
Most worked erratically, with some laborers frequently absent 
for weeks at a time. Only five of those employed in March 
1867 continued to work for Capell in March of the following 
year. Capell's records exhibit increasing frustration with 
his laborers. In December 1866 he confided in his diary, "I 
am completely disgusted with free negroes." One week later 
he wrote, "negroes very unsettled won't say what they are 
going to do I never saw such a state of things. Not one on 
my place except old Tone has as yet said they would stay on 
with me."322
The freedmen understandably proved reluctant to continue 
serving their former masters in what amounted to a semi- 
servile state. The initial contract between Joseph Embree 
and his laborers contained many features of the slave system. 
Embree's employees worked from dawn to dark with a portion of 
their salary deducted if the overseer judged their work 
inferior. Laborers were forbidden to ride his animals or 
curse in his presence, and leaving the plantation without 
permission resulted in a stiff fine. This situation 
constituted an effort to keep the freedmen as close to 
slavery as possible. But the tendency of many blacks to 
place work second to enjoying their new found freedom helped
Diary of Eli Capell, December 30 and 31, 1866, 
January 7, 1867, Eli Capell's Laborer's Record Book, Pleasant 
Hill Plantation, Book No. 8, 1867-1885, all in Capell Papers 
(LLMVC).
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expose a crucial flaw of Reconstruction and aggravated the 
prevailing circumstances. Owning no land, blacks lacked the 
means to achieve the self-sufficiency central to the piney- 
woods freemen's existence. Without funds to purchase food or 
land on which to grow it, many soon became desperate. The 
Freedmen1s Bureau provided temporary relief to some but its 
resources proved woefully inadequate to sustain a significant 
portion of the state's population indefinitely. As a result, 
many blacks resorted to stealing privately owned livestock, 
primarily hogs, in order to survive. Demonstrating the 
severity of this problem Dustin Willard declared, "the 
negroes is doing very bad here there is but a few that will 
work for a living but steal all the time, on the river it is 
worse than it is on the hills, there is scarcely any hogs in 
the country and but few cows. I do believe they will starve 
us all for there is no law that can reach them." 
Congressional investigators reported that blacks, accustomed 
to having everything provided by their former masters, "have 
taken to filching and stealing fruit, vegetables, and poultry 
so that the raising of these items literally had to be 
abandoned to the great distress of the white people." Eli 
Capel killed his sixteen remaining hogs rather than see them 
stolen like most of his others. In the winter of 1867 
Freedmen's Bureau agents at Clinton, Amite City, and
324
Madisonville reported extremely high levels of tension 
between the races due to the theft of poultry and hogs.323
Like many areas of the South in the immediate post-war 
period, eastern Louisiana constituted a society adrift with 
no clear sense of direction. Central to the prevailing 
chaotic circumstances was an absence of effective leadership. 
John Ellis summarized the lack of direction in a letter to 
his brother Tom. "We have no leader, no one to stand forth 
with honesty and capacity and will to thwart the tempest. 
These whom we call leaders are sunk in apathy or afraid to 
rise." Initially it appeared that President Andrew Johnson's 
policy toward the defeated Confederates would disenfranchise 
a large percentage of the pre-war elite. Johnson's pardon 
program excluded higher ranking Confederate civil and 
military officials as well as those possessing estates valued
323 Dustin Willard to Micajah Wilkinson, March 18,
1868, in Micajah Wilkinson Papers (LLMVC) ; Contract agreement 
between Joseph Embree and his laborers, dated February 1866, 
in Joseph Embree Papers (LLMVC); "Report of the Special 
Congressional Investigating Committee of Three," Documents of 
the United States House of Representatives. Forty-Third 
Congress, Second Session, House Report No. 101 (1657), pp. 4- 
20, herein after referred to as "Report of the Special 
Congressional Investigating Committee of Three, 1874". The 
congressional investigating teams which examined conditions 
in the South in this period almost always constituted 
partisan bodies collecting only that evidence which supported 
the position of their party. Diary of Eli Capell, January 4, 
1867, in Capell Papers (ibid.); Letters to Freedmen's Bureau 
Headquarters at New Orleans from; James DeGrey agent at 
Clinton, November 10, 1867, W.H. Haugen agent at
Madisonville, December 31, 1867, and James Hough agent at
Amite City, December 31, 1867, in "Freedmen's Bureau Reports" 
(National Archives); Forrest McDonald and Grady McWhiney, 
"The Antebellum Southern Herdsman: A Reinterpretation,"
Journal of Southern History. XLI, No.2, p. 164.
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at $20,000 or more. Yet by September, 1865, Johnson had
abandoned his policy of cautiously granting pardons and
instead issued them wholesale, thereby nullifying much of the 
substance of the pardon program.324
But the war itself had played havoc with the antebellum 
elite of the Florida parishes. Federal raiders targeted the 
property of the "sesech" aristocracy and some of what 
survived had been confiscated. As a result many of the old 
ruling order, overwhelmed by personal problems, withdrew from 
public service. Others found it unacceptable to stand for 
office in the turmoil of the post-war period. B.W. Clark
considered the very idea of serving blacks and shirkers
repulsive. According to Clark, "electioneering is an uphill 
battle with me under any circumstances and it would be 
especially disagreeable for me to go smiling about some 
rascally deserter and informing him that I would be happy to 
obtain his vote, when in reality it would afford me great 
satisfaction to give him a good kicking." The East Feliciana 
Patriot observed that men about Jackson and Clinton directed 
their energies toward financial recovery rather than
324 E. John Ellis to Tom, January 29, 1870, see also 
John to Tom, January 9, 1870, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); 
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed pp. 60 and 63; Jonathan 
Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty Under Lincoln and Johnson: The
Restoration of the Confederates to Their Rights and 
Privileges (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 
1953) pp. 116-117 and 138-141, herein after referred to as 
Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty; Eric Foner, Reconstruction 
America's Unfinished Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York: Harper
and Row, 1988) pp. 190-191.
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politics. Still others among the antebellum elite succumbed 
to the ravages of the war. J.R. Galtrey noted that most of 
the local power brokers in Amite County, Mississippi, 
including "Squire Reeves and Mr. Weathersby" died during the 
course of the war adding "everything about here wears the air 
of dilapidation and decay."325
Although death, disenfranchisement, and financial ruin 
certainly served to remove many from the political spectrum, 
these issues alone do not account for the wholesale 
transformation of elected officials in the Florida parishes. 
Though ex-Confederates dominated the legislative election of 
November 1865, few of them had served in the prewar period. 
Only G.W. Munday of East Feliciana and J.H. Collins of West 
Feliciana had any prewar experience among those elected from 
the Florida parishes. Moreover, few of the candidates 
elected in the piney-woods parishes came from the pre-war 
planter elite. Though Washington and St.Tammany parishes 
returned farmers to the lower house, only Jacob Magee of 
Washington possessed the wealth necessary in 1860 to classify 
as a planter. The balance of legislators elected from the 
piney woods came from the emerging merchant and professional 
class. They included among their ranks lawyers, court 
recorders, and lumbermen. Analogous circumstances prevailed
325 J.R. Galtrey to Dear Uncle Grip, September 5,
1867, in Albert Batchelor Papers (LLMVC); B.W. Clark to 
Eugene Hunter, July 23, 1865, in Hunter-Taylor Family Papers 
(ibid.); Clinton East Feliciana Patriot. November 20, 1869; 
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed pp. 54-55 and 64-65.
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in regional and municipal elections in the piney woods. Only 
one of the six sitting members of the St. Tammany Parish 
police jury retained his seat in the immediate post-war 
period. In Greensburg Mayor Henry Williams, a member of one 
of the largest and most affluent families in the parish, was 
replaced by local merchant C.H. Hyde. Similarly in Amite 
City the mayor and three out of five councilmen failed to 
retain their seats.326
A perception of powerlessness contributed to the 
political transformation in the Florida parishes. The 
presence of Federal garrisons at Baton Rouge, Bayou Sara, 
Clinton, and Amite City served as a constant reminder that 
real power rested with an army of occupation. Periodically 
these garrisons dispatched cavalry contingents to 
Franklinton, Greensburg, Springfield, and Covington, 
demonstrating the Federal presence throughout the territory. 
Local governing bodies and the courts functioned under the 
close scrutiny of resident Federal officials. In early 1867
House Journal 1860, 1864, and 1865; Senate Journal 
1856, 1860, 1864, and 1865; Eighth Census of the United
States. 1860. "Heads of Households;" Records of the Louisiana 
State Government. 1850-1888. War Department Collection of 
Confederate Records, Doc.F-75, Roll 9 (National Archives); St 
Tammany parish police jury minutes, January 1865 session, 
March 6, 1865 lists sitting members, see also August 1865 and 
August 1866 sessions (LLMVC). Although F.A. Cousin, police 
jury president in 1865, also retained his seat on the jury he 
was decisively defeated in his bid to secure reelection as 
president and never attended a session during the following 
year. Amite City Times. July 27, 1867; Amite City Council 
Minute Book, entries June 1863-July 1866 (Amite City Hall); 
Seventh Census of the United States. 1850. "Heads of
Households."
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General Philip Sheridan, commanding the Fifth Military 
District, issued a proclamation which confirmed the impotence 
of local civil authority. According to the decree "existing 
civil functionaries will be continued but simply 
provisionally and subject to removal should their conduct not 
comport with the military commanders view of their duty." 
Similarly the local courts exercised little realistic 
authority. In the summer of 1865 General E.R.S. Canby 
pronounced that state courts could resume their duties with 
the exception of cases involving soldiers or civil officials 
affiliated with the United States government. William P. 
Mellen urged the military authorities to submit cases only to 
those state courts that appeared sympathetic to the interests 
of Washington. The Greensburg Journal summarized the opinion 
of many local residents when it declared the Federals1 
usurpation of local authority a violation of the fundamental 
tenants of republicanism. "Our political position is already 
sufficiently humiliating, even if our state officials use 
their utmost energies and talents to conceal the fact that 
the powers at Washington to which we owe allegiance are 
adverse to state sovereignty and constitutional liberty."327
Si( Greensburg Journal. February 23, 1866; Greensburg 
Weekly Star and Journal. April 27, 1867; Proclamation of
General Philip Sheridan reprinted in Clinton Feliciana 
Democrat. March 21, 1867, found in J.G. Kilbourne Record Book 
No. 23; Proclamation from Headquarters Department of the Gulf 
signed by General E.R.S. Canby, June 27, 1865, and letter
William P. Mellen to B.F. Flanders, April 27, 1866, in
Benjamin F. Flanders Papers (LLMVC).
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The absolute control exercised by the United States 
military authorities did further the changing political 
climate, particularly so among the remnants of the planter 
elite who deeply resented the collapse of their commanding 
power in state government. But the revival of the societal 
commitment to a peculiarly piney-woods republicanism 
contributed in a more substantive sense to changing attitudes 
in the eastern parishes. From the late 1830's to the early 
1850's the centrality of the republican tradition to piney- 
woods perspectives promoted increasing disillusionment with 
planter-dominated government. Planter power brokers had, 
however, skillfully manipulated the sectional crisis and the 
omnipresent fear of slave unrest to create an "us versus 
them" mentality. This manuever in turn necessitated 
continuing plain folk acceptance of the rule of their planter 
protectors.
But the catastrophe that secession and the war 
represented for all white social classes in eastern Louisiana 
encouraged the plain folk to reassess their fealty to the 
planters. Linus Parker declared that his reflection upon the 
events leading to secession and its results had led him to 
"wonder at the hollowness of the whole affair." In a 
chilling reference to the piney-woods tradition of political 
powerlessness the Greensburg Weekly Star and Journal urged 
its readers to action by declaring "you will have a 
government made for you if you do not make it for yourself."
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The St. Helena Echo reminded the people that the man who 
works the land has always been oppressed by "class 
legislation" initiated by the "lordly planters." Calls for 
the revival of the independent self-sufficient lifestyle 
which characterized the region in less complicated times 
proved a popular theme of the piney-woods press during the 
immediate post war period. The Greensburg Journal exhorted 
a revival of Jeffersonian principles to liberate the people 
from the manipulation which led to war, ruin, and subsequent 
exploitation by Yankees proclaiming "home manufacturing is 
the true road to independence." Likewise the Amite Citv 
Democrat reminded its readers of the near Utopian existence 
inherent in the independent and self-sufficient piney-woods 
lifestyle. Many newspapers equated the prevailing
deprivation with the people's abandonment of self-sufficiency 
for the unpredictable and dependent circumstances of the 
market economy. The East Feliciana Patriot urged farmers to 
plant corn not cotton. "We never did right in so tilling our 
soil as to enrich others at our expense and we can never 
reach that level of independence as long as we allow that 
great mine of wealth, our soil lie dormant. The surest way 
of relieving ourselves of debt and becoming independent is to 
raise everything our soil and climate can afford for human 
consumption.,|328
328 Linus Parker to John Burruss, September 27, 1865, 
in John C.Burruss Papers (LLMVC); Greensburg Weekly Star and 
Journal. April 27, 1867; St. Helena Echo. September 12, 1891;
331
The resurgent republican ideal demanded that piney-woods 
farmers free themselves from all agents of exploitation. 
This included their Yankee conquerors as well as their 
planter overlords, whom many plain folk appeared increasingly 
willing to believe had manipulated them. Osyka resident J.W. 
Courtney argued that the poor had fought and suffered through 
the war merely to support the lifestyle of the rich. 
Proclaiming his refusal to submit further to planter 
selfishness Courtney declared, "I am determined in my mind 
not to serve them [planters] any longer they have allways 
(sic) made laws to oppress the poor." Cotton increasingly 
came to be seen as the tool for exploiting the less 
privileged. Deliverance from the shackles of King Cotton 
became synonymous with independence in the piney-woods press. 
The St. Helena Echo declared "wealth and prosperity will come 
only through independence and independence will come only 
through agricultural diversity." Other country newspapers 
such as the East Feliciana Patriot and Magnolia Gazette urged 
farmers to plant food crops in order to break the cycle of 
dependence and limit the wealth of rich manufacturers.329
Greensburg Journal. July 20, 1866; Amite City Democrat.
October 2, 1875; Clinton East Feliciana Patriot. April 27, 
1867, November 13, 1869, and July 2, 1870.
329 J.W. Courtney to My dear brothers and sisters, 
February 7, 1864, in Joel A. Stokes Papers (LLMVC);
Greensburg St. Helena Echo. August 4, 1889, January 23, 1892, 
January 30, 1892 and January 31, 1896; Clinton East Feliciana 
Patriot. April 27, 1867, November 13, 1869, and July 2, 1870; 
Magnolia Gazette. April 12, 1883; Kentwood Commercial.
February 26, 1898.
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Calls for economic independence, coupled with the 
results of the immediate post-war elections and the 
commanding presence of the Federal military, created 
conditions favorable to political realignment in eastern 
Louisiana. But as they had in the 1850's, the planters would 
again delay the arrival of realistic democracy in the piney 
woods by identifying and promoting fear of another common 
enemy of southern whites. Planter preeminence was now 
subject to an alliance with the increasingly powerful 
merchant-professional class who also demanded racial unity 
and home rule. But the importance of the old elite surged in 
the face of a determined common enemy. Henry Clay Warmoth, 
a Republican organizer and successor to Governor Wells, 
correctly surmised that the old elite intentionally fostered 
hatred in order to maintain their power. According to 
Warmoth, Louisiana's problem lay "in the contumacy of the old 
ruling aristocracy, who believe that they were born to 
govern, without question, not only their slaves but the 
masses of the white people." By capitalizing on reinforced 
racial fears and lingering hatred for the Yankees the elite 
again presented themselves as the protectors of the common 
man. Carpetbaggers, northerners who supposedly carried all 
their belongings in a sack as they came south to exploit the 
defeated region, and local people who supported the efforts 
of the Republican party, known derisively as scalawags, 
provided excellent scapegoats. The old elite aggressively
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promoted contempt for the Republicans and their supporters. 
One Democratic party circular declared, "most ill disposed 
negroes are not half so much deserving our aversion and non­
intercourse with them as the debased whites who encourage and 
aid them, and who become through their votes the office 
holding oppressors of the people. Whatever of resentment you 
have should be felt toward the latter and not the colored 
men." Such statements, typical in the immediate post-war 
period, implied that the Republicans constituted the real 
enemy not the freedmen. And, by joining the old elite in 
vanquishing the power of these intruders the common people 
could again enjoy the fruits of their adherence to the 
Jeffersonian-Jacksonian tradition. Although significant 
evidence demonstrates that the piney-woods aversion for rule 
of the elite had resurfaced, racial fears and the new common 
enemy would again delay the ramifications of this 
resentment.330
Fortunately for the battered ranks of the old elite and 
their reluctant allies, the Republicans would simplify the 
task of maintaining and expanding the remnants of their 
power. J. Madison Wells became governor in early 1865 when 
the Unionist Michael Hahn was elected to fill a seat in the
330 Copy of Democratic Party circular and statement of 
Henry Clay Warmoth found in "Report of the Joint Committee of 
the General Assembly of Louisiana on the Conduct of the Late 
Elections and the Condition of Peace and Order in the State," 
Special Report to the Louisiana Legislature, 1869, pp. 7 and 
22-23.
United States Senate. He then secured election as chief 
executive in his own right in November 1865, defeating an 
absentee Henry W. Allen who had fled the country following 
the collapse of Confederate resistance. Wells, a native of 
Rapides Parish, had remained a consistent Unionist throughout 
the war. Though he shared many of the racial views of his 
Democratic counterparts, Wells emerged as one of a score of 
political chameleons whose machinations added to the 
confusion that prevailed in postwar Louisiana. Convinced 
that the ex-Confederates would emerge as the real power 
brokers, he initially made appointments and supported 
legislation favorable to that group. But the growing 
strength of the Radical Republicans, led by the youthful 
carpetbagger Henry Clay Warmoth, induced Wells to shift his 
allegiance frequently. In March, 1867, Congress overcame 
Johnson's veto and divided the South into five military 
districts; General Philip Sheridan became the commander of 
the fifth district which encompassed Louisiana and Texas. By 
the spring of 1867 Wells' inconsistency had alienated 
virtually everyone, prompting an exasperated General Sheridan 
to remove him from office. In his place Sheridan appointed 
New Hampshire-born Benjamin F. Flanders whose seven month 
tenure signalled the end of Presidential Reconstruction and 
the advent of Military Reconstruction in Louisiana.331
331 Greensburg Journal. February 23, 1866; Taylor,
Louisiana Reconstructed pp. 71, 80-82, 103-104, and 140;
Baton Rouge Weekly Advocate. June 30, 1866; New Orleans Daily
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The events contributing to the introduction of Military 
or Radical Reconstruction are well documented.332 The 
primacy of racial fears prompted all but Tennessee among the 
southern states to reject the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather 
than see the South returned to the fold with its antebellum 
power structure intact, Congress initiated a series of acts 
designed to produce substantive change in the former 
Confederacy.
The Congressional plan required a new registration of 
voters, a measure intended to disenfranchise secessionist 
leaders. Moreover, black enfranchisement provided the best 
means for the freedmen to secure their rights as citizens and 
to promote the fortunes of the Republican Party in the South. 
The measure approved by Congress on March 2, 1867 denied the 
vote to thousands of ex-Confederate civil and military 
officials. Everyone who had served the Confederacy from beef 
inspectors to sextons of cemeteries found themselves subject 
to disqualification under the new act. Registrars, who owed
Picayune. February 8 and 9, 1867; Dawson, Army Generals and 
Reconstruction p. 44.
332 David H. Donald, The Politics of Reconstruction. 
1863-1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1965); William M. Evans, Ballots and Fence Rails;
Reconstruction on the Lower Cape Fear (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1967) Eric Foner,
Reconstruction America's Unfinished Revolution: 1863-1877
(New York: Harper and Row, 1988) ; Kenneth Stampp, Era of
Reconstruction. 1865-1877 (New York: Knopf, 1965) ; Ted
Tunnel1, Crucible of Reconstruction: War. Radicalism, and
Race in Louisiana. 1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1984).
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their tenures to Radical Republicans, were given ample 
discretionary powers to exclude as many Democratic voters as 
possible. Sheridan directed that the order be interpreted so 
as to include virtually all ex-Confederates of any standing. 
His proclamation declared, "Registrars will give the most 
rigid interpretation to the law and exclude from registration 
every person about whose right to vote there may be doubt." 
Broad and intentionally vague categories for disqualification 
included "all who had advocated treason or submitted 
treasonous articles to papers," and "all who held any office, 
civil or military, for one year or more." Republican
registrars regularly consulted local Unionists to ascertain 
the political affiliation of many ex-Confederates before 
determining their eligibility. In parishes where it proved 
difficult to locate Unionists to act as registrars, Union 
soldiers or Freedmens Bureau agents performed this service. 
These measures served to disenfranchise temporarily a 
decisive proportion of local whites.333
333 Documents of the United States House of
Representatives. Fortieth Congress, Second Session, Vol. 17, 
1867-1868, Exec. Doc. No. 291; Instructions to Supervisors of 
Registration With a Transcript of the Constitutional. 
Naturalization. and Other Laws Pertaining to the 
Qualification of Electors. Prepared by the Board of 
Registration (New Orleans: A.L~ Lee State Printer, 1868) pp.
6-7. Testimony of John H. Pipes, pp. 384-392, and Martial 
Amacker, pp. 392-397, delivered before a Congressional 
investigating commission May 1869, in "United States 
Congressional Hearings Supplement," No. 1, 1869, House
Committee on Elections, testimony collected by Sub-Committee 
of Elections in Louisiana, May-June 1869, herein after 
referred to as "United States Congressional Hearings 
Supplement, 1869" (National Archives); Charles E. Kennon to
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White conservative efforts to prevail in peace where 
they had failed in war necessitated the actions of the 
Radical Republicans in Congress. But disfranchising scores 
of men imbued with a fierce republican tradition and just 
emerging from a brutal war had enormous implications which 
the Republicans either failed to foresee or underestimated. 
Local newspapers blasted the Republicans for "perpetuating 
disunion" and "trampling upon the fundamental virtues of the 
Constitution.11 As reports circulated that disqualification 
included all road overseers, school directors, commissioners 
of election, sheriffs' deputies, steamboat pilots, and others 
who held seemingly insignificant positions before the war but 
had served in the Confederate army or civil service, passions 
reached a fever pitch. The Amite Citv Times relentlessly 
condemned efforts to emasculate the white South and the 
concomitant delivery of local government into the hands of 
opportunistic carpetbaggers and their minions "from the land 
of the gorilla and the ape." The Times and other state 
papers also strongly urged those permitted to vote to do so. 
On the day appointed for the election to approve a
John Ellis, September 22, 1870, in Ellis Family Papers
(LLMVC); Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty pp. 333-335; Taylor, 
Louisiana Reconstructed pp. 132, 139, and 143; Dawson, Army 
Generals and Reconstruction p. 49; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. April 21 and June 28, 1867; New Orleans Tribune. 
July 23, 1867, called for loyal persons to help produce
evidence to "erase the rebels" from the voters rolls.
Sheridan chose to view the United States Attorney General's 
narrow interpretation of the law as merely an opinion, not a 
statement of policy.
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constitutional convention, the New Orleans Daily Picayune 
estimated that one half of the white voters of the state had 
been denied the suffrage.334
The results of the constitutional-convention election 
appeared to confirm the massive disfranchisement of white 
voters. The convention secured approval by a vote of 75,083 
to 4,006. Republicans elected ninety-six of the ninety-eight 
delegates with blacks making up one-half of that number. But 
this election does not provide an adequate indication of the 
level of disfranchisement. Hopelessness and disgust served 
to keep most whites away from the polls. Many recognized 
that conservatives had no chance for success while others 
hoped that a low turnout would nullify the election results. 
Still others could not yet accept the idea of voting
alongside blacks. By the day of the election even the 
normally enthusiastic Daily Picayune admitted that it too had 
abandoned hope for a conservative victory.335
The April 1868 state and constitutional ratification
election provides a much more definitive statement on the
334 Amite city Times. July 27, August 10, and August
31, 1867; New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 21, June 28, and 
September 27, 1867; Charles E. Kennon to John Ellis,
September 22, 1870, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
335 New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 27, 1867; 
Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention for 
Framing a Constitution for the State of Louisiana. 1867-1868 
(New Orleans; J.B. Roudanez and Co., 1868) herein after 
referred to as Constitutional Convention Proceedings. 1868; 
Charles Vincent, "Negro Leadership and Programs in the 
Constitutional Convention of 1868," Louisiana History. X, No. 
4, pp. 339-351; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed pp. 146-148.
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level of disfranchisement. Though far from revolutionary, by 
Louisiana standards the Constitution of 1868 represented a 
radical departure from the past. White anger increased as 
the document, written by and reflecting almost exclusively 
the views of blacks, Yankees, and scalawags, became public. 
Thousands who had avoided the earlier election now determined 
to participate. The Daily Picayune urged readers to vote 
against the document designed to benefit "the camp followers 
left behind by the Federal army and a lot of white trash of 
southern origin." The gubernatorial candidacy of the 
carpetbagger Henry Clay Warmoth, whose public comments to 
black audiences had gained him notoriety as a dangerous 
radical, also encouraged white conservative participation. 
Significantly, although Warmoth's opponent James G. 
Taliaferro represented a reputedly more radical faction of 
the Republicans, thousands of white Democrats supported his 
candidacy merely because he was a native of Louisiana.336
The Republicans reported that only 2,169 men had been 
rejected outright by the registrars. Published lists of 
voters denied registration which appeared in local newspapers 
indicate that the figure was considerably higher. Moreover
336 New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 15 and 17, 1868; 
Constitutional Convention Proceedings. 1868: Thomas G.
Davidson to James Taliaferro, April 25, 1868, in James G.
Taliaferro Papers (LLMVC); Testimony of Charles E. Kennon, in 
"United States Congressional Hearings Supplement, 1869;" 
Amite City Times. August 31, 1867; Vincent, "Negro Leadership 
and Programs" pp. 339-351; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed p. 
151.
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public awareness that General Sheridan demanded a rigid 
application of the law probably discouraged many from 
subjecting themselves to the humiliation of rejection. 
Returns show that approximately 36,029 whites voted in the 
April 1868 election. This figure constituted slightly more 
than forty-one percent of adult white males, a dramatic 
decrease in voter turnout from elections in the late 1850s. 
Thus, although claims that fifty percent of white males had 
been denied the suffrage are almost certainly exaggerated, 
following the implementation of the Reconstruction acts of 
1867 nearly one third fewer whites voted. Both the 
constitution and Warmoth secured the voters approval by 
comfortable majorities. East Baton Rouge, Livingston, St. 
Helena, and Washington parishes joined sixteen primarily 
upstate cotton and Sabine River region parishes in rejecting 
the constitution.337
By disfranchising many among the pre-war elite the 
Republicans provided the old aristocracy with a powerful 
propaganda tool. Denying landholding freemen the suffrage 
constituted a fundamental violation of the piney-woods 
tradition of republicanism. The old elite emerged as victims
337 Ninth Census of the United States. 1870.
"Population", p. 629; Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington: United States
Bureau of Census, 1975) Vol. II, p. 1072; Donald W. Davis, 
"Ratification of the Constitution of 1868 - Record of Votes," 
Louisiana History. VI, No. 3, pp. 301-305; Amite Citv Times. 
September 28, 1867; New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 27, 
1867; Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty pp. 333-335; Taylor, 
Louisiana Reconstructed, pp. 143-144.
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of tyrannical outsiders who sought not only to create 
equality among the races but indeed to make blacks dominant 
in order to serve their own special ends. This transition 
would prove decisive in determining the outcome of Radical 
Reconstruction through large areas of the South. Racial 
solidarity and hostility to outsiders again secured the old 
elite from the potential for social upheaval. Latent 
antagonism between white social classes would remain dormant 
until the common enemy was subdued.
Following the election the Republicans moved swiftly to 
consolidate their power. The legislature granted the 
governor the authority to fill vacant political positions and 
replace officials considered ineligible. Warmoth accordingly 
removed many elected officials on the state, parish, and 
municipal level and replaced them with party loyalists. The 
expulsions alienated many of the business and professional 
men who filled the immediate postwar void of elected 
officials. The disaffected consequently flocked to the 
battered ranks of the old elite. Warmoth further antagonized 
Florida parish conservatives by appointing scores of Federal 
soldiers, Freedman's Bureau agents, and local Republicans 
with questionable ethical backgrounds to responsible 
positions. Other clearly incompetent Republicans gained 
office either by election or appointment. H.H. Bankston, 
facing several indictments for fraud and embezzlment of 
municipal funds, secured appointment as mayor of Amite City.
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Freedman's Bureau agent James DeGrey was appointed sheriff of 
East Feliciana despite his limited knowledge of the people 
and region. In St. Tammany, Warmoth appointed a crippled 
illiterate black, named Populus, parish tax collector to 
spite an opponent within his own party. Perhaps the greatest 
regional farce occurred in St.Helena where an uneducated 
field hand, albeit Republican organizer, John Kemp, secured 
election as parish coroner.338
The Republican's determination to fill positions 
exclusively with party loyalists necessarily created 
problems. Many of those appointed to responsible positions 
found themselves incapable of performing their duties. An 
exchange between James H.George, elected district judge from 
St.Helena, and members of a Congressional sub-committee 
investigating conditions in Louisiana symbolized this 
problem.
q - Do you think opposition to you arose mainly from 
politics?
Senate Journal. Executive Sessions June 1868 and 
January 1869; Amite City Council Minute Book, entries June 
1863 through February 1867 (Amite City Hall); Testimony of 
H.H. Bankston, Thomas C.W. Ellis, James H. George, John H. 
Pipes, Robert Babington, R.F. Briggs, and Johnson E. Yerks, 
all in "United States Congressional Hearings Supplement, 
1869;" James DeGrey to Freedman's Bureau Headquarters at New 
Orleans, April 18 and 30, 1868, in Freedman's Bureau Reports 
(National Archives); Isaac Evans to James G. Taliaferro, 
February 28, 1870, in James G. Taliaferro Letters (LLMVC); 
John to Tom Ellis, June 13, 1872, in Ellis Family Papers
(LLMVC); Amite City Tangipahoa Democrat. July 4 and August 2, 
1872; Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed p. 176.
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A - It mainly arose from politics. The lawyers held a meeting 
and agreed not to practice under me.
Q - Why?
A - Two reasons, one that I was ineligible and another that 
I was elected by negroes.
Q - How were you ineligible?
A - For lack of a knowledge of the law.
Q - Then you mean you were incompetent?
A - Yes, that is what I mean.339
Under the prevailing circumstances the Republicans 
naturally faced acute limitations in resources. But their 
determination to rule absolutely, regardless of the quality 
of local government, proved both provocative and fateful. 
Most local whites viewed the changing circumstances not 
merely as a loss of control over their own destiny, but as an 
affront to the very idea of order and government. And in 
eastern Louisiana, as in other areas of the South, the last 
months of the war had demonstrated an effective means of 
dealing with a perceived oppressor.
But for blacks and white Republicans the advent of 
Radical Reconstruction represented an unprecedented 
opportunity. With the future in their own hands few would 
willingly relinquish their new found power, and many would 
fight to retain it. Most regarded the limitations of some of
Testimony of James H. George, "United States 
Congressional Hearings Supplement, 1869."
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their number as a product of decades of misrule and brutal 
oppression. With such a vast chasm between the opponents the 
struggle was certain to be painful.
Violence characterized the Florida parishes from the 
very outset of Reconstruction. Freedmen's Bureau agents, 
Federal soldiers, and blacks all suffered frequent attacks. 
The day after the second attempt on his life Lieutenant 
Edward Ehrlich reported, "outrages are committed daily at 
Amite City." During the summer and fall of 1865 at least 
sixteen shootings and stabbings occurred in the eastern 
Florida parishes. Dozens of incidents of assault, battery, 
and intimidation also were reported. In the few cases local 
law enforcement sought to prosecute it failed miserably, 
often with comical dimensions. A jury acquitted George Story 
of shooting a black woman based on his assertion that he was 
actually shooting at another man down the street from the 
victim. The jury apparently not only lacked sympathy for the 
victim but also considered Story's intentions 
justifiable.340
Letters received at Freedmen's Bureau headquarters 
in New Orleans from: James Hough, agent at Amite City,
December 12 and 20, 1867, Lieutenant Edward Ehrlich, agent at 
Amite City, September 18, 1865 (three letters), and December 
19, 20, 21, 23, and 26, 1865 (multiple letters), General A.J. 
Edgerton, September 6, 1866, Captain H.H. Rouse, agent at
Amite City, September 9, 1865, James DeGrey, agent at
Clinton, April 20, June 20, and October 7, 1867, W.H. Haugen, 
agent at Madisonville, October 10, 1867, A.F. Hayden to
Edward Ehrlich, October 1865, all in Freedmen's Bureau 
Reports (National Archives). Amite City Times. August 10 and 
31, 1867; Colonel George Forsyth to Judge of District Court 
at Covington, May 27, 1867, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
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The Federals also proved incapable of dealing with the 
scope of the violence. Insufficient manpower and a sluggish 
bureaucracy insured that before enough evidence could be 
gathered in one case several more startling incidents had 
occurred. Civil authorities refused to share information 
from ongoing criminal investigations with Federal troops and 
only reluctantly responded to Federal demands. The vast 
majority of local whites refused to cooperate with Federal 
authorities in any way. When summoned to appear before the 
local Freedmen's Bureau agent, Amite City resident Mark Day 
responded simply, "to hell with the Yankee."341
Although blacks suffered greatly from acts of violence, 
many proved willing to defend themselves, and others resorted 
to violence to obtain their own ends. Many blacks who spoke 
in support of the Democrats became victims of black-on-black 
terror. Only moments after Stephen Durden, a black resident 
of Livingston Parish, completed a speech supporting the 
Democrats, a group of freedmen shot and killed him on a 
public highway. Such incidents increased in the wake of the 
September 1867 election. After touring Washington Parish, 
Freedmen's Bureau agent W.H. Haugen observed that many blacks 
refused to work, instead preferring to steal and "are a 
perfect terror to the country." Armed freedmen also seized 
several plantations in East Feliciana and St. Helena parishes
341 Report of James Hough, agent at Amite City, to 
Freedmen's Bureau headquarters at New Orleans, December 12, 
1867, in Freedmen's Bureau Reports (National Archives).
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threatening to kill anyone who interfered with their 
operations. Under the heading "An Ugly Sight," the Amite 
City Democrat described the passion of a particular black 
woman for carrying "a tremendous navy six shooter" with her 
about the streets of Amite City in search of a "white man who 
gave her a drubbing." The article concluded, "we hope some 
of her colored friends will prevail upon her to leave the 
ugly weapon at home and use the law to protect her." White 
Republican officials were often accused of instigating acts 
of violence. Governor Wells faced accusations that he 
provided immunity to those who murdered his political 
enemies. “
The level of violence increased dramatically with the 
emergence of several paramilitary organizations. Prior to 
this development, despite the presence of numerous "rifle 
clubs" and other politically inclined groups, most violent 
incidents had been random acts between individuals. During 
the spring and summer of 1867, Republican organizers from New
Amite Citv Democrat. November 20, 1875; Amite Citv 
Times, August 31, 1867; "Register of Murders and Outrages
Committed," description of Stephen Durden murder August 12, 
1868, in Freedmen1s Bureau Reports; letters received at 
Freedmen's Bureau headquarters in New Orleans from; W.H. 
Haugen, January 20 and February 29, 1868, James Hough, August 
10, 31, and September 30, 1867, James DeGrey, October 10,
1867, and message received from Lieutenant Colonel G.W. 
Mitchell, December 20, 1867, ibid. Testimony taken by
congressional sub-committee from; William H. Wilder pp. 91- 
94, Henry Clay Warmoth p. 510, and Thomas C.W. Ellis, pp. 98- 
110, in "United States Congressional Hearings Supplement," 
1869; W.H. Sparks to James G. Taliaferro, March 6, 1869, in 
James G.Taliaferro Papers (LLMVC).
Orleans worked aggressively to establish Loyal League clubs 
among the blacks in eastern Louisiana. Increasing acts of 
violence against the freedmen and inequitable labor practices 
encouraged a newfound militancy and willingness to defend 
themselves. Throughout the summer of 1867, local Freedmen's 
Bureau agents and Federal officers reported growing political 
agitation among the freedmen. White residents became 
increasingly tense with the discovery of each new 
"incendiary" tract issued by the New Orleans Radical Club 
headed by Henry Clay Warmoth and others. Warmoth created 
near panic in February 1868 when he proclaimed before a black 
audience in New Orleans that ex-Confederates "are traitors 
and treason under the Constitution is punishable by death." 
Carpetbagger A.J. Sypher admitted that his formation of a 
black militia in Rapides Parish "greatly exasperated the 
majority of the white people in the parish." By August 1867 
Freedmen's Bureau agent James Hough reported that blacks 
increasingly left work to attend inflammatory political 
meetings "where incompetent negroes create insubordinate 
feelings." Hough further noted that armed groups of blacks 
regularly established picket posts along the public roads and 
"travellers passing by are halted and subjected to 
annoyance." Suspicions of impending trouble became a reality
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during the volatile circumstances surrounding the September 
1867 election.343
One of the most militant black paramilitary
organizations emerged in western St.Helena Parish. This 
Loyal League Club, led by a mulatto farmer named Thomas 
Turner, created consternation by publicly parading with arms 
and threatening local whites. James Hough described Turner 
as "very troublesome and the terror of all whites in his 
neighborhood." In the summer of 1867 Turner announced that 
he had received authority from the commanding officer of the 
local Federal garrison "to hang all the whites." He posted 
pickets on the roads in lower St.Helena who loudly proclaimed 
their intentions. On the eve of the September 27, 1867
election Turner mobilized his forces. Rather than marching 
on Greensburg as local residents expected, Turner instead
Report on the Conduct of the Late Elections. 1868. 
p. 26; and Warmoth comments in ibid., "Minority Report," 
1869, p. XL; letters received at Freedmen's Bureau 
headquarters in New Orleans from: James Hough, agent at
Amite City, August 10 and 31, and September 30, 1867,
A.Finch, agent at Bayou Sara, September 21, 1867, James
DeGrey, agent at Clinton, August 20, 1867, all in Freedmen's 
Bureau Reports (National Archives); Amite Citv Times. August 
31, 1867; Woodville The Woodville Sentinel. August 21, 1871. 
Testimony taken by a congressional sub-committee from: James
H. George, pp. 41 and 95, John H. Pipes, pp. 384-392, Thomas 
C.W. Ellis, pp. 98-110, Amos Kent, pp. 223-227, all in 
"United States Congressional Hearings Supplement," 1869. John 
Ellis to Tom Ellis, August 10, 1867, in Ellis Family Papers 
(LLMVC); New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 5 and October 8, 
1868; Otis A. Singletary, "The Negro Militia Movement During 
Radical Reconstruction," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana State 
University, 1949) pp. vi and 6-12; James Stewart McGehee, 
"Ramble in Autobiography," unpublished manuscript found in 
James S. McGehee Papers (LLMVC).
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headed for Amite City. In the afternoon of September 27, 
Turner arrived outside of Amite City at the head of an armed 
band which estimates placed at anywhere from 50 to 250. 
Major James Offley, commanding the Federal garrison, informed 
the militiamen that they would not be permitted to enter the 
town as an armed body. But to the horror of local whites, 
Offley permitted the blacks to conceal their weapons and 
march into town en masse. Turner's men voted without 
incident then camped on the outskirts of town for several 
days as a demonstration of their resolve.344
In permitting Turner's militia to enter Amite City as an 
organized body and camp on the outskirts of town Offley 
created panic among local whites. Turner had boasted that he 
was authorized to hang any whites who interfered with his 
group, and many residents considered the Federal commander's 
actions irrational. Few had forgotten that in the summer of 
1866 black Federal soldiers had rounded up suspected white 
criminals in Clinton and threatened to kill the prisoners if 
anyone hindered their arrest. Many also remained outraged 
that Yankee planters had provided arms to many of their black 
laborers. The Amite Citv Times and other local newspapers 
angrily contrasted General Sheridan's orders to break up
344 James Hough, agent at Amite City, to Freedmen's 
Bureau headquarters in New Orleans, September 30, 1867, in 
Freedmen's Bureau Reports; testimony taken by a congressional 
subcommittee from John H. Pipes, pp. 384-392, Amos Kent, pp. 
223-227, and Thomas C.W. Ellis, pp. 98-110, in "United States 
Congressional Hearings Supplement," 1869; Amite Citv Times. 
August 31, 1867.
350
meetings supporting hospitals and monuments for Confederate 
veterans with his tolerance of secret meetings by armed 
blacks. The Times. however, continued to profess confidence 
in Major Offley's intentions but declared, "the whites can 
not and will not sit idle and see their families butchered by 
barbarians. Self defense is God's gift - a deduction from 
the gift of existence itself."345
Similar processions by armed groups of blacks panicked 
whites statewide. Following a mass demonstration by armed 
freedmen who defied civil authorities and threatened to burn 
the town of Breaux Bridge in St. Martin Parish, Alexandre 
DeClouet confided in his diary "much anxiety felt by all." 
DeClouet noted a counter demonstration by whites a few days 
later had attracted 1,2 00 supporters. A new organization 
called Knights of the White Camellia had been a conspicuous 
presence at this later meeting. Tom Ellis summarized the 
perspective of local whites to a congressional investigating 
commission declaring, "this organization on their (blacks) 
part called for organization on our part."346
Amite Citv Times. August 31, 1867; Clinton East
Feliciana Patriot. July 21, 1866; James Stewart McGehee,
"Ramble in Autobiography," in James Stewart McGehee Papers 
(LLMVC).
346 Alexandre DeClouet Diary, Vol. 3, September 20-24, 
in Alexandre DeClouet Papers (LLMVC); Testimony of Thomas
C.W. Ellis before a congressional sub-committee, in "United 
States Congressional Hearings Supplement," 1869, pp. 98-110; 
James Stewart McGehee, "Ramble in Autobiography," in James S. 
McGehee Papers (LLMVC).
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Limited evidence does indicate that secret white 
paramilitary organizations functioned in Louisiana prior to 
the winter of 1867-1868. In a November 1865 address to the 
state legislature Governor Wells announced, "secret political 
associations, the members of which are bound to each other by 
strange oaths, and recognize each other by signs and 
passwords, are being revived in this city (New Orleans) with 
affiliations in the parishes throughout the state." Wells 
failed to speculate on the motives of these secret 
organizations nor did he provide any evidence to support his 
allegations. But if the evidence is sparse concerning white 
paramilitary organizations statewide, even less exists to 
indicate their presence in the Florida parishes prior to the 
first months of 1868. The explosive conditions surrounding 
the elections in the fall of 1867 and the spring of 1868 
promoted the rapid growth of white secret societies across 
Louisiana. The Knights of the White Camellia and the Ku Klux 
Klan constituted the principal groups to emerge in this 
period.347
Historians have frequently misunderstood the 
relationship between these two white supremacy organizations. 
Despite the recurrent misconceptions, both groups functioned 
separately with different methods, if not purposes. In the 
winter of 1867-1868 the first reports of a Ku Klux Klan in
' House Journal. Extra Session November, 1865, 
"Address of Governor Wells," p. 13.
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Louisiana began to circulate. Organized in Tennessee in 
1866, the Klan initially functioned as a social club for 
Confederate veterans. Yet by early 1867 Klan members 
recognized that their secrecy and mysticism enabled them to 
function effectively as regulators. By the spring of 1868 
ample evidence suggests that several Klan dens existed in the 
Florida parishes as well as in upstate Louisiana and 
southwestern Mississippi. The Klan combined an unqualified 
commitment to white supremacy with a murderous contempt for 
aspiring blacks and white Republicans. Terror served as the 
weapon of choice for Klansmen. Murder, arson, and
intimidation all played an integral role in the Klan's 
nightly adventures. Their violent activities demanded 
absolute secrecy; few ever admitted membership. Klansmen in 
eastern Louisiana conformed to the stereotype of white-hooded 
and shrouded specters who travelled late at night and 
terrorized with impunity.348
348 Limited evidence concerning the Ku Klux Klan's 
presence and activities in Louisiana has caused some 
historians to speculate that it either did not exist as an 
organized body during Reconstruction or that it functioned 
under the name Knights of the White Camellia. See Taylor, 
Louisiana Reconstructed. p. 145; Tunnell, Crucible of 
Reconstruction. p. 6; George Rable But There Was No Peace: 
The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984) p. 71. Report
on the Conduct of the Late Elections. 1869. pp. xxxi-xxxii, 
83-86, and 147-156. Dustin Williard to Micajah Wilkinson, 
March 8, 1868, in Micajah Wilkinson Papers (LLMVC); Diary of 
Willie Dixon, entries February 20 and June 16, 1868, Dixon
refers directly to his induction into the Ku Klux Klan "at a 
late hour of the night" in Clinton, in William Y. Dixon 
Papers(ibid.); Charles Kennon to Tom Ellis, July 5, 1870, in 
Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); Mary Alley Scrapbooks, Vol.l,
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In contrast to the Klan, the Knights of the White 
Camellia originated in Louisiana with slightly different 
intentions. While the Klan combined fealty to white 
superiority with a determination to terrorize their enemies 
into submission, the Knights incorporated a similar 
commitment to white supremacy into a political and economic 
agenda. Though equally brutal in their condemnation of 
assertive blacks and white Republicans, the Knights seldom 
engaged in terror. Instead they typically incorporated 
menacing persuasion with economic intimidation to achieve 
political ends.
Members of the White Camellia openly admitted their 
affiliation, though the very same men denied any knowledge of 
the Klan. Local residents apparently felt justified in their 
determination to preserve the superiority of the white race 
but proved reticent in discussing an organization which 
encouraged murder. When congressional investigators in the 
spring of 1869 repeatedly insisted that Knights of the White 
Camellia constituted nothing more than a pseudonym for Ku 
Klux Klan, prominent Tangipahoa merchant Charles Kennon 
exploded, "I know that it is not the Ku Klux. I have never 
heard it called so." Though some residents belonged to both,
pp. 7-9 (ibid.); testimony taken by congressional sub­
committee from: James B. Wands pp. 97-102, Charles Benedict
pp. 218-224, William H. Wilder pp. 91-94, H.H. Bankston pp. 
83-87, Isham Buckhalter pp. 400-403, Thomas C.W. Ellis pp. 
98-110, all in "United States Congressional Hearings 
Supplement," 1869.
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the oaths of each group symbolize the contrast in emphasis. 
In swearing loyalty to the White Camellia one committed 
himself to "defending the social and political superiority of 
the white race and in all places to observe a marked 
distinction between the white and African races." 
Furthermore, initiates pledged to "vote for none but white 
men for any position of honor, profit or trust, and to 
protect and defend persons of the white race against the 
encroachments and aggressions of an inferior race." Though 
containing an extreme commitment to racial superiority and an 
apparent willingness to defend that principle, the oath did 
not include an overt call to violence. A Klansmen pledged to 
"reject and oppose the principles of the radical party in all 
its forms, and forever maintain that intelligent white men 
shall govern this country." After swearing to protect 
"females, widows and their households," the Klansmen further 
pledged to "obey all instructions given me by my chief, and 
should I ever divulge or cause to be divulged any secrets, 
signs or passwords of the Invisible Empire, I must meet with 
the fearful and just penalty of the traitor, which is death, 
death, death, at the hands of my brethren."349
349 Testimony taken by congressional sub-committee
from: Charles Kennon, pp. 217-223, John R. Wood, p. 308,
Robert Babington, pp. 368-371, John H. Pipes, pp. 384-392, 
Martial Amacker, pp. 392-397, Thomas C.W. Ellis, pp. 98-110; 
E.R. Boissat, p. 276; Report on the Conduct of the Late 
Elections. 1869. pp. xxxi-xxxii. Walter L. Fleming, The 
Reconstruction of the Seceded States (Albany: New York State
Education Department, 1905) pp. 119 and 125; J.C. Lester and
D.L. Wilson, Ku Klux Klan:_____It's Origin Growth and
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Black activism and defensive preparations encouraged the 
formation of secret white paramilitary societies. And by 
fanning the flames of racial hysteria the old elite recovered 
much of their influence. The near universal support among 
whites attained by the postwar leadership enabled them to 
aggressively pursue their primary purpose, recovery of 
political control. But as in the antebellum period all 
whites did not share the same priorities. Though most whites 
feared black empowerment and demanded government led by 
native conservatives, the divergence in priorities 
exemplified by the nebulous distinctions between the Knights 
of the White Camellia and the Ku Klux Klan symbolized a 
contrast among whites that was central to the chaotic 
conditions of the late nineteenth century. Although the two 
organizations shared many of the same ideals and members, in 
eastern Louisiana political control proved primary to the 
White Camellia while Klansmen typically regarded racial 
dominance as preeminent. The difference in the priorities 
and methods of these two groups contributed to a schism 
between piney-woods whites in the late nineteenth century 
which resulted in the emergence of violently competitive 
factions.
The distinctiveness between the two organizations 
sharpens when examining their day-to-day operations. The
Disbandment (New York: Neale Publishing Co., 1905) pp. 189-
198; John Ellis to Tom Ellis, March 6, and December 23, 1869, 
and January 11 and 29, 1870.
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membership of the White Camellia represented the best 
elements of white society. Most of their leaders in eastern 
Louisiana, including Tom and John Ellis, John Pipes, and J.B. 
McClendon represented the emerging business and professional 
class which provided leadership in the immediate post-war 
period. Others, such as former state senator and Washington 
parish patriarch Hardy Richardson, exemplified the old 
elite's commitment to the movement. The Klan's obsessive 
secrecy makes identifying members difficult. But the few in 
eastern Louisiana whose membership is certain differed from 
the Knights; they were younger, less affluent, and largely 
detached from sources of power. Tom Ellis referred to the 
Klansmen simply as "drinking characters." Other possible 
Klansmen such as Robert Babington, a Franklinton businessman 
and postmaster, represented those associated with both 
organizations.350
In the weeks preceding the November 1868 election, the 
white societies initiated an offensive which exemplified 
their respective practices. Having failed in the spring of 
1868 to achieve victory through legal means, the Democrats
350 John Ellis to Tom, March 6, 1869, in Ellis Family 
Papers (LLMVC) ; testimony taken by congressional subcommittee 
from: Charles Benedict, pp. 218-224, John Wood, p. 308,
Robert Babington, pp. 368-371, John H.Pipes, pp. 384-392, 
Martial Amacker, pp. 392-397, and Thomas C.W. Ellis, pp. 98- 
110, all in "United States Congressional Hearings 
Supplement," 1869. Ninth Census of the United States. 1870. 
"Heads of Hou eholdsy" Diary of Willie Dixon, entry June 16, 
1868, in William Y. Dixon Papers (LLMVC); Report on the 
Conduct of the Late Elections. 1869. pp. 83-86 and pp. 147- 
148.
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determined to triumph through extra-legal activities. The 
Daily Picayune declared in the immediate aftermath of the 
April election "the next time an election takes place we will 
be prepared, and their (Republicans) intimidation game will 
not be a very safe one." The most hotly disputed contest in 
addition to the presidential election and a few local races 
involved the selection of a congressman from eastern 
Louisiana. That race pitted an aging Louis St.Martin against 
the carpetbagger General J.H. Sypher in a bitter contest 
characterized by massive fraud and violence.
The white conservative campaign incorporated economic 
intimidation, psychological terror, and murder. One 
technique involved a systematic economic lockout of blacks 
who voted Republican. Acting at the behest of the Knights of 
the White Camellia, local Democratic executive committees 
issued protection papers to freedmen who voted Democratic. 
The papers identified the individual as a Democratic voter 
who was therefore entitled to retain his employment and 
receive valuable services provided by Democrats such as 
grinding corn and extending credit. Local newspapers and 
power brokers promoted this effort relentlessly in the weeks 
preceding the November election. According to congressional 
testimony the owners of the Magee Mill and Lumber Company in 
Washington Parish distributed fliers informing the freedmen 
that the mill would no longer grind their corn or cut their 
timber if they failed to vote Democratic. Isham McGee, a
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black resident of Washington Parish, confirmed that many 
freedmen voted Democratic simply to avoid losing their jobs 
or essential services. The Democrats circulated a petition 
among whites pledging that they would not buy from or sell to 
blacks who failed to vote Democratic. Those who refused to 
sign came under immediate suspicion. In the Florida parishes 
as in other regions of the South, voting Republican carried 
a stiff price.351
Another part of the Democratic strategy involved the use 
of terror. This aspect of the multi-faceted campaign of 
intimidation fell to the Ku Klux Klan. To fulfill their part 
of the scheme the Klan employed tactics designed to eliminate 
black leadership and inspire fear in their Republican 
opponents. During the interim between the April and November 
elections, the Klan sought to "turn over" Republican 
activists. Johnson E. Yerks, a leading St.Helena Parish 
Republican, informed a congressional investigating team that 
several prominent blacks presented letters urging them to 
turn over or face death. Yerks himself received a menacing
351 Diary of Willie Dixon, entry June 13, 1868, in
William Y. Dixon Papers (LLMVC); New Orleans Daily Picayune. 
April 15, 1868; letters received at Freedmen's Bureau
headquarters from James DeGrey, agent at Clinton, April 10 
and May 10, 1868, and W.H. Haugen, agent at Madisonville, May 
10, 1868, in Freedmen's Bureau Reports (National Archives). 
Testimony taken by a congressional sub-committee from; H.H. 
Bankston, pp. 83-87, James H. George, pp. 41 and 85, Johnson
E. Yerks, 87-90, William H. Wilder, pp. 91-94, John Evans, 
pp. 95-97, and Charles Benedict, pp. 218-224, in "United 
States Congressional Hearings Supplement, 1869;" Report on 
the Conduct of the Late Elections. 1869. pp. 83-86.
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letter signed only "KKK." Headed “Crow Hall Midnight," the 
letter warned that Yerks was suspected of Radical principles 
and should beware the hour of midnight. Other prominent 
Republicans received similar letters. H.H. Bankston 
testified that the Klan placed cards with mystic warnings on 
his door and those of other known Republicans. As the 
election neared the Klan began making nightly raids in full 
costume. Black Washington Parish residents Isham Buckhalter 
and Isham McGee received midnight visits from large groups of 
Klansmen. Both declared that the Klansmen "dressed in sheets 
from the top of their heads to their horses heels" and "wore 
false faces." The nightriders warned the blacks to vote 
Democratic or die. Buckhalter testified that the blacks knew 
the Klan were men and not ghosts, but added that most 
believed they would be killed if they voted Republican.352
Republican activists had good reason to fear the Klan. 
In the two weeks preceding the November election armed 
Klansmen in groups fifty to one hundred strong made nightly 
rides through the streets of Greensburg and Franklinton 
creating fear and consternation among friend and foe alike. 
Other groups of Klansmen made discreet yet menacing midnight 
rides near the homes of Republican organizers. Even more
352 Testimony taken by a congressional sub-committee 
from Johnson E.Yerks, pp. 94-95, Isham McGee, pp. 397-400, 
Isham Buckhalter, pp. 400-403, and H.H. Bankston, pp. 83-87, 
in "United States Congressional Hearings Supplement," 1869; 
Report on the Conduct of the Late Elections. 1869. pp. 83-86 
and 147-156.
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disturbing, Klansmen unexpectedly dynamited trees late in the 
evening near Republican homes greatly heightening the anxiety 
of the inhabitants. William Wilder and H.H. Bankston both 
declared that the "tree burstings" created extreme fear among 
local Republicans black and white. Wilder described panicked 
families huddled in their homes waiting to be attacked and 
afraid to venture out for sustenance much less to vote. Word 
circulated later that the "tree burstings" served as a signal 
to Klansmen that the election should proceed without violent 
interruption, indicating that the Klan recognized their 
campaign of terror had been successful. With little physical 
harm the Klan's nocturnal activities effectively neutralized 
a significant portion of the Republican electorate.353
But, seemingly exasperated by the intransigence of some 
black leaders who refused to "turn over," in the days 
immediately preceding the election the Klan systematically 
eliminated the black and significantly weakened the white 
Republican leadership. Congressional candidate J.H. Sypher 
emerged as the principal candidate for elimination. Sypher, 
widely regarded as a ruthless and opportunistic carpetbagger,
Testimony taken by a congressional sub-committee 
from: William H. Wilder, pp. 91-95, H.H. Bankston, pp. 83-
87, Charles Benedict, pp. 218-224, Martial Amacker, pp. 392- 
397, David Hennessy, pp. 220-222, "United States 
Congressional Hearings Supplement, 1869"; "Register of Murder 
and Outrages Committed," entries for November, 1868, describe 
numerous freedmen terrorized by nightriders "styling 
themselves Ku Klux," in Freedmen's Bureau Reports (National 
Archives); Report on the Conduct of the Late Elections. 1869.
pp. 83-86 and 147-156.
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along with his brother engineered the appointment to local 
office of numerous Republicans in eastern Louisiana. His 
frequent speeches to largely black audiences encouraging 
support for the Republican party and self defense enraged 
many whites in the Florida parishes.
Ten days before the November election armed bodies of 
whites broke up Republican meetings at Greensburg and 
Tangipahoa where Sypher planned to speak. Rumors circulated 
that prominent Republicans including Sypher and John Kemp, 
president of the local black Republican club, would be killed 
that night. Learning of the rumors Sypher wisely cut short 
his visit to Greensburg and canceled his appearance at 
Tangipahoa. Kemp received a final warning which he answered 
with a telegram to Governor Warmoth requesting troops. 
Unfortunately for Kemp, his message fell into the hands of 
Klansmen who intercepted the youth attempting to mail it in 
a nearby village. Late that evening a body of Klansmen 
crossed the state line below Osyka, Mississippi heading 
south. The Klan routinely employed neighboring dens in 
extreme cases to hamper identification. The nightriders 
entered the village of Tangipahoa and inquired at the hotels 
for Sypher. Learning of the absence of their prize the 
Klansmen proceeded to Kemp's home outside the town and 
brutally murdered him. Six days later Jim Beekham, leader of 
a black militia forming in western Washington Parish, 
similarly met his fate. Black Republican organizers Squire
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Roberts and Mumford McCoy barely escaped with their lives. 
The Republican mayor of Amite City placed Roberts under 
arrest for disturbing the peace on election day and probably 
saved his life. McCoy, a Greensburg blacksmith and 
legislative candidate received a post-election visit from a 
group of white men who denounced his activism. The visitors 
warned McCoy that if any whites should be harmed he would be 
held personally responsible and that as retribution the Klan 
would cut off his head. McCoy understandably fled the parish 
the same day. Many other less prominent freedmen suffered 
similar abuse including Bill Wheeler whose eyes were gouged 
out at Greensburg, and Daniel Lee and Marshall Thompson both 
bushwhacked near Amite.354
In addition to Sypher, the Klan also targeted other 
prominent white Republicans. James B. Wands, a former Union 
naval officer from New York, aroused the ire of Democrats by 
securing from Warmoth appointment as local tax collector and 
state representative. If the onerous burden of
Reconstruction taxation did not in itself condemn Wands, his
354 Testimony taken by a congressional sub-committee 
from: James H. George, pp. 41 and 95, H.H. Bankston, pp. 83-
87, Thomas C.W. Ellis, pp. 98-110, William H. Wilder, pp. 90- 
94, John Evans, pp. 95-97, James B. Wands, pp. 97-102, R.F. 
Briggs, pp. 23 6-238, Robert Babington, pp. 368-371, J.C. 
Bach, pp. 110-111, in "United States Congressional Hearings 
Supplement, 1869." "Register of Murders and Outrages 
Committed," May-December 1868, several entries November,
1868, in Freedmen's Bureau Reports (National Archives); 
letter received at Freedmen's Bureau headquarters in New 
Orleans from J.D. Buckley, agent at Amite City, November 15, 
1868 (ibid.); Report on the Conduct of the Late Elections.
1869. pp. 147-156; ibid.. 1868, p.13-14.
aggressive support of the Republican cause did. In the days 
preceding the November election Wands distributed Republican 
ballots in Livingston, St.Helena, and Washington parishes. 
Warned of a plot to kill him, Wands fled Franklinton the 
evening before the election and camped in the woods as 
Klansmen searched the area. David Hennessy, a member of 
Warmoth's newly created Metropolitan Police and a registrar 
of voters in Washington Parish was not so lucky. The day 
before the election the third attempt to kill Hennessy proved 
successful. Mass torchlight counter demonstrations by 
Republicans and Democrats in Clinton and Jackson avoided 
bloodshed only because both sides recognized the horrific 
casualties that could result. Describing a provocative 
Democratic procession near Olive Branch in East Feliciana 
Parish which stumbled into a similar Republican procession, 
Willie Dixon declared, "we came very near having a bloody 
battle with them." A timely absence from the region was all 
that saved Republican Congressman J.P. Newsham of West 
Feliciana from a brutal murder at the hands of an outraged 
mob. Numerous bloody encounters between individuals 
contributed to an incredibly high level of tension by 
election day in the Felicianas and East Baton Rouge. In the 
wake of massive election day violence and fraud, Freedmen's 
Bureau agent J.W. Coleman reported from Baton Rouge, "the
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Bureau appears to be the only protection the freedmen 
have.,|355
The pressure applied to black voters came from friend 
and foe alike. To counter Democratic threats and 
intimidation white Republicans warned that blacks who failed 
to vote, and Republican at that, would not receive their 
share of land and mules. Republicans routinely promised the 
freedmen that once in power their supporters would be 
appropriately compensated. Moreover, the Federal garrisons 
increasingly demonstrated an unwillingness to intervene on 
behalf of black Republicans. Prominent Republican William H. 
Wilder declared, "the soldiers are worse on the negroes than 
anybody else." Thus blacks had the option of risking their 
life by voting Republican or voting Democratic and forfeiting 
their only realistic hope for economic advancement.
355 Diary of Willie Dixon, entries August 1, 15, 22, 
29, September 2, October 19, and November 3, 1868, in William 
Y. Dixon Papers (LLMVC); testimony taken by a congressional 
investigating commission from James B.Wands, pp. 97-102 and 
Charles Benedict, pp. 218-224, in "United States 
Congressional Hearings Supplement," 1869. Letters received 
at Freedmen's Bureau headquarters in New Orleans from George 
Dunwell, agent at Clinton, June 9 and 20, 1868, J.W. Coleman, 
agent at Baton Rouge, November 20, 1868, H.E. Barton, agent 
at Clinton, November 10, 12, and 20, 1868, and Robert M.
Davies, agent at St.Francisville, October 14 and 20, 1868, in 
Freedmen's Bureau Reports. Report on the Conduct of the Late 
Elections. 1868. pp. 23-24; ibid., 1869, pp. 17-26, 79-81, 
and 229-230; Baton Rouge Tri-Weeklv Advocate. September 16, 
October 5, and November 4, 1868.
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Unfortunately for the freedmen this unenviable predicament 
would only get worse.356
The 1868 Democratic campaign of terror proved remarkably 
successful. By employing the lessons in brutality learned 
from the war the Democrats effectively neutralized much of 
their opposition. Political violence claimed the lives of 
2 04 black and white Republicans statewide with at least 
thirteen murdered in the Florida parishes. Rowdy armed 
Democrats congregated about most precincts intimidating all 
who sought to vote Republican. Colorized ballots made a 
voter's preference easily identifiable thus expediting 
coercive efforts. Only precincts guarded by Federal troops 
recorded any Republican votes. White and black Republicans 
voted Democratic at most polling stations in St.Helena and 
Washington parishes or faced the consequences of failing to 
vote. Their votes contributed to huge Democratic majorities 
in both parishes. The extent of their defeat alarmed both 
the state and national Republican leadership. Barely forty 
percent of the region's Republicans cast ballots for their 
party's ticket. Excepting in West Feliciana where the 
Republicans scored a substantial victory, every parish in 
eastern Louisiana returned a Democratic majority, (see table
356 Testimony taken by congressional sub-committee 
from: William H. Wilder, pp. 91-94, Thomas C.W. Ellis, pp.
98-110, and Charles Kennon, pp. 217-223, in "United States 
Congressional Hearings Supplement, 1869"; Letter received at 
Freedmen's Bureau headquarters in New Orleans from A. Finch, 
agent at St.Francisville, February 20, 1868, in Freedmen's 
Bureau Reports (National Archives).
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14) The margin of victory ranged from slightly more than one 
hundred votes in East Baton Rouge to a one hundred percent 
Democratic vote in Washington.357
The Republicans two-to-one majority among registered 
voters in the delta parishes easily offset a similar 
Democratic majority in the piney woods. Despite the regional 
preponderance of Republicans, what the Democrats had failed 
to accomplish through persuasion in April 1868 they achieved 
splendidly only seven months later. The key to success 
remained the unqualified application of violence. Moreover, 
Democratic efforts contributed to an emerging societal 
phenomena. The secret societies, and nightriding in general, 
promoted an important camaraderie among the country whites. 
Amongst the dearth of opportunities for fraternizing in the 
rural areas, Republican bashing became an important outlet 
for socializing and, ominously, violence was at its core. 
With startling alacrity violence progressed from a common 
element in the piney-woods of Louisiana and southwestern 
Mississippi to an integral aspect of the resident's very 
existence. Long acceptable in affairs of honor, unrestrained 
brutality emerged as the principal means of societal
357 Baton Rouge Tri-Weeklv Advocate. November 4 and 9, 
1868; Report on the Conduct of the Late Elections. 1869. p. 
xxix; testimony taken by a congressional sub-committee from: 
James H. George, pp. 41 and 95, William H. Wilder, pp. 91-94, 
Charles Benedict, pp. 218-224, and R.F. Briggs, pp. 236-238, 
in "United States Congressional Hearings Supplement, 1869"
T a b l e  1 4
1860 Presidential Election 
PARISH £RANT S E Y M O U R -
East Baton Rouge 1249 1353'
East Feliciana 644 1411
Livingston 149 670
St. Helena 136 1094
St. Tammany 470 704
Washington 0 757
West F e l 1ciana 1137 648
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regulation and governance. Significantly, violence became an 
aspect of behavior not merely accepted but expected. The 
events of the 1860's clearly demonstrated that the old adage 
"violence does not solve anything" was nonsense.
Since Grant did not require Louisiana's electoral vote 
to secure the presidency little formal protest accompanied 
the presidential election. But to insure that the 
Republicans retained control of state government Warmoth 
engineered the creation of two vital agencies. Though 
federal law prohibited the creation of a state militia, 
Warmoth established the Metropolitan Police Force to counter 
Democratic intimidation. Composed of white and black 
Republicans, the Metropolitans served as the governor's 
private militia independent of any other authority. Warmoth 
secured arms, including Gatling guns, in Washington which 
enabled the Metropolitans to become an effective fighting 
force. More importantly, Warmoth's Election Act provided for 
the establishment of a Returning Board to be controlled by 
reliable Republicans whose duties included tabulating votes 
and excluding those from regions influenced by violence or 
intimidation. Though intended to prevent fraud, the 
Returning Board proved as adept at stealing elections as did 
Democratic practices. Congressional investigators examining 
the results of the 1872 Louisiana elections reported that the
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Returning Board had committed "flagrant and transparent" 
fraud upon the citizens of Louisiana.358
To increase their strength on the local level in the 
wake of the November 1868 debacle, the Republican dominated 
legislature created several new parishes. Among these 
Tangipahoa, carved from portions of each of the four piney- 
woods parishes in eastern Louisiana, constituted the 
wealthiest. The new parish spanned the length of the Florida 
parishes from Lake Maurepas to the Mississippi state line 
along the course of the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad. An act 
of the legislature granted Warmoth the power to appoint all 
officials for the new parish. The certainty of Republican 
domination of Tangipahoa combined with the exclusion of the 
railroad from the existing parishes intensified piney-woods 
Democrats' hostility for the state government. The unusual 
procedure creating the new parish government led a suspicious 
Paris Ellis to assert, "I ascertained while in New Orleans 
that the Radicals were in ascendancy and offices being let to 
the highest bidder." But Republicans defended the necessity 
of creating the new parish. H.H. Bankston defeated for 
sheriff the preceding year testified during a congressional 
hearing, "they robbed me out of my election in St.Helena and 
I came to New Orleans took an active part in getting the new
"Report of the Special Congressional Committee of 
Three, 1874," pp. 1-34; James Longstreet to Henry Clay 
Warmoth, June 30, 1870, in Henry Clay Warmoth Papers (LLMVC) ; 
Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed pp. 177-182.
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parish created and asked for the appointment as sheriff." 
Commenting on the creation of the new parishes and the 
suspect qualifications of some of the appointed officials, 
the New Orleans Republican maintained, "men must be known to 
be in full sympathy with the administration before receiving 
office else its policy can not be carried out successfully, 
to the victors belong the spoils."359
Republicans believed the creation of new state agencies 
and parishes would provide the mechanisms to contain 
Democratic intimidation and maintain power. But regardless 
of the strategy they employed in eastern Louisiana their 
efforts would probably have failed. As violence became less 
a method of last resort and instead a preferred means for 
settling disputes, it became increasingly apparent that local 
Republicans and their northern supporters lacked the 
resources and resolve to prevail. Moreover, despite the odds 
against them the Republicans contributed directly to their 
own demise.
In the past three decades many scholars have sought to 
portray the vast majority of Republicans as honest and hard 
working rather than as the incompetent thieves presented in
359 Acts Passed by the General Assembly of the State 
of Louisiana at the Second Session of the First Legislature 
Begun and Held in New Orleans. January 4, 1869 (New Orleans: 
Ramirez-Jones Printing Co., 1869) p. 83; Paris Ellis to Tom 
Ellis, March 7, 1869, and John Ellis to Tom Ellis, March 6 
and 13, 1869, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC) ; testimony taken 
by a congressional investigating committee from H.H. 
Bankston, pp. 83-87, in "United States Congressional Hearings 
Supplement, 1869;" New Orleans Republican. March 10, 1869.
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earlier studies. And indeed many Republicans, black and 
white, did risk their lives to improve the plight of the 
freedmen and establish a more democratic southern society. 
Some such as James B. Wands remained successful in the post- 
Reconstruction period without abandoning their principles 
based on their integrity. But Wands did not represent the 
majority of Republicans in Louisiana. Unfortunately, the 
greed of some overshadowed the sincere intentions of others. 
Republican corruption contributed to an unqualified hatred 
for carpetbagger control among the conservative whites of 
Louisiana, and more importantly, reinforced latent 
disillusionment with government.360
The dramatic increase in the rates of taxation initiated 
by the Republican-dominated legislature in itself proved 
catastrophic for many already heavily burdened by war related 
debts. But the hefty increase in salaries the legislature 
provided for themselves and other elected officials provoked 
even greater resentment. Likewise, the public became 
increasingly aware that scores of state jobs were being
360 For recent interpretations see: Richard Current,
Those Terrible Carpetbaggers (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988) ; Eric Foner, Reconstruction:_____ Americas
Unfinished Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and Row,
1988); James McPherson, Ordeal Bv Fire: The Civil War and
Reconstruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992) ; Kenneth
Stampp, Era of Reconstruction. 1865-1877 (New York: Knopf, 
1965). For older views see: Claude Bowers, The Tragic Era
Reconstruction After Lincoln (New York: Halcyon, 1929);
E.Merton Coulter, The South Purina Reconstruction. 1865-1877 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1947);
William A. Dunning, Reconstruction. Political and Economic. 
1865-1877 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1907).
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awarded to northerners who had little interest in Louisiana 
other than making a personal profit. Vermont native M.H. 
Twitchell secured the establishment of Red River Parish in 
upstate Louisiana and filled the payroll with family members 
and friends. Twitchell repeatedly sponsored legislation 
increasing both the salaries and per diem of elected 
officials. Congressional investigators found that by 
controlling the legislative, judicial, and tax collecting 
mechanisms of the parish the Twitchells had amassed great 
wealth to the detriment of many established families, and 
they naturally held the Republican Party responsible. 
Governor B.F. Flanders received and acted on scores of 
petitions from northern business associates soliciting jobs 
and lucrative state contracts. The always controversial 
J.Madison Wells acknowledged that Federal officers had stolen 
between $50,000 and $100,000 of New Orleans municipal funds 
while serving as city administrators. Wells also confirmed 
that General Banks had placed scores of cronies on the state 
and New Orleans municipal payroll including his brother who 
continued to receive a large salary though he had not resided 
in the city for months. Some Republicans recognized that 
selfishness and rampant corruption nullified their hopes for 
reform. Governor Warmoth's successor William Pitt Kellogg 
conceded that the Republicans had awarded themselves 
excessive salaries. In a January, 1876 address to the 
legislature, Kellogg acknowledged that the salaries of many
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state and local officials greatly exceeded the amount fixed 
by the constitution. In urging the legislature to contain 
its greed, he noted that excessive government salaries served 
as a principal contributor to the increasing state debt. He 
concluded, "there is no public officer in Louisiana whose 
duties as such are so onerous or his responsibilities so 
great as to justify a larger compensation than $10,000 a 
year."361
Kellogg had long recognized that excessive fees and 
salaries damaged the image of the Republicans and decimated 
the state treasury. The unregulated fees for services
361 "Annual Address of Governor William Pitt Kellogg," 
House Journal. First Legislature, First Session, January 
1876, p. 20; G. Wheat to Maston Newsom, June 17, 1874, and
receipt for parish taxes, June 22, 1874, in Maston Newsom
Papers (LLMVC); Port Vincent Livinqstonian. April 25, 1879; 
New Orleans Republican. January 1, 1873. "Report of the 
Special Congressional Committee of Three, 1874," see in 
particular pp. 104-108; Ted Tunnell (ed.). Carpetbagger From 
Vermont: The Autobiography of Marshall Harvev Twitchell
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989); J.
Mills Thornton, "Fiscal Policy and the Failure of Radical 
Reconstruction in the Lower South," in J.M. Kousser and James 
McPherson, Region. Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor
of C. Vann Woodward (New York: Oxford University Press,
1982); Oscar Lestage, "The White League in Louisiana," 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly Vol. xviii, No. 3, pp. 657- 
661, herein after referred to as Lestage, "The White League 
in Louisiana." Philip H. Sheridan to Orville E. Babcock, 
January 21, 1875, General Philip H. Sheridan Letter (Newberry 
Library); Elizabeth Tilton to B.F. Flanders, October 3, 1867, 
John Hutchins to Flanders, October 6, 1867, David Barritz to 
Flanders, October 9, 1867, all in Benjamin F. Flanders Papers 
(LLMVC); J.Madison Wells to Andrew Johnson, May 22, 1865, in 
J. Madison Wells Collection (National Archives). In one of 
his first actions as Governor Francis T. Nichols, the first 
Redeemer chief executive, promoted legislation "reducing 
their (legislators) present extravagant compensations," see 
Nichols to E.A. Burke, February 20, 1877, in Francis T.
Nichols Papers (LLMVC).
charged by Republican appointed sheriffs, coroners, district 
attorneys, and other officials necessitated increasing rates 
of taxation. The method of taxation often seemed designed to 
promote default and seizure. In one instance, Maston Newsom 
unexpectedly received notice to pay more than $340 in taxes 
within ten days or all his property would be confiscated. 
The public naturally resented higher taxes particularly when 
they received little benefit from their sacrifice. A 
congressional investigating committee sent to discover the 
source of Louisianians' fierce resistance to their government 
expressed dismay at the policies of the Republican state 
government. The committee's report exemplified its surprise: 
"In the parishes taxation has been carried almost to the 
extent of confiscation. In many of the parishes all the 
white Republicans and all the office holders belong to a 
single family. As the people saw taxation increase and 
prosperity diminish, as they grew poor while officials grew 
rich, they became naturally sore." The committee further 
noted that the governor and legislature exercised 
"extraordinary and exclusive jurisdiction over political 
questions," commanded a private political militia, created 
monopolies, abolished courts, and "commanded a degree of 
power scarcely exercised by any sovereign in the world." The
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committee concluded that based on its observations few could 
wonder at conditions in Louisiana.362
In an 1874 legislative address Kellogg acknowledged an 
emerging trend of enormous consequence for the future 
development of the region. According to the governor, under 
the direction of the Republicans legal fees and court costs 
had risen to a level that "bared the way to the courts in 
many instances." He prophetically concluded that this 
tendency would cause many to avoid using the legal system to 
redress grievances. His fear would soon be proven painfully 
correct. Yet Kellogg contributed to this problem himself by 
continually interfering with the courts in favor of friends 
and allies creating the impression that the legal system was 
also subject to his will.363
In addition to the selfishness and seeming lack of 
concern for the state's welfare exhibited by many Republican 
officials, accusations of theft of public and private funds 
further damaged their image. Deputy United States Marshall 
Thomas H. Jenks admitted to a congressional committee that
2 "Address of Governor William P. Kellogg," Senate 
Journal. First Legislature, First Session, January 5, 1874, 
pp. 12-13; notice of taxes due signed by James B. Wands, in 
Maston S. Newsom Papers (LLMVC); "Report of the Special 
Congressional Committee of Three, 1874," pp. 3-34; New 
Orleans Times. April 14, 1873.
363 "Address of Governor William P. Kellogg," Senate 
Journal. First Legislature, First Session, January 5, 1874, 
pp. 12-13. J.J. Monette to William P. Kellogg, January 22, 
1876, and J. Regan to Kellogg, March 17, 1876, in Governor's 
Correspondence Collection (LLMVC).
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his brother L.B. Jenks embezzelled $14,000 in parish funds 
while serving as deputy tax collector in East Feliciana. 
Jenks1s theft continued a trend of missing funds in East 
Feliciana during Reconstruction. Fraud surfaced there as 
early as 1869 when only $10,000 of a special $20,000 tax 
reached the parish treasury. Tangipahoa and Livingston also 
recorded large discrepancies between the amount of taxes 
collected and the amount of money deposited in the parish 
treasuries. Municipal funds also mysteriously disappeared 
under the direction of Republican administrators. The 
Woodville Sentinel repeatedly demanded that the Republican 
mayor account for missing funds during his two years in 
office. Comparable accusations appeared in many regional 
newspapers. The Amite City Democrat and the Tangipahoa 
Democrat gleefully published weekly accounts of alleged 
fraudulent practices. The Amite City Democrat fanned the 
flames of outrage by declaring that Republican graft had 
increased the state debt from four million to seventy-five 
million dollars during their seven years in power. 
Allegations involving the theft of personal funds proved even 
more disturbing to local residents. Prominent Tangipahoa 
Parish Republican organizer Johnson Yerks faced frequent 
accusations concerning the theft of funds entrusted to his 
care by an elderly school teacher.364
364 Testimony of Thomas H. Jenks, found in "Testimony 
Taken by the Select Committee on Alleged Frauds in the 
Presidential Election of 1876," United States House of
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The Republicans further damaged their own image by 
neglecting to fulfill their promises. During each
campaigning season they advocated educational reform. Long 
neglected in Louisiana, improved educational opportunities 
proved attractive to many poorer whites as well as blacks. 
And initially the Republicans did make some dramatic reforms. 
The legislature appropriated funds establishing the first 
schools for blacks and increased funding for existing public 
schools. An infusion of Peabody educational funds improved 
the quality of many private as well as public schools. But 
the increasing flow of funds created greater temptation for 
theft. Prior to the war many parishes publicly disclosed 
school appropriations to prevent theft of the precious funds. 
St. Helena Parish in particular meticulously accounted for 
every educational dollar spent. Yet by 1873 black and white 
community leaders expressed outrage over the misappropriation 
of educational funds entrusted to Republican officials. J.W. 
Armstead, a black West Feliciana proponent of education, 
informed congressional investigators that the Republicans 
misuse of school funds created scores of Democratic
Representatives. Miscellaneous Document No. 31, pt.1, Forty- 
Fifth Congress, Third Session (Washington: Government
Printing, 1879) herein after referred to as "Select Committee 
on the Presidential Election of 1876." Letter signed 
"Citizen" to Henry Marston, June 8, 1869, in Henry Marston 
Papers (LLMVC); Lestage, "The White League in Louisiana," p. 
633; Woodville Sentinel. August 26, 1871; Amite Citv
Democrat, August 21, September 18, and November 6, 1875;
Amite City Tangipahoa Democrat. June 7, 1873, September 19, 
1874, and September 26, 1874; Mary Lotspich to Maston Newsom, 
March 20, 1873, in Maston Newsom Papers (LLMVC).
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supporters among the freedmen. Reports submitted by many 
parish superintendents appeared chaotic. They provided no 
indication of funds appropriated, spent, or even the number 
of schools operating and students in attendance. Some 
parishes, such as St.Tammany, simply stopped submitting 
reports after 1866.365
Despite Republican boasts to the contrary, by 1874 the 
school system was in a shambles. Barely 37 percent of 
children in the Florida parishes attended school. Though 
this constituted a slight numerical improvement over the 
antebellum period, particularly among blacks, the figures 
compiled by the state Board of Education indicate that the 
increasing appropriations did little to broaden the appeal 
and quality of education. Unfortunately a significant 
percentage of the school appropriations never reached the 
schools themselves. Summary reports for the period 1870-1877 
demonstrate that excepting Livingston, which consistently 
accounted for all school appropriations, every parish in
365 St. Helena Parish Records, 1816-1853, see treasury 
reports February, 1853 and October, 1857 (LLMVC); James 
Mobley, "The Academy Movement in Louisiana," Louisiana 
Historical Quarterly. Vol. XXX, No. 3, pp. 739-928. 
Testimony taken by a congressional investigating committee 
from J.W. Armstead, pp. 295-299, in "Select Committee on the 
Presidential Election of 1876," pt. 3; "Annual Report of the 
State Superintendent of Education," Legislative Docs.. First 
Legislature, Third Session, January 1870; ibid.. First 
Legislature, First Session, 1874; "Report of the 
Superintendent of Education," ibid.. Fourth Legislature, 
First Session, 1852, demonstrates increased level of funding 
to education in 1870's. Copy of speech of E. John Ellis 
delivered at Cummingsville, Ohio, October 5, 1880, in Ellis 
Family Papers (LLMVC).
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eastern Louisiana witnessed the theft of substantial school 
funds. Massive embezzelment characterized the school systems 
in East Feliciana, East Baton Rouge, and St. Tammany. The 
treasurer of the St. Tammany school board purloined with such 
vigor that he effectively forced the closure of the entire 
parish system for lack of operating funds. Similarly in 
Tangipahoa superintendent Johnson E. Yerks embezzled nearly 
$8,000 in school funds thereby decimating the parish system. 
St. Helena recorded a shortfall of over $20,000 in funds 
appropriated for education and monies actually distributed to 
the schools. The systems in Washington and West Feliciana 
through the efforts of some determined individuals maintained 
a higher degree of integrity. But in each of these parishes 
the schools suffered from the misuse of funds for political 
purposes and outright theft. Describing the problems 
plaguing education in Louisiana, David F. Boyd, president of 
Louisiana State University complained, "radicalism, 
mismanagement of state affairs for years past has daily hurt 
us, hindered us with a state debt and driven off private 
patronage.,|366
Republican fraud and mismanagement of state funds began 
at the highest levels of government, state auditors Charles 
Clinton and George Johnson under the direction of Governor 
Kellogg allegedly permitted the theft of over $320,000 in 
state funds. When state investigators came to examine the
380
auditors' records for evidence of misappropriated funds, 
Johnson locked the office doors and removed the records to 
the Customhouse at New Orleans beyond the reach of state 
investigators increasing public outrage.367
But most damaging of all to the character of the 
Republicans were the accusations of massive corruption on the 
part of the legislature. According to the allegations, in 
the form of levee and asylum bills Republican legislators 
routinely pocketed huge sums of state funds. Funds 
appropriated for the construction and improvement of levees 
and other state works frequently either disappeared or fell 
far short of requirements. E.L. Weber, Republican senator 
from West Feliciana Parish, described the method of fraud to 
a congressional commission. On his arrival at the 
legislature Senator M.H. Twitchell encouraged Weber to join 
a combination of nineteen Republican senators. Twitchell 
explained that the nineteen senators comprised a one vote 
majority which afforded them great opportunity. According to 
Weber, the combination frequently secured passage of levee 
bills which appropriated millions of dollars for certain 
parties and companies holding levee bonds and contracts. The 
members of the combination received from $10,000 to $20,000 
of the appropriation for each bill that passed. Weber
"Report of the Joint Committee of investigation of 
the Affairs of the Late Auditors to the General Assembly 
state of Louisiana," Legislative Docs.. First Legislature, 
First Session, 1878.
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described scores of levee, asylum, and statehouse bills in 
which the combination pocketed hundreds of thousands of state 
dollars. Thomas Durant exposed a similar conspiracy to
defraud the state of six million dollars of federal levee
appropriations. In an 1876 address to the legislature
Governor Kellogg acknowledged that the state had awarded a 
monopoly contract to the Louisiana Levee Company, and despite 
the appropriation of millions of dollars, the company had 
made little effort to meet its obligations. By 1875 the 
misappropriation of funds endangered essential state
services. The failure to maintain the levees resulted in 
frequent crevasses, particularly a disastrous one at Bonnet 
Carre which decimated railroad operations for months. C.B. 
White, director of the state Board of Health, complained to 
Governor Kellogg that over the past two years the legislature 
had failed to appropriate any funds to maintain essential 
quarantine stations leaving the citizens vulnerable to the 
depredations of yellow fever.368
The most compelling evidence of Republican corruption 
came from the Republicans themselves. Congressman J. Hale 
Sypher acknowledged that the corruption of some Republicans
368 Testimony taken by a congressional investigating 
commission from E.L. Weber, pp. 234-235, in "Select Committee 
on the Presidential Election of 1876," pt. 3; "Annual Message 
of Governor William Pitt Kellogg," Senate Journal. first 
Legislature, First Session, January, 1876, pp. 8-10; Thomas 
Durant to Benjamin Flanders, June 7, 1867, in Benjamin F.
Flanders Papers (LLMVC); C.B. White to Kellogg, May 1, 1875, 
in Governors Correspondence (LLMVC); Amite City Democrat. 
November 20, 1875.
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had destroyed the party's chances for success in Louisiana. 
Similarly St. Helena Republican J.P. Wall affirmed his 
commitment to the party but denounced those members "who to 
obtain their own selfish ends succumbed to a few renegades 
not worthy to be recognized by any party." Many black voters 
abandoned the Republicans when they failed to provide the 
quality of leadership they sought. Black Republicans in West 
Feliciana Parish directed a "petition of outrage" to Governor 
Kellogg for appointing a corrupt official to their parish 
leadership. Black leader Jefferson Carter declared that his 
support for the Democrats resulted from the Republicans 
failure to fulfill their promises to establish schools for 
the freedmen. Explaining his support for the Democrats, 
Isaac Guy declared, "the Republicans promised me in 1865 two 
mules and forty acres of land to vote for them; well I voted 
for them, but I learned to find if I got my forty acres and 
two mules I would have to work for it myself. So I thought 
I would just as soon vote for the others, because I got tired 
of being fooled." Others resented the Republicans' refusal 
to nominate qualified blacks for local office. Black 
Republican leader Charles Roxborough summarized the 
disillusionment of many of his followers, " I know that the 
Republican party conferred citizenship and the right to vote 
upon the negro. But even this, it seems to me, was done from 
political necessity - in order to swell their vote - to keep 
them in ascendancy in this country." A congressional
3 8 3
investigating committee confirmed that Republican fraud, 
exploitation, and neglect had served to drive many blacks 
into the arms of the Democrats.369
Although rampant corruption existed in Louisiana during 
Reconstruction, fraud was not unprecedented in the Bayou 
State. In fact corruption had been a standard practice of 
Louisiana politics since the colonial period. Tax collectors 
routinely recorded discrepancies in the amount of funds 
collected and delivered to the state treasury. Officials 
also frequently awarded state contracts and positions to 
family members or friends. Far from it, Reconstruction 
produced neither the first nor last corrupt Louisiana 
official. The significant difference between Reconstruction
369 Amite City Tangipahoa Democrat. June 7, 1873;
petition protesting the appointment of L.B. Jenks to serve as 
parish recorder in West Feliciana, submitted to Governor 
Kellogg April, 1876, in Governors Correspondence (LLMVC). 
Testimony taken by a congressional investigating commission 
from; Jefferson Carter, pp. 150-151, Isaac Guy, p. 165, and 
Charles Robinson, p. 3 37, in Documents of the United States 
House of Representatives. Forty-Fourth Congress, Second 
Session, Misc. Docs. No. 34, pt. 3; Charles Roxborough to 
J.S. Davidson, Chairman Republican Parish Executive 
Committee, July 31, 1890, Charles A Roxborough Letter
(LLMVC); testimony taken by a congressional investigating 
commission from; J.Hale Sypher, pp. 541-542, and B.F. 
Joubert, pp. 453-462 in "Testimony Taken by the Select 
Committee to Investigate the Condition of Affairs in 
Louisiana," United States House of Representatives Document. 
Forty-Second Congress, Second Session, Misc. Doc. No. 211, 
1872? also see testimony of James E. Anderson, pp. 1-64, and 
Thomas H. Jenks, pp. 315-318, in "Select Committee on the 
Presidential Election of 1876." Amos Ackerman to B.F. 
Flanders, May 22, 1872, and H.C. Hobart to Flanders, February 
6, 1873, in Benjamin F. Flanders Papers (LLMVC); Amite City 
Democrat. September 4, 1875; "Report of the Special
Congressional Committee of Three, 1874" pp. 18-30.
384
corruption and that of other periods lay in the public 
awareness of the fraud. Newspapers and Democratic
politicians relentlessly paraded evidence of corruption 
before the public thereby creating the impression that such 
practices were unprecedented. The propaganda blitz persuaded 
many that Reconstruction served as an anomaly to Louisiana's 
tradition of "good" government. Although this fallacy does 
not absolve corrupt Republican officials from their misdeeds, 
particularly that of subverting an opportunity for realistic 
reform, it does help explain the intensity of the 
conservative reaction.370
Allegations of Republican fraud reinforced the 
Democratic appeal. Conservative leaders effectively
manipulated events in support of their own goal to re-secure 
power. By encouraging the belief that Republican officials 
systematically looted the state of its wealth, the Democrats 
produced a near hysterical demand for their ouster. 
Suspicions of electoral fraud seemed confirmed in 1872 when 
the Republican dominated Returning Board seated Kellogg as 
governor over the Fusion candidate and Warmoth backed John 
McEnery. Thereafter conservative Louisianians ceased to 
regard the state government as legitimate. By 1873 most of
370 List of defaulting tax collectors in Legislative 
Docs.. Second Legislature, First Session, 1853; Board of 
Trustees of Montpelier Academy vs. Dr. Thomas Webb, May 6, 
1841, involves allegations of theft of school funds, in St. 
Helena Parish Records (LLMVC); Thomas G. Davidson to A.W. 
Walker, October 23, 1870, involves efforts to purchase black 
votes, in Ellis Family papers (ibid.).
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the country parishes were in open revolt against the 
government. Local political contests dramatically aggravated 
the prevailing hostility. In the Florida parishes, where 
local judges exercised enormous influence, judicial races 
provoked the greatest controversy. For the remainder of the 
century the dominant regional party or faction could often be 
identified by those seated at the parish and district 
judicial benches.
In a hotly contested 1873 race in the Sixth Judicial 
District, comprising the piney-woods region of the Florida 
parishes, Democratic incumbent E.P. Ellis faced challenges 
from Regular Republican Ashford Addison and Independent 
Republican William Breed Kemp. Despite some irregularities, 
far less violence characterized this elections than those of 
1868. The results indicated an Ellis victory by more than 
1000 votes. Democrat Bolivar Edwards defeated his Republican 
challenger F.M. Bankston by a similar margin for district 
attorney. But determined not to lose their grip on power, 
particularly in a parish created and designed to be a 
Republican stronghold, the Returning Board threw out the 
results and declared Kemp and Bankston the winners. Though 
many black voters avoided the polls as a result of earlier 
events, little evidence of direct voter intimidation existed 
to sustain the Returning Board's findings. In addition the 
Democrats commanded a 2500 vote majority over the Republicans 
in the piney-woods parishes. Nevertheless other Florida
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parish contests, particularly the parish judgeship and 
legislative seats, were determined in a similar manner. The 
most provocative debate centered on the seating of Kemp, whom 
many regarded as a consummate opportunist and scalawag. When 
Federal authorities at New Orleans sustained the Returning 
Board's findings, open rebellion flared in eastern Louisiana. 
The Tangipahoa Democrat, in a call for active resistance 
declared, "to resist by lawful means Kellogg's taxes, when 
Kellogg's tools and lickspittles are his judges is worse than 
nonsense. There is no justice for the people in these bogus 
courts. They are filled with usurpers, who were put in 
office because right or wrong, they would meekly do their 
masters bidding."371
The seating of the defeated Republican candidates 
provided the proverbial match to the tinderbox of Democratic 
outrage. As Democrats in Tangipahoa, Livingston, and St.
37 Amite City Tangipahoa Democrat. September 27,
1872, February 1 and 7, 1873; "Annual Address of Governor
William P. Kellogg," Senate Journal. First Legislature, First 
Session, January 5, 1874. "Report of the Special
Congressional Committee of Three," Documents of the United 
States House of Representatives. Forty-Third Congress, Second 
Session, House Report No. 101 (1657), pt. 1, 1874, pp. 338- 
340. John Ellis to Tom Ellis, January 29, 1873, May 30,
1873, and June 4, 1873, Alexandra to Maggie, July 28, 1873, 
and copy of court order summoning witnesses to appear in the 
case of E.P. Ellis vs. W.B. Kemp, dated April 21, 1873, all 
in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); Case of W.B. Kemp vs. E.P. 
Ellis, No. 4655, in Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in 
the Supreme Court of Louisiana (New Orleans: Republican 
Printing, 1873) Vol. XXV, pp. 253-263. Report on the Conduct 
of the Late Elections. 1869. p. xxix; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. April 25 and May 9, 1873; Amite City Independent. 
November 7, 1874; Port Vincent Triune. July 22, 1873.
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Tammany organized to prevent the seating of the "usurpers," 
mass meetings in East Feliciana, St. Helena, and Washington 
urged support for their oppressed neighbors. J.G. Kilbourne 
and G.W. Munday, prominent members of the old elite in East 
Feliciana and St. Helena respectively, directed the 
Democratic response. The widespread reaction exemplified 
regional white unity and the resurgent authority exercised by 
the planters.372
Armed bodies of men seized the courthouses in 
Tangipahoa, Livingston, and St. Tammany parishes in support 
of the Democratic officials functioning under the authority 
of the McEnery pretender government. Sporadic violence 
erupted in St. Helena and Washington as residents vented 
their frustration. In Livingston Parish armed citizens 
removed the seat of justice from Springfield to the 
Democratic stronghold at Port Vincent on the Amite River. 
Initially state officials seemed overawed by the 
determination of the resistance and did nothing. But as 
frightened Republicans rushed to the safety of New Orleans 
with accounts of open rebellion, Kellogg determined to 
act.373
372 New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 25 and May 9, 
1873; "Address of Governor William P. Kellogg," Senate 
Journal. First Legislature, First Session, January 5, 1874; 
John Ellis to Tom Ellis, May 20, 1873 and June 4, 1874, in 
Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
373 New Orleans Daily Picayune, April 25 and 29, 1873; 
"Address of Governor William P. Kellogg," Senate Journal. 
First Legislature, First Session, January 5, 1874; John Ellis
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To suppress the insurgency he secured an additional 
$30,000 in armaments from the Federal government and 
dispatched an elite brigade of the Metropolitan Police to 
contain the most severe outbreaks. Three of the seven 
deployments of Metropolitans in 1873 served to quell 
disturbances in the Florida parishes. The Daily Picayune 
reported the mood prevailing in the Florida parishes. "The 
people feel deeply this new outrage. The Kellogg usurpation, 
infamous before, brought now into closer contact with the 
citizens, grows irksome beyond endurance. If these outrages 
are repeated, the citizens will meet force with force. The 
hireling bands of a pretended authority, denounced in the 
United States Congress as a vile usurpation, resting only on 
fraud and force will be resisted."374
The Metropolitans had arrived in Amite City on April 19, 
1873 at a late hour in the evening. After surrounding the 
public buildings and disarming the surprised guards, they 
forced the Democratic officials to step down and installed 
their Republican opponents. With their mission accomplished 
the Metropolitans perilously held their position before 
departing shortly before dawn on the fourth day. This force 
then combined with another brigade dispatched from New 
Orleans to conduct the dangerous journey across Livingston
to Tom Ellis, May 20, 1873 and June 4, 1874, in Ellis Family 
Papers (LLMVC).
374 Ibid.
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Parish. After fighting off some bushwhackers, the 
Metropolitans returned the seat of government to Springfield 
and installed the Republican officials. A similarly 
successful operation forced the opening of the parish court 
at Covington in St. Tammany Parish a few months later. 
Though these expeditions successfully disrupted the 
functioning of the local Democratic government, their 
inability to deploy garrison forces insured the weakness of 
the Republican officials. As a result, by 1873 virtual chaos 
reigned in the piney woods.375
Kellogg hoped that an effective Metropolitan Police 
Force backed by Federal troops would allow him to regain lost 
ground in the country parishes. But the steadily decreasing 
numbers of the Federal occupation army soon rendered it 
virtually ineffective beyond New Orleans. Moreover, 
outrageous incidents such as the Colfax Massacre, in which 
armed whites slaughtered at least one hundred blacks, 
demonstrated that Kellogg exercised little realistic 
authority outside the Crescent City. The September 1874 
defeat of the Metropolitans at the hands of the White League, 
a para-military force committed to white supremacy and
"Address of Governor William P. Kellogg," Senate 
Journal, First Legislature, First Session, January 5, 1874; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 23, 25, 28, and 29, 1873; 
New Orleans Times. April 19, 24, and 28, 1873; Amite City 
Independent. September 5, and November 7, 1874; Amite City 
Tangipahoa Democrat. October 31, 1874; John Ellis to Tom
Ellis, May 30, and June 4, 1873, in Ellis Family Papers
(LLMVC).
390
supporting the McEnery claim to the governorship, radically 
curtailed the effectiveness of the governor's private 
militia. Even with the unflinching support of the Grant 
administration and a rump Federal force quartered primarily 
in New Orleans, by late 1874 the Kellogg government tottered 
on the brink.
When word reached the piney woods of the Metropolitans' 
defeat in New Orleans, most of the Republican officials fled 
the region. President Grant's assurance that Federal troops 
would support their claims to office prompted some to return 
and resume, as much as possible, their duties. The 
Republican Amite City Independent warned the Democrats, "the 
new Rebellion will be crushed. The president has ordered 
troops stationed at White League strongholds all over the 
state." Similarly the New Orleans Republican declared that 
if the Democrats persisted in their efforts to "clean out" 
the Yankees, southerners could expect the same treatment in 
the North. According to the Republican, "a brutal mob in any 
northern city might at any time revenge this intolerance in 
a manner painful to all sentiments of humanity. As there are 
more southern people who go North than northern people who go 
South, this balance of insult and possible injury must go 
against our section." Unmoved by these threats the Amite 
City Democrat declared, "let us organize, unite, and arm for 
the task, they can call us White League, Ku Klux or what not. 
The mercenaries that prowl around the country forcing
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themselves into offices against the express will of the 
people will be attended to in due time." The same paper 
urged the use of violence as the best means to destroy their 
enemies. By the close of 1874 state authority in Washington 
Parish had completely collapsed; the remainder of Louisiana 
would soon follow.376
The power of the Federal army alone sustained the 
government of William Pitt Kellogg. In the Florida parishes 
Kellogg's authority rarely extended beyond the garrison towns 
of Baton Rouge and Bayou Sara. By 1874 he commanded only a 
fraction of the electoral strength necessary to maintain his 
administration. As a result, the Republicans increasingly 
relied on the expanding fraud perpetuated by the Returning 
Board at New Orleans to retain control of state government. 
Revulsion for the increasingly impotent administration 
encouraged the growth of a movement to join the Florida 
parishes with Mississippi. Giving voice to this idea the 
Amite City Democrat reported, "We have lately heard from 
numerous persons in the Florida parishes on the subject of 
the annexation of this part of Louisiana to Mississippi. 
There is decidedly strong feeling in favor of it and that 
feeling is growing everyday." Although this movement soon
376 New Orleans Republican. April 5, 1873; Amite City 
Independent. September 5, 1874; Amite City Democrat.
September 4 and December 11, 1875; Amite City Tangipahoa
Democrat. September 26, 1874; New Orleans Daily Picayune. May 
9, 1873. Resolutions adopted at White League meeting in
Bayou Barbary, Livingston Parish, September 5, 1874, in Mary 
Alley Scrapbooks (LLMVC).
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faded, it demonstrated that many residents despised 
Republican government more than they loved Louisiana.377
As the prestige of state government declined in the eyes 
of the majority in eastern Louisiana, local government 
assumed an increasing importance. Daniel Wedge informed 
congressional investigators that the people of eastern 
Louisiana respected local officials but had no confidence in 
state authority. Conservatives intensified their efforts to 
secure control of the local courthouses in response to the 
increasing irrelevancy of state government. And increasingly 
their efforts proved successful. Joseph Thompson, a member 
of the McEnery pretender legislature announced from Covington 
in the fall of 1874, "we in St. Tammany have taken possession 
of the courthouse and public offices - have turned over the 
keys to the officers elect and intend to hold possession. I 
hope that the other Florida parishes have done the same."378
377 Amite Citv Democrat. April 1, 1876; D.A. Weber to 
William P. Kellogg, March 6, 1876, in William Pitt Kellogg 
Papers (LLMVC); E.R. Platt, Assistant Attorney General to 
William P. Kellogg, 1874, describes additional troops en 
route to Baton Rouge, in Ellis Family Papers(ibid.); "Report 
of the Special Congressional Committee of Three, 1874," pp. 
1-34; S.E. Claille, Intimidation and the Number of White and 
Colored Voters in Louisiana in 1876 As Shown bv Statistical 
Data Derived From Republican Official Reports (New Orleans: 
Picayune Printing, 1877) p. 31; New Orleans Daily Picayune. 
May 4, 1873.
378 Testimony taken by a congressional investigating 
committee from Daniel Wedge, p. 138, in "Select Committee on 
the Presidential Election of 1876," pt. 3; Joseph M. Thompson 
to Tom Ellis, September 17, 1874, in Ellis Family Papers
(LLMVC).
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With startling speed conservatives in each of the 
remaining Florida parishes bludgeoned their way back into 
power. Convinced that politics offered no hope for an honest 
trial, they instead relied on a proven means for success, 
violence. since 1871 several counties in southwestern 
Mississippi, particularly Amite and Wilkinson, had 
experienced frequent racial troubles, often on a massive 
scale. Wilkinson County blacks, many of them Union army 
veterans, boasted a well-armed and disciplined militia which 
frequently picketed roads and marched en masse through towns. 
Their forthright actions created alarm among the local whites 
and neighboring Louisiana conservatives who typically 
cooperated closely. Madison Batchelor reported that a plot 
had been uncovered among blacks in Amite County to rise and 
slaughter as many whites as possible "about a certain day." 
By the summer of 1875, with Kellogg's authority rapidly 
deteriorating, East Feliciana whites determined to act. 
Armed mobs drove all black elected officials from the parish 
threatening them with death should they return. Kellogg 
provided encouragement, but little else, yet by summer's end 
the threat of Federal intervention had produced an uneasy
379peace. '
379 Madison Batchelor to Albert, September 6, 1874, in 
Albert Batchelor Papers (LLMVC); Woodville Sentinel. August 
26, 1871; House Journal. First Legislature, First Session, 
January 1876, pp. 94-99; Henry Marston to J.F. Temple and 
Sons, August 5, 1875, and Marston to J.W. Burbridge and Co., 
August 5, 1875, in Henry Marston Letter Book No. 4, p. 228.
Nevertheless, sensing victory and Republican weakness 
the Democrats continued to push their advantage. On October 
7, 1875 an armed mob marched on the courthouse at Clinton, 
shot black Sheriff Henry Smith, and forced him to resign on 
pain of death. The mob then entered the courthouse, halted 
the proceedings, and also forced the Republican judge to 
resign. A few days later a leader of the mob, Dr. J.W. 
Saunders nearly succumbed to a massive dose of poison 
administered by his maid. A hysterical crowd promptly hanged 
the maid, Babe Mathews, in the courthouse square and marched 
on Baton Rouge to arrest her brother-in-law, former 
Representative John Gair, whom Mathews had implicated as the 
instigator of the plot. Apprehended by the mob in Baton 
Rouge, Gair, a leading East Feliciana Republican since the 
advent of Radical Reconstruction, never reached Clinton. 
Mobs similarly forced the resignation of Republican officials 
in West Feliciana and St. Helena. A mass meeting in East 
Baton Rouge produced a petition demanding that the Republican 
officials resign or face the consequences. Lieutenant 
Governor C.C. Antoine acting in Kellogg's absence announced, 
"certain evil disposed persons acting in concert with 
residents of Mississippi have banded together for unlawful 
and disorderly purposes and brought about in the parish of 
East Feliciana and in the district immediately adjacent 
thereto a condition of anarchy and mob violence." Antoine 
ordered the First Division State Militia to the region to
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restore order, though at least one Clinton resident, Henry 
Marston, reported that no troops ventured into the troubled 
area. Commenting on the events in the Felicianas the Amite 
City Democrat remarked causticly, "the insolent, ignorant, 
negro Sheriff Smith of East Feliciana has at last 
resigned. "380
With state officials apparently unable or unwilling to 
contain the violence, whites in the delta parishes continued 
to effectively "bulldoze" the territory. Bulldozing emerged 
as a term describing the attainment of goals through armed 
might by crushing the opposition into submission. Under the 
pretext of preventing the theft and resale of seed cotton by 
blacks, armed bands of regulators terrorized the freedmen and 
Republican sympathizers in the Felicianas and East Baton 
Rouge. Nightriders brutally abused and murdered many blacks 
in an effort to return them to a state of economic and 
political dependence. Blacks responded in kind by forming 
the Sage Hill Club which retaliated by murdering at least two 
whites. By the eve of the election of 1876 chaos prevailed
House Journal. First Legislature, First Session, 
January 1876, pp. 94-99; Amite City Democrat. November 20, 
1875; Henry Marston to J.F. Temple and Sons, August 5, 1875, 
and Marston to Jacob Wall, October 14, 1875, both in Henry 
Marston Letter Book No. 4, pp. 228 and 250. Although Marston 
noted that no troops arrived to assist the Republicans during 
the troubles in the fall of 1875, he did indicate that a 
small contingent of troops visited Clinton in the summer of 
1876, see Marston to A. Foster Elliot, July 9, 1876, in Henry 
Marston Letter Book No. 4, p. 300 (LLMVC).
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throughout the Florida parishes. The Daily Picayune declared 
Louisiana to be in a complete state of anarchy.381
With the Kellogg administration near collapse by the 
spring of 1876, many black and white Republicans abandoned 
the party in an effort to salvage their political careers or 
save their lives. Kellogg attempted to shore up the party in 
rural areas by replacing some wavering parish officials with 
loyal Republicans. Yet almost as soon as they received their 
commissions, mobs forced their resignation or flight. The 
Bayou Sara Ledger reported, "four members of the West 
Feliciana police jury were forced to resign, in open session, 
last Monday, to save trouble, in the face of blue jackets,
Testimony taken by a congressional investigating 
committee from: John DeLee, pp. 140-142, E.L. Weber, pp.
198-234, Henry Reid, p. 266, J.W. Armstead, pp. 295-299, J.S. 
Dula, pp. 351-363, T.M. Clark, pp. 383-385, George Swayze, 
pp. 386-388, Julius Green, pp. 506-509, in "Select Committee 
on the Presidential Election of 1876," pt. 3. Testimony 
taken by a separate congressional investigating commission 
from: Isaac Guy, p. 165, M.F. Jamar, p. 238, Benjamin
Rogers, pp. 241-243, G.W. Munday, p. 332, J.G. Kilbourne, p. 
457, and George Norwood, p. 480, in Documents of the United 
States House of Representatives. Forty-Forth Congress, Second 
Session, House Misc. Doc. No. 34, pt. 3, 1877, herein after 
referred to as "Congressional Investigating Committee at 
Clinton." E.L. Weber to William P. Kellogg, April 10, 1876, 
Richard Walther to Kellogg, April 24, 1876, Joseph W.
Armstead to Kellogg, May 1, 1876, and copy of proceeding from 
the Inquest on the Death of Max Aronson on the Plantation of 
H.S. Perkins, May 13, 1876, all in William Pitt Kellogg
Papers (LLMVC). J.A. Glasper to Stephen Packard, January 
1877, in Louisiana State Executive Department, Governors 
Correspondence (ibid.); Henry Marston to A. Foster Elliot, 
October 17 and 19, 1875, in Henry Marston Letter Book No. 4, 
p. 251 (ibid.); Amite citv Democrat. November 27, 1875; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. May 4, 1873. "Reminiscences of Days 
Before and After the Civil War," printed pamphlet by Philip 
H. Jones, in Annabel Smith Papers (LLMVC).
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who are stationed at a stones throw from the seat of justice 
in our parish."382
During the course of 1876 increasingly chaotic 
conditions prevailed in eastern Louisiana. Murder and 
bushwhackings occurred with painful frequency as lawless 
elements exploited the lack of legal authority. Arson, 
attributed to disgruntled blacks, destroyed significant 
portions of the towns of Clinton, Jackson, and Amite City. 
Most importantly, by early summer large sections of eastern 
Louisiana and southwestern Mississippi appeared on the verge 
of a race war. Following the murder of white regulator Max 
Aronson in West Feliciana Parish, conservatives intensified 
their campaign of terror against local blacks. Multiple 
lynchings of freedmen suspected in Aronson's murder climaxed 
when armed blacks massed near Pinckneyville, Mississippi. 
Whites from across eastern Louisiana and southwestern 
Mississippi converged on the region. Though possessing 
superior numbers, the blacks panicked when confronted by the 
white mob. Before darkness brought a halt to the slaughter, 
reports indicated that fifty freedmen had been killed 
outright and a half a dozen others lynched along the roadside 
as an example of the futility of their rebellion. With black
Amite Citv Democrat. April 1, 1876, and Bavou Sara 
Ledger reprinted in ibid., May 20, 1876; Joseph Armstead and 
George Swayzie to William P. Kellogg, May 1, 1876, and Agnes 
Jenks to Kellogg, September 23, 1876, in William Pitt Kellogg 
Papers (LLMVC).
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resistance effectively crushed, the last hope for the 
Republican party in eastern Louisiana flickered out.383
In the wake of the Pinckneyville massacre scores of 
blacks who had previously testified about the scope of 
Democratic intimidation recanted their statements before a 
congressional commission at New Orleans. Other blacks 
abandoned the Republicans during the election of 1876 based 
on the strength of Democratic promises of schools and higher 
wages. Samuel Houston, a Republican party official in 
St.Tammany Parish, noted "the times were getting poorer and 
they (blacks) were getting poorer with them, the Democrats 
gave kind and conciliatory speeches to the blacks and 
generally out-generaled the Republicans.11 Nevertheless, the 
Republicans managed to "steal" the election in part by 
rejecting the returns from East Feliciana and portions of 
West Feliciana, East Baton Rouge, Livingston, and Tangipahoa. 
But with blacks firmly cowed and Republican state authority 
smashed, Louisiana effectively returned to the rule of native 
whites. As a final demonstration of their contempt for 
Republican government a committee visited and shot the newly
383 Cornelia Stewart to Albert Batchelor, May 23,
1876, Batchelor to Cornelia Stewart, May 25, 1876, in Albert 
Batchelor Papers (LLMVC); records of the inquest relating to 
the death of Max Aronson in West Feliciana, May 13, 1876, in 
William Pitt Kellogg Papers (ibid.). Testimony taken by a 
congressional investigating committee from M.F. Jamar, p.
238, in "Congressional Investigating Committee at Clinton, 
1877"; Amite Citv Democrat. April 22, May 13 and 20, 1876; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. March 24, 1876. James S.
McGehee, "Ramble in Autobiography," unpublished manuscript in 
James S. McGehee Papers (LLMVC).
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"elected" Governor Stephen Packard who quickly abandoned his 
claim.384
Jubilant celebrations heralded the collapse of 
Republican government in Louisiana. It mattered little that 
"John Sherman's theft" had secured Louisiana's electoral vote 
for the Republican presidential candidate Rutherford B. 
Hayes. In their eyes from the depths of defeat and despair 
Louisiana whites had secured a brilliant victory over the 
Yankees. And for the moment native Louisiana whites felt 
unified and confident. But in reality the victory over 
Reconstruction would prove more catastrophic to many regions 
of the South than had defeat in war. For blacks the greatest 
of triumphs, liberation from bondage, concluded with the 
advent of decades of political exploitation and grinding 
poverty. And for whites a generation of bitterness and 
brutality had distorted their perceptions of the traditions
384 Testimony taken by a congressional committee from 
Samuel H. Houston, p. 263, in "Testimony Taken by the Select 
Committee on the Recent Elections in Louisiana," Documents of 
the United States House of Representatives. Forty-Fourth 
Congress, Second Session, House Misc. Doc. No. 34, pt.2; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. October 31, 1876; testimony taken by 
a congressional investigating committee from: Thomas
McWilliams, p. 139, Henry Reid, p. 266, J.W. Armstead, p. 
295, Andrew Duncan, pp. 300-314, T.M.J. Clark, pp. 381-383, 
T.W. Dalton, pp. 503-505, and Julius Green, pp. 506-507 in 
"Select Committee on the Presidential Election of 1876," pt. 
3; "Report of the Board of Returning Officers to the General 
Assembly of the State of Louisiana, Relating to the Election 
of 1876," Louisiana Legislative Docs.. 1877. Also concerning 
blacks defection from the Republican party see Henry Marston 
to J.W. Burbridge and Co., September 29, 1876, Henry Marston 
letter book No. 4, p. 320, (LLMVC).
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they held dear and the methods appropriate to sustain 
them.385
The unprecedented publicity surrounding cases of 
Republican fraud and impropriety demonstrated just how 
corrupt government could be, thus augmenting the plain folk's 
suspicions of authority. Many among the piney-woods dwellers 
recalled the failure of government to address their needs in 
the antebellum period, and an enlightened few recognized that 
their own desires had always been subsumed by the grand 
strategy of the planter elite. Each time assertiveness or 
discontent surfaced among the plain folk the elite 
circumvented their intentions with appeals for unity in the 
face of a common threat. The Spanish colonial government, 
abolitionists, Federal troops, and carpetbagger government 
had all served to rally the forces against a common enemy. 
And throughout racial unity served as the foundation for 
their appeals. In the post- Reconstruction period no 
apparent common enemy would emerge. Blacks, no longer 
enslaved or politically independent, would pose far less of 
a threat. With these threats removed, contempt for the old
385 Substantial evidence, most provided by the
Republicans themselves, exists to demonstrate that John 
Sherman engineered the fraud which handed Louisiana's 
electoral vote to the Republicans in 1876. See testimony 
taken by a congressional investigating commission from: 
James E. Anderson, pp. 1-64, Thomas H. Jenks, Agnes Jenks, 
and J.Hale Sypher, pp. 60-325, in "Select Committee on the 
Presidential Election of 1876;" unsigned statement presented 
to B.F. Flanders concerning John Sherman's role in 1876 
Louisiana electoral fraud and subsequent patronage, January 
28, 1889, in Benjamin F. Flanders Papers (LLMVC).
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elite quickly manifested itself in the piney woods. In the 
first major post-Reconstruction election voters in Tangipahoa 
Parish, the scene of the fiercest late nineteenth-century 
disorders, decisively voted down the old elite in favor 
independent candidates.386
In the late nineteenth century the Florida parishes 
served as a microcosm for examining the South as a whole. In 
the Felicianas and East Baton Rouge stability returned as the 
old elite augmented by some new faces effectively returned to 
power. But in the piney woods a continuing cycle of social 
and political instability predominated. In addition to the 
turmoil promoted by a rapid economic and demographic 
transformation several determinants peculiar to the region 
insured social strife. Among these were a failure of 
leadership and latent resentment for authority. The piney- 
woods republican tradition, as manifested in eastern 
Louisiana, virtually demanded defiance to governance. And at 
least thirty years of suspect government had amply reinforced 
latent suspicions of authority. Leadership failed primarily 
due to its inability to overcome the powerful factions which
386 The results from Tangipahoa during the state
election of 1879 startled members of the old elite as well as 
the Democratic party. In particular the defeat of judicial 
candidates O.P. Amacker and J.M. Thompson, both members of 
the pre-war elite and conservative leaders during 
Reconstruction indicated the changing political climate. 
Though the Democrats ran strong in all the towns excepting 
the village of Tangipahoa, they generally did poorly at all 
rural precincts, see Amite Citv Independent. December 6, 
1879.
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rapidly emerged and also because of its failure to cope with 
the incredible levels of violence.
By the close of Reconstruction eastern Louisiana 
constituted a culture of violence. Few residents conducted 
their daily affairs unarmed. Sixteen years of fighting 
Federal troops and Republican government had demonstrated the 
effectiveness and finality of brutality. From the year 
immediately preceding the outbreak of war to the year of the 
close of Reconstruction the murder rate increased 900 
percent. Similarly the level of assault increased by 
approximately 377 percent. Such incredible rates of violence 
did not simply end with the conclusion of Reconstruction. An 
even more appalling period of misery and terror would follow. 
With the common enemies removed the white factions turned on 
themselves in a chaotic carnage of factional feuding which 
terrorized the population and decimated the economy. In his 
last annual address to the legislature William P. Kellogg 
summarized the enduring condition of the Bayou State, "the 
great need of Louisiana is peace - peace and the enforcement 
of the laws, with the active concurrence of the people for 
whose protection the laws are devised." Kellogg could not 
have realized that his words would prove more relevant twenty 
years later than they had when he first spoke them.387
"Report of the Attorney General," Louisiana 
Legislative Docs.. 1860; ibid., 1877. "Annual Address of
Governor William Pitt Kellogg," House Journal. First 
Legislature, First Session, January 1876, p. 22.
Chanter Six 
War Without Honor: Chaos Ensconced
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In a swampy area along a roadside in northeastern 
Tangipahoa Parish three men waited nervously. One, a teenage 
boy with little experience in such matters, crouched 
anxiously in a clump of bushes about one hundred yards up the 
road from the others. If all went as planned, he would 
announce the approach of the unfortunate victim with a series 
of bird calls. The two assassins, both armed with double 
barrelled shotguns and Winchesters, remained concealed in the 
thickest undergrowth near a stream bed. A can of turpentine 
and a pile of cigarette butts lay at their feet. As morning 
turned to midday, the bushwhackers settled in for another 
day of patient waiting. Their rival had survived another 
morning. Perhaps he would come tomorrow, and if not, they 
just might shoot somebody then anyway.388
Similar situations constituted a regular occurrence in 
the Florida parishes as well as in many other regions of the 
late nineteenth-century rural South. With the close of 
Reconstruction large areas of the South returned to a
388 Similar descriptions of bushwhackings found in: 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 4-5, November 9, and 
December 11, 1897; New Orleans Times Democrat. July 4-5, 11, 
December 11, 1897.
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semblance of the stability they knew in the antebellum 
period. But in other regions, unrestrained violence remained 
a fundamental component of everyday life. In some relatively 
isolated areas of the piney woods and mountain South scores 
of fierce feuds erupted. Many of these feuds found their 
origins in the struggle for economic and political primacy 
which characterized much of the post-Reconstruction South. 
The frequency and endurance of this white- on-white violence 
indicated the presence of a retarded system of justice and 
the continuity of the frontier mentality. Moreover, it 
demonstrated a breakdown in the social homogeneity which 
prevailed among native whites during Reconstruction. But 
more importantly, the widespread acceptance of violence 
unregulated by traditional interpretations of honor, 
indicated a perverted understanding of the Jeffersonian- 
Jacksonian concepts of independence and honor. In the 
Florida parishes, violence did result from perceived threats 
to individual liberty. But it also functioned as a matter of 
economic or political policy, frequently motivated by but 
transcending concerns for independence and honor.389
389 For examples of late nineteenth century southern 
violence see: Michael Hyman, The Anti-Redeemers: Hill
country Political Dissenters in the Lower South From 
Redemption to Populism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1990); O.V. Burton, In Mv Fathers House 
There Are Many Mansions: Family and Community in Edgefield.
South Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1985); Stephen Cresswell, Mormons. Cowboys. 
Moonshiners and Klansmen: Federal Law Enforcement in the
South and West (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1870-1893); Robert Ingalls, Urban Vigilantes in the New
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Among the piney-woods dwellers of eastern Louisiana the 
Jeffersonian tradition served not as a blueprint for creating 
good citizens but instead as the instigator of an obsessive 
concern with liberty and independence. Rather than promoting 
agrarian virtue, the republican tradition as manifested in 
the Florida parishes produced a suspicion of government and 
authority figures in general. This perverted tradition 
demanded a resistance to restraints on liberty even to the 
point of employing dishonorable means, such as shooting 
perceived agents of oppression in the back. Only the 
presence of a series of common enemies prevented the fruition 
of this philosophy from the antebellum period to the close of 
Reconstruction. With the common threats removed, this 
debauched Jeffersonianism waxed ascendant producing an 
ungovernable society overwhelmed by violence.
The feudists themselves were not the only ones who 
demonstrated the presence of a perverted republican ideal. 
Although the unwillingness of certain individuals to address 
the chaotic conditions can certainly be attributed to 
cowardice, this in itself does not account for the reaction 
of the majority. The tacit tolerance of lawlessness by the 
mass of the population signified instead the dominance of a
South: Tampa 1882-1936 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1988) ; Charles Mutzenberg, Kentucky1 s Famous Feuds and 
Tragedies (New York: R.F. Fenno Co., 1917); Altina Waller,
Feud: Hatfields. McCoys. and Social Change in Appalachia.
1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1988) .
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corrupted Jeffersonian tradition as a social determinant. By 
employing only those aspects of the Jeffersonian tradition 
conducive to their social and political agenda, local power 
brokers promoted in the people an intense but distorted 
republican legacy, which violently rejected government and 
other sources of restraint on their individual liberty. The 
refusal of the mass of the population to address the 
lawlessness reinforced the impression that individual liberty 
was most effectively manifested through the barrel of a gun. 
In an effort to explain the source of the chaotic conditions 
prevailing in the Florida parishes, the Daily Picayune 
described the residents as peculiar people "who are 
exceedingly jealous of what they deem their rights, and it 
was mainly through their misconception of what those rights 
really were that the troubles originated.1,390
Evidence of this dangerous tradition is readily 
apparent. One recent immigrant to the area received a 
chilling response to an article he published castigating the 
prevailing violence and distorted sense of personal rights 
common to the region. A derisive response from a long-term 
resident warned the newcomer that he had lived in the 
territory too briefly to understand "society here," adding 
contemptuously, "his stay here will be short unless before he 
leaves some domestic misfortune should happen to him or his,
N e w  O r l e a n s  D a i l y  P i c a y u n e . A p r i l  1 2 ,  1 8 9 9 .
4 0 7
which heaven forbid will help him understand the social 
qualities of this community."391
The ominous circumstances were furthered by a legacy of 
instability connected to the criminal and rebellious 
composition of the initial settlers. The plain folk's strong 
proclivity for rebellion against the existing order simmered 
as the political agenda of the ruling elite repeatedly 
subsumed their aspirations. Lingering suspicions of 
authority, combined with the increasing demands of the market 
economy and years of unprecedented brutality, all contributed 
to the emergence of a peculiar set of social mores. By the 
late nineteenth century, confirmation of governmental 
corruption and the absence of a unifying common enemy 
permitted the emergence of the dangerous product of this 
tradition, unleashing a vicious cycle of violence and 
anarchy.
In many areas of the post-Reconstruction South stability 
returned under the direction of the old elite. Despite the 
continuity of racial and class oppression their resumption of 
power signalled the return of societal equilibrium. In 
Louisiana, years of chaotic conditions climaxed with the 
dramatic collapse of the Republican government. The sudden 
Federal refusal to sustain the Republican government, 
combined with the prevailing disorder in the rural parishes, 
created a momentary power vacuum. In most of the delta and
391 A m i t e  C i t v  I n d e p e n d e n t . A u g u s t  2 0 ,  1 8 8 7 .
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sugar parishes the planters easily reasserted their 
dominance. But in some areas of the state, particularly the 
piney-woods region of eastern Louisiana, local residents 
resisted the return of the prewar status quo.
In a determined but haphazard manner many voices urged 
the people to concentrate on personal concerns rather than 
the political agenda of the elite. The expanding influence 
of the emerging merchant-professional class exacerbated the 
challenge to planter power. Calls for new leadership 
surfaced in all areas of the Florida parishes. In a direct 
attack on the legacy of planter dominance the Baton Rouge 
Capitolian-Advocate declared, "the old war horses of 
antebellum days have become so mixed in their political 
theology, so crochet and rank by reason of a thousand 
political entanglements and creeds, that the only salvation 
for the country is in placing its politics in the hands of 
the young men." Recognizing the necessity of explaining 
their rejection of the old elite the same paper continued, 
"there can be no doubt that these (old elite) and these alone 
have caused a large proportion of our discord, strife and 
bitterness within the party in past years, and with all 
seriousness we assert that the only means of escape in the 
future is to trust our political fates to new men."392
Although in the delta parishes their vast patronage 
enabled planter interests to maintain the lion's share of
392 B a t o n  R o u g e  C a p i t o l i a n - A d v o c a t e . A u g u s t  1 5 ,  1 8 8 8 .
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authority, in the piney woods, where the planter elite had 
always maintained a precarious grip on power, a serious 
challenge emerged. At the forefront of this dispute the 
piney-woods press gave voice to the dissenters. Among the 
most aggressive of the newspapers in eastern Louisiana, the 
Franklinton New Era condemned the efforts of Feliciana 
planters to dominate politics in the piney-woods parishes. 
The political intrigues of delta planters in the piney woods 
represented a particularly sore topic for many in the eastern 
parishes. Similarly the Amite City Florida Parishes 
published letters attacking the "political bosses and bloats" 
who had long dominated the region and now sought to entrench 
their power further. The same paper attacked government 
mismanagement and the failure of local politicians to address 
the will of the majority. As an alternative to maligning the 
prevailing conditions, the Amite City Democrat reminded its 
readers of the independence and security inherent in the 
piney-woods lifestyle, attributes which the residents had 
virtually abandoned to conform to the agenda of the planter 
elite.393
The sharpest break with the politics of the past 
occurred in Tangipahoa Parish. The new parish initiated the 
move to resist the resurrection of the prewar status quo when 
its voters repudiated the old elite in the initial state
393 Franklinton New Era. August 15, 1888; Amite City 
Florida Parishes. July 15, August 5 and 12, 1891; Amite City 
Democrat. October 2, 1875.
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elections. And indeed Tangipahoa was aptly suited for this 
leadership. The rapid economic and demographic
transformation of Tangipahoa, occasioned by its proximity to 
the New Orleans-Jackson Railroad, greatly exacerbated the 
post-Reconstruction instability. The possibilities created 
by the railroad encouraged scores of opportunists to settle 
in Tangipahoa. By the early 1870's Tangipahoa was second 
only to East Baton Rouge among the Florida parishes in the 
number of white residents and the parish seat, Amite City, 
had equaled Clinton as the second largest town in eastern 
Louisiana. The influx of new settlers, combined with the 
weakened status of the antebellum elite, permitted the rise 
of numerous factions which competed fiercely for political 
control. This situation in turn provoked resentment on the 
part of the traditional piney-woods dwellers and the old 
elite, many of whom had opposed the railroad and now fiercely 
resisted its associated consequences.394
As events would demonstrate, Tangipahoa experienced some 
of the most ferocious societal divisions in the nation during 
the course of the late nineteenth century. But despite the 
savagery of its conditions, Tangipahoa was not alone. 
Factional politics and economic competition destabilized the
Amite Citv Independent. December 6, 1879; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. December 8, 1897; Ninth Census of the 
United States. Population (Washington: Government Printing,
1872) pp. 154-157 and 629.
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piney woods of much of Louisiana and especially the Florida 
parishes for the next three decades.
Bitter factional disputes emerged in Louisiana 
immediately following the overthrow of the Republican state 
government. With the Republicans removed as an effective 
force, the Democrats rapidly fragmented into three primary 
groups: the moderate patricians, the lottery dominated ring
faction, and the reactionary Bourbons. The bitter divisions 
among these three statewide factions contributed 
significantly to the turbulent political conditions in the 
Florida parishes. Few local political contests operated 
beyond the intrigues of the Democratic factions. In the 
winter of 1892 the Daily Picayune observed that bitter 
hostility prevailed among the Democrats in eastern Louisiana. 
Weary of the infighting and disappointed by the lack of 
unity, congressional candidate C.J. Boatner expressed the 
feelings of many Democrats in an 1894 speech; "I am heartily 
tired of factional fights and want to see the party united as 
in the days of 1868 to 1879." Others placed party above 
personal ambition in a vain effort to reduce the infighting. 
B.T. Young declined the nomination for representative from 
St. Helena in an effort to alleviate factional 
antagonisms.395
395 C.J. Boatner to Steve Ellis, March 12, 1894, Tom 
Ellis to Steve, December 4, 1879, Steve to Tom, September 23, 
1883, M.S. Newsom to Tom, December 14, 1883, multiple letters 
regarding Democratic factional fighting july 1885-August 
1887, Steve to Tom, April 5, 1892, S.M. Robertson to Steve,
4 1 2
The dramatically weakened Republicans also suffered from 
infighting and factional divisions. They too endured bitter 
internal disputes resulting from the popular aversion for the 
rule of the old elite. The struggle of younger Republicans 
to cast off the domination of sugar-planting interests ripped 
asunder party organization in the Florida parishes which 
added to the political chaos. In a heated denunciation of 
the efforts of old-line Republicans to maintain their 
dominance the Kentwood Commercial declared, "there was a time 
perhaps when two or three men could manipulate the politics 
of the parish behind locked doors but it won't do now." The 
Commercial joined the Weekly Picayune in prophesying "an end 
to the Republican organization here" if its members did not 
negotiate a speedy conclusion of their internal troubles.396
Factional fighting debilitated party loyalty and 
correspondingly the entire regional political structure. But 
factionalization was not limited to politics. During the
August 25, 1893, T.M. Akers to Steve, August 8, 1894, T.E. 
Warner to Steve, September 10, 1894, all in Ellis Family 
Papers (LLMVC). Charles Lea To Uncle Hardy, March 20, 1879, 
in Hardy Richardson Papers (ibid.); Lemuel Conner to Dearest 
Mother, April 27, 1884, in Lemuel Conner Papers (ibid.). New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. January 23 and 30, 1892; Greensburg 
St. Helena Echo. September 26, October 3 and 10, 1891,
January 23 and February 13, 1892; Amite Citv Independent.
December 22, 1883; Kentwood Commercial. January 1 and March 
13, 1897; Frankl inton New Era. August 31, 1887 and August 15, 
1888; Amite City Florida Parishes. October 1 and 8, 1890,
August 12 and September 16, 1891.
396 Kentwood Commercial. April 4 and August 1, 1896, 
June 5, 1897; New Orleans Weekly Picayune. September 10,
1896, Daily Picayune. December 5, 1897; Steve Ellis to Tom, 
April 5, 1892, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
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course of the late nineteenth century bitter divisions also 
emerged along social, cultural, and economic lines. 
Temperance advocates provoked almost constant controversy by 
aggressively encouraging prohibition. Local tavern keepers 
and patrons of the illicit "blind tiger" moonshine 
distilleries often forcefully opposed the efforts of the 
"drys." Hostility surrounding the temperance movement 
climaxed in June 1890 when two days of rioting disrupted 
communities in northern Tangipahoa and St. Helena parishes, 
as well as portions of neighboring Pike County, Mississippi. 
Heated controversy also frequently plagued the efforts of 
railroad promoters and educational reformers. The prevailing 
antipathy often provoked extreme controversy over seemingly 
insignificant issues. Efforts to purchase a building to 
serve as the parish courthouse repeatedly produced hostile 
factions in Tangipahoa as did the controversy created by the 
ban on sling shots in Amite City.397
Perhaps the most significant division in white society 
centered on racial attitudes. In particular this controversy
Kentwood Commercial. July 9, 1895 and August 22, 
1896; Amite City Florida Parishes. October 8, 1890 and March 
11, 1891; New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 10, 1889 and 
October 16, 1897; Amite Citv Democrat. November 6, 1875.
E.D. Frost to H.S. McComb, July 15, 1875, in W.M. Francis and 
E.D. Frost Out Letters Collection (Newberry Library); E.W. 
Preston to Robert R. Reid, April 27, 1897, in Robert R. Reid 
Papers (LLMVC). R.L. Duvall to Robert Corbin, March 17, 
1892, in Robert A. Corbin Papers (ibid.); broadside entitled 
"To the Citizens of the Parish of Tangipahoa," concerns 
factions surrounding the location of the courthouse building, 
in Louisiana Broadside Collection (ibid); Amite City Council 
Minute Books, January 30, 1886 (Amite City Hall).
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pitted racial moderates against those who demanded 
unqualified white supremacy. During the last phase of 
Reconstruction many whites advocated racial cooperation as a 
tool to overcome the Republican government. As early as the 
fall of 1874 the impassioned debate surrounding this issue 
had created a rift in the once-solid ranks of Florida parish 
Democrats. Addressing those who supported racial
cooperation, Democratic organizer Charles Kennon declared, 
"we can never control the negro vote for the simple reason 
that it involves social equality which we can never accept. 
Let our banner be white and keep it unsullied." But other 
whites disagreed, preferring instead to grant blacks the 
suffrage which they in turn would control. The Weekly 
Picayune observed that blacks were learning "who would give 
them employment and treat them kindly." In return for 
political support blacks would be granted limited 
opportunities for advancement. Most importantly, some 
secured employment in white- owned businesses. For the 
cooperationists black employment provided a cheap an£ easily 
exploited source of labor. Black votes and labor contributed 
to the empowerment of one white faction at the cost of the 
unqualified hatred of the other.398
398 Charles Kennon to Tom Ellis, November 11, 1870 and 
October 6, 1874, Tom Ellis to Steve, April 1, 1884, all in 
Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC). Resolutions adopted by White 
League meeting at Bayou Barbary, Livingston Parish, September 
5, 1874, in Mary Alley Scrapbooks (ibid.). Amite City
Florida Parishes. August 2 6 and September 16, 1891; New
Orleans Weekly Picayune. February 24, March 2, and April 9,
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It should be noted that despite the factionalization of 
white society blacks were victimized by all white groups. 
The New Orleans Weekly Picayune summarized the prevailing 
racial climate in eastern Louisiana: "the question of white
supremacy is not an issue here as it is well understood that 
the citizens will not tolerate anything else." Completely 
cowed by the massive violence characterizing the final months 
of Reconstruction, blacks retained only the unenviable option 
of suffering exploitation or intimidation. While the 
advantages of controlling black votes and labor proved 
readily apparent to all whites, one primary group determined 
to exclude blacks, while the other sought to use them. This 
strategical fissure contributed significantly to the eruption 
of bitter factional feuding.399
During the 1870's and 1880's economic conditions 
improved substantially in eastern Louisiana. Considerable 
new industry, primarily lumber mills, brickyards, and cotton 
mills, located predominantly along the course of the
1896, and Daily Picayune. February 22 and July 4, 1897,
January 10, 1898; Charles E. Lea to Uncle Hardy, March 20,
1879, in Hardy Richardson Papers. Testimony of Samuel H. 
Houston, in "Testimony Taken by the Select Committee on the 
Recent Election in Louisiana," United States House of 
Representatives Report. Forty-Fourth Congress, Second 
Session, 1877, p. 263; testimony of J.W. Armstead, pp.297- 
299, Robert C. Wickliffe, pp.548-549, and John Kennard, 
p.592, in "Testimony Taken by the Select Committee on Alleged 
Frauds in the Presidential Election of 1876," United States 
House of Representatives Report. Forty-Fifth Congress, Third 
Session, 1879.
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railroad. Included were some large firms such as the 
Isabella (later Banner) Lumber Company at Kentwood, in 
northeastern Tangipahoa Parish, and the Gullet Cotton Gin 
Manufacturing Plant at Amite City. Other industrial concerns 
included shoe and box factories, vegetable canneries, and 
railroad repair facilities. In addition, scores of truck 
farms dotted the landscape alongside cotton fields and herds 
of grazing livestock. The rapid rate of development 
initially created a labor shortage. Moreover, it heightened 
the tension between planters and commercial interests who 
competed directly for laborers. E.D. Frost regional director 
for the Illinois Central Railroad, successor to the New 
Orleans-Jackson line, complained to H.S. McComb that fierce 
competition for laborers raged between planters and railroad 
interests in the Florida parishes. Likewise the Amite City 
Gazette published letters from St.Helena planters desperately 
seeking cotton hoers.400
400 E.D. Frost to H.S. McComb, November 3, 1875, in 
W.M. Francis and E.D. Frost Outletters Collection (Newberry 
Library); Amite City Gazette. May 23, 1890; Amite City
Democrat. November 20, 1875. Amite city Tangipahoa Democrat. 
August 9, 1872; Kentwood Commercial. March 16, July 1, 9, and 
16, 1895, March 14, 1896, June 12 and July 17, 1897; "Report 
of the Chief of the Bureau of Soils," United States 
Department of Agriculture Report (Washington; Government 
Printing Office, 1905) p. 252. Amite City Florida Parishes. 
November 26, 1890 and March 4, 1891 (notes nine sawmills
operating in a five mile radius about Hammond); Newsom Brick 
Yard and Sawmill receipts, in John Thomas George Papers 
(LLMVC); Charles Gayarre to L.E. Simonds, July 4, 1875 and
November 12, 1877, in Charles Gayarre Collection (ibid.).
Liberty, Mississippi Southern Herald. August 25, 1883; New
Orleans Weekly Picayune. November 1 and 7, 1894, March 29,
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Brisk economic growth attracted additional sources of 
capital and labor to the region. Hundreds of northern 
settlers and investors emigrated south in search of cheap 
land and labor. Business advocate Charles Gayarre informed 
inquiring northern industrialists that southern labor could 
be worked sixty hours a week, adding that management "will 
not be interfered for many years to come by the impatient 
demands of overtaxed workmen."401
Several new communities dominated by northern 
immigrants, in particular Kentwood and Roseland, developed 
along the railroad. Other previously established towns such 
as Hammond also encouraged northern immigration. Newspapers 
there proclaimed the benefits of northern emigration and 
actively encouraged new settlement. One broadside 
distributed by industrial promoters in Kentwood proclaimed 
the village "free from malarial influences, poisonous snakes 
and other reptiles, and annoying insects of all kinds." And, 
addressing the greatest concern of northern immigrants 
declared, "at Kentwood the people are polite and kindly
Kentucky. Tennessee. Mississippi, and Louisiana On the Line 
of the Southern Division of the Illinois Central Railroad 
(Cedar Rapids: Republican Printing Co., 1892) pp. 118-148,
hereinafter cited as Where to Locate New Factories.
401 Charles Gayarre letter published in New Orleans 
Bulletin. 1885, in Charles Gayarre Collection (LLMVC);
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disposed towards northern people and always treat them 
well.1,402
The population of some of these settlements quickly 
surpassed many previously established towns along the 
railroad. Moreover, the rapid rate of economic development 
encouraged commercial interests in older communities such as 
Clinton, Franklinton, and Greensburg to petition for the 
construction of spur railroads through their towns. The 
Franklinton New Era urged its readers to encourage the 
construction of a railroad to stimulate economic development 
in Washington Parish.403
But the influx of northern settlers and ideals 
threatened the traditional social structure of the Florida 
parishes as never before, leading to a dangerous polarization 
of society. Many of the region's traditional residents 
accordingly resisted the changes brought by northerners, and 
frequently felt animosity for the settlers themselves. 
Although it aggressively courted northern immigrants the 
Kentwood Commercial admitted that outside the towns "back in 
the woods," many residents resented Yankee intrusion. The
402 Undated broadside advertising Kentwood found in 
Amos Kent Papers (LLMVC); Roseland Herald. June 15, 1894;
Kentwood Commercial. February 16, April 6 and 13, and 
December 14, 1895, February 15 and March 14, 1896.
Greensburg Gazette. June 17, 1882; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. March 9, 1897; Where to Locate New Factories pp.
118-148.
403 Franklinton New Era. May 21, 1896; Greensburg St. 
Helena Echo. September 17, 1892, June 10, 1893, and March 15, 
1895
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Commercial also reluctantly noted that a mass meeting 
designed to promote support for northern immigration among 
established residents "was very poorly attended." Less 
inclined to play down the issue, the Amite City Independent 
observed that many older residents exhibited overt hostility 
to northerners settling in the area. The New Orleans Daily 
Picayune reported that in contrast to depending on yankee 
immigration, promoters in Amite City were employing local 
capital to develop the existing resources of their town.404
Northern settlers and capital challenged the existing 
order in the Florida parishes in two important ways. Their 
money fueled the economic growth occurring primarily along 
the railroad, which in itself threatened the traditional 
piney-woods lifestyle of eastern Louisiana. The intrusion of 
numerous industrial concerns and the purchase of huge tracts 
of timberland naturally jeopardized the conventional 
existence prevailing in the Florida parishes. Moreover, the 
northern work ethic and conception of property rights 
differed from the established relaxed attitude regarding work 
and landholding. The societal transition initiated by these 
changes produced concomitant blocs of supporters and 
opponents, increasing regional divisiveness. In essence, 
progress had reached a region where most were unprepared for 
it, many resented it, and some would violently resist it.
404 Kentwood Commercial. March 30, April 6 and 13,
December 14, 1895; Amite Citv Independent. November 14, 1874; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. March 27, 1897.
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The problems plaguing the Florida parishes related 
directly to the events of the preceeding decades. The 
weakened status of the old elite, the multiple societal 
factions emerging, and the challenge posed to the traditional 
culture contributed to a continuing cycle of instability in 
the piney woods. Most significantly, the events of the war 
and Reconstruction had created a culture of violence in the 
eastern parishes.
Incredibly high rates of violent crime characterized the 
piney woods of the Florida parishes throughout the late 
nineteenth century. The breakdown of legal authority amidst 
the highly charged racial and political circumstances during 
the last years of Reconstruction virtually required that all 
residents be armed. With an armed camp established, few were 
willing to be the first to conduct their affairs unarmed. 
The Kentwood Commercial observed, "a good many peaceable 
citizens carry guns simply because dangerous men carry them." 
The editor declared that his research indicated that 
proportionately more people carried concealed weapons in the 
Florida parishes than any other region of the nation. 
Despite these allegations similar situations prevailed in 
other areas of the country. But most regions enjoyed the 
discipline provided by a popularly supported legal system 
which was painfully lacking in the Florida parishes.405
Kentwood Commercial. September 12 and May 2, 1896.
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As early as the spring of 1879 local newspapers urged 
legislation to contain the proliferation of concealed 
weapons. Many recognized that although weapons may have 
proved essential in defeating the Reconstruction government, 
they now constituted a menace. In the spring of 1890 the 
Amite City Gazette reported, "Saturday night last one would 
have supposed Amite City had been turned into a frontier town 
and wild Indians had made an attack so numerous were the 
pistol shots." Violent crimes frequently went unnoticed for 
hours because of a general acclimation to gunshots. The 
Kentwood Commercial complained that the reports of weapons 
from the scene of one violent crime had "caused no alarm or 
excitement as the people of the town are not unaccustomed to 
hearing the discharge of firearms during the night." 
Kentwood attempted to control the random discharge of weapons 
in town by building a shooting gallery "for the rowdy boys." 
James S. McGehee reflected that Florida parish boys "had 
grown up in a country where youths were permitted by public 
opinion to carry revolvers at an age when they scarcely had 
sufficient discretion for pen knives. Human life there has 
always been held far too cheaply." Not surprisingly women 
also frequently carried guns for self-protection.406
406 Amite Citv Independent. April 26, 1879; Amite Citv 
Gazette. May 23, 1890; Kentwood Commercial, March 30, 1895
and August 29, 1896; New Orleans Weekly Picayune. August 2, 
1894, March 26, 1895 and Daily Picayune. November 21, 1896; 
New Orleans Times Democrat. December 9, 1888. James Stewart 
McGehee, "Ramble in Autobiography," unpublished manuscript in 
James Stewart McGehee Papers (LLMVC); untitled, undated
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In a series of articles beginning in the winter of 1890 
the Amite City Florida Parishes provided perhaps the best 
explanation of the regional obsession with violence. "Four 
years of war added to ten years of alien carpetbag rule, 
fourteen years of demoralization and destruction could not 
have been expected to leave the people of this state in a 
very settled condition, nor with a very high regard for the 
majesty of the law." The editor emphasized that by the close 
of Reconstruction few local residents had retained any 
respect for established legal authority. But, ominously, the 
same paper observed that the absence of effective law 
enforcement since the close of Reconstruction had permitted 
"a few lawless and irresponsible men in the community who 
have nothing to lose to terrorize a whole community." Local 
newspapers fanned the flames of chaos by dramatically 
publicizing events and essentially making heroes out of 
notorious criminals. Many newspapers also encouraged a 
culture of violence by the nature and emphasis of some of 
their articles. One such article entitled, "How to Whip a 
Bigger Man Than Yourself" described a series of dirty tricks 
to overcome a more powerful opponent.407
newspaper article (apparently Daily Picayune. 1900?, 
describing armed women in Tangipahoa, in John W. Lambert 
Papers (ibid.).
407 Amite City Florida Parishes. November 5, 1890 and 
February 11, 1891? undated unidentified news article (Amite 
Citv Advocate) found in Duncan Francis Young Scrapbooks, Vol. 
4, pp. 12-13, (Department of Manuscripts and Rare Books, 
Howard Tilton Library, Tulane University).
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With the order and stability provided by a dominant 
planter class removed, as well as Federal troops, the piney 
woods of the Florida parishes declined into anarchy. The 
popular desire to return to an independent unregulated 
existence foundered on the reality of the prevailing 
circumstances. The rapid economic transformation occurring 
primarily along the railroad impeded efforts to return to a 
simpler lifestyle. Many openly opposed the implications of 
modernization. Local newspapers vigorously attacked the 
perceived exploitation inherent in capitalism. The Kentwood 
Commercial predicted that the abuses of capitalism would 
produce "a revolution the magnitude of which few have ever 
dreamed of." Similarly the East Feliciana Patriot condemned 
the "merciless creditors" who exploited honest working 
people. The Patriot joined the St. Helena Echo and other 
papers in urging readers to strive for self-sufficiency and 
economic independence.408
The negative impact of modernization proved readily 
apparent. Many lumber mills provoked widespread resentment 
by compensating workers in script redeemable exclusively at 
the company store. Such restrictive practices naturally kept 
many laborers in poverty. Likewise the railroad incurred the 
wrath of many residents. Some farmers condemned the high
4 Kentwood Commercial. July 30, 1895; Clinton East
Feliciana Patriot. April 27, 1867; Greensburg St. Helena
Echo. August 24, 1889, September 12, 1891, and January 14, 
1898; Amite Citv Independent. January 7, 1882.
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freight charges which cut substantially into their meager 
profits. Others deplored the railroad's decimation of their 
livestock. Most importantly, many deeply resented the 
railroad's exploitation of its own laborers. Regional 
director E.D. Frost observed that the railroad had aroused 
the hostility of local residents primarily due to its failure 
to pay its workers. Frost summarized the prevailing 
animosity simply by noting "we have broken so many promises." 
The St.Helena Echo, always at the forefront in condemning 
unfair labor practices, declared "it is fast becoming the 
old, old question of capital vs. labor, freemen vs. 
capitalist slavery. Let the farmers stop, think, and take 
measures to protect themselves."409
As abundantly demonstrated in the newspapers, a fierce 
determination to maintain one's independence and honor 
remained central to the piney-woods existence in the Florida 
parishes. And, in a society now heavily armed and 
extensively schooled in the effectiveness and finality of 
brutality, conditions proved conducive to chaos. In an 
effort to rationalize the chaos that gripped the eastern 
Florida parishes the New Orleans Daily States explained, "the 
people of the Florida parishes are generally rough and of an
*uy E.D. Frost to H.S. McComb, October 18, 1875 and 
June 27, 1875, in W.M. Francis and E.D. Frost Out Letters
Collection (Newberry Library); Greensburg St. Helena Echo, 
January 16, 1892; Amite Citv Democrat. December 4, 1875; New 
Orleans Weekly Picayune. November 27, 1895.
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independent, too often fierce spirit unrestrained by the 
efficient enforcement of criminal justice."410
Like the social structure and economy of the region, the 
system of justice in the Florida parishes was completely 
transformed as a result of events associated with the war and 
Reconstruction. The remnants of the prewar legal system 
which survived the war collapsed before the purges initiated 
during Reconstruction. With real power concentrated in the 
hands of Federal authorities the majesty of civil justice 
declined. The system installed by the Republican government 
proved incapable of coping with the ever increasing cycle of 
violence. Moreover, the popular perception of corruption and 
fraudulent rise to power of the Republican system negated 
respect for the courts among the residents.
Tangipahoa and East Feliciana experienced the widest 
chasms between legal authority and popular approval. In 
Tangipahoa the Republicans appointed as sheriff a widely 
despised man accused of prewar criminal activity. And, a 
large portion of the population believed that the local 
judges held office fraudulently. In East Feliciana popular 
outrage resulted in the violent ouster of the local sheriff 
and judges. But the similarities between these two parishes 
end with redemption. The return of the planter class to 
power in East Feliciana allowed for the establishment of a
410 New Orleans Daily States, reprinted in Kentwood 
Commercial. January 1, 1897; New Orleans Daily Picayune.
April 12, 1899 and Weekly Picayune. August 2, 1894.
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respected assertive legal system in a social framework which 
retained many elements of the antebellum system. The rapid 
economic transformation of Tangipahoa and the concomitant 
factionalization of society and politics hindered efforts to 
reestablish a respected system of justice.
Throughout the late nineteenth century the local 
courthouse served as the premier political prize in many 
regions of the rural South. In the Florida parishes judges 
commanded the greatest power and respect, though the district 
attorney and sheriff also retained considerable influence. 
Central to understanding the chaos which emerged at its worst 
in Tangipahoa Parish is the incoherent system of justice that 
prevailed there. Unfortunately for the residents the 
district judgeship fell directly under the control of one 
faction, the district attorney remained partisan to another, 
and a progression of sheriffs proved cowardly and 
incompetent. Although all of the piney-woods parishes 
experienced inordinant rates of violence, as a result of the 
legal chaos prevailing in Tangipahoa, it continued a regional 
tradition attracting scores of lawless elements.
The turbulence within the legal system rendered it 
largely ineffective, promoting increasing disaffection with 
the mechanisms of justice. Violent criminals in the charge 
of the sheriff frequently escaped as did inmates of the 
parish prisons. Henry Crittenden, who escaped from 
Tangipahoa Sheriff P.P. McMichael while en route to the state
427
penitentiary, announced that he would kill all who had 
testified against him, causing several families to flee the 
region. Most escapees, such as Cade Strickland, who fled the 
courthouse during an exchange of gunfire between his friends 
and sheriff's deputies, were not pursued after their escape. 
Criminal dockets were often stolen or destroyed, and in one 
case, the Washington Parish courthouse mysteriously burned 
down amidst a series of heated cases.411
The cowardly behavior of several sheriffs, in particular 
P.P. McMichael and F.P. Mix of Tangipahoa, encouraged the 
violence. Neither made any realistic effort to control the 
ever- widening cycle of brutality. When asked how a mass- 
murderer could so blatantly snub the legal system, a female 
member of one of the notorious feuding families responded 
curtly, "they were afraid to arrest him." Concerned citizens 
frequently filed charges in vain against local sheriffs for 
failure to perform their duties. Similarly, the district 
attorney repeatedly failed to prosecute those aligned with 
his faction or particularly dangerous elements. The New 
Orleans Daily Picayune observed that in the late nineteenth 
century piney woods, the old honor bound means of settling 
disputes, in face to face confrontations, had given way to
411 Kentwood Commercial. March 30, 1895, June 6, 1896, 
January 1, March 20 and 27, June 12, and July 3, 1897; Amite 
City Florida Parishes. June 10, 1891; Greensburg St. Helena 
Echo. August 15, 1891 and January 22, 1897; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. January 20 and 29, 1891, June 14, 15, and July 1, 
1897, and Weekly Picayune. June 2, 1896.
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"skulking, cowardly, assassins," thus neutralizing the legal 
system with fear. The failure of the mechanisms of justice 
to arrest the increasing violence led a group in Washington 
Parish to urge its readers to "deal out the justice of Judge 
Lynch with an unsparing hand."412
Sheriff McMichael's cowardice proved particularly 
shameful. Throughout the 1890's, the bloodiest decade in the 
region's history, McMichael remained completely unwilling to 
confront the most violent elements. Moreover he seemed to 
resent those who possessed the courage he lacked. For months 
prior to the fall of 1896, merchants in Hammond had been 
bullied by a notorious thug who was "trying to run the town 
with a small gang at his back." When Hammond city marshall 
Tom Rhodes courageously confronted the gang, a shootout 
resulted leaving one of their number dead and Rhodes 
seriously wounded. But to the dismay of the residents who 
applauded Rhodes' bravery, McMichael promptly arrested Rhodes 
for creating a disturbance. The remaining gang members 
continued to roam free "making threats." Sheriff Mix 
likewise incurred the wrath of East Feliciana residents. 
After accompanying a "dangerous negro maniac" to the asylum 
at Jackson the sheriff was angered to find the facility full.
412 New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 14-15, 1897, 
January 31 and February 10, 1898, June 12, 1898? Kentwood
Commercial. June 12 and July 3, 1897; Sixteenth Judicial
District Court Minute Book, No. 5 and 6, multiple entries 
1893-1899, (Archives of the Clerk of Court, Tangipahoa 
Parish, Amite City).
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Rather than returning the man to jail in Tangipahoa, Mix 
simply released him in Jackson.413
The shortcomings of the legal system mirrored a more 
substantive problem. Conditioned by brutality and a fierce 
tradition of independence, many residents rejected the idea 
of government intervention in what they considered private 
affairs. Feuding families frequently expressed contempt for 
the interest shown by non-participants and often regarded the 
system of justice as merely another hostile faction.414 
Many considered government to be inherently corrupt and 
partisan while others regarded murder as the most definitive 
means of defending independence and honor. In court, 
defendants repeatedly appealed to the warped Jeffersonian 
tradition which permitted a man to confront a perceived 
threat aggressively, and juries accordingly sustained their 
pleas. With juries unwilling to convict, the efforts of 
peace officers were neutralized and the entire system 
demoralized. Commenting on the prevailing attitude toward 
the legal system in the piney woods, the Weekly Picayune
413 New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 7, 1889 and 
October 31, 1896; Kentwood Commercial. October 24, 1896 and 
January 23, 1897.
414 Though most of the families involved in the 
primary feuds resented the interest shown by outsiders, some 
of the feudists themselves, particularly younger unattached 
men, seemed to revel in the publicity surrounding the later 
phases of the feuds.
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observed, the people seem to fear the courts "more than 
smallpox.1,415
In the winter of 1890 the Florida Parishes summarized 
conditions in the piney woods. The editor observed, "from a 
period of anarchy we have progressed to one in which the law 
breaker is at least brought to trial." Despite this positive 
step he noted that few criminals filled the local jails. He 
concluded with an impassioned appeal for jurors to convict 
the guilty noting, "we can have no prosperity until we have 
peace; we can enjoy no peace as long as the criminal laws of 
the land are violated openly and with impunity." At the 
conclusion of a session of the district court seven years 
later, the same paper lamented that despite the large number 
of locally and illegally distilled "blind tiger" whiskey 
cases heard, not a single conviction had resulted. In a 
similar complaint to that of years before the editor noted, 
"the court officers do what they can but the juries favor 
whiskey and won't convict." Following the April 1891 
bushwhacking of Jack Hall in Livingston Parish, the Florida 
Parishes argued that his murder was a logical step. Hall had 
been tried for the murder of Bud White a few months earlier, 
but a jury had failed to convict him.416
415 New Orleans Weekly Picayune. August 2, 1894.
416 Amite City Florida Parishes. November 5, 1890,
April 29, 1891, and April 30, 1897.
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In an 1894 article entitled, "What is the Reason," the 
Roseland Herald observed that of the thirteen true bills 
returned by the sitting grand jury none had resulted in 
convictions. The indictments, ranging from trespass to 
murder, were all dismissed by a jury composed of men "who 
will never convict, no matter what the evidence may be." The 
Herald continued, "If this is true then justice has fled, and 
the courts are a mere farce, a travesty on justice." Instead 
of improving the system these appeals had little if any 
positive effect. The Daily Picayune noted that every 
celebrated case appearing before the Sixteenth Judicial Court 
at Amite City in June, 1897, had been dismissed. In some 
cases the jury deliberated only five minutes before returning 
a verdict of not guilty. The only exception being a party of 
armed feudists who, upon learning that their case would 
actually go to trial, marched out of court derisively mocking 
the proceedings. The court responded by disbanding the jury 
and canceling the proceedings.417
Outraged by what it called "The Reign of Blood" in the 
piney-woods parishes, the Daily Picayune printed an 
assessment of the legal system there. The report commended 
Sixteenth Judicial District Judge Robert R. Reid for his 
efforts but aggressively condemned the incompetence of 
Tangipahoa Sheriff P.P. McMichael. A similar report
' Roseland Herald. June 15, 1894? New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. June 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 19, 1897;
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presented by an 1897 grand jury also praised the efforts of 
Judge Reid but gingerly criticized District Attorney Duncan 
Kemp and Sheriff McMichael. Both reports reserved their 
strongest criticism for the mass of the population. The 
Picayune denounced the residents for their pervasive 
disrespect for the law. According to the Picayune this 
condition resulted from a persistent effort of some to bring 
justice into disrepute, thereby creating a condition in which 
juries refused to convict out of sympathy for the accused or 
fear of being killed by friends of the criminals. The 
Picayune concluded, "The burden is placed where it belongs 
upon the people." In a separate article the same paper and 
others noted that in the past fifty years Washington Parish 
had convicted only one accused murderer amidst the relentless 
prevailing violence.418
To counter the ineffectiveness of the judicial system 
the St. Helena Echo called for radical changes. The Echo 
urged that court officials be made appointive lest the region 
continue "onward and downward to financial ruin.” But like 
most other observers, the Echo admitted that without a change 
in the character and accountability of the population any 
effort to restructure the system of justice would be doomed 
to failure. Judge Robert Reid provided perhaps the best 
summary of the prevailing conditions in a January 1897 charge
418 New Orleans Daily Picayune. June 15 and July 12, 
1897, October 26, 1896; Kentwood Commercial. March 27, 1897.
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to a sitting jury. "The failure to perform the duties 
entrusted to you is the fruitful source of mobs and riots, 
the people become incensed against the machinery of justice 
by reason of such failure; evil doers become emboldened by 
immunity from punishment for crime and the result is a hatred 
and contempt for them and anarchy and lawlessness spread 
their reign of terror over the community."419
In a culture dominated by an extremely sensitive concern 
for honor and independence, an ineffective legal system 
spelled disaster. Seemingly insignificant issues frequently 
resulted in serious "difficulties.11 "Difficulty" emerged as 
a term popularly employed among the press and people to 
describe an honorable violent confrontation. Difficulties 
differed from "cowardly murders" and bushwhackings, both of 
which connotated craven assassinations or murders conducted 
under criminal auspices. Bushwhacking almost always 
indicated an advance planned, feud- related homicide. In 
examining events in the piney woods of eastern Louisiana in 
the late nineteenth century, it is important to remember that 
the majority of residents tolerated murder as a means of 
settling differences. Thus most difficulties were considered 
justifiable.
Greensburg St. Helena Echo. September 30 and 
October 7, 1893, also reprinted in New Orleans Daily
Picayune. August 2, 1897; see also Daily Picayune. January 
14, 1897.
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Difficulties comprised 79 of the 13 3 homicides 
identified in the Florida parishes during the period 1882- 
1898. Twenty murders occurred under criminal circumstances. 
These incidents ranged from the bungled train robberies of 
the much heralded Eugene Bunch to the random murder of 
inoffensive tramps camping along the railroad. In one 
particularly grisly incident, a pair of highway bandits 
robbed and murdered a travelling salesman horribly mutilating 
his corpse to inhibit identification. Nineteen bushwhackings 
occurred in the same period as did six racially-motivated 
murders. Most of the remaining nine murders were feud- 
related instances in which the victim received wounds in the 
back. Such instances differed from difficulties in that they 
manifested no sense of honor. Significantly, a considerable 
proportion of the difficulties and almost all of the 
bushwhackings were-feud related.420
420 These figures include four murders in southwestern 
Mississippi related to or directly influencing events in the 
Florida parishes. Amite City Florida Parishes. January 7 and 
28, and April 29, 1891, March 2 3 and August 10, 1892, April 
12 and 26, 1893, January 23, 1904; Greensburg St. Helena
Echo. January 31, July 11 and 25, August 29, 1891, May 21,
June 18, July 9, August 20, September 17 and 24, 1892, May 27 
and June 10, 1893, September 20, 1895; Kentwood Commercial. 
March 30, June 11 and 25, July 9 and 16, December 28, 1895, 
January 11, April 24, September 12, October 24, 1896, April 
10, July 10, August 7, November 13, 1897, February 5 and
March 19, 1898; Liberty, Mississippi Southern Herald. April 
5, 1884; Magnolia Gazette. August 25 and September 8, 1882, 
May 31 and July 26, 1883; Osvka Two States. November 23 and 
30, 1888; Amite City Gazette. August 19, 1887; Amite Citv
Independent. July 15, 1882 and May 26, 1883; Baton Rouge
Daily Advocate. August 6, 1888; New Orleans, Daily Picayune. 
January 26, February 2 and 5, April 20, 1883, May 9, 1887,
December 17, 1888, January 22, 25,and 26, 1889, January 11
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In addition to the almost daily incidents of personal 
violence, collective terror and nightriding continued to 
plague the region. In the late nineteenth century many areas 
of the South witnessed the rise of terroristic organizations 
known as whitecaps. Usually inspired by economic 
competition, whitecaps often engaged in violent acts against 
oppressive employers or industries. But in most cases blacks 
served as the target of whitecap violence. Whitecaps 
frequently drove blacks from employment and sought to force 
their code of morality on the resident population. Jews also 
suffered at the hands of whitecaps, though it had less to do 
with religion than perceived price gouging by Jewish 
merchants. One observer described the situation in early 
1893, "there is a good deal of excitement here about what is
and 20, 1991, July 12, 1894,, October 10, November 21,
December 23 and 25, 1896, March 15 and 27, April 6, May 25, 
June 12, July 4, 20, and 29, August 24 and 26, November 9 and 
22, December 11 and 13, 1897, January 31, May 31, June 8, 
July 13, 1898; New Orleans Weekly Picayune. November 2 and 
December 9, 1894, March 24 and 26, November 21, 1895, January 
10, April 22 and 27, June 4, July 14, and September 7, 1896. 
A.c. Bankston to Uncle Simon, August 18, 1876, in William
Bond Papers (LLMVC); W.D.J. Warner to Tom Ellis, September 
15, 1874, in Ellis Family Papers (ibid.); W.W. Draughon to 
Judge Robert Reid, June 15, 1900, also undated news clippings 
from New Orleans Times Democrat and Greensburg St. Helena 
Echo, all in Robert R. Reid Papers (ibid.); Sixteenth 
Judicial District Court Minute Books, Books No. 4-6 multiple 
entries (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court Archives, Amite 
City); Minutes of the Pike County, Mississippi circuit Court, 
Minute Books A and B multiple entries (Pike County Clerk of 
Courts Office, Magnolia, Mississippi). Unidentified 
newsclipping dated March 3, 1894, two undated untitled
newsclippings (1888?), all in Duncan Francis Young 
Scrapbooks, Vols. 5 and 6 (Department of Manuscripts and Rare 
Books, Howard Tilton Library, Tulane University).
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called whitecaps. They are running all the darkeys off from 
peoples mills and farms at a dreadful rate. It is rumored 
that all the Jews in Summit are going to Jerusalem." 
Whitecaps met in secret, concealed their identities from the 
general population, and often included mystic rituals in 
their initiation process. The celebrated Mississippi 
whitecap, Will Purvis, who escaped fate when his head slipped 
through the hangman's noose, maintained that whitecaps 
functioned as a direct outgrowth of the Ku Klux Klan.421
The success of nightriding during Reconstruction had not 
been lost on the residents of the Florida parishes and 
southwestern Mississippi. Moreover, nightriding continued to 
provide a source of camaraderie in a region otherwise 
virtually devoid of entertainment. But whitecapping was a 
deadly serious business. Whitecappers terrorized the 
community and paralyzed economic development. In the Florida 
parishes whitecappers were seldom motivated by high ideals.
1 Sister to J.J. Stokes, February 6, 1893, in J.A. 
Stokes Papers (LLMVC); untitled news article dated Laurel 
Hill, La., January 22, 1893, in J.Burruss McGehee Papers
(ibid.). Francis Williams Griffith, True Life Story of Will 
Purvis (Purvis, Mississippi: Booster Press, 1935); John H.
Napier, Lower Pearl River's Piney Woods: It's Land and
People (Oxford: University of Mississippi Center for the
Study of Southern Culture, 1985) p. 84; William Holmes, 
"Whitecapping: Agrarian Violence in Mississippi, 1902-1906," 
Journal of Southern History. XXXV, 1969, p. 165. New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. July 10, 1887, March 30, 1894, October 15, 
1896; New Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 16, 1887; Greensburg 
St. Helena Echo. November 15, 1895; Baton Rouge Capitolian- 
Advocate. July 1, 1888. Kentwood Commercial. November 16, 
1895, February 1 and April 4, 1896; Amite City Florida
Parishes, January 14, February 4 and 11, 1891.
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Instead they typically functioned as racial regulators, 
keeping the blacks down, and assaulting the interests of 
economic competitors.
Whitecaps frequently posted armed pickets near sawmills 
and brickyards to prevent blacks from working. In one 
instance in the summer of 1895, several whitecaps called 
together a group of black laborers working for a sawmill in 
central Tangipahoa Parish. The nightriders informed the 
blacks that they could no longer work at the mill. And, to 
demonstrate their resolve they singled out a man whom they 
had already warned. The unfortunate man pleaded that he had 
not understood them initially but would cease working 
immediately. The whitecaps coldly responded that the time 
for amends had passed and cruelly murdered him before all the 
gathered workers. Similar incidents occurred with painful 
frequency.422
Unlike in neighboring Mississippi where local 
authorities aggressively combated whitecapping violence with 
the enthusiastic support of the governor, little official 
sanction hampered them in the Florida parishes where the 
whitecaps commanded broad support. One group, the Phantom 
Riders, which operated extensively in Tangipahoa, St.Helena,
422 Kentwood Commercial. June 11, 1895; Magnolia
Gazette. November 9, 1882; Sister to J.J. Stokes, February 6, 
1893, in Joel A. Stokes Papers (LLMVC); Amite City Florida 
Parishes. January 14, February 4 and 11, 1891; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. October 15, 1896, April 5, 1899, and Weekly 
Picayune August 2, 1894.
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and Washington parishes, functioned as a pseudo-legal arm. 
The Phantom Riders whipped and terrorized accused thieves, 
wife-beaters and the like, always reserving their most severe 
treatment for blacks. They boasted among their number some 
prominent local figures which strengthened their immunity 
from criminal prosecution and furthered acceptance of extra- 
legal violence among the population. In an article highly 
critical of the Phantom Riders the Republican New Orleans 
Weekly Pelican observed, "no notice of them (Phantom Riders) 
whatsoever has appeared in our daily papers. The murderous 
doings were suppressed for fear, it is said that some good 
(?) citizens might be implicated in such questionable 
acts."423
Some of these groups considered their actions both 
morally justified and essential to securing regional 
stability. The constitution of the Knights of the Mystic 
Ring, based at Amite City, declared, "it shall be the duty of 
every member to protect the weak, the innocent, and the 
defenseless, from the indignities, wrongs, and outrages of 
the lawless, the violent, and the brutal." These were 
clearly high-minded ideals for an organization focused on 
secret para-military operations.424
425 New Orleans Weekly Pelican. July 16, 1887; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. July 10, 1887 and February 22, 1897.
424 Handwritten constitution of the "Knights of the 
Mystic Ring," found in Thomas E. Warner Papers (LLMVC).
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Their pretensions to address the ineffective legal 
system notwithstanding, the whitecaps themselves constituted 
an extreme threat to regional stability. This resulted not 
simply from their extra-legal activities but from the 
possibilities inherent when multiple clandestine militias 
terrorize a community at will. Individual efforts to impress 
upon the residents the necessity of controlling whitecap 
lawlessness typically failed miserably.
Throughout the late 1890's Kentwood served as a center 
for whitecap activities. Located barely five miles from the 
Mississippi state line it offered a safe haven for Magnolia 
state fugitives as well as harboring many indigenous 
desperados. When C.T. Curtis, the northern-born editor of 
the local newspaper, criticized the prevailing lawlessness, 
he quickly received two death threats. Curtis responded with 
an admission of his own cowardice and a lengthy apology to 
those he had offended. Yet his weekly apologies apparently 
failed to appease his antagonists. One month later the same 
paper reported that Curtis had "mysteriously 
disappeared.1,425
Wilfred Colvert, a former editor of the Chicago 
Vindicator and an ex-secret service agent, replaced Curtis. 
Initially Colvert appeared uniquely suited for the stressful 
role of a "fighting editor." But he too, soon earned the
425 Kentwood Commercial. August 13 and 20, October 1,
1895.
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wrath of the whitecaps. In December, 1895, Colvert 
announced, "we have heard of one person who does not like the 
Commercial or its editor and we are considering the 
advisability of shutting up the shop." Colvert continued to 
direct the paper seeking, as far as possible, to distance 
himself from the prevailing factional violence. Despite his 
efforts in March, 1897, the Commercial reported that the 
editor had received two notes ordering him to "git" out of 
town on pain of death signed "Captain Whitecaps." Instead of 
fleeing like his predecessor, Colvert instead retreated from 
his position of criticizing lawless elements and allowed his 
paper to degenerate into the mechanism for publicizing the 
views of the most violent local faction.426
The greatest threat to regional stability posed by 
whitecapping, involved the possibility that they could fall 
under the control of one ill-intentioned individual or group. 
In a January 1891 address to a sitting grand jury Judge 
Walter Thompson lamented, "I predicted then that no matter 
how good the motives of the parties who started this 
organization (whitecaps) it would fall under the control of 
parties who would use it as a means of private vengeance and 
oppression. Subsequent events have confirmed my
predictions." If the brutality practiced by terroristic 
nightriders was not in itself enough, a private clandestine 
militia in the hands of a rancorous competitor could wreak
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havoc on the local economy and provoke the emergence of 
counter para-military organizations. Such a situation would 
result in little less than complete societal chaos. And, in 
the Florida parishes perfect conditions for chaos were 
already in place.427
The political power vacuum prevailing in the post- 
Reconstruction piney woods created the opportunity for new 
leadership. But the men who filled the void in leadership 
lacked both the stature of the old elite and the unifying 
issues which the planters had manipulated so effectively in 
support of their dominance. The factionalization of politics 
and the rapid economic transformation occurring in certain 
areas rendered stability increasingly elusive. Indeed, 
societal equilibrium proved exceedingly difficult to secure 
in a region where, in the absence of a common threat, many 
refused to be governed. Furthermore, the fledgling political 
leaders faced the resentment of many of the old elite who not 
only offered little assistance but withdrew their active 
support from a legal system in crisis.
Among the more important families who sought to fill the 
political void in this turbulent period were the Reids, led 
by brothers Joseph and Robert. The Reid brothers, both 
practicing attorneys, migrated from Madison County, 
Mississippi in 1866 and settled near Amite City. By the late 
1870's the Reids had established themselves as an alternative
427 Amite City Florida Parishes. January 14, 1891.
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to the old elite and secured a strong political base. 
Colonel Robert Reid, a graduate of the Virginia Military 
Institute and one of scores of Louisiana politicians who 
continued to rise in the ranks of the Confederate army 
throughout the late nineteenth century, emerged as the 
family's consummate politician. Their growing influence in 
regional politics climaxed when Robert Reid secured election 
to the highly influential district judgeship.428
But like many other political newcomers the Reid's 
success provoked extreme resentment from many members of the 
old elite. Congressman S.M. Robertson repeatedly expressed 
deep reservations about the character of the Reids to his 
friend Steve Ellis. Similarly Charles Lea informed 
Washington Parish patriarch Hardy Richardson that a bloodless 
revolution would be necessary to terminate the rule of the 
Reids. The efforts of the Reids and other emerging political 
families to promote education and stability consistently 
suffered from a lack of support among the old elite.429
Minutes of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District 
Court, Succession No. 852 A (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of 
Court, Amite City); Register of Doctors, Tangipahoa Parish 
Conveyance Records, filed December 2, 1882 (ibid.);
Succession of Dr. Columbus Reid, No. 443, filed April 13, 
1886 (ibid.).
429 Tom Ellis to Steve Ellis, December 4, 1879, Steve 
to Tom, November 15, 1887, S.M. Robertson to Steve, August 11 
and 25, 1893 and July 24, 1896, T.M. Akers to Steve, August
8, 1894, Steve to Tom, September 4, 1894, T.M. Babington to 
Steve, September 19, 1894, s.W. Settoon to Steve, September
9, 1895, Milton Strickland to Tom, February 15, 1896, all in 
Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC). Charles Lea to Hardy 
Richardson, March 20, 1879, in Hardy Richardson Papers
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Resistance to the Reids and allied families also 
centered on their methods and the factionalization of the 
Democratic party. The Reid faction, like many of the 
emerging families, aggressively exploited the divisions 
created by the Louisiana lottery and the increasing power of 
the Farmers Alliance. By 1892 the Reid faction of Florida 
parish Democrats openly defied the regular party provoking 
considerable resentment. The pro-lottery and anti-Reid St. 
Helena Echo observed, "this faction with its audacious 
leaders in bitter hostility to the Democratic party is 
drawing lines deep." In a blatant effort to employ an old 
strategy to sustain the power of the regular Democrats the 
Echo equated the assertiveness of the Reid faction with a 
blow to white superiority. "It must be noted that white 
supremacy, the peace and happiness of the people of our state 
is seriously threatened."430
Part of the Reid faction's political success resulted 
from both its determination to contain the prevailing 
lawlessness and its willingness to use force. The aggressive 
methods of the Reids brought them into frequent conflict but 
also gained them powerful allies, most notably Tangipahoa 
Parish mill owner, postmaster, and Democratic party chairman 
Sam Hyde. But as with all the piney-woods political
(ibid.); New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 4, 1897.
430 Greensburg St. Helena Echo. January 23 and
February 13, 1892; Amite City Florida Parishes. July 22, 29,
and August 19, 1891.
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factions, the Reid organization's primary purpose remained 
local political control. And in this endeavor they proved 
extremely successful through most of the late nineteenth 
century. By the early 1890's the Reid faction frequently 
directed regional Democratic strategy and parish policy 
through secret sessions of the Tangipahoa Parish Executive 
Committee meeting at the courthouse in Amite City. Many of 
those excluded from this process deeply resented the secret 
sessions. The New Orleans Times Democrat condemned their 
iron-fisted political control as "undemocratic." As a 
result, many Florida parish residents viewed them as merely 
another political faction embroiled in the internecine 
warfare which overwhelmed the region. Despite this 
perception, the legitimacy of their often marginally legal 
efforts to control criminal elements led the newspapers to 
dub them the "Courthouse faction."431
Another politically prominent group which promoted the 
fortunes of one feuding faction under the cloak of legitimacy 
was the Kemp family. Though a Confederate veteran William B. 
Kemp allied himself with the Republicans in the wake of the 
war. He attained notoriety when he secured appointment as
Amite City Florida Parishes. January 14 and August 
12, 1891; New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 4 and 5, 1897, and 
Weekly Picayune. September 6, 1896; New Orleans Times
Democrat, September 14, 1890 and July 11, 1897; Kentwood
Commercial. June 11, 1895; Greensburg, St. Helena Echo.
January 23 and 30, 1892. S.W. Settoon to Steve Ellis,
September 9, 1895, and Milton Strickland to Tom Ellis,
February 15, 1896, in Ellis Papers (LLMVC).
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district judge from Governor Kellogg after being defeated at 
the polls by E.P. Ellis. With the close of Reconstruction, 
Kemp recast himself again into a race-baiting spokesman for 
the rights of local whites, especially Confederate veterans. 
In 1896 his son, Duncan, secured election as district 
attorney gaining the support of some and the boundless 
contempt of others by his ability to manipulate the legal 
system in support of friends. In reference to his 
maneuvering the Kentwood Commercial observed, "he (Kemp) is 
generally like a flea, very hard to catch." As district 
attorney Kemp consistently refused to prosecute or delayed 
the trials of feudists opposed to the Courthouse faction 
allowing them time to murder all witnesses and secure 
alibis.432
By the early 1880's the old elite had clearly lost the 
advantage in the piney-woods parishes to the emerging 
factions. Both the Courthouse faction and the diverse 
elements associated with the Kemp faction commanded broad 
support in each of the five parishes. Politicians and 
office-seekers typically identified themselves as Reid or 
anti-Reid men. A "Reid Democrat" came to symbolize one who
432 Andrew Booth, Records of Louisiana Confederate
Soldiers and Louisiana Confederate Commands (Spartanburg: 
Reprint Co., 1984) vol. Ill, p. 531; Kentwood Commercial. 
January 30, 1897; Amite City Florida Parishes. October 8,
1890; Amite City Tangipahoa Democrat. February 1, 1873;
Greensburg St. Helena Echo. July 26, 1895; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. December 21, 1897. Sixteenth Judicial District
Court Minute Books, multiple entries vols. 5 and 6 
(Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court Archives, Amite City).
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adhered to the Florida parish faction of Democrats committed 
to securing local control independent of the regular party. 
The Courthouse faction frequently antagonized the state 
Democratic party by obsessively concentrating on local 
contests and exhibiting little interest in statewide races. 
Though influenced by pro and anti-lottery agitation and the 
growth of the Farmers Alliance, each faction operated 
independently of statewide trends lending support to the 
group which seemed best situated to promote its 
interests.433
As the dominant faction the Reids endured intense 
hostility. St.Helena attorney Milton Strickland declared to 
friends in Tangipahoa, "your friends and mine can never have 
any chance in this district in business or politics unless 
the rule of those Reids is overthrown and their reign closed. 
Everywhere they are attempting to defeat and crush out every 
man who will not wear the Reid collar, let us fight them to 
the death." But in the absence of an effective legal system 
the Courthouse faction embodied the only realistic hope for 
stability. Accordingly, many of the old elite reluctantly 
supported the Courthouse faction in an effort to contain the 
prevailing lawlessness. Livingston Parish senatorial
433 H.R. Williams to Judge Robert Reid, April 8, 1900, 
in Robert R. Reid Papers (LLMVC); Tom Ellis to Steve Ellis, 
December 4, 1879, T.M. Akers to Steve, August 8, 1894, Steve 
to Tom, September 6, 1894, S.W. Settoon to Steve, September 
9, 1895, Milton Strickland to Tom, February 15, 1896, F.M. 
Hinson to Steve, March 15, 1896, all in Ellis Papers (ibid.).
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candidate F.M. Hinson declared himself outraged to learn that 
the Ellis family had placed their dwindling support behind 
the Courthouse faction.434
But the Courthouse faction never commanded the absolute 
control that would have been necessary to bring stability to 
the region. The local district attorney and most sheriffs 
typically remained outside their realm of influence or were 
controlled by directly competing factions. Moreover, the 
Courthouse faction, like the other political cliques which 
filled the power vacuum created by the decline of the old 
elite, lacked the deferential support the planters had always 
enjoyed. Part of this problem resulted from the character of 
some of the faction's most important supporters. Throughout 
the early 1890's Sam Hyde remained embroiled in seemingly 
constant tort-action lawsuits, primarily resulting from 
disputed timber transactions and labor controversies. He 
also possessed a notoriously quick temper, engaging in his 
first shootout at sixteen. Similarly Joe Reid endured the 
contempt of many piney-woods residents. Congressman S.M. 
Robertson informed a supporter in Amite City, "I note what 
you say about Joe Reid. It is astonishing to me that such a 
man, known as he is, to the community in which he is now 
located, so well, can have any political influence." Reid's
434 Milton Strickland to Tom Ellis, February 15, 1896, 
F.M. Hinson to Steve Ellis, March 15, 1896, in Ellis Papers 
(LIaMVC) .
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reputation suffered significantly from his alleged 
participation in an 1891 killing in Amite City.435
The prevailing instability was dramatically complicated 
by the arrival of a new family. Led by brothers A.H. (Lance) 
and Joel, the Goss family migrated to the Louisiana- 
Mississippi border region under suspicious circumstances. At 
least some members of the family had been heavily involved in 
whitecap atrocities in and about Marion County, Mississippi. 
In sharp contrast to practices in Louisiana in the 1880's and 
1890's, successive Mississippi governors, particularly John 
M. Stone and Anselm McLaurin, sought to crush the whitecap 
menace. Their efforts resulted in many arrests and the 
dispersal of the remaining fugitives. During this same 
period portions of the Goss family resettled in Osyka, 
Mississippi and the village of Slaughter in East Feliciana 
Parish.436
Soon after their arrival in the region the Goss brothers 
introduced practices which would eventually cost both their
Congressman S.M. Robertson to Steve Ellis, August 
25, 1893, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC); Sixteenth Judicial 
District Court Minute Book, No. 5, multiple civil action 
entries (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court Archives, Amite 
City). Amite Citv Democrat. May 6, 1876; Kentwood
Commercial. June 11, 1895; Amite City Florida Parishes. 
December 3, 1890, January 7 and 14, 1891; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. September 6, 1896, February 9 and 11, 1897.
436 New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 1, 8, 9,
29,1888, January 12, 1889, March 30, April 1 and 12, 1894, 
November 12, 1895, December 27, 1896; Francis Williams
Griffith, True Life Story of Will Purvis. published 
manuscript (Mississippi State Archives, Jackson).
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lives. Like scores of other pharmaceutical drummers, 
druggists, and practitioners of "country medicine," both of 
the Goss's claimed the title doctor. The brothers combined 
a passion for politics with a determination to eliminate all 
economic competition in the communities where they located. 
To secure these goals the Goss brothers directed whitecap 
groups which systematically terrorized and sometimes murdered 
competing pharmacists and merchants. Their ambition to 
exercise political control over specific regions led them to 
employ whitecaps to terrorize the labor of competing 
merchants and politically opposed mill owners. The Goss's 
criminal activities brought them into almost constant 
conflict with the courts and local residents.437
The Goss family troubles began almost immediately upon 
their arrival in the region. Lance Goss directed a movement 
to dominate through terror the region about Slaughter in
J.J. Goss allegedly possessed a degree from the 
Georgia Eclectic Medical College, specializing in female and 
chronic diseases, Magnolia Gazette, March 22, 1883,
Greensburg Gazette. June 17, 1882. Greensburg St. Helena
Echo, July 25, 1891 and June 18, 1892; Amite City Florida
Parishes, July 29, 1891 and June 29, 1892; undated clipping 
from the New Orleans Times Democrat, describing the Goss's 
involvement in the murder of a druggist in Osyka, 
Mississippi, in Robert R. Reid Papers (LLMVC). New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. December 1, 8, 9, 12, 29, 1888, January 12, 
1889, December 23, 1896, February 22, July 11, December 29, 
1897, June 8, 15, 17, and 29, 1898; Minutes of the Pike 
County, Mississippi Circuit Court, minute book A, pp. 553- 
555, 563, 565, 569, and 576, minute book B, pp. 11-12, 16, 
and 18 (Pike county Courthouse, Magnolia, Mississippi). 
Sixteenth Judicial District Court Minute Book, multiple 
entries book no. 5, 1892-1896 (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of
Court Archives, Amite City) ; Baton Rouge Capitolian-Advocate. 
August 8, 1888.
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lower East Feliciana Parish. But this effort, in a stable 
delta parish, met with an aggressive response from the local 
planter hierarchy. Led by planters from East Baton Rouge and 
West Feliciana parishes as well as the local sheriff, an 
armed group of more than one hundred men forcibly drove Goss 
and his gang from East Feliciana. Similarly, Joel Goss fled 
Osyka, Mississippi after directing the murder of competing 
druggist Felix Varnado. A jury failed to convict Goss even 
though both of the assassins stated that Goss had paid them 
to kill Varnado. In this case, Goss initiated a pattern his 
family would employ in the future: the killers were to be
compensated with a business established at the Gosses’ 
expense. Moreover, each would receive an additional one 
hundred dollars. But Joel Goss's boasts that all who 
testified against him would be put to "a long sweet sleep," 
and his obvious involvement in the murder of the popular 
Varnado, created a strong public reaction which forced the 
Goss brothers to flee. Prophetically they migrated to the 
increasingly lawless environs of Tangipahoa Parish.438
438 Baton Rouge Capitolian-Advocate. August 8, 1888; 
New Orleans Times Democrat. July 11, 1897, also undated
clipping from the Times Democrat. detailing Goss's 
involvement in the murder of Varnado in Robert R. Reid Papers 
(LLMVC). Osvka Two States. November 23 and 30, 1888; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. November 24 and 30, December 1, 8, 9, 
12, 19, 20, 29, 1888, January 12, 1889, December 23, 1896, 
February 22, 1897; New Orleans Times Democrat. December 9 and 
11-13, 1888. Minutes of the Pike County, Mississippi Circuit 
Court, minute book A, pp. 553-555, 563, 565, 569, 575, and
576, minute book B, pp. 11-12, 14-15, 16-18.
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The Varnado murder embarrassed the residents of Pike 
County. In the wake of the trial a citizen's commission met 
at Osyka and released a statement condemning the murderers 
adding that none of the accused including "doctors" Joel J. 
Goss, Lance Goss, W.M. Tetts, and Bill Rials were "old 
citizens of Pike County." The commission noted the 
relentless threats that Lance Goss, who joined his brother in 
Osyka after fleeing Slaughter, "would kill anyone who 
testified against them" had outraged many local residents. 
Many regretted that the law had not reacted to the Gosses' 
frequent public boasts that they intended to murder Varnado. 
But despite the public reaction, sixteen additional deputies 
were hired to keep order during the trial, the courts 
attitude toward the Gosses' appeared to be simply, get out of 
Mississippi. Responding to a warning that some of the 
accused might flee before the resumption of the next term of 
court the presiding judge said, "at least the country will be 
rid of them." In essence the courts served only to drive the 
felons away possessing the knowledge that one can get away 
with murder.439
Upon their arrival in Tangipahoa Parish the Gosses had 
entered the heart of a region ripped asunder by factional 
politics and without effective law enforcement, perfect
439 New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 8 and 29,
1888, January 12, 1889; New Orleans Times Democrat. December 
9 and 12, 1888. Minutes of the Pike County, Mississippi
Circuit Court, minute book A, pp. 553-555, 563, 565, 569,
575-576, minute book B, pp. 11-12, 16.
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conditions for the implementation of their method to achieve 
economic and political dominance. Their operations would 
soon bring them into conflict with the dominant Courthouse 
faction, which in turn would create for them a natural ally 
in the Kemp faction.
By 1890 the Gosses' directed a group of whitecaps which 
operated freely in the region. Despite their reputation, the 
Goss group initially attracted broad support, including that 
of some prominent residents, with their moralistic appeal and 
aggressive "negro bashing." The whitecaps whipped, murdered, 
and generally terrorized blacks driving scores from the 
region. But their nightly adventures also terrorized many 
whites. In one highly publicized operation the whitecaps 
raided the village of Tangipahoa, entered the homes of 
several women of supposed "ill repute" and warned them to 
leave town or die.440
In these endeavors the whitecaps continued to command 
some public support. But the relationship with many 
prominent residents soon soured when Lance Goss exposed his 
ambitious plans. Goss announced that he intended to organize 
companies of whitecaps throughout the region led by himself 
and brother Joel. His first priority was to eliminate the 
prominent Draughon brothers of Tangipahoa, particularly Avery
New Orleans Times Democrat. July 11, 1897; Amite 
City Florida Parishes. January 14, February 4 and 11, 1891; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 22 and December 11, 
1897.
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Draughon who served as one of the few effective deputy 
sheriffs. While serving as mayor of Tangipahoa Avery 
Draughon had sought to curtail whitecap depredations in his 
village by arresting Joel Goss, thus incurring the Gosses' 
wrath. Moreover, Goss proposed to drive away black labor 
from the mills at Kentwood, Tangipahoa, and Hyde Station. He 
insisted that blacks belonged in the fields and had no right 
to such labor. The plan called for the whitecaps to burn the 
mills, kilns, and other property belonging to those who 
resisted. But his real motive centered on an effort to 
secure the support of the emerging Populist movement to 
further his own political ambitions. Regardless, each of 
these plans brought him into direct conflict with members of 
the Courthouse faction, in particular Sam Hyde, a friend of 
the Draughons and a mill owner who employed black labor.441
Members of the Courthouse faction accordingly joined the 
whitecaps with the stated intention of seizing control and 
redirecting their energies. In particular they wanted to 
protect the Draughons and halt the flow of cheap black labor 
from the region. Within weeks they had secured control of
441 Amite City Florida Parishes. January 14, February 
4 and 11, 1891; New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 22 and 
December 11, 1897; New Orleans Times Democrat. July 11, 1897. 
Hyde Station, Louisiana was a small mill town and post office 
located about six miles south of Tangipahoa. At the height 
of the bloody Tangipahoa troubles the legend originated that 
railroad conductors would announce "Hyde next stop 
Tangipahoa" and all the passengers would seek cover under 
their seats. The name of the community was changed to Fluker 
in 1916.
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the whitecaps and elected Hyde captain. Outraged by the 
nightriders1 change of direction, the Goss brothers, more 
determined than ever to break thier opponents, departed with 
their supporters and created a new whitecap organization.442
The schism in the whitecaps weakened but did not wreck 
the Goss group's plans. The whitecaps continued to terrorize 
black mill workers. But during a late night effort to drive 
off laborers employed by the Draughons, one of the blacks met 
their attack with a shotgun allegedly provided by the 
Courthouse faction and "brought down several of the boys," 
including Lance Goss. This shootout exposed many of the 
participants and the underlying motives of the Goss faction 
temporarily breaking up their operation. With their support 
evaporating the Goss brothers wisely fled the region. But 
before departing, Lance Goss made public threats against 
prominent members of the Courthouse faction whom he blamed 
for the whitecap's demise.443
The brothers relocated in Purvis, Mississippi. After 
allowing time for tensions to cool in the Florida parishes, 
Lance returned to Tangipahoa and reentered politics. Joel 
organized a highly publicized band of whitecaps that 
terrorized the region about Marion County, Mississippi.
442 New Orleans Times Democrat. July 4 and 11, 1897; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 22, 1897.
443 Amite City Florida Parishes. January 14, February 
4 and 11, 1891; New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 22 and 
December 11, 1897; Kentwood Commercial. June 11, 1895.
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Among the participants of this group was the notorious Will 
Purvis. But the Mississippi state authorities aggressively 
pursued Goss, whom Purvis claimed had framed him for murder, 
forcing him to again flee and return to Tangipahoa 
parish.444
Upon his return to the Florida parishes Goss reorganized 
the whitecaps. This time the Goss faction concentrated on 
controlling businesses in Amite City and aggressively courted 
the local Populists with their message condemning the 
political elite and advocating mill work for whites only. 
Specific Amite City merchants received notices ordering them 
to leave town or face the consequences. But this time the 
Gosses had challenged the Courthouse faction at their 
strongest point, and they moved quickly to "down the Goss 
Faction." Moreover, Lance Goss's effort to destabilize the 
economy by damaging railroad property brought him into 
conflict with a well-financed major corporation, the Illinois 
Central Railroad. But the Gosses' promotion of white labor 
and calls for the disfranchisement of blacks, whose votes 
were increasingly manipulated by the Courthouse faction, 
continued to attract supporters in northeastern Tangipahoa. 
By associating themselves directly with the emerging 
Populist-Republican fusion party in a loudly proclaimed
444 New Orleans Daily Picayune. March 30, 1894,
November 12, 1895, February 22, 1897; New Orleans Times 
Democrat. July 11, 1897; Williams, True Life Story of Will 
Purvis; Kentwood Commercial. November 16, 1895.
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effort to seize power from the dominant Courthouse faction, 
conditions were perfect for the onset of a bitter feud.445
In the absence of effective law enforcement, feuding 
filled the vacuum for addressing perceived injustices. In 
the late nineteenth century numerous family feuds erupted in 
diverse regions of the rural South. Most of these feuds 
involved personal quarrels between families that abated when 
the primary feudists were killed or driven from the area. 
But few regions endured multiple unrelated feuds occurring in 
the same period. Moreover, in most cases, as in the 
celebrated Hatfield-McCoy feud, the local system of justice 
endeavored to curtail the violence and at least some of the 
feudists suffered the consequences of their crimes.446
The brutality which engulfed the Florida parishes 
differed from that of other regions in that the legal system 
was subject to, rather than separate from, the feuding. Not 
only were the representatives of the legal system completely 
cowed by the violence, but feudists so permeated the system 
itself that it proved ineffective, functioning as merely
445 Kentwood Commercial. February 15, 1896; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. December 23, 1896, February 22 and 
December 11, 1897; Amite City Florida Parishes. January 14, 
February 4 and 11, 1891, June 29, 1892. Greensburg St.
Helena Echo. June 18, 1892. New Orleans Times Democrat. July 
11, 1897; Sixteenth Judicial District Court Minute Book,
minute book 5, multiple entries (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of 
Court Archives, Amite City).
446 For an insightful examination of the Hatfield-
McCoy feud see: Altina Waller, Feud: Hatfields. McCoys, and
Social Change in Appalachia 1860-19 00 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1988)
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another partisan tool of the feudists. In addition, unlike 
other states where concerned governors monitored and 
interceded in affairs, in Louisiana, only a sustained 
statewide cry for intervention moved a reluctant Governor 
Murphy J. Foster to make even a cursory effort at controlling 
the violence in the Florida parishes. As a result, none of 
the criminal elements ever faced the implications of their 
actions before a determined court of law.
One of the first and most significant conflicts which 
emerged in post-war eastern Louisiana was the bloody Tanner- 
Kirby feud. Waged primarily in Livingston and St. Helena 
parishes, this feud had its origins in a personal quarrel 
emanating from the late Reconstruction period. As with many 
of the celebrated feuds, the name assigned it by the press 
constituted something of a misnomer. The conflict pitted the 
Kirby and Jackson families and their supporters against the 
large Lanier family and their allies.
The feud began amidst the chaos of Reconstruction. The 
absence of legal intervention in the increasingly brutal 
internecine warfare required that the families take measures 
to defend themselves. But, significantly, no evidence exists 
to indicate that either side ever sought legal intervention 
on its behalf. Instead all parties involved chose to resolve 
their differences personally without government intervention. 
The bushwhacking of Captain Pierce Lanier, Sr. in February 
1883 and the retaliatory murder of one of the Kirbys near the
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same spot dramatically intensified the brutality. Public 
interest was piqued when the news circulated that Captain 
Lanier's body had been soaked in coal oil and burned, 
possibly before he died.447
By the spring of 1883, when the feud reached its height, 
both factions engaged in brutal offensive operations. 
Following a series of individual murders injurious to both 
sides, the Kirbys determined to deliver a fatal strike 
against their enemies. Four members of the Kirby faction led 
by Bill Kirby bushwhacked and killed two Laniers on the 
Springfield-Greensburg highway; a third survived by fleeing 
into the town of Greensburg. In the wake of these murders 
the Amite City Independent reported "three Laniers, one 
Kirby, and two Jacksons are still alive, it is hoped this 
will end the feud in which six or seven men have died." On 
May 20, 1883 the Kirbys engineered a second bushwhacking of 
a group of Laniers amidst the thick undergrowth along Hog 
Branch in Livingston Parish. The ambush resulted in the 
death of two more Laniers as well as Bill Kirby. After some 
sporadic sniping at one another the feud finally subsided in 
early 1884 when the remnants of the Lanier family departed 
St. Helena Parish.448
447 Baton Rouge Capitolian-Advocate. May 22 and 24,
1883 .
448 Special edition of the Amite City Independent
presenting highlights from the period July 15, 1882 to May
26, 1883; Magnolia Gazette. May 31, 1883; New Orleans Daily 
Picayune. December 14, 1897; Baton Rouge Capitolian-Advocate.
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The Tanner-Kirby feud captured the attention of local 
residents and provided a poignant lesson in the importance of 
individual action and the irrelevance of the legal system. 
In its wake scores of feuds developed across the Florida 
parishes. Many utilized the opportunity to settle old 
scores. Others felt compelled to slay their antagonists lest 
they themselves be killed. All recognized that little if any 
effort would be made to arrest them and few juries would 
convict anyway.
Each individual feud resulted from circumstances 
peculiar to the combatants. Some ensued as a result of 
seemingly petty personal quarrels while others had their 
origins in intensive economic or political competition. The 
Ricks-Bond feud which flared intermittently throughout the 
course of the early 1890's and claimed at least five lives 
had its origin in a broken marital engagement. By contrast 
the Settoon-Johnson feud in Livingston Parish resulted from 
the introduction of economic competition in a relatively 
homogeneous area. The shooting began when the Johnson 
faction established a general merchandise store in 
Springfield. The new store competed directly with the 
existing one owned by former state senator J.S. Settoon. The 
Settoon faction's determination to maintain commercial
May 22 and 24, 1883; W.D.J. Warner to Tom Ellis, September 
15, 1874, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC).
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domination about Springfield continued to provoke sporadic 
violence throughout the mid-1890 ' s ,449
Other feuds, such as the McClendon-Overton conflict, 
emerged as a direct result of the failure of the legal 
system. An East Feliciana Parish jury's failure to convict 
B.W. McClendon of the highly suspicious murder of Bill 
Overton, prompted Overton's brother Tom to kill McClendon 
with a specially loaded shotgun. This murder in turn 
provoked additional reprisal killings. Similarly the long 
enduring Jolly-Cousin feud in St. Tammany Parish originated 
in a legal dispute over a piece of land which an ineffective 
legal system never properly adjudicated. This feud, which 
lasted more than thirteen years, climaxed in 1897 with a 
pitched battle involving pistols, shotguns, and clubs that 
left four dead and two wounded.450
By far the most dramatic feud, and the one that best 
illustrated the relationship of the eastern Louisiana piney- 
woods mentality and peculiar pattern of development to the 
continuing cycle of violence, was the so called Hyde-Goss 
feud. This feud resulted from the struggle for political and
449 Greensburg St. Helena Echo. July 9, 1892; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. October 22, 1894 and Weekly Picayune. 
August 2, 1894 and June 27, 1895; A.C. Bankston to Uncle
Simon, August 18, 1876, in William Bond Papers (LLMVC).
450 New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 26, 1883, 
January 20 and 29, 1891, March 27, November 22 and 27, 1897; 
Amite City Democrat. November 13, 1875; Kentwood Commercial. 
December 4, 1897.
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economic control between the Courthouse faction and a diverse 
collection of political aspirants and criminal elements.
The Goss faction's failure to attain commercial 
supremacy through intimidation forced them to rely on 
political appeals to challenge the Courthouse faction who now 
consistently disrupted their operations. Lance Goss in 
particular remained deeply embittered over the breakup of the 
whitecaps. Moreover Joel Goss's effort to reestablish the 
whitecaps at Amite City had brought the full weight of the 
Courthouse faction down on the family. Joe Reid especially 
resented the Goss faction's methods as well as the threat it 
presented to the power of the Courthouse faction. 
Accordingly he persuaded the sheriff to have Joel Goss, who 
remained a fugitive from justice in Marion County, 
Mississippi, arrested and returned to stand trial. But again 
Goss secured acquittal, reappearing in Amite City boasting of 
his intention to have the arresting deputy Bob McMichael, Joe 
Reid, and Avery Draughon killed.451
To confront their enemies in the Courthouse faction the 
Goss brothers allied themselves closely with the emerging 
Populist-Republican fusion party which challenged the rule of 
the Democrats statewide in the 1896 election. Recognizing 
that the best chance to challenge the statewide control of 
the Democrats lay in unity, the remnants of the Republican
451 New Orleans Times Democrat. July 11, 1897; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. February 22 and December 11, 1897, 
June 15 and 17, 1898.
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party combined with the increasingly forceful Populists. The 
Populist emphasis on labor and agriculture and its commitment 
to improve the quality of life of the common man attracted a 
large following in Louisiana. The combined ticket commanded 
the support of black and white workers alike, cutting into 
traditional sources of Democratic support.
The Fusion party constituted a serious threat to the 
race baiting, do nothing rule of the Louisiana Bourbon 
Democrats. But in the piney woods of the Florida parishes 
the highly charged election represented a serious factional 
confrontation. Though the gubernatorial challenge the Fusion 
candidate John Pharr posed to the Democrat Murphy Foster 
stimulated some interest, the area was gripped by the 
intensity of the regional contests. Local attention 
concentrated primarily on the challenges to Judge Reid, 
District Attorney Kemp, and Sheriff McMichael. In addition 
the challenge posed by Lance Goss to the Courthouse faction's 
candidate for coroner, Dr. J.M. Craig, provided additional 
interest.
After a grueling campaign the Fusion party appeared 
poised for victory based on their organization of local 
blacks into Fusion party clubs. But in the last hours before 
the election Hyde and other members of the Courthouse faction 
persuaded the blacks to support the candidacy of Judge Reid 
regardless of who they voted for in the governor's race. 
Accordingly the majority of blacks supported Pharr for
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governor but provided the decisive margin to re-elect Judge 
Reid and defeat Lance Goss.452
On election day, April 21, 1896, a large crowd gathered 
to observe the voting at the precinct in Tangipahoa. When it 
became apparent that blacks were voting in support of the 
Courthouse faction despite the threats issued, members of the 
Goss family became enraged. Deason Goss, twenty year old son 
of Lance Goss, accordingly approached Sam Hyde and gave him 
a sound drubbing which seemed to reduce the prevailing 
tension. But a few moments later Lance Goss approached Hyde
demanding an explanation. When Hyde turned to walk away,
Goss promptly drew his pistol and shot him in the back. 
While falling Hyde drew his own revolver and emptied it into 
Goss. The shooting provoked a general exchange between 
supporters of each man. In the aftermath Lance Goss lay 
dead, struck eight times. Sam Hyde, shot once in the back 
and once in the stomach, appeared mortally wounded.453
Hyde survived his wounds but the feud was now on in
earnest. The Goss family, particularly the deceased man's
wife and sister Ida Fenn, swore vengeance against all those 
who participated in his death. And to many residents the
452 New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 22 and 23, 1896; 
Amite City Florida Parishes. April 24, 1896.
453 New Orleans Daily Picayune. April 22, 1896,
February 22 and December 11, 1897; Amite City Florida
Parishes. April 24, 1896; New Orleans Times Democrat. April 
22, 1896 and July 11, 1897; Kentwood Commercial. April 24, 
1896.
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Gosses had good reason to be angry. Though only five empty 
chambers were found in Hyde's gun, Lance Goss had been struck 
eight times, indicating that others had fired on him. 
Moreover Goss's nephew, Willie Knapp, who had also fired on 
Hyde, barely survived the wrath of his uncle's killers. Goss 
family members repeatedly claimed that the entire incident 
resulted from a pre-arranged conspiracy to kill both Goss and 
Knapp who had been condemned by some for his participation in 
a killing in East Feliciana a few years earlier.454
Though it had again prevailed at the voting booths, the 
Courthouse faction emerged from the election of 1896 badly 
bruised. Several of their strongest supporters had been 
involved in a violent personal confrontation which left one 
of them severely wounded. More importantly their candidates 
had faced a surprisingly strong district-wide challenge. 
Though they carried the parishes of Tangipahoa and St. 
Tammany, their majorities in each had noticeably declined. 
The decline in support for the Courthouse faction candidates 
proved more drastic in St. Helena and Livingston where the 
Courthouse ticket prevailed by only 28 and 59 votes 
respectively. But the greatest shock came in Washington
454 Amite City Florida Parishes. April 24, 1896;
Kentwood Commercial. April 24, 1896; New Orleans Daily
Picayune. April 22, 1896, February 22, July 4, and December 
11, 1897; New Orleans Times Democrat. April 22, 1896, July 
11, 1897; Greensburg St. Helena Echo. July 25, 1891.
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Parish where Judge Reid himself was defeated by nearly a 3 00 
vote margin.'155
The declining strength of the Courthouse faction did 
relate directly to the strong appeal of the Fusion ticket. 
Beginning in the late 1870s the strength of the Farmer's 
Alliance increased steadily in the Florida parishes. The 
combination of farmers committed to improving their standard 
of living and delivering themselves from capitalist 
exploitation embodied in the Alliance rapidly gained strength 
in the post-Reconstruction period. Its rhetoric espousing 
the virtues of the independent agrarian lifestyle played well 
in the piney woods. With the emergence of the Populist 
crusade in the early 1890's the agrarian movement became far 
more radicalized. Florida parish farmers collectively 
transported their goods overland and by lake steamer to New 
Orleans to force the railroad to lower its freight rates for 
hauling produce. Locally the Populists increasingly vented 
their frustration on the Courthouse faction which 
demonstrated little if any interest in their program. In a 
frustrated outburst one Tangipahoa Parish farmer wrote, "We 
are tired of being ridden by the political bosses of Amite 
City and we demand that something be done toward giving the
455 Amite City Florida Parishes. April 24, 1896; New 
Orleans Daily Picayune. April 23, 1896; S.W. Settoon to Steve 
Ellis, September 9, 1895, Milton Strickland to Tom Ellis,
February 15, 1896, F.M. Hinson to Steve Ellis, March 15,
1896, W.H. McClendon to Steve, April 12, 1896, and S.M.
Robertson to Steve, July 24, 1896, all in Ellis Family Papers 
(LLMVC).
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white Democrats of the parish an opportunity to say who shall 
fill the offices for the next four years." Such statements 
also exemplified the consistent theme of white supremacy 
which permeated the rhetoric of the piney-woods Populists. 
The racist appeal reinforced their resentment of the 
Courthouse faction which allied itself closely with mill 
owners who employed cheaper black laborers. As a result, 
blacks in the Florida parishes demonstrated far less interest 
in the local ticket than they did in the statewide Fusion 
effort.456
But the declining power of the Courthouse faction also 
related to their inability to govern effectively. Though 
they had been dominant for years, criminal elements and 
lawlessness continued to prevail in the piney woods. In an 
effort to encourage greater citizen support for law 
enforcement Judge Reid and other members of the Courthouse 
faction organized the "Law and Order League." The 
constitution of the League acknowledged, "a spirit of 
lawlessness prevails in certain portions of this parish which
Amite City Democrat. September 25 and November 20, 
1875; Amite City Gazette. June 28, 1889; Greensburg St.
Helena Echo. August 22, 1891 and September 23, 1893; St.
Francisville Feliciana Sentinel. June 22, 1889. Amite City 
Florida Parishes. October 1 and December 17, 1890, July 8, 
August 12 and 19, 1891; New Orleans Daily Picayune. June 19 
and April 25, 1896; D. Caffery to Steve Ellis, September 20, 
1893, in Ellis Family Papers (LLMVC). Newspapers clipping 
from the Wesson, Mississippi (?) Southern Industry. May 16, 
1885, in Duncan Francis Young Scrapbooks (Department of 
Manuscripts and Rare Books, Howard Tilton Library, Tulane 
University); James S. McGehee, "Ramble in Autobiography," p. 
85, in James Stewart McGehee Papers (LLMVC).
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the regularly constituted authorities have thus far failed to 
suppress and the welfare and security of a large majority of 
the population, white and colored, are jeopardized by these 
parties, who under cover of darkness seek to regulate the 
affairs of both employees and employers in defiance of 
civilization." The statement concluded with a call for 
citizens to take action to suppress those who "singly or in 
bands seek to disturb the industrial and social harmony of 
any portion of the parish."457
Although the League constituted a noble effort to 
encourage citizen involvement in containing the growing 
lawlessness, it failed for a variety of reasons. Fear 
discouraged many residents from associating themselves with 
an organization committed to containing the most violent 
elements. Others maintained a steadfast rejection of the 
right of government to interfere in personal matters. Scores 
of piney-woods dwellers remained committed to the idea of 
individual action spurning the intervention of government. 
The prevailing attitude that some folks "needed a killing" 
and that government served as an unwanted interloper in the 
natural course of human affairs, served consistently to 
stifle efforts to restore stability in eastern Louisiana. 
Finally, the Courthouse faction failed to free itself from 
the morass of factional fighting occurring in the piney
457 Amite City Florida Parishes. February 4 and 11,
1891.
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woods. Its opponents relentlessly accused them of prejudice 
in their direction of the courts and thus rejected their 
authority. Lacking the strength and public support to 
enforce stability, the prestige of the Courthouse faction 
steadily declined.
The expanding cycle of violence increasingly prompted 
local residents to appeal directly to state officials for 
relief. The near anarchy prevailing in the piney woods was 
exemplified in a petition sent to Governor Foster by 
"Indignant Citizens" of Livingston and St.Helena parishes. 
The petition requested the governor's intervention to halt 
the constant unprovoked "shooting of people on the 
Greensburg-Springfield road" by unknown parties. Foster's 
reluctance to intervene in the increasingly turbulent Florida 
parishes prompted some residents to adopt desperate measures, 
some of which threatened the political structure. The single 
greatest challenge to the legally constituted authorities 
occurred in October 1896, in Tangipahoa Parish.458
The threat arose in conjunction with the brutal murder
of the Cotton family at Tickfaw. The axe murder of the
entire family of five by two blacks, John Johnson and Arch 
Joiner, provoked unprecedented rage in the southern portion 
of the parish. After securing a confession, Judge Reid 
ordered the prisoners sent to New Orleans for their own
458 Greensburg St. Helena Echo. January 13, 1896 and
January 22, 1897; New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 27,
29, and 30, 1896.
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protection. An outraged mob halted the train on its return 
to Amite City and threatened the deputies who had transported 
the accused to New Orleans. Determined to force the return 
of Johnson and Joiner, a mob of more than 500 marched on 
Amite City threatening to kill Judge Reid and other 
officials. In the midst of the crisis Joe Reid, Sam Hyde, 
and Charles Bradley arrived at the head of about fifty 
supporters of the Courthouse faction. Hastily sworn in as 
deputies, the men barricaded themselves and prepared to be 
stormed while Judge Reid and Sheriff McMichael sent frantic 
telegrams to Governor Foster appealing for assistance. 
Responding rapidly under the circumstances, Foster ordered a 
company of state militia to Amite City and placed three more 
on alert. Fortunately bloodshed was avoided when the mob 
halted before the barricades established on the outskirts of 
Amite City. A conference held between a committee from the 
mob and parish officials defused the situation when the 
officials consented to return the accused to Amite City to 
stand trial. Within days after their arrival in Amite City, 
Johnson and Joiner were taken from the courthouse by a mob 
250 strong and lynched at the site of the murders; this time 
parish officials did not intervene.459
New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 24, 27, 29, 
30, October 4 and 15, 1896, January 21 and July 4, 1897;
Kentwood Commercial. October 3, 1896 and January 23, 1897;
Greensburg St. Helena Echo. January 22, 1897.
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The Courthouse faction emerged from the Cotton tragedy 
severely weakened. The affair dramatically exposed the 
limitations of their authority. Moreover, the confrontation 
with the mob had strengthened their enemies who loudly
condemned their protection of "negro murderers." Many
refused to recognize that they had acted in support of the 
parish officials, not the accused. For their enemies the 
time seemed right to settle some scores.460
Following the death of Lance Goss his family engaged in 
elaborate preparations to fulfill their threat to kill all 
those involved in his demise. In support of this effort they
recruited the assistance of a large family living near
Tangipahoa. The Gill family embodied the piney-woods 
lifestyle and mentality. They congregated in a remote area 
near the Tangipahoa River appropriately named "Gilltown." 
Their tendency, along with the closely related Ricks family, 
to intermarry made them a tightly knit, somewhat xenophobic 
clan with distant blood connections to the Gosses. Several 
sons of the family patriarch Frank Gill, in particular 
Alonzo, Alex, Gage, and Obe had served as stalwart members of 
the Goss whitecap band. The Gills raised much of their own 
food, cutting a little timber and manufacturing a little 
blind tiger whiskey for cash. During the early 1890's the 
Gill boys compiled an impressive record of arrests ranging
460 New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 29 and 30, 
1896, January 21, 1897; Greensburg St. Helena Echo. January 
22, 1897.
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from attempted murder to forcible disruption of peaceable 
assemblies. Their frequent brushes with the law had steadily 
increased their contempt for the Courthouse faction but 
created for them an important friend in District Attorney 
Kemp, who typically secured their release without trial.461
In recruiting the Gills as assassins, Ida Goss Fenn and 
Joel Goss continued the pattern they had established earlier 
in Mississippi. The Gills would be set up in a business 
financed by the Gosses and paid a set amount of cash for each 
murder. By November 1896 the Gosses had secured a small 
general merchandise store in Tangipahoa which Alonzo Gill and 
his brothers operated. The Tangipahoa location would 
expedite the murder of the first intended victim Bill 
Davidson. On Christmas eve, 1896, while Alonzo Gill served 
as lookout, Obe Gill and friends Monroe and Otto Bamber 
cornered Davidson and shot him four times in the back. 
Though Davidson returned fire before he died wounding one of 
the assassins, they all escaped into the nearby river swamp 
leaving the first member of the Courthouse faction dead in 
the streets of Tangipahoa.462
461 New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 22 and July 
4, 1897, April 9 and 12, 1899; New Orleans Times Democrat. 
July 4 and 11, 1897; Kentwood Commercial. March 6, 1897.
Sixteenth Judicial District Court Minute Books, multiple 
entries vols. 5 and 6 (Tangipahoa parish Clerk of Court 
Archives, Amite City); interview with Junie Ricks, June 21, 
1988.
462 New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 25 and 26, 
1896, February 22, July 4, and December 11, 1897; Kentwood
Commercial. February 27, 1897; New Orleans Times Democrat.
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But despite the success of their plan the Goss family 
had little to celebrate. Only hours before the Davidson 
murder Joel Goss lost his life in a difficulty in Amite City. 
Deputy Sheriff Bob McMichael's attempt to arrest Goss’s son 
Walter for the attempted murder of an Amite City businessman 
provoked a challenge from Goss. When Goss threatened to have 
McMichael murdered if he arrested his son, McMichael shot him 
point blank in the head killing him instantly. With the 
sheriff's brother responsible for this questionable killing, 
the sheriff's department was rendered increasingly 
ineffective at an extremely critical moment.463
No one resented the killing of Bill Davidson more than 
his cousin Sam Hyde. The Davidson murder left nine 
fatherless children and deprived the Courthouse faction of a 
staunch supporter. Many residents were particularly incensed 
that Davidson had been shot multiple times in the back. On 
the evening of the murder supporters of the Courthouse 
faction gathered in Tangipahoa. They learned that the Gills 
and Bambers had purchased a large quantity of ammunition 
before fleeing into the river swamp. As they conferred in 
front of the telegraph office, several shots were fired into
January 11 and July 11, 1897. Sixteenth Judicial District 
Court Minute Book, No. 5-7 multiple entries temporarily 
assigned docket no. 219 (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court 
Archives, Amite City); interview with Junie Ricks; interview 
with Orin Davidson June 18, 1988.
463 New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 23 and 24, 
1896, June 17, 1898; New Orleans Times Democrat. January 11, 
1897; Kentwood Commercial. January 23, 1897.
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the gathering wounding one of their number. The assailant 
escaped undetected.464
Under intense pressure from friends of Davidson, some of 
whom initiated legal action for nonfeasance, Sheriff 
McMichael reluctantly agreed to attempt the arrest of the 
Gills and Bambers. Local residents reported that the 
fugitives camped in the swamp at night, then returned to 
their homes in the morning. In the pre-dawn hours of 
February 20, 1897 McMichael dispatched two deputies by train 
to direct the arrests though he remained safely in Amite. 
When the train arrived in Tangipahoa, Sam Hyde, Charles 
Bradley and fourteen others were waiting. After being 
deputized the posse proceeded to Gilltown and surrounded 
Frank Gill's fortress-like home shortly before dawn.465
Deputy Ellzy Dees, believing he could persuade Obe Gill 
to surrender peacefully, approached the house and became a 
hostage of the parties inside. Once inside Dees realized 
that just such a move had been anticipated as nearly a dozen 
heavily armed men manned the barricaded doors and windows. 
A fierce shootout lasting several hours followed. During the
464 New Orleans Dai1v Picayune. December 25 and 26, 
1896, February 22, July 4, and December 11, 1897; New Orleans 
Times Democrat. July 11, 1897; interview with Orin Davidson.
465 New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 21 and 22, 
July 4 and 5, 1897; New Orleans Times Democrat. February 21 
and 22, 1897, Kentwood Commercial. February 27, 1897.
Sixteenth Judicial District Court Minute Book, no. 5, two 
entries pp. 100 and 284 (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court 
Archives, Amite City); interview with Junie Ricks.
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course of the firing two members of the posse were wounded. 
Sam Hyde who had moved close to the house demanded the 
release of Deputy Dees as the condition for the posse' s 
withdrawal. Dees was released, but Hyde found himself pinned 
down by the firing from the house behind a stump in the yard. 
After remaining for several hours unable to retreat or return 
fire, he called for someone in the house to serve as a shield 
while he departed. Felder Ricks accordingly walked between 
Hyde and the house to the edge of the property. Upon 
reaching the fence line, Ricks fell to the ground and the 
Gills opened fire striking Hyde once in the back as he 
scrambled for cover. The effort to arrest Obe Gill had 
failed miserably.*66
Local officials made no further attempts to arrest the 
Bambers and Gill in connection with Davidson's murder. But 
Judge Reid's threat to request state militia units to secure 
their capture if they did not appear for the June 1897 
session of the district court proved effective. At the head 
of twenty heavily armed men the fugitives appeared at the 
courthouse, learned that they would actually have to stand 
trial, and fled warning that they should not be pursued. The 
Gills maintained that they could not receive a fair trial 
before Judge Reid, and they understandably feared
New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 21 and 22, 
July 4 and 5, 1897; Kentwood Commercial. February 27, 1897; 
New Orleans Times Democrat. February 21 and 22, 1897; 
interview with Junie Ricks.
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incarceration in the stronghold of their enemies. But their 
escape produced grave consequences. Six days later Gurley 
Mixon and Alex Martin, prosecution witnesses in the Davidson 
killing, were mysteriously murdered at Tangipahoa in separate 
incidents.467
With the Gills and Bambers now acting as the primary 
feudists of the Goss faction the newspapers assigned this 
group the name "Branch men," due to the proximity of numerous 
branches or streams about Gilltown. With clearly little to 
fear from the legal system, the Branch men determined to 
continue the process of eliminating their enemies before the 
same could be done to them. They recruited the assistance of 
a notorious desperado, Julius Parker, to assist in the murder 
of Sam Hyde.
Parker possessed many qualities that could be deemed 
psychopathic. He had fled Westville Mississippi, "under a 
cloud" a few years earlier charged with among other things 
abuse of a young boy and cruelty to animals. His time in the 
Florida parishes had been equally troublesome. Parker lived 
in poverty after abandoning his wife and children for a 
teenage girl. To secure funds he sold some blind tiger 
whiskey and frequently offered to kill for money. Ida Fenn's 
promise of large sums of cash and a business opportunity
New Orleans Daily Picayune. June 8, 13, 15, 17, 
21, July 4 and 5, December 11, 1897; New Orleans Times
Democrat. July 4, 5, and 11, 1897; Kentwood Commercial. June 
19, 26, and August 7, 1897; interview with Junie Ricks.
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easily persuaded Parker to join the conspiracy to murder 
Hyde.468
The Branch men knew that in his capacity as postmaster 
Hyde would file a monthly report in Amite City within the 
first three days of the month. The three assassins secreted 
themselves in the thick underbrush along Dry Branch near 
Areola Station and waited four days for their victim. Though 
warned the evening before that the assassins awaited him, on 
July 3, 1897 Hyde proceeded toward Amite alone. At the spot 
assigned for the bushwhacking the Branch men emptied their 
shotguns into Hyde's back and fled, scattering turpentine to 
confuse the bloodhounds certain to pursue them.469
Immediately following Hyde's armed funeral Joe Reid, 
Charles Bradley, and other supporters of the Courthouse 
faction gathered to formulate a strategy for dealing with the 
Branch men. Outraged residents forced Sheriff McMichael to 
step down temporarily and appealed to the governor to declare 
martial law. The Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury reinforced 
their efforts by offering an unprecedented reward for Hyde's
468 New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 4-6, 8-12, August 
3-7, 24, September 2-4, 10, and November 9, 1897; New Orleans 
Times Democrat. July 11, August 3, and December 11, 1897; 
interview with Junie Ricks.
469 New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 4-6, 8-12, 14-16, 
August 3-7, 24, September 2-10, October 8, November 9, 1897; 
New Orleans Times Democrat. July 4, 5, 9, 11, 14, 15, and 19, 
August 3 and 25, 1897. Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. July 4, 
1897; Kentwood Commercial. July 10, 17, and August 7, 1897; 
interviews with Junie Ricks, R.A. Kent, Jr., August 1, 1991, 
and Eugene B. Watson, December 27, 1980.
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murderers. Several unrelated murders in the following weeks 
in Tangipahoa Parish increased the tension. Governor Foster 
promised state militia to secure the fugitives' arrest. But 
fearing retaliation if they remained overnight in the Amite 
City jail, Obe Gill and the Bamber brothers agreed to turn 
themselves in to stand trial for the Davidson murder only if 
they would be incarcerated in New Orleans. The trio had good 
reason to be fearful. As they quietly boarded the train at 
Tangipahoa for transport to New Orleans, their plan became 
public. An effort to intercept the fugitives failed when the 
horse carrying a rider dispatched to alert the men gathered 
at Hyde Station collapsed in route.470
Under intense public pressure sheriff's deputies soon 
made several arrests in connection with the Hyde murder. The 
evidence accumulated against Alex Gill, Julius Parker, and 
Joe Goins proved particularly convincing. But District 
Attorney Kemp, gleefully observing the systematic destruction 
of his rivals in the Courthouse faction, refused to pursue 
the matter. Indeed Kemp and his father along with Judge 
Reid's bitter political foe, Milton Strickland, served as 
legal counsel to the accused. Joe Reid accordingly directed 
the prosecution personally. In an eloquent and emotional
470 New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 14-16, 20, 29, August 2, 3, 5-7, 1897; New Orleans Times 
Democrat. July 4-6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 1897. Kentwood
Commercial. July 10 and 17, August 7, 1897; Sixteenth
Judicial District Court Minute Book, No. 5, multiple entries; 
interviews with Junie Ricks, and Herbert Hart, February 2, 
1991.
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appeal Reid urged the jury to pass judgement based on the 
evidence and deliver the "country from anarchy and ruin, and 
prove the potency of the arm of justice." Despite his 
efforts a series of relatives asserting the innocence of the 
accused and a liberal dose of threats against the jurors 
secured not guilty verdicts for all.471
The decision provided a definitive illustration of the 
impotence of the legal system. In its wake a reign of terror 
engulfed the piney woods as the Branch men extracted revenge 
on all who had opposed them. Those who came to northern 
Tangipahoa now did so at the risk of their own lives. An 
elderly minister, one of the few members of the local 
religious establishment courageous enough to condemn the 
violence, received a near fatal beating at the hands of 
several Branch men. The same group attacked staunch 
supporters of the Courthouse faction Ben and Seaborn Hart who 
saved themselves by dashing into a store in Tangipahoa and 
returning fire, others were not so fortunate. Branch men 
forced the city marshall of Tangipahoa and others to kneel 
before them publicly and blow down the barrels of their 
pistols. Merchants were terrorized and sites suitable for 
bushwhackings established along the roads to Gilltown. The
471 New Orleans Times Democrat. July 11, 14, 15, and 
19, August 3, 1897; New Orleans Daily Picayune. July 14-16, 
August 3, 5-7, and 24, September 2-4, 7, and 10, October 8, 
November 9, and December 11, 1897. Kentwood Commercial.
August 7 and 28, September 4, 11, and 18, 1897; W.W. Draughon 
to Robert Reid, June 15, 1900, in Robert R. Reid Papers
(LLMVC).
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Branch men notified friends travelling at night to place a 
lantern on the left side of their horse and whistle a 
specific tune otherwise they would be killed. As a climax to 
the fall activities some of the Branch men bushwhacked young 
Willie Mixon, who possessed information concerning the 
Davidson murder, under circumstances similar to the Hyde 
killing.472
Joe Reid and other surviving elements of the Courthouse 
faction continued to press the criminal cases outstanding 
against the Branch men, particularly the unresolved Davidson 
murder. Members of the Gill and Goss families repeatedly 
announced their intention to kill the Reids. The brothers 
foiled several prepared bushwhackings by alternating their 
route when they travelled to court in neighboring St. Helena 
and Washington parishes. In early December 1897 the Gills 
received a tip from someone in the district attorney's office 
that Joe Reid would be handling cases at the Washington 
Parish Courthouse in Franklinton. On the evening of December 
9, 1897, Alex, Alonzo, and Gage Gill along with Walter Goss 
waited patiently outside the courthouse for Reid to depart. 
As he descended the steps, Gage Gill approached from behind 
firing five shots, one hitting Reid in the back and killing
472 New Orleans Daily Picayune. September 4, 7, 10, 
and 16, October 8, November 9, 16, and 24, 1897; Greensburg 
St. Helena Echo. December 17, 1897; New Orleans Times
Democrat. December 3, 11, 12, 1897. Kentwood Commercial.
October 30, November 13 and 27, December 18, 1897;
Reminiscences of Dr. J.W. Lambert, J.W. Lambert Papers
(LLMVC); interview with Norma Lambert, July 26, 1988.
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him. Though a vast crowd gathered to condemn the murder, 
only two volunteered to join a sheriff's posse departing in 
pursuit of the killers.473
Three days later a Baptist minister became the next 
victim of the Branch men. S.B. Mullen, an itinerant preacher 
from Simpson County, Mississippi, arrived in Amite City to 
attend a local religious revival. Unfortunately for Mullen 
the Branch men mistook him for a detective. Following their 
typical pattern several men approached Mullen from behind and 
shot him point blank in the back on the steps of the Amite 
City Hotel. The St. Helena Echo led the condemnation of the 
minister's murderers declaring, "Oh heaven pity! And if 
there be any power to save, hear the cries of the poor widows 
and orphans and save this country from the further shedding 
of blood."474
The successive series of murders committed by known 
parties provoked a statewide demand for order in the eastern
473 New Orleans Times Democrat. 'December 11-13, 1897; 
New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 11-21, 29, 1897, January 
3-4, 6-7, 10, 1898; Kentwood Commercial. December 18, 1897; 
Amite City Florida Parishes, reprinted in Daily Picayune. 
January 10, 1898; interview with Junie Ricks.
474 Greensburg St. Helena Echo. December 17, 1897; New 
Orleans Times Democrat. December 13-14, 25, 1897; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. December 13-16, 20-21, 1897; Kentwood
Commercial. December 18, 1897. Though the mistaken detective 
theory remained the most widely accepted interpretation of 
Mullen's murder, others interpreted the situation 
differently. Some noted that Mullen resembled Judge Reid, 
while others pointed out that Mullen came from the same 
region as Julius Parker, and the Branch men feared the 
information he possessed.
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Florida parishes. Many locals were also outraged that 
members of the Branch faction boldly entered Amite City 
during Joe Reid's funeral and made threats around the town. 
Newspapers across the state called for action to reestablish 
law and order in the piney woods. The Crowlv Signal 
complained that murder in Washington and Tangipahoa parishes 
constituted little more than a misdemeanor. The New Orleans 
Daily Picayune declared "law has ceased to be supreme and 
society in the parish of Tangipahoa has degenerated to that 
primitive state where each individual must look out for 
himself as best he can. The entire state demands that the 
reign of law shall be restored in Tangipahoa, no matter what 
the cost." Likewise the Shreveport Times observed, "nowhere 
in the state does a feeling of such dread and terror exist as 
in Tangipahoa. Only a determined and unflinching effort to 
discover and punish the assassins will redeem Tangipahoa from 
its Baptism of Blood." The Times maintained that lawlessness 
in the Florida parishes damaged the reputation of the entire 
state. Similarly the Plaquemines Journal condemned those 
responsible for the murders. "The soil of Tangipahoa has 
literally been drenched with blood of late, most of those who 
have lost their lives being the victims of cowardly and 
heartless assassins. There is no coward so vile and 
despicable as he who strikes a fellow being from behind under 
the favoring shadows of night or the protecting trees of a 
forest. These black hearted miscreants have made the name of
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that fair section of the state a byword and a reproach."475
Increasing calls from the press and public demanded 
intervention by the governor. The Baton Rouge Daily Advocate 
insisted the governor must intervene "with firmness and 
decision." The New Orleans Times Democrat demanded that 
Governor Foster force the resignation of District Attorney 
Kemp, Judge Reid, and Sheriff McMichael for failure to 
maintain order. In an interview with the Daily Picayune. 
Deputy Sheriff Millard Edwards explained the prevailing 
situation in Tangipahoa and neighboring parishes. According 
to Edwards "it is well known to everyone that a terrible feud 
exists in the region, every other man is a friend of one side 
or the other and thus it would be impossible to organize a 
posse of 50 men to serve warrants." Edwards noted further 
that those not involved in the feud were terrified of the 
participants and therefore would not support the peace 
officers. John King superintendent of the Gullet Gin Company 
at Amite City reaffirmed Edwards' observations. "The feud is 
so severe that everyone goes about armed, everyone knows who 
killed Joe Reid. There are two parties arrayed against each 
other and each has many influential friends there so that it 
is practically impossible to suppress the lawlessness. If
475 Crowlv Signal and Baton Rouge Capital Item,
reprinted in Franklinton New Era. December 17, 1898; New
Orleans Daily Picayune. December 11-14, 21, 1897; New Orleans 
Times Democrat. December 11-13, 1897; Baton Rouge Daily
Advocate. Plaquemines Journal. Shreveport Times. and Amite 
City Florida Parishes all reprinted in Daily Picayune. 
January 4 and December 21, 1897.
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the people rose in mass to suppress the violence it would be 
one faction against the other and a bloodbath.1,476
Under mounting statewide pressure Governor Foster 
ordered the convocation of a conference to discuss the 
violence increasingly referred to as the "Bloody Tangipahoa 
Troubles." The meeting convened in New Orleans on December 
20, 1897, with Governor Foster and Attorney General
Cunningham in attendance. Judge Reid represented the 
Courthouse faction and District Attorney Kemp, who 
increasingly served as the defender of the Goss faction, 
spoke for the Branch men. The newspapers noted that the 
representatives of each faction slept at different hotels 
adding "the relations between the two factions are not 
amicable." Sheriff McMichael and several deputies also 
attended. The conference lasted two days but other than 
condemning the incompetence and cowardice of McMichael, 
little of substance was achieved. The governor too seemed 
baffled by the incredibly chaotic circumstances and chose to 
remain aloof. Other than promising troops if the violence 
persisted he took no action.*77
The governor's conference proved to be an unqualified 
victory for the Branch men. Governor Foster had failed to
*76 Baton Rouge Daily Advocate. December 28, 1896, and 
reprinted in New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 21, 1897; 
New Orleans Times Democrat. December 23 and 25, 1897; Daily 
Picayune, December 15-16, 1897.
1*77 New Orleans Daily Picayune. December 20-21, 1897;
New Orleans Times Democrat. December 23 and 25, 1897.
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dispatch troops and the remnants of the once powerful 
Courthouse faction had been humiliated and left seemingly 
without support. Some speculated that Foster's inaction 
resulted from his reluctance to intervene in the factional 
feuding lest it cost him the political support of one of the 
groups. Others saw it as consistent with the ineffectual 
pattern of his administration. Rather than attempt to 
conduct the scheduled trial of the Branch men accused in the 
murders of Davidson, Mixon, and Joe Reid, parish officials 
canceled the January term of the district court. The Daily 
Picayune lamented "a feeling of unrest prevails here and 
trouble is looked for." Exasperated the Franklinton New Era 
complained "in Washington and Tangipahoa the law is held in 
contempt because it is not enforced.1,478
In the wake of the governor's conference District 
Attorney Kemp secured the release of Obe Gill and the Bamber 
brothers from prison in New Orleans. Kemp's political power 
increased significantly in the vacuum created by the 
destruction of the Courthouse faction. But by this time the 
shift in power made little difference. When officials in 
Meridian, Mississippi arrested Julius Parker and forcibly 
returned him to stand trial in Tangipahoa for burglary and 
abandoning his family, the officials at Amite City
New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 7, 10, and 13, 
1898; Sixteenth District Judicial Court Minute Books, No. 5 
and 6 multiple entries (Tangipahoa Clerk of Court Archives, 
Amite City); Franklinton New Era. December 17, 1898.
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reluctantly admitted him to jail and endured the criticism of 
the more courageous Mississippi deputies. Nine new murders 
in the five months following the governor's conference 
confirmed the continuing absence of law enforcement in Bloody 
Tangipahoa. When those accused of the Davidson murder 
finally came to trial in June 1898, the Daily Picayune 
reported their acquittal with the contemptuous comment "the 
state having made no case against them."*79
With their victory complete over the system of justice 
and their enemies, the Branch men returned to whitecapping. 
Merchants and mill owners were visited and ordered to dismiss 
their black laborers on pain of death. But their effort to 
force the dismissal of blacks from the huge Banner Lumber 
Company in Kentwood provoked a serious challenge. When the 
directors of the Banner Company refused their demands, Branch 
men killed one company foreman near Franklinton and 
bushwhacked another near Spring Creek. In response an armed 
posse of more than 100 Banner employees, exasperated 
citizens, and sheriff's deputies from three different 
parishes pursued the Branch men for weeks in a wild series of 
encounters which included several pitched battles and deaths.
*79 New Orleans Daily Picayune. January 7, 16, 18, 20, 
and 31, February 10, 12, and 17, March 9 and 13, April 3, 4, 
and 23, May 31, June 4, 6-8, 12, and 18, 1898; Franklinton 
New Era. December 17, 1898. Kentwood Commercial. November 
13, and 27, 1897, February 5, 12, and 26, March 5 and 19,
1898; Sixteenth District Judicial Court Minute Book, No. 5 
and 6 multiple entries (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court 
Archives, Amite City).
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Hard pressed by deputies under the direction of state 
Adjutant General Jumel and Deputy Sheriff Avery Draughon the 
Gills and Bambers agreed to submit to a court hearing. But 
as before they came backed by an armed mob, posted bond, and 
departed. When tensions cooled a few months later the Gills 
summarily executed Avery Draughon in Tangipahoa. Among those 
who participated in the futile effort to capture his 
murderers were the seventeen year old sons of two previously 
assassinated members of the Courthouse faction. The feud had 
passed to a new generation, and it would flare intermittently 
until the outbreak of World War I.480
The violence which consumed the Florida parishes in the 
late nineteenth century demonstrated that when left to their 
own devices the piney-woods dwellers proved incapable of 
effectively governing themselves. A peculiar pattern of 
regional development and an infatuation with a warped 
Jefferrsonian tradition which accepted violence as the means 
to an end, subverted the honorable and progressive intentions 
of the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian perception of independence. 
This perverted tradition created in many residents an 
obsessive compulsion with independence which compelled them
480 Franklinton New Era. April 8, 1899; New Orleans 
Daily Picayune. April 4-8, 10, 12-14, 1899; W.W. Draughon to 
Robert Reid, June 15, 1900, and undated clipping from the St. 
Helena Echo.in Robert R. Reid Papers (LLMVC). Sixteenth 
District Judicial Court Minute Books, No. 5 and 6 multiple 
entries (Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court Archives, Amite 
City); interview with Norma Lambert; undated newsclipping 
from Daily Picayune, in Dr. J.W. Lambert Papers (LLMVC).
to reject violently governance and legally constituted 
authority. When the bonds of planter dominance and 
concomitant exploitation were finally broken, the result was 
anarchy and the degeneration of a central element of piney- 
woods society, honor. In the end those without honor 
prevailed, contributing to a legacy of violence which insured 
the Florida parishes would maintain inordinately high rates 
of brutality into the middle of the twentieth century. 
Perhaps then planter dominance of the piney woods had been 
good for the region, promoting stability, prosperity, and 
reinforcing the sense of honor essential to agreeable 
interpersonal relations in many areas of the South. But 
conditions created by the planters had repeatedly subverted 
the ambitions and customs of the plain folk corrupting the 
purity of their traditions and contributing correspondingly 
to decades of bloodshed. The question remains then did 
planter dominance provide a moment of stability in an 
otherwise chaotic society? Or did the agenda of the planters 
corrupt the natural societal evolution of the piney woods 
producing anarchy? To those who lost their lives in war, 
Reconstruction, and family feuds, the debate matters little.
Bibliography
Manuscript Collections
Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valiev Collection. Louisiana 
State University, Baton Rouge.
Allen, William M. Letters 
Alley, Mary Scrapbooks 
Amacker, O.P. Papers
Amite Navigation Company Document, 1813
Amite River Academy Circular, 1879
Anderson, John Q. Papers
Andrews, James M. Papers
Anonymous Civil War Letters Collection
Aswell, James B. Papers
Barrow, Robert Letter
Barrow, W.M. Family Papers
Bass, John H. Diary
Batchelor, Ruth Ker Papers
Batchelor, Albert Papers
Benson Family Papers
Bond, William Papers
Bonner, Samuel C. Family Papers
Bonny, P .L . Papers
Bowman, James P. Family Papers
Boyd, David F. Papers
Bringier, Louis Papers
Burke, E . A . Papers
Burruss, John C. Papers
Butler Family Papers
Butler, Thomas Papers
Capell, Eli Papers
Carpenter, George H. Papers
Carruth, Elizabeth Papers
Cartwright, Samuel Family Papers
Causey, R.J. Papers
Clinton and Port Hudson Railroad Company Records
Collins, O.L. Account Book
Connor, Lemuel Family Papers
Corbin, Robert A. Papers
de Clouet, Alexander Papers
Democratic Party Handbill 1876
Dixon, William Y. Papers
Durnin, James and John Papers
Durnin, Henry Notebook
East Baton Rouge Parish Volunteer Fund Letter 
East Feliciana Parish Archives Collection 
Edwards, James Wiley Papers
489
490
Ellis Family Papers
Embree, Joseph Papers
Evans, Nathaniel Family Papers
Fuqua, James O. Papers
Flanders, Benjamin F. Papers
Fluker, David J. Papers
Garig, W.W. Papers
Gayarre, Charles Papers
Gayle, W.O. Record Book
George, John Thomas Papers
Gurley, John W. Papers
Hamilton, William S. Papers
Hardin, J. Fair Collection
Harris, John A. Letters
Harrower, G.T. Letters
Hayden, S .A . Letter
Haynes, Bythell Letter
Hennen-Jennings Papers
Hephzibah Church Books
Herrin, Edmund Papers
Hulin, Aaron Letter
Hunter-Taylor Family Papers
Hursey, Asa H. Family Papers
Johnson, Charles James Letters
Kellogg, William P. Papers
Kemp, John Papers
Kendall, John Irwin Biography
Kendrick, Benjamin Papers
Kent, Amos Papers
Kilbourne, J.G. Family Papers
Killian and Harry Account Book
Knighton, Josiah Family Papers
Knights of Honor Books
Koch, Christian D. Family Papers
Ku Klux Klan Items
Lambert, Samuel Military History
Lambert, John W. Papers
Lea, Lemanda Papers
Leake, W.W. Letter
Lebret, Peter Account Books
Livingston Parish Papers Collection
Louisiana State Executive Department
Correspondence Collection
Lusher, Robert M. Papers
Lyons, Mary E. Notebook
Marston, Henry W. Family Papers
McBeth Letter 1864
McGee, Zuma F. Collection
McGehee, John Burruss Papers
McGehee, James Stewart Papers
McGehee, D .L . Papers
McKinney, Jeptha Papers
Governor's
491
McKowen, John C. Papers 
Newsom, M.S. Papers 
Nichols, Francis T. Papers 
Norsworthy, W .F . Letter 
Norwood, Abel John Diary
Parish Police Jury Minutes (primarily St. Tammany, East 
Feliciana, West Feliciana, and East Baton Rouge)
Patrick, Robert W. Family Papers
Pike, George A. Scrapbook
Pugh, Alex Diaries
Pugh, Josephine Papers
Raoul, W. Greene Papers
Redhead, Joseph Diary
Richardson, Hardy Papers
Richardson, Henry Papers
Reid, Robert R. Papers
Roxborough, Charles A. Letter
Ruggles, Daniel Confederate Military Report
Russell, J. Letter
Scott, M.J. Letter
Sherman, John Letter
Sherman, Thomas W. Letter
Sherman, William T. Letters
Slauson, Daniel D. Notebook
Smith, Richard H. Correspondence
Smith, Annabel Diary
Snell, S.F. Letter
Southern Watchman Mailing List
St. Helena Parish Records
Stevens, Charles E. Letters
Stewart, William and Walter Papers
Stirling, Lewis Family Papers
Stokes, Joel A. Papers
Taliaferro, James G. Papers
Taylor, Sereno Papers
Taylor, Margaret A. Papers
Taylor, Calvin Papers
Tyson, Robert A. Diary
Vinet, John B. Letters
Warmoth, Henry Clay Papers
Warner, Thomas E. Family Papers
Washington Hall Hotel Ledger
William Watson Sheriffs Fee Book
Wells, J. Madison Papers
West Feliciana Parish Military Board Minute Book 
Wilkinson, Micajah Family Papers
492
Mississippi State Archives. Jackson.
East Fork Baptist Church Records 
Military Annals of Mississippi
New Orleans-Jackson and Great Northern Railroad Collection 
Ruggles, Daniel Papers 
Terry, Joseph S. Papers
True Life Story of Will Purvis (printed manuscript)
National Archives. Washington D.C.
Records of the Louisiana State Government, 1850-1888, War 
Department Collection of Confederate Records, Doc. F-75 
Records of the Commissioner for the State of Louisiana Bureau 
of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands
Newberry Library. Chicago.
W.M. Francis and E.D. Frost Out Letters Collection 
General Philip H. Sheridan Letter 
Illinois Central Railroad Collection 
Illinois Central Railroad Overflow Reports 
West Feliciana Railroad Collection
Southern Historical Collection. University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill
Henry Clay Warmoth Papers
Center for Regional Studies. Southeastern Louisiana 
Un ivers ity, Hammond.
Dunn, Velmarae Collection 
Magee, Zuma Collection
Tangipahoa Parish Courthouse Collection
Department of Manuscripts and Rare Books. Howard-Tilton 
Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans.
Everett Family Papers
Farrar, Lee Collection
Kuntz Family Collection
Young, Duncan Francis Scrapbooks
493
Independently located manuscript, collections
Amite City Council Minute Books (Amite City Hall)
Hyde Family Papers (in possession of Margaret Hyde Quin, 
Amite City, Louisiana)
Sixteenth Judicial District Court Minute Books, No. 4-7 
(Tangipahoa Parish Clerk of Court Archives, Amite City, 
Louisiana)
Minutes of the Pike County, Mississippi Circuit Court Books 
A-B (Pike County Courthouse, Magnolia, Mississippi)
Wands, James B. Letters (in possession of Emma Duvall, 
Roseland Louisiana)
Newspapers
Amite City
Daily Wanderer 
Democrat 
Florida Parishes 
Gazette 
Independent 
Louisiana Star 
News Digest 
Progress
Tangipahoa Advocate 
Tangipahoa Democrat 
Times
Tri-Weeklv Wanderer 
True Democrat
Baton Rouge
Capitolian-Advocate 
Daily Advocate 
Daily Comet 
Democratic Advocate 
Gazette
Bayou Sara
Ledger
Clinton
American Patriot 
East Feliciana Patriot 
Feliciana Democrat
Feliciana Whig
Louisiana Floridian 
Patriot-Democrat 
Semi-Weekly Patriot Democrat
Covington
Wanderer
Fort Adams, Mississippi 
Item
Franklinton
New Era
Greensburg
Gazette
Imperial
Journal
St. Helena Echo 
Weekly Star and Journal
Kentwood
Commercial
Liberty, Mississippi
Southern Herald
Magnolia, Mississippi
Gazette 
Grand Trunk
New Orleans
Bee
Daily Crescent 
Daily Delta 
Daily Picayune 
Price Current 
Republican 
Times
Times Democrat 
Weekly Courier 
Weekly Pelican
495
Osyka, Mississippi
Two States
Port Vincent
Livinastonian
Triune
Roseland
Herald
St. Francisville
Asylum and Feliciana Advertiser 
Feliciana Sentinel 
Louisianian 
Louisiana Journal
Woodville, Mississippi
Republican
Sentinel
Wilkinson Gazette
Government Documents
American State Papers. Legislative Documents of the Congress 
of the United States in Relation to Public Lands. Nineteenth 
Congress, First Session, No.'s 455-457, January 24, 1826
(Washington: Duff Green, 1834)
Historical Records Survey. Works Progress Administration, 
Louisiana Parish Archives Inventory, No. 46 (St. Helena 
Parish).
Louisiana State Board of Registration.
Instructions to Supervisors of Registration With a Transcript 
of the Constitutional. Naturalization. and Other Laws 
Pertaining to the Qualification of Electors (New Orleans:
A.L. Lee State Printer, 1868).
Louisiana State Secession Debates (New Haven: Research
Publications, 1970).
496
Official Journal of the Proceedings of the House of 
Representatives of the State of Louisiana. 1812-1899.
Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Senate of the 
State of Louisiana. 1812-1899.
Official Documents of the Legislature of the State of 
Louisiana. (Legislative Docs.) 1812-1899.
The War of the Rebellion; Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1893) .
Report of the Returning Board of the State of Louisiana to 
the General Assembly. Session 1875 (New Orleans: Government
Printing, 1876)
Report of the Board of Returning Officers Session 1876 to the 
General Assembly of the State of Louisiana Relating to the 
Election Held November 7. 1876 (New Orleans: Pelican
Printing, 1877).
United States Census, 183 0: Third Census of the United
States (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1811).
United States Census, 1850: Heads of Households (Washington:
Robert Armstrong Public Printer, 1853).
-------- . Statistical View of the United States, Compendium
of the Seventh Census (Washington: Robert Armstrong Public
Printer, 1853).
-------- . Slave Schedule (Washington: Robert Armstrong
Public Printer, 1853).
United States Census, 1860: Heads of Households (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1864).
-------- . Slave Schedule (Washington: Government Printing,
1864) .
-------- . Agricultural Statistics (Washington: Government
Printing, 1864).
United States Census, 1870: Heads of Households (Washington:
Government Printing, 1872).
-------- . Agricultural Statistics (Washington: Government
Printing, 1872).
United States Census, 1880: Compendium of the Tenth Census
(Washington: Government Printing, 1880).
497
United States Congress, House. Fortieth Congress, Second 
Session, Executive Doc. 291 (1343), 1868.
-------- . Forty-Third Congress, Second Session, "Report of
the Special Committee of Three," House Report No. 101 (1657), 
pt. 1, 1875.
-------- . Congressional Hearings Supplement, House Committee
on Elections, "Sub-Committee Investigating Elections in 
Louisiana," No.l, 1869.
-------- . Miscellaneous Documents, Forty-Fifth Congress,
Third Session, "Testimony Taken by the Select Committee on 
Alleged Frauds in the Presidential Election of 1876," No. 31, 
pt. 1, 1878.
-------- . Miscellaneous Documents, Forty-Fifth Congress,
Third Session, "Testimony Taken by the Select Committee on 
Alleged Frauds in the Presidential Election of 1876," No. 31, 
pt. 3, 1879.
-------- . Miscellaneous Documents, Forty-Fourth Congress,
Second Session, "Testimony Taken by the Select Committee on 
the Recent Election in Louisiana," No. 34, pt.2, 1877.
--------- . Miscellaneous Documents, Forty-Forth Congress, No.
34, pt. 3. (in Vol V p 42)
---------. Miscellaneous Documents, Twenty-Fifth Congress,
Second Session, No. 463.
--------- . Executive Document, Fortieth Congress, Second
Session, "Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture," 1867.
--------- . Executive Document, Thirty-First Congress, Second
Session, No. 34, "Report of the Commisioner of Patents for 
the Year 1850," pt. II, pp. 257-261.
United States Department of Agriculture, "Preliminary Report 
Upon the Florida Parishes of East Louisiana and the Bluff, 
Prarie, and Hill Lands of Southwest Louisiana," U.S. 
Geological Survey Series, 1896, pt. 1-4.
--------- . Forests of Louisiana. Forest Service Release No.
75, April 1955.
--------- . Forest Atlas of the South, publication of the U.S.
Forest Service, 1969.
---------. Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Soils for
1905 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905).
498
United States Department of Justice, "Letters Received by the 
Department of Justice From the State of Louisiana, 1871- 
1884," Doc. F—167.
Publishdd Works
Books
American Institute of Homoeopathy. Official Report of the 
Homoeopathic Yellow Fever Commission (New Orleans: A.H.
Nelson Printing, 1879).
Stanley C. Arthur, The Story of the West Florida Rebellion 
(St. Francisville: Democrat Printing, 1935).
Stephen Ash, Middle Tennessee Society Transformed 1860-1870: 
War and Peace in the Upper South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1988).
Emmett Asseff, The History of the Government of Louisiana 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana Legislative Council, 1964).
Edward Bacon, Among the Cotton Thieves (Detroit: The Free
Press, 1867).
John V. Baiamonte, Immigrants in Rural America: A Study of
the Italians of Tangipahoa Parish Louisiana (New York: 
Garland, 1980).
Alvin Bertrand, Many Louisiana's: A Study of Rural Social
Areas and Cultural Islands (Louisiana State University, 
Department of Rural Sociology, Louisiana Agricultural 
Experiment Station, No. 496, 1955)
H.M. Brackenridge, Views of Louisiana; Together With a 
Journal of a Voyage Up the Missouri River in 1811 (Pittsburg: 
Cramer, Spear, and Eichbaum, 1814).
Orville Burton and Robert McMath, Class. Conflict, and 
Consensus: Antebellum Southern Community Studies (London:
Greenwood Press, 1982).
Bertram Wyatt-Brown, Honor and Violence in the Old South (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
Howell Carter, A Cavalryman's Reminiscenes of the Civil War 
(New Orleans: American Printing Co., 1900)
499
Henry E. Chambers, A History of Louisiana (New York: 
American Historical Society, 1925).
William Darby, Geographical Description of the State of 
Louisiana (Philadelphia: John Melish, 1816).
Edwin Davis (ed.), Diary of Bennett H. Barrow: Plantation
Life in the Florida Parishes of Louisiana 1836-1846 As 
Reflected in the Diary of Bennett Barrow (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1943).
Joseph Dawson, Armv Generals and Reconstruction. Louisiana 
1862-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1982) .
Sara Morgan Dawson, A Confederate Girl1s Diary (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1913) .
J.D.B. DeBow, The Industrial Resources. Etc.. of the Southern 
and Western States (New Orleans: DeBow's Review. 1853).
Daniel Dennett, Louisiana As It Is (New Orleans: Eureka
Press, 1879).
Mary Duval, History of Mississippi and Civil Government 
(Louisville: Courier-Journal Printing, 1892)
Wayne Durrill, War of Another Kind: A Southern Community in
the Great Rebellion (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990).
Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in
Missouri Purina the American Civil War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989).
Lacy Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South
Carolina Upcountrv 1800-1860 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1988) .
Celine Fremaux Garcia, Celine: Remembering Louisiana 1850-
1871 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987).
Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United 
States to 1860. Vol. I, (New York: Peter Smith, 1941).
Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers
and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountrv 1850-1890 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).
William Ivy Hair, Bourbonism and Agrarian Protest: Louisiana
Politics 1877-1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1969).
500
Sam Hilliard, Hog Meat and Hoe Cake: Food Supply in the Old
South. 1840-1860 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Press, 1972).
F.F. Hansell (ed.), Commercial and Statistical Almanac: 
Containing a History of the Epidemic of 1878 (New Orleans: 
James A. Gresham, 1879).
J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society: 
White Liberty and Black Slavery in Augusta's Hinterlands 
(Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1985).
Perry Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana 1812-1852 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 1957).
Robert Ingalls, Urban Vigilantes in the New South: Tampa
1882-1936 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1988).
John Inscoe, Mountain Masters. Slavery, and the Sectional 
Conflict in Western North Carolina (Knoxville: University of
Tennessee Press, 1989).
E.T. Jeffery, Remarks of E.T. Jeffery. General Manager 
Illinois Central Railroad. Before the New Orleans City 
Council (New Orleans: L. Graham and Sons, 1888).
Louisiana Folklife Program. Folklife in the Florida 
Parishes, Center for Regional Studies, Southeastern Louisiana 
University (Baton Rouge: Bourque Printing, 1989).
John Hebron Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the 
Old Southwest (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1988).
Grady McWhiney, Cracker Culture: Celtic Wavs in the Old
South (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988).
John H. Napier, Lower Pearl River1s Pinev Woods: Its Land 
and People (Oxford: University of Mississippi Center for the
Study of Southern Culture, 1985).
Milton Newton, Atlas of Louisiana: A Guide For Students
(Louisiana state University, School of Geoscience Misc. 
Publication 72-1, 1972).
James Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of American
Slaveholders (New York: Knopf, 1982).
Frederick Law Olmsted, A Journey in the Backcountry (New 
York: Mason Brothers, 1863).
501
Frederick Law Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom: A Traveller's
Observations on Cotton and Slavery in the American States 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953).
Frank Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1949).
Noel Polk (ed.), Mississippi's Pinev Woods:____ A Human
Perspective (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi,
1986).
George Rable, But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence
in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1984).
Merl Reed, New Orleans and the Railroads: The Struggle for
Commercial Empire 1830-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1966).
Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of William C.C. 
Claiborne (Madison: Democrat Printing Co., 1917).
Eron Rowland (ed.), Life.Letters, and Papers of William 
Dunbar (Jackson: Press of the Mississippi Historical Society, 
1930).
William Howard Russell, Mv Diary North and South (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1954).
Arthur M. Shaw, Centenary College Goes to War in 1861 
(Shreveport: Centenary College Press, 1940).
Roger Shugg, Origins of the Class Struggle in Louisiana: A
Social History of White Farmers and Laborers During Slavery 
and After. 1840-1875 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1939)
F.J. Taylor (ed.), The Reluctant Rebel: The Secret Diary of 
Robert Patrick 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1959).
J. Mills Thornton, Politics and Power in a Slave Society: 
Alabama 1800-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University,
1978).
Ted Tunnel1, Crucible of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1984).
Altina Waller, Feud: Hatfields. McCoys, and Social Change in
Appalachia 1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1988).
502
Where to Locate New Factories in the States of Kentucky. 
Tennessee. Mississippi and Louisiana. On the Line of the 
Southern Division of the Illinois Central Railroad (Cedar 
Rapids: Republican Printing Co., 1892).
Howard White, The Freedmen's Bureau of Louisiana (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970).
Russell Weigley, The Partisan War: The South Carolina
Campaign of 1780-1782 (Columbia: University of South
Carolina Press, 1970).
Jonathan Wiener, Social Origins of the New South. Alabama. 
1860-1885 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1978).
Harold Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and
Marketing the Cotton Crop of the South 1800-1925 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1968).
Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South: 
Households. Markets, and Wealth in the Nineteenth Century 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1978).
Articles
Robert J. Baxter, "Cattle Raising in Early Mississippi," 
Mississippi Folklore Register. X, Spring, 1976.
Powell Casey, "Military Roads in the Florida Parishes of 
Louisiana," Louisiana History. XV, Summer, 1974.
J.F.H. Claiborne, "A Trip Through the Piney Woods,"
Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society. IX, 1906.
Gilbert Din, "Early Spanish Colonization Efforts in 
Louisiana," Louisiana Studies. XI, Spring, 1972.
Richard Doss, "Andrew Jackson Road Builder," Journal
Mississippi History. XVI, 1954.
Margaret L. Duval, "Legends of Wilkinson County and the
Surrounding Area," Louisiana Folklore Miscellany. Ill, 1975.
Lawrence Estaville, Jr. , "A Strategic Railroad: The New
Orleans-Jackson and Great Northern in the Civil War" 
Louisiana History. XIV, Spring 1973.
503
John Eisterhold, "Lumber and Trade in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley and New Orleans 1800-1860," Louisiana History. XIII, 
Winter, 1972.
Harry Evans, "James Robb, Banker and Pioneer Railroad 
Builder," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXIII, January, 
1940.
Jack D.L. Holmes, "Indigo in Colonial Louisiana and the 
Floridas," Louisiana History. VIII, Fall, 1967.
Derek Hackett, "Vote Early! Beware of Fraud! A Note on Voter 
Turnout in Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections in 
Louisiana, 1828-1844," Louisiana Studies. XIV, Summer, 1975.
William F. Holmes, "Whitecapping: Agrarian Violence in
Mississippi 1902-1906," Journal of Southern History. XXXV, 
1969.
Forrest McDonald and Grady McWhiney, "The Antebellum Southern 
Herdsman: A Reinterpretation," Journal of Southern History.
XLI, 1975.
James A. Padgett (ed.), "The Constitution of the West Florida 
Republic," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XX, October, 1937.
James Peacock, "Statistical and Historical Collections of 
Louisiana," DeBow1s Review. XI, 1851.
Amy Quick, "The History of Bogalusa, The Magic City of 
Louisiana," Louisiana historical Quarterly. XXIX, January, 
1946.
Milton Rickels, "Thomas Bangs Thorpe in the Felicianas, 183 6- 
1842," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXXIX, April, 1956.
Ginger Romero, "Hungarian Folklife: The Sweet Taste of
Yesterday." In Florida Parishes of Southeast Louisiana 
Series. (Hammond: Center For Regional Studies, 1987) .
Sidney J. Romero, "The Political Career of Murphy J. Foster" 
Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XXVIII, October 1945.
Roger Shugg, "Suffrage and Representation in Antebellum 
Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. XIX, 1938.
Raleigh Suarez, "Bargains, Bills, and Bankruptcies: Business
Activity in Rural Antebellum Louisiana," Louisiana History. 
VII, Summer, 1966.
Arthur Turner, "Turkey Drives: South Mississippi, Greene
County," Mississippi Folklore Register. Ill, Summer, 1969.
504
Christopher Waldrep, "Planters and the Planters Protective 
Association in Kentucky and Tennessee," Journal of Southern 
History. LII, November, 1986.
Theses and Dissertations
Joseph G. Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Study
in Eao Politics. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania, 1954.
Interviews
Orin Davidson (June, 1990)
Luther Dyson (September, 1990) 
Herbert Hart (February, 1991)
Samuel C. Hyde (July, 1990)
Norma Lambert (August, 1990)
Junie Ricks (July and August, 1990) 
Eugene B. Watson (March, 1981)
Appendix
1.) Explanation of tables one and two:
A. Topic -"Value Land with Improvements"-data taken directly 
from census
B. All Livestock -Total numbers obtained by counting 
livestock held by each farmer (census figures were off)
- using the average price for each animal given in the 
1880 agricultural census, I adjusted the average price by 
using the Warren-Pearson Price index for 1850 (George F. 
Warren and Frank A. Pearson Prices N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 
1933)
- I then multiplied the total number of a given animal by 
the adjusted price to get the total value of the animals for 
1850
C. Value of Slaves -Using several sources- U.B. Phillips, 
Fogel-Engerman, Frederick Bancroft, and Robert Evans plus 
primary evidence from my research, I obtained an average 
price in 1850 of $1000 per slave and multiplied this by the 
total # of slaves in each parish taken from the census
D. Manufacturing Capital - Taken from 1850 census compendium
505
Vita
Samuel C. Hyde, Jr. was born in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
January 25, 1958. He spent his youth in Amite City,
Louisiana. In 1980 he received a B.A. from Tulane
University. After completing two summer sessions in Europe 
and one year of coursework at the University of Munich, 
Germany, he completed his M.A. at the University of New 
Orleans in 1987. In 1989 he was awarded a Fulbright
Fellowship for overseas study which he fulfilled at the 
University of Bonn, Germany. He is currently a candidate for 
a Ph.D. in history at Louisiana State University and an 
instructor of history at Southeastern Louisiana University.
506
D O C T O R A L  E X A M I N A T I O N  A N D  D I S S E R T A T I O N  R E P O R T
Candidate: Samuel C. Hyde, Jr.
Major Field: History
Title of Dissertation: "Pistols and Politics: Planter and Plain
Folk Relations in the Piney Woods South,
The Florida Parishes of Louisiana 1810-1899"
Approved:
Dean of the Graduate School
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Oudi'S) I "> n )  /'
c S'
l \ r , o X ^
\
Date of Examination:
November l-Q ,— 1992
